THE SINCERE VOTE

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A Psychological Study of Voting

Proefschrift

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PREFACE

Elections have long fascinated me. This interest was one of the driving forces behind my decision in the early 1990s to study political science in Leiden. In those years, I soon came to realise that if one wants to understand the choices of voters, some knowledge of psychology might be helpful. So I followed a couple of introductory courses in that field. When I had to choose a subject for my master's thesis, I ultimately decided to focus on what interested me most and apply some ideas from psychology to the electoral context. When I had finished the thesis, my conclusion was that the strategy adopted had been fruitful. Moreover, in as far as I did not exactly know why people voted in a particular way, at least I had some ideas about how to find out. I wrote down my ideas in a research proposal, on the basis of which I was awarded the position of Ph.D. candidate in the department of Political Science at the University of Leiden. It took a little longer than I anticipated, but the final result now lies in front of you.

Of the many things that could additionally be said, there is one peculiarity that seems nice to highlight. During my *doctoraal* (three-year program leading to a master's degree) in political science at the University of Leiden, there were two courses for which I received the lowest passing grade. The first course was on research methods, and the second was on political psychology. Strikingly, both topics feature quite prominently in this thesis. Perhaps this makes you wonder whether my dissertation would have been much better, had it been on another subject. Or perhaps you wonder how much better a dissertation would have been written about this subject, had someone else been given the opportunity to do so. These are interesting questions, although we might never know the answer.

This leads me to the people whose contribution I wish to acknowledge. First, I want to express my gratitude to the department of Political Science at the University of Twente, which generously provided me with the opportunity to finish the disser-

tation in a stimulating and friendly environment. Second, I am grateful to the colleagues who commented on draft versions of chapters or related papers, which I presented at several conferences. Third, I would like to thank the person who was willing to use his artistic talents, which are not easily underestimated, for designing the cover of this thesis: Martin van Leeuwen. Finally, I would not have been able to write this thesis if my private life would not have been such a happy one. Family and friends contributed to this, but the single person largely responsible is the one who accompanied me in life for all those years.

Enschede, October 2004
Martin Rosema

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Introduction and Background

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INTRODUCTION

Why do people vote as they do? That is the central question of this research. Why do voters support one candidate or party rather than another? This has been one of the classic questions of political science, which should be no surprise given the fact that elections are the cornerstone of the democratic system. The essence of democracy is that political power is acquired through a competitive struggle for the people's vote.[1] Consequently, without insight in why people vote as they do in elections, we know little about the functioning of democracies. The validity of the interpretation of an election outcome as a mandate, for example, depends on why people vote as they do. If they vote for a party because they approve of its performance in the past, the outcome cannot be interpreted in the same way as when they do so because they like its promises for the future.[2] To understand what meaning can be attributed to election outcomes, and judge how democracies function, we need to understand what makes voters decide in a particular way.

The question why people vote as they do is not new. Many answers have already been given and substantial insights have been gained (see Dalton and Wattenberg 1993; Harrop and Miller 1987). Nevertheless, our understanding of voting behaviour is still limited. In a sense, today it appears even more limited than some decades ago. For example, in the Netherlands in the 1950s the choice of a large majority of voters could be explained on the basis of their religiosity and social class (Lipset and Rokkan 1967; Lijphart 1974; Andeweg 1982). Today, however, on the basis of the same information vote choices can be predicted much more poorly. Moreover, no other social characteristics seem to have taken the place of religiosity and social class (Andeweg 1982, 1995; Irwin and Van Holsteyn 1989a; Van Holsteyn and Irwin 2003; Van der Kolk 2000). Alternative explanations of vote choice have since been provided, for example on the basis of ideology and policy preferences (Van der Eijk and Niemöller 1983; Irwin and Van Holsteyn 1989b; Middendorp 1991; Van

Wijnen 2001). However, this has not yet resulted in satisfactory explanations. Moreover, since the mid-1980s the explanatory power of models based on ideology and policy preferences seems also to have decreased (Thomassen et al. 2000; Van Wijnen 2001; Van Holsteyn and Irwin 2003).

The decrease in understanding described above is the result of changes in society, not developments in scientific theory. One may argue that to know that today religiosity and social class structure vote choice to a limited extent and to know that in the 1950s they did to a large extent, both concern the same amount of understanding. What the example illustrates, is that a so-called sociological approach to voting behaviour is of limited value today. We must turn to other approaches. One possibility is to focus more strongly on what goes on in voters' minds.

This shift is also important for another reason. The question how well a model explains voting behaviour is often answered on the basis of the number of voters whose choice can be predicted correctly on the basis of information other than their voting – in statistical terms: the amount of variance explained of the dependent variable (vote choice) on the basis of the independent variables (for example, religiosity and social class). At least equally important, however, is to understand *how* independent variables are related to vote choice (Asch 1952, ch. 18). For example, if Catholic voters were all to vote for a Catholic party, the question remains why they do so. Do they vote out of habit, or do they deliberately make up their mind? Do they vote because people in their surrounding influence them, or because they agree with the policy proposals of the party? Or do they vote because they reckon that they share the same ideology? To really understand why people vote as they do, such questions must be answered.

The questions just posed point to one specific way in which our understanding of voting is limited, namely in terms of the underlying psychological processes. Although much electoral research has been done, the psychology of voting has remained poorly understood. Some scholars have explicitly stated that their studies adopted a psychological perspective, most notably those of the so-called Michigan school (Campbell et al. 1954, 1960). In the following chapter it will be argued, however, that it may be doubted whether these studies are as psychological as generally thought, and whether they give insight in the psychological processes that underlie voting.

THE RESEARCH QUESTION

Voting is often regarded as comprising two decisions: whether to vote or abstain, and which party or candidate to vote for. The two decisions correspond with different questions that voters ask themselves: "Shall I vote or not?" and "For whom shall I vote?". These questions may be related. If voters know whom they prefer, this may

be an incentive to cast a vote. If voters have no idea for whom to vote, this may be a reason to abstain. This implies that the two decisions are not always made independently of one another. Nevertheless, in voting research both decisions are often regarded as independent, or at least treated as if they are (see, for example, Dalton and Wattenberg 1993; Miller and Shanks 1996). This research adopts the common approach and focuses on 'for whom' people vote. Hence, in this study the question is why people vote as they do, *given the fact that they vote*.

If voting behaviour is defined in terms of 'for whom' people vote, the question arises who this 'whom' is. In this research voting is defined in terms of parties. While in principle the theory to be outlined can also be applied to other objects – for example, candidates – this study speaks about vote choice in terms of parties for whom people vote. The main reason to do so is that in most established democracies parties play a key role. Elections may therefore be conceived of as competitions between parties. Moreover, even if, in a formal and/or psychological sense, people vote for candidates, their votes may still be analysed in terms of the parties that in a sense receive them. This means that the research question may in practice be phrased as why people vote for (a candidate of) a particular party.

A PSYCHOLOGICAL APPROACH

The fact that the study of voting has its own name – psephology[3] – illustrates that one might regard the study of voting as a discipline on its own. The theories that have been used to explain voting are usually not meant to be applied outside the voting domain. This does not mean, however, that psephology operates in isolation of other fields. Rather, the major theories of voting have a basis in three other disciplines: sociology, psychology, and economics (Harrop and Miller 1987). Likewise, this study is strongly based in psychology.

The psychological explanation for voting fits the fourth and latest phase of the development of the study of mind and behaviour (see LeDoux 1998, ch. 2). Until the beginning of the twentieth century the study of mind and behaviour was based primarily on introspection. During the first half of the twentieth century the dominant approach became that of behaviourism, which proclaimed that concepts that concern the mind, and which were gained access to by introspection (e.g. concepts like perception, memory, and emotion), are not appropriate topics for scientific study. In the behaviourist approach the psychological processes that mediate between 'external events' and 'behaviour' were regarded as a 'black box'. With the development of computers a new metaphor for the human mind arose, namely that of an information-processing system. This laid the base for a third approach, which opened up the black box: cognitive science. An essential element, however, was still missing. Arguably, the most important difference between computers and humans is that, unlike

humans, computers are not directed by emotions. The incorporation of emotions in information-processing marks the approach of the fourth phase. Unlike the behaviourist approach, the study of mental phenomena is regarded as necessary; and unlike the purely cognitive approach, emotions are regarded as phenomena to be included.

The core idea in the psychological approach adopted is that to understand why people vote as they do, we must understand what goes on in their mind. When individuals act, like when they vote, specific thoughts or feelings have preceded and these are regarded as the key to understanding the behaviour. This is not to say that the underlying psychological processes are all there is to know. However, even for the understanding of the impact of non-psychological phenomena, such as social settings and political events, insight in the psychological processes is important. Such phenomena have an impact on voting behaviour only if (and thus because) they influence how voters think and feel about political objects. This means that their impact is mediated by psychological variables. Hence, the study of social settings and political events may not only benefit from, but arguably requires, insight in the psychological processes that underlie voting.[4]

Psychological variables may be regarded as consequences of non-psychological variables and as causes of behaviour.[5] However, psychological variables may also be consequences of behaviour. Various scholars have emphasised that what individuals do influences what they feel or think, rather than the other way round (Festinger 1957; Bem 1972). In this study those processes will not be focused on. The question here is what psychological processes underlie voting behaviour, not what psychological processes result from it. However, when focusing on particular psychological variables in order to explain voting, it is important to ask the question whether these variables should not be regarded consequences, rather than causes, of the behaviour studied. Furthermore, it is important to note that causal relationships may also exist between psychological variables themselves.[6] This implies that psychological variables may be related to behaviour indirectly, since their influence may be mediated by other psychological variables. So to understand the psychological processes that underlie voting, the way psychological variables are related to one another must also be examined.

The question *which* psychological variables are to be focused on remains to be answered. This will be done in the remainder of this study by applying some general ideas from social psychology, and to some extent neuroscience, to the electoral context. Theories not directed at voting behaviour may provide useful insights for its study. In some instances the electoral context may require modifications of those theories. Another difference with general psychological research is that in this study the concepts will mostly be phrased in a way that only applies to voting. For example, a key concept in this study is that of party evaluations. These may be seen as an example of the social psychological concept of attitudes.

THE DUTCH CASE

The psychological processes that underlie voting are presumably not fundamentally different across voters, elections, countries, or time. All voters use similar brains and therefore similar psychological processes will operate. Consequently, in a sense it is not relevant in which context the theory to be developed is put to the test. Nevertheless, from the perspective of electoral research, the Netherlands is particularly interesting.

As will be shown in more detail in the next chapter, the Netherlands has been considered a country to which a sociological approach applies very well (Lipset and Rokkan 1967: 15). In terms of so-called psychological models of voting the Dutch case was found to be special too, because the models could *not* be applied well. With respect to party identification, one of the central concepts in psychological models of voting, the Netherlands has been found to be the oddest case of all (Miller and Shanks 1996: 117; see Chapter 2). Among Dutch voters party identification and electoral choice could not be distinguished meaningfully (Thomassen 1976b), and the major psychological model was therefore considered not useful. Although solutions to the Dutch 'party identification problem' have been proposed, as yet it has not been solved. To substantiate the principal claim of this study that vote choice can be distinguished meaningfully from partisanship if it is conceptualised in terms of party evaluations, a useful strategy may be to test the ideas in a context that seems least likely to be suitable. Because the Dutch case has been known for its unsuitability to explain voting behaviour on the basis of the existing psychological models and the impossibility to distinguish between partisanship and vote choice, there is arguably no better case for an empirical test than the Dutch one.

Dutch parliamentary elections may also be considered interesting in their own right. Although Dutch politics has perhaps not been renowned for a high level of excitement, recent elections brought some eye-catching changes. In 1994 the Christian Democrats (CDA) suffered a record loss of 20 seats (out of 54). This resulted in the first government without any Christian party since the introduction of universal suffrage at the beginning of the twentieth century.[7] In 2002 the Labour Party (PvdA) beat the record, losing 22 of their 45 seats. The most amazing electoral event was arguably the fact that in the same year a new list of candidates headed by Pim Fortuyn, who was assassinated nine days before the election, entered parliament with 26 seats. This made them the second-largest party. To understand these events, it is necessary to gain insight in what went on in the minds of voters.

A final reason why the Dutch case is an appropriate one for this study, is that data for analysis are available. The Netherlands has a research project called the Dutch Parliamentary Election Studies (DPES), which contains data from surveys held around each parliamentary election since 1971 (about the DPES, see Van der Eijk and Niemöller 1994). On the basis of these data, the major models of voting have

already been tested. Although the DPES data are not perfect for testing all ideas put forward in this research, the surveys in 1986, 1994, 1998, and 2002 included questions on the basis of which key ideas can be tested.

DESIGN OF THE BOOK

The aim of this research is to contribute to the understanding of voting at the theoretical level by focusing on the psychological processes that underlie voting. A theory of voting will be developed and the corresponding models will be tested empirically in the context of Dutch parliamentary elections.

This book is organised in four parts: background, theory, empirical analyses, and conclusions. The psephological and psychological background of this research will be discussed in the following two chapters. Chapter 2 points out how existing theories of voting might be viewed from a psychological perspective, what their implications are, and 'where they go wrong'. Chapter 3 discusses attitude-behaviour research, an important sub-field of social psychology, including applications to voting behaviour.

The aim of Part II is to synthesise insights from voting research and psychological research in order to develop a psychological theory of voting. Chapter 4 deals with the relationship between party evaluations and voting behaviour, which are specified in the sincere vote model. Chapter 5 discusses the choice mechanisms that underlie voting in terms of six ways in which voters may decide how to vote. Chapter 6 concerns the explanation of party evaluations.

In Part III the theory is put to the test in the context of four Dutch parliamentary elections. Chapter 7 presents an empirical test of the sincere vote model. Chapter 8 examines why some voters cast a so-called non-sincere vote by focusing on alternative choice mechanisms. Chapter 9 contains analyses of why voters evaluated parties as they did.

The concluding Chapter 10 in Part IV integrates the theoretical models, summarises the findings of the empirical analyses, and discusses their implications.

CHAPTER 2

PSYCHOLOGY IN VOTING THEORY

Three approaches to voting are distinguished: a sociological, psychological, and economic approach (Harrop and Miller 1987, ch. 6). These are represented by the Columbia school, the Michigan school, and the Downsian school, respectively. This chapter elaborates upon the corresponding studies. This discussion is not an extensive review of all theories of voting, but a highlighting of the major approaches (for more thorough reviews, see Dalton and Wattenberg 1993; Harrop and Miller 1987). Discussing the so-called Michigan studies is especially relevant, since these are regarded as the most important example of a psychological approach. Special attention will also be given to theories of issue voting and to applications to the Netherlands.

The discussion in this chapter focuses on the psychology in the theories. Both the explicit and the implicit assumptions and hypotheses about the psychology of voting are elaborated upon. This should further clarify what the psychological perspective that is adopted in this research means. What is important in this respect, is that some theories that are often regarded as psychological will be shown to be in a sense non-psychological, while some other theories that are regarded as non-psychological will be shown to be in a sense psychological.

ON ELECTORAL RESEARCH

DEVELOPMENT OF MODERN ELECTORAL RESEARCH

Today, electoral research is based primarily on large-scale projects held when major elections take place. In the United States large-scale surveys are held around the presidential elections: the American National Election Studies. In many other countries there are similar projects, such as the British Election Studies and the Dutch

Parliamentary Election Studies. These studies have one feature in common: they are based on interviews with a large sample of voters.

Individual data have not always been the standard for election studies. Before surveys were the basis of analysis, electoral behaviour was examined mainly on the basis of census data or comparable sources of information. Not the individual, but geographical entities were the unit of analysis. This changed with the work by the commercial polling agencies, which in the 1930s collected individual data about electoral behaviour on a large scale for the first time (Campbell et al. 1960: 14). Their work laid the foundation for major voting studies in the United States. The first election to be studied extensively in this way was the 1940 U.S. presidential election. Paul Lazarsfeld, Bernard Berelson and Hazel Gaudet from Columbia University published the results in 1944 in *The People's Choice*. This study marks the beginning of modern electoral research. At the theoretical level the unit of analysis shifted to the individual, replacing geographical entities such as regions or neighbourhoods. At the methodological level it marks the beginning of the use of interviewing and the survey method.

The aim of *The People's Choice* was to examine the psychological process of opinion formation, but the authors ultimately concluded that vote choice could be explained well on the basis of social characteristics. This 'sociological research' left many questions unanswered – in particular, how the voter's mind was affected – and from a psychological perspective it did not answer the question why people vote as they do satisfactorily. This partly changed in 1954, when Bernard Berelson, Paul Lazarsfeld and William McPhee published a second Columbia study, *Voting*. In this study it was explained *why* social characteristics influenced vote choices. Two 'processes' or 'mechanisms' that linked social characteristics to vote choices were considered specifically important: social influence on voters by people who surround them, and political interests shared by voters with similar social characteristics.

In the same year, Angus Campbell, Gerald Gurin and Warren Miller from the Survey Research Center of the University of Michigan published their first major election study, *The Voter Decides*. The Michigan scholars argued that their research shifted the attention from sociological to psychological variables. They focused on voters' stands on the issues, their feelings about the major parties, and their perceptions of the candidates. This approach was elaborated upon by Angus Campbell, Philip Converse, Warren Miller and Donald Stokes in *The American Voter*, published in 1960. The Michigan studies have since been considered the major representatives of a 'psychological approach' to voting behaviour (Harrop and Miller 1987, ch. 6).

An economic approach is usually distinguished as a third approach. *An Economic Theory of Democracy*, published in 1957 by Anthony Downs, is regarded its major representative. Downs discussed how voters would behave if they applied the principles of rationality, which he derived from economic theory, to voting. Various scholars have tested Downs' ideas empirically. Like the so-called sociological and

psychological studies, these studies were based on survey data and had the individual as unit of analysis.

Theories of voting are usually phrased in terms of one of two analytical frameworks: the force field framework and the spatial framework. The force field framework is related to the work of the psychologist Kurt Lewin. According to Lewin's (1951) field theory, behaviour results from a number of simultaneous psychological forces that act upon a person. The net effect of these forces determines how individuals behave. With respect to voting this implies that voters experience various forces that direct them either towards voting for a particular party, or away from such voting. Together such forces determine for whom they vote.

In *The People's Choice* the Columbia scholars adopted the force field framework. Their discussion of what they called 'cross-pressures' clearly shows this.

> By "cross-pressures" we mean the conflicts and inconsistencies among the factors which influence vote decision. Some of these factors in the environment of the voter may influence him toward the Republicans while others may operate in favor of the Democrats. In other words, cross-pressures upon the voter drive him in opposite directions. (...) There were a number of factors differentiating Republican and Democratic voters. Each of these factors could be considered a "pressure" upon final vote decision. We found the Protestant vote allied to the Republicans and the Catholic vote more strongly Democratic. We found that individuals on the higher SES levels tended to vote Republican and their poorer neighbors to vote Democratic. In other words, a vote decision can be considered the net effect of a variety of pressures. (Lazarsfeld et al. 1944: 53, 56)

The notions of forces and pressures are fairly similar. The words quoted also indicate what the pressures stemmed from: social characteristics such as religious affiliation and socio-economic status. Forces related to these characteristics 'predisposed' voters in a Democratic or Republican direction.

Although cross-pressures were predominantly viewed as resulting from social characteristics, the Columbia scholars used the term also to discuss 'attitudinal forces'. Some voters

> (...) were subject to strong attitudinal cross-pressures (resulting from their "weak" predispositions); they liked Roosevelt for this and Willkie for that, or they approved one part of a candidate's program but disapproved another part. (Lazarsfeld et al. 1944: 99)

So the notion of forces was in some instances related to voters' psychological, rather than social, characteristics.

In *The Voter Decides* the Michigan scholars spoke about 'motivational forces' and 'psychological forces', indicating the use of the force field framework. Party identification, issue orientation, and candidate orientation were regarded as three simultaneous forces acting upon individuals and influencing their vote choice. In *The American Voter* the Michigan scholars explicitly linked their theory to Lewin's field theory (Campbell et al. 1960: 33). Forces were conceptualised in terms of six so-called 'partisan attitudes', each of which could be regarded as a force towards either a Republican or a Democratic vote.

Both the Columbia and Michigan scholars did not assume that voters experienced the 'forces' they distinguished as such. The forces were not psychological entities, but analytical constructs. In *Voting* the Columbia scholars stated that situations with cross-pressures

> (...) may have *no* subjective reality for the voter himself at the moment; it is merely that we as observers can foresee his future vulnerability by virtue of his location within cross-currents of social influence. (Berelson et al. 1954/1966: 284)

In *The Voter Decides* the Michigan authors stated that their three-fold division of orientations was also made for analytical purposes.

> In defining the concept of candidate orientation, as in our definitions of party identification and issue orientation, we are attempting to differentiate analytical constructs, and are not attempting to isolate psychologically pure "types." (Campbell et al. 1954/1971: 136-137)

This view can be extended to *The American Voter*. The 'partisan attitudes' were not psychological entities either, but analytical constructs to examine the influence of voters' perceptions and feelings with respect to candidates, parties, and issues.

THE SPATIAL FRAMEWORK

Another framework that has been used in voting research is that of 'spatial analysis'. The central idea here is that parties and voters can both be positioned in some kind of (political) space in which mutual distances represent differences and similarities: the larger the distance between two objects, the larger their difference; the smaller the distance, the larger their similarity. The dimensions of the space usually represent certain dimensions of political conflict. If politics is viewed as being structured by only one dimension of conflict, we speak about a one-dimensional space. In a similar way two dimensions of conflict correspond with a two-dimensional space, three with a three-dimensional space, and so on. Voting models using this framework are usually based on the assumption that voters choose the party closest to them in the political space. This idea is known as 'the smallest distance hypothesis'.

In *An Economic Theory of Democracy* (1957) Downs made use of the spatial framework and defined it in terms of ideology. A simple conceptualisation would be to view the political space as one-dimensional based on ideology in terms of a left-right continuum. Parties and voters are then assumed to take a position on this dimension, and voters are assumed to vote for the party that is closest to them. In addition to ideology, other phenomena may be used to define the political space; for example, a number of salient issues. The number of issues involved would then correspond to the number of dimensions of the space. Issues and ideology can both be regarded as dimensions of political conflict.[1] The spatial framework may also be used to model the impact of other phenomena, such as voters' images of candidates' personal capabilities (Enelow and Hinich 1984, ch. 5; Endersby 1994).

Studies of voting that make use of the spatial framework are mostly silent about the psychological processes that operate. Their aim is not to reveal what goes on in voters' minds, but to explain voters' choices at the polls on the basis of their ideological positions or policy preferences. Through which psychological processes the latter are transformed into a vote choice, is not considered relevant.

The spatial framework can be used to explain voting behaviour, but it is not a theory of voting. The question how the political space is to be defined is not answered by merely adopting the spatial framework. Similarly, the question what forces constitute a field is not answered by adopting the force field framework. Only after the dimensions of the space, or the forces of the field, are defined, is an answer given to the question why people vote as they do. The most relevant question when discussing theories of voting is therefore not which of the two analytical frameworks is used, but what the forces or distances correspond with or stem from. If one defines forces in relation to social characteristics, then social characteristics are the explanation provided for voting. If forces are defined in terms of attitudes, then attitudes are the explanation. If one focuses on a one-dimensional ideological space, then ideology is the explanation provided for voting. If dimensions are defined in terms of policy preferences, then these constitute the explanation. What is also relevant, is which social characteristics are put forward, which attitudes, which ideological dimension, and which policies. The remainder of this chapter will focus on these aspects and additionally will elaborate further upon what is psychological, and what is not, about the various studies.

A SOCIOLOGICAL PERSPECTIVE: THE COLUMBIA STUDIES

SOCIAL CHARACTERISTICS AND POLITICAL PREDISPOSITION

The People's Choice (1944) was based on repeated interviewing of the same people during the campaign period. Seven interviews were held with a sample of voters

from Erie County, Ohio, in the period from May until November 1940, when Franklin D. Roosevelt eventually beat his Republican challenger Willkie to secure his third term as U.S. President. The aim of the study by Lazarsfeld and his colleagues was to discover the "processes underlying opinion formation and political behavior" (Lazarsfeld et al. 1944: 10), which is reflected in the subtitle of the study: *How the Voter Makes Up His Mind in a Presidential Campaign*. The study concentrated on voters' exposure to the campaign in the media, and on changes in voting intentions and the reasons underlying these. It made extensive use of open-ended questions about why voters changed their vote choice and why they favoured a particular candidate.

The best known findings of the study, however, stem from a chapter that examined the impact of various social characteristics, among which socio-economic status, religious affiliation, and residence. The general pattern was that voters with a high socio-economic status favoured the Republicans, those low in socio-economic status the Democrats; Protestants favoured the Republicans, Catholics the Democrats; rural voters favoured the Republicans, urban voters the Democrats. On the basis of these social characteristics a so-called index of political predisposition was constructed. Voters with a high SES level, who were Protestant, and who lived in the rural area had the strongest Republican predisposition, whereas urban Catholics with a low SES level had the strongest Democratic predisposition. A clear empirical relationship between political predisposition and voting was found: when voters' predisposition tended stronger towards the Republican or Democratic side, they voted for the corresponding party in larger numbers. Whether they would vote for the Republican or Democratic candidate could be predicted correctly on the basis of the index for 67 per cent of the voters.[2] The main conclusion of the study consequently was that voters' choices were largely determined by their social characteristics. The authors came to their much-cited conclusion that "a person thinks, politically, as he is, socially. Social characteristics determine political preference" (p. 27).

The People's Choice showed *that*, and *which*, social characteristics were related to vote choice. The second Columbia elaborated upon *why* they were. In Berelson, Lazarsfeld and McPhee's *Voting* (1954) the central idea was that people are influenced by whom they have contact with, which in turn is determined by their social characteristics. Three principles related to this process were identified: (1) there is a social basis for political interest: voters belong to different groups that have different interests, (2) voters 'inherit' vote preferences from their family, and (3) voters have contact predominantly with other people from the same social groups (cf. pp. 74-75, 147). By these three principles the groups people belong to influence for whom they vote.[3] Hence, because they have similar *political interests* a political predisposition based on *social characteristics* translates into vote preferences.[4]

Another part of *Voting* focused on issues, since these supplied "the content of political debate [and were] the 'stuff' in terms of which a democratic campaign is rationalized, in both senses" (p. 182). The authors also discussed effects of candidate

images, but it was concluded that the trends in the 1948 campaign were not due to shifts in candidate evaluations, but to an increase in the saliency of certain issues (ch. 12). The main focus concerning images in the voters' minds was therefore on the issues. They were regarded as manifestations of underlying cleavages that have a history that goes beyond single elections. In the 1948 election, for example, the major issues (specifically those of the Taft-Hartley Law and of price controls) were related to a (class) cleavage, resulting from Roosevelt's New Deal in the 1930s. So previous vote preferences were reactivated through issues related to the dominant cleavage of class.

CLEAVAGES IN WESTERN EUROPE

The idea that cleavages are important for voting may be even more true for Western Europe (for a definition of cleavages, see Bartolini and Mair 1990, ch. 9). The ideas that Seymour Martin Lipset and Stein Rokkan set out in *Party Systems and Voter Alignments* (1967) are particularly relevant in this respect. Lipset and Rokkan argued that to understand alignments among voters we must focus on the alternatives voters can choose from. These alternatives are parties that offer 'packages' which are historically given – parties were viewed as "alliances in conflicts over policies and value commitments" (p. 5). Hence, in order to understand voter alignments we must understand party formation. Lipset and Rokkan identified four lines of cleavage that corresponded with conflicts between centre and periphery, between rural and urban interests, between church and state, and between employers and workers. These cleavages had been the basis for party formation. Moreover, the party systems established on the basis of these cleavages had shown to be enduring. Lipset and Rokkan argued that "the party systems of the 1960's reflect, with few but significant exception, the cleavage structures of the 1920's" (p. 50). This phenomenon is known as 'the freezing of party systems' (cf. p. 3).

Lipset and Rokkan referred to the Netherlands as the most typical example of 'institutionalised segmentation', for which the Dutch use the term 'verzuiling' ('pillarisation') (cf. p. 15). The impact of social characteristics on vote choice was very strong. Among voters who were Catholic or Calvinist (one of the two main Protestant denominations) and who were classified as church attendees, at least 90 per cent voted for the party of their 'zuil' ('pillar' or 'segment').[5] Of those who attended church less often the figures varied between 50 and 65 per cent. Voters with another Protestant denomination, those who classified themselves as Reformed, fit the structure less well. Non-religious voters mostly supported Labour, Liberals, or Communists. As a result of this structure, in the Netherlands in 1956 vote choices could be predicted correctly on the basis of religious affiliation in combination with church attendance for 72 per cent of the voters.[6]

What cleavages are important with respect to vote choice varies across countries. Whereas in the Netherlands the primary cleavage resulted from religion, in Britain social class has been of paramount importance (Norris 1997, ch. 6). The corresponding phenomenon is known as 'class voting'. There are also other social characteristics that have been used in explaining voting behaviour, some of which are not related to cleavages. But arguably the most important ones are, and the discussion above presumably clarifies sufficiently what kind of variables a so-called sociological approach makes use of.

SOCIAL CHARACTERISTICS AND THE PSYCHOLOGICAL PERSPECTIVE

A sociological perspective is characterised by its focus on social characteristics or group belonging as determinants of voting behaviour. The sociological perspective does not focus on what goes on in voters' minds. The sociological perspective therefore differs fundamentally from the psychological perspective. In practice, however, this difference frequently vaporises. For example, the Columbia studies also elaborated upon psychological mechanisms that linked social characteristics to vote choice. Moreover, studies of voting that are regarded as sociological make use of concepts that may well be regarded as psychological. For example, religion and social class can be viewed as psychological concepts. They do not refer to an individual's position in the society that is to be assessed 'objectively', but they concern an individual's (subjective) feelings or thoughts. They do not refer to group belonging, but to *a sense of* group belonging. They concern voters' 'social identity' (Norris 1997). Identity is a psychological concept.[7]

According to Solomon Asch (1952: 556), studies like *The People's Choice* "fall short of the needs of psychological investigation in an essential way".[8] What is missing, is insight in the principles that relate conditions (social characteristics) to consequences (voting behaviour), and hence the sociologist establishes no "meaningful nexus between his variables" (p. 533). Only if the processes through which social characteristics are transformed into vote choices are known, will understanding be achieved. By uncovering those processes, the psychological domain is entered.

The discussion of the Columbia studies provided in this chapter shows that they handled the 'nexus' between social characteristics and vote choice. Moreover, it would be untrue to conclude that studies on voting from a sociological perspective brought no understanding (and only confirmed the already known). The sociological perspective has certainly resulted in insight in why people vote as they do. Much of this insight, however, stems from interplay between a sociological and a psychological approach. A strict division between both perspectives can be made in theory, but hardly in practice. Moreover, a sociological and a psychological perspective are not that different. In several ways they are related and complementary to each other.

social characteristics	**psychological processes**	vote choice

FIGURE 2.1 The psychological black-box of sociological models of voting

In *Voting*, the Columbia scholars gave special attention to how social and psychological characteristics relate to each other. They accepted the psychological point of view, according to which what voters think and feel matters.

> What parties do affects what the voters think they are and what the voters think they are affects what they subsequently do. (...) "The parties" have their main impact in the attitudes and the perceptions held by the voters. Political ideas associated with the parties are more important (...) than the formal organizations themselves. Accordingly, the next step is to review what Republicans and Democrats think about politics – the "pictures in their heads." (Berelson et al. 1954/1966: 216, 182)[9]

In their view this next step is especially challenging.

> It is not hard to relate such preconditions as class position or religion or even personal associations to such end products as turnout or party preference. But it is hard to analyze and document the fine sequences of events that intervene between them. *How* is a harder question to answer than *what*. (Berelson et al. 1954/1966: 253)

In *Voting* a contribution was made to answering the 'how-question'. It discussed various processes – some of which fairly psychological – that are affected by social structures.[10] Moreover, the view presented indicates that to understand why certain psychological processes occur, sociological insight may be helpful. Many important issues are related to cleavages; understanding the role of issues requires an understanding of the historical trend of those cleavages. To understand the psychological, the sociological has to be known. Even the much-cited conclusion that "a person *thinks*, politically, as he is, socially" (emphasis added) (Lazarsfeld et al. 1944: 27) indicates that social characteristics have an impact on voting because they influence what goes on in voters' minds. Sociological characteristics thus influence individuals' behaviour through mediating psychological variables. Because in a purely sociological approach the psychological process by which social characteristics influence vote choice is ignored, we could name this 'the psychological black-box of sociological models of voting'. Figure 2.1 represents this idea.

To open the black box, a psychological perspective has to be adopted. From a psychological point of view the question is how social characteristics are transformed into vote choices. In methodological terms: what psychological variables are influenced by social characteristics that thereby indirectly have an impact upon vote choice? This points to a possibility for a synthesis between the sociological and psychological approach. If we have a view on *what* psychological characteristics are important, the relationship between social characteristics and those psychological characteristics can be examined. Once a psychologist has indicated what the most relevant psychological characteristics are, we can analyse how social characteristics influence those characteristics, rather than focus solely on the ultimate vote choice. In this way a sociological-psychological synthesis may result in further insight than any of the two approaches can achieve on its own.[11]

A PSYCHOLOGICAL PERSPECTIVE: THE MICHIGAN STUDIES

PARTY IDENTIFICATION, CANDIDATE ORIENTATION, AND ISSUE ORIENTATION

The Michigan studies can be regarded as a reaction to the Columbia studies. Campbell and his colleagues argued that there are three methods of dealing with the question why people vote as they do: (1) studying external events, such as specific speeches, newspaper articles, or television programs, (2) studying the social settings, as done by the Columbia scholars, and (3) studying psychological variables that intervene between external events and voting behaviour (Campbell et al. 1954/1971: 83-86). The sociological approach could not explain voting well, the Michigan scholars argued, and the focus should be shifted from social to psychological characteristics. Whereas the Columbia scholars had emphasised voters' group belonging, the Michigan scholars emphasised "the pictures in their heads" (Campbell et al. 1960: 39).

In *The Voter Decides* (1954) Campbell, Gurin and Miller focused on the 1952 U.S. presidential election between the Republican candidate General Eisenhower and the Democratic candidate Governor Stevenson. The study was based on two interviews held with the same voters: one shortly before the election and another shortly after. To explain voting behaviour the Michigan scholars focused on voters' 'motivating factors' or 'motivational forces', which were regarded as psychological in nature. Three psychological factors were distinguished and viewed as the most important: those concerning parties, issues, and candidates (pp. 85-86). Conformity to group standards was named as a fourth factor influencing the direction of the vote, but this aspect was not elaborated upon.

Party identification is a core concept in the Michigan studies. The concept had been introduced in an article about foreign policy (Belknap and Campbell 1952), but

was discussed more elaborately by Campbell and his colleagues in *The Voter Decides* and *The American Voter* (1960). They argued that political parties, a specific category of social groups, were one of the central objects in politics. The feelings individuals have with respect to political parties as social groups were conceptualised as party identification.

> The sense of personal attachment which the individual feels toward the group of his choice is referred to (...) as identification and, with respect to parties as groups, as *party identification*. (Campbell et al. 1954/1971: 88-89)

This attachment was measured by asking individuals how they saw themselves in partisan terms.

> Generally speaking, do you usually think of yourself as a Republican, a Democrat, an independent, or what?[12]

Those who said they thought of themselves as a Republican or Democrat, were asked:

> Would you call yourself a strong Republican (Democrat) or a not very strong Republican (Democrat)?

Independents were asked:

> Do you think of yourself as closer to the Republican or Democratic party?

Voters were classified as strong Republicans, weak Republicans, independent Republicans, Independents, independent Democrats, weak Democrats, or strong Democrats. These categories were regarded as making up a single seven-point scale.

Party identification was strongly related to presidential preference of voters and non-voters. As voters' party identification tended more strongly towards the Republican or Democratic side, a larger proportion voted for the candidate of the corresponding party. Moreover, the strength of the relationship was considerably larger than found by the Columbia scholars with respect to social characteristics. The correlation between party identification and vote choice was, however, not perfect. The discrepancy between party identification and vote choice was seen as an indicator that party identification is not the same as vote choice (Campbell et al. 1954/1971: 97).

The second force that was supposed to act upon a voter, issue orientation, was assessed on the basis of voters' agreement or disagreement with the positions on seven issues taken by the government of President Truman. A position in line with the government stand was regarded as pro-Democratic, whereas disagreement was regarded as pro-Republican (cf. p. 113, note 2). On each issue voters' positions were related to their vote choice: compared to other voters, those taking 'Democratic stands' favoured Stevenson more often, and those taking opposite stands preferred Eisenhower more often. With respect to two issues voters were asked whether they

thought there were differences between the Democratic and Republican parties, which was the basis for a measure called 'sensitivity to party differences'. By combining voters' perception of party differences and voters' own positions on four of the issues an 'issue partisanship' score was constructed. A strong relationship was found between issue partisanship and vote choice. Voters with strong Democratic or Republican scores tended towards the corresponding candidate in large proportions; voters with weak scores tended to the corresponding candidate but less strongly; and voters with neutral scores favoured Eisenhower somewhat over Stevenson, almost exactly in the same proportion as the sample as a whole did.

The third force identified as determining voting behaviour, candidate orientation, was meant to include only the candidate appeal resulting from personal attributes. The basis for operationalising candidate orientation was the set of spontaneous references to the candidates as persons made by voters during the interview. By subtracting a Stevenson score (the number of positive remarks on Stevenson minus the number of negative remarks on him) from an Eisenhower score (constructed in a similar way) one measure was constructed for 'candidate partisanship'. These scores were transformed into a five-point scale with one neutral position and moderately and strongly favourable positions for Eisenhower and Stevenson. The more positive the score was for Eisenhower, the larger the proportion of voters who preferred to vote for him.

On the basis of additional analyses it was concluded that although the three psychological factors shared some common element, they were sufficiently independent and qualitatively different to be distinguished (ch. 10). The Michigan scholars also examined the effects of different combinations of the three motivational factors on vote choice and found that as more forces impelled voters towards the same candidate, larger proportions supported that candidate. When forces pulled in different directions, the proportion favouring a specific candidate decreased. Voters who were pulled by none of the forces favoured both candidates in about equal numbers (ch. 11).

FUNNEL OF CAUSALITY AND PARTISAN ATTITUDES

In 1960, Campbell, Converse, Miller and Stokes published *The American Voter*. In this study the Michigan scholars repeated several of their earlier arguments, but they also made some amendments and additions, both theoretically and methodologically. First, the idea presented in *The Voter Decides* that a vote choice is the result of different psychological forces was elaborated upon. Second, the Michigan scholars presented their view on how different kinds of variables can be put into a single theoretical framework. Third, the concept of party identification was elaborated upon and its position as explanation of vote choice was viewed differently than before.

In *The American Voter* the Michigan scholars clarified that they adopted a psychological perspective. Following Walter Lippmann's (1922) notion of 'pictures in the head', Campbell and his colleagues (1960: 39) argued, "the voter has a picture of the world of politics in his head, and the nature of this picture is a key to understanding what he does at the polls". Voters' cognitions with respect to politics matter with respect to voting. The scholars indicated that cognition or perception is not all that matters.

> The elements of politics that are visible to the electorate are not simply seen; they are evaluated as well. Evaluation is the stuff of political life, and the cognitive image formed by the individual of the political world tends to be positively and negatively toned in its several parts. This mixture of cognition and evaluation, of belief and attitude, of percept and affect is so complete that we will speak of the individual's cognitive *and affective* map of politics. (Campbell et al. 1960: 42)

The idea that cognition, belief, or perception is associated with evaluation, attitude, or affect is related to ideas set out by Lewin (1951) in relation to the framework of field theory. Lewin spoke about valences, the attracting or repelling forces of objects. The notions of affect and attitudes are closely related to the notions of valences and evaluations. The essence is that in memory the cognitive representation of objects have attached a certain amount of positive or negative affect. The affect is important, because it influences the behaviour with respect to the objects.

The forces that the Michigan scholars distinguished as determinants of an individual's vote choice can be seen as the result of such affect or evaluations. They stated:

> Our hypothesis is that the partisan choice the individual voter makes depends in an immediate sense on the strength and direction of the elements comprising a field of psychological forces, where these elements are interpreted as attitudes toward the perceived objects of national politics. (...) A system of attitudinal variables measuring the net partisan direction of the voter's political reactions (...) constitute a field of forces operating on the individual as he deliberates over his vote decision. (Campbell et al. 1960: 9, 16)

Voters evaluate their images of issues, parties, and candidates. These result in psychological forces pulling them either towards a vote for the Republican candidate, or towards a vote for the Democratic candidate.

In *The American Voter* the psychological forces were conceptualised in terms of six so-called partisan attitudes. Candidate orientation was represented by two factors: personal attributes of the Democratic candidate, and personal attributes of the Republican candidate. Issue orientation was also represented by two factors: issues of domestic policy and issues of foreign policy. Two additional attitudinal forces cor-

responded with groups involved in politics and with the parties' record in govern-ment management. Each of the six dimensions of partisan attitudes consisted of two elements: direction (Republican or Democratic) and intensity (from very weak to very strong). On the basis of voters' positions on these six dimensions in the 1952 and the 1956 U.S. presidential elections Campbell and his colleagues 'predicted' correctly for whom 85 per cent of the voters sampled would vote.

The Michigan scholars understood something needed to be said about how the attitudinal influences related to other explanations, like those based on social charac-teristics or past events. To handle this, they presented the theoretical notion of a 'fun-nel of causality'. According to this notion, "events are conceived to follow each other in a converging sequence of causal chains, moving from the mouth to the stem of the funnel." (p. 24) One way to conceive the direction of the funnel was in terms of time. The stem of the funnel would then represent the present and the mouth of the funnel the (far) past.[13] The notion of a funnel of causality was related to a specific aspect of Lewin's field theory. In field theory behaviour is seen as the resultant of forces acting at that moment. A past event can have an impact on current behaviour only if it is in some way represented in the present field, or has influenced forces acting upon a person that are part of the present field (pp. 33-34).

In the Michigan model the partisan attitudes were regarded as making up that 'present field'. Voting behaviour was seen most directly as a consequence of atti-tudes towards candidates, policies, and group benefits. These attitudes are influ-enced by voters' party identification, which in turn is determined by social character-istics, which are located in the mouth of the funnel.

CANDIDATE EVALUATIONS AS DIRECT DETERMINANTS OF VOTE CHOICE

The ideas set out in *The American Voter* laid the foundation for later studies on voting. An example is an article by Gregory Markus and Philip Converse (1979). What is in-teresting about their model, is that it includes candidate evaluations as the most di-rect determinant of vote choice. They assumed that voters' overall evaluations of the competing candidates mediated other influences on vote choice, such as party iden-tification, issue stands, perceived candidate personalities, and previous voting. Hence, voters were expected to simply vote for the candidate they evaluate most positively. If evaluations of both candidates are fairly similar, party identification was assumed to influence vote choice directly and be decisive. The idea that candi-date evaluations are the determinant of vote choice, and that other phenomena influ-ence vote choice only by affecting such evaluations, is also central in several other models of voting (see, for example, Rahn et al. 1990; Markus 1982; Page and Jones 1979). The essential difference with the Michigan studies discussed above is that overall judgements of the individual candidates were included as primary determi-nants of vote choice.

A related difference is that in Markus and Converse's study candidate evaluations were assessed directly. Candidate evaluations were operationalised on the basis of so-called feeling thermometer scores, measures used in the American National Election Studies (NES) to tap how favourable or unfavourable voters feel towards each individual candidate. The NES-question is as follows.

> I'd like to get your feelings toward some of our political leaders and other people who are in the news these days. I'll read the name of the person and I'd like you to rate that person using this feeling thermometer. You may use any number from 0 to 100 for a rating. Ratings between 50 and 100 degrees mean that you feel favorable or warm towards the person. Ratings between 0 and 50 degrees mean that you don't feel too favorable toward the person. If we come to a person whose name you don't recognize, you don't need to rate that person. Just tell me and we'll move on to the next one. If you do recognize a name, but don't feel particularly warm or cold towards the person, you would rate that person at the 50-degree mark.

To answer the question respondents are shown a picture of a vertical thermometer bulb that has nine values listed next to it, which are all labelled (see Alwin 1997: 335). The labels are, from top to bottom: 100° "very warm or favorable feeling", 85° "quite warm or favorable feeling", 70° "fairly warm or favorable feeling", 60° "a bit more warm or favorable feeling than cold feeling", 50° "no feeling at all", 40° "a bit more cold or unfavorable feeling", 30° "fairly cold or unfavorable feeling", 15° "quite cold or unfavorable feeling", 0° "very cold or unfavorable feeling".

THE MICHIGAN STUDIES AND THE PSYCHOLOGICAL PERSPECTIVE

The essence of the Michigan theory is that voters have 'pictures in their heads' and that these pictures determine for whom they vote. The nexus between the pictures and the vote consists of the notion of psychological forces, which operate because the pictures are evaluated.

> The elements of national politics – the presidential candidates, questions of group interests, the issues of domestic and foreign policy, the performance of the parties in the conduct of government – are not simply perceived by the individual; they are evaluated as well. Orientations to these objects, seen by the voter as positive or negative, comprise a system of partisan attitudes that is of primary importance for the voting act. (Campbell et al. 1960: 66)

Positive and negative evaluations of political objects resulted in forces towards the Democratic or Republican side, which were captured in *The Voter Decides* in the notion of three orientations and in *The American Voter* in the notion of six partisan attitudes.

From a psychological perspective, it is important to note two things about the Michigan studies. First, with respect to issues and candidates the evaluations were not assessed directly, but constructed on the basis of voters' own policy preferences and remarks about the candidates. Second, the three orientations and partisan attitudes should not be regarded as an indication of how the voter's mind is organised. The distinction was made for analytical purposes only. This points to an important distinction, namely between concepts that refer to psychological entities, which are assumed to exist as such in the voter's mind, and concepts that are mere analytical constructs to analyse (the impact of) such psychological entities.

In the case of the Michigan studies the psychological phenomena analysed are the voters' images of parties, candidates, and issues. The motivational forces distinguished in *The Voter Decides* and the partisan attitudes distinguished in *The American Voter* are the analytical constructs used to analyse these images. They are the presumed partisan effects of cognitions and affects with respect to certain classes of objects that are stored in voters' memories. Hence, the Michigan studies are psychological in the sense that their explanation of voting behaviour is based on the information in voters' minds. However, they are not psychological in the sense that they describe mental processes that underlie voting, or that the concepts used are psychological entities.

The party identification concept is different in this respect. Campbell and his colleagues (1960: 122) stated that this concept was based on particular psychological theories. Warren Miller and Merrill Shanks (1996) summarised this as follows.

> Party identification is a concept derived from reference and small group theory positing that one's sense of self may include a feeling of personal identity with a secondary group such as a political party. […] The tie between individual and party is psychological – an extension of one's ego to include feeling a part of a group. (Miller and Shanks 1996: 120)

The idea that partisanship can be conceived of in terms of group belonging, analogous with religious and other forms of social identity, is central in various treatments of the concept (Miller and Shanks 1996; Green et al. 2002). Few scholars, however, have elaborated upon the psychological theory in which the party identification concept is presumably based. An exception is Steven Greene (1999), who linked the concept explicitly to social identity theory, which is related to the reference group theory the Michigan scholars referred to (see Forsyth 1990: 40-41). In this view political parties are groups to which voters may belong, and for whom this belonging may be more or less central to their self-concept.

If one views partisanship as an identification, this should be reflected in the measures used to operationalise it (see Greene 2002). The traditional American 'root question' appears to concern the self-concept and can be linked to the idea of identification. It is difficult to argue the same with respect to the follow-up question asked

to Independents. This problem was recognised by Warren Miller (1991), who argued that partisanship treated in terms of identification is operationalised best on the basis of the root question only. The follow-up question asked to Republicans and Democrats should be discarded too, Miller thought, because this measure is influenced too strongly by short-term forces that do not concern identification. Moreover, he argued, what matters are the boundaries between identifiers and nonidentifiers and these are assessed by the root question.

A related matter is that one may question whether the operationalisation of party identification as a single dimension is appropriate (see Weisberg 1980; Greene 1999). Identification with the Democratic Party and identification with the Republican Party may well be viewed as two distinct phenomena. The fact that both are related to each other, does not imply they are not two different phenomena. This means that the single dimension has to be regarded as an analytical construct used to analyse the impact of two psychologically distinct phenomena.

A final observation to be made is that the concept of partisan attitudes in *The American Voter* differs from the concept of attitudes as used in social psychology. Generally, attitudes are conceptualised as positions on a single dimension that ranges from very positive to very negative; they refer to liking or disliking certain things (cf. Tesser and Martin 1996; Eagly and Chaiken 1993, ch. 1). Partisan attitudes are positions on a dimension that does not range from very positive to very negative, but from strongly pro-Republican to strongly pro-Democratic. The evaluative dimension concerns to what extent cognitions (and affect) with respect to certain objects pull individuals towards one party and away from the other. It is not a matter of liking single parties, but a matter of favouring one party over the other with respect to something. It is not a matter of *affect*, but a matter of *effect*.

PARTY IDENTIFICATION IN THE NETHERLANDS

The concept of party identification has been applied not only in the United States, but also in various other countries (Campbell and Valen 1961; Budge et al. 1976; Holmberg 1994a). In other political contexts party identification 'behaved' differently than in the United States. On the basis of a study by Jacques Thomassen (1976b) the Netherlands have been considered the oddest case (Miller and Shanks 1996: 117).[14]

The questions used to operationalise party identification in the United States could not be translated directly into Dutch. In the Netherlands the concept has been operationalised on the basis of the following questions.

> Many people think of themselves as an adherent of a particular political party, but there are also people who do not think of themselves as an adherent of a

political party. Do you think of yourself as an adherent or not as an adherent of
a political party?

Those who said they did not think of themselves as an adherent were asked:

Is there a party to which you feel more attracted than to other parties?

If voters responded positively to any of these questions, they were asked which
party they were an adherent of, or to which party they felt more attracted.[15]

Thomassen (1976b) questioned whether the party identification concept could
be applied to the Netherlands. On the basis of an analysis of panel data from the
1970-1972 period he concluded that it probably could not.[16] This conclusion was
based on three findings: (1) party identification was less stable than vote choice,[17] (2)
the distinction between party identification and vote choice could be due to
unreliability of the measurement, and (3) party identification seemed not to be prior
to vote choice (p. 77). To explain why party identification did not function,
Thomassen pointed out that in the Netherlands political parties were closely allied
with social groups, and that voters probably identified with these groups rather than
with the related parties (Thomassen 1976b: 65-66, 78).

According to Samuel Barnes (1990), the Dutch findings were not the result of
this pillarised structure, but of its collapse. He argued that the instability of party
identification compared to vote choice had to do with a process of realignment that
was taking place. Barnes also pointed to the impact of minor parties, to which voters
of the major parties may turn relatively easily. Bradley Richardson (1991) argued that
the finding that vote choice was more stable than party identification might have to
do with negative feelings toward non-preferred parties. Richardson found that vot-
ers who were stable in their vote choice were more likely to be persons with "feelings
of out-party hostility" and hypothesised that voting was sometimes "driven mainly
by negative feelings toward other parties" (p. 765). Hence, he argued,

Future research should try to identify the sentiments of these negative parti-
sans more effectively via measurements that focus on feelings toward alterna-
tive parties as well as those that tap positive affect for a preferred party.
(Richardson 1991: 766)

Sören Holmberg (1994a: 100) argued that the strong correlation between the
vote and party identification did not mean voters had not developed lasting psycho-
logical attachments to the parties. What is problematic, is that as a concept party
identification is interesting for voting theory only if it is not too closely related to
vote choice (p. 95 ff.). If voters vote for the party they identify with and vice versa,
then party identification is not useful for explaining voting, because voting and
party identification cannot be distinguished meaningfully. Frode Berglund (2000)

came to similar conclusions, but argued that because of its long-term effects the concept remains meaningful for other purposes than explaining vote choice.

C. van der Eijk and B. Niemöller (1983, ch. 8) analysed the stability of party identification and also found it to be (too) instable. Additionally they pointed to another problem, namely that in the Netherlands voters frequently identified with more than one party. This is incompatible with the concept of party identification, they concluded (see also Niemöller and Van der Eijk 1984: 533-534). Considering the conclusions drawn about party identification in the Netherlands, Niemöller and Van der Eijk (1984: 534) argued that either the concept had to be operationalised differently, or that a theoretical concept had to be found that was measured by the questions that were intended to measure party identification. A strategy Niemöller and Van der Eijk preferred, however, was to develop a "functional, theoretical, and operational equivalent" that suited the Dutch multi-party system, such as ideological identification (p. 534) (see also Niemöller and Van der Eijk 1990). In line with this argument they focused on ideology in terms of left and right, building on the work by Downs (1957).

AN ECONOMIC PERSPECTIVE: DOWNS AND SPATIAL MODELS

AN ECONOMIC THEORY OF DEMOCRACY

In *An Economic Theory of Democracy* (1957), Downs outlined a theory that deals with the behaviour of both parties and voters. Central in his theory is the notion of rationality, which was taken from traditional economic theory. Downs was clear that the model he presented was not a description of how parties and voters actually behave, but how they would behave under a certain set of assumptions. This does not imply that the theory is normative. The model explains what *will* happen under certain conditions, not what *should* happen (p. 14).

Downs assumed that selection of government is the sole purpose of elections. According to his theory, both parties and voters act rationally, which implies that they seek to maximise benefits. Parties' goals are to get as many votes as possible in order to win elections (vote-maximisation axiom). For voters, benefits are defined in terms of the utility they receive from government activity (utility income), which are defined in terms of policy outcomes. The model outlines how rational parties and voters behave, given their goals. The benefits themselves are taken as givens. The notion of rationality applies to the means, not the ends.

Voters cast their votes for the party they believe will provide the highest utility income. To maximise the utility they derive from the next government, voters compare the utility incomes that the competing parties provide if they would be in office. The difference between the hypothetical future benefits of the different parties (ex-

pected utility incomes) is referred to as the *expected party differential*. Voters base their judgement of the expected party differential on their judgement about the past. To judge what parties will do in the next election period, voters evaluate what they have done in the most recent. For the governing party the evaluation is based on what it has done while it was in power. For an opposition party it is based on what voters think it would have done if it had been in power. The corresponding equivalent of the expected party differential is a *current party differential*. According to Downs, making use of the current party differential is rational because the information on which it is based concerns real facts (at least with respect to the governing party), whereas the future party differential concerns only hypothetical situations (ch. 3).[18]

Voters decide for whom to vote on the basis of the policies the parties adopt. The decision-making process starts with gathering information about the policy issues and ends with a vote choice.[19] Between gathering and analysing relevant factual information and actually voting (or abstaining), Downs distinguished three steps.

> [1] For each issue, appraising the consequences of every likely policy in light of relevant goals. This is a value appraisal, not a strictly factual one.

> [2] Coördinating the appraisals of each issue into a net evaluation of each party running in the election. This is also a value judgment personally tailored to the goals of the voter himself.

> [3] Making the voting decision by comparing the net evaluations of each party and weighting them for future contingencies. (Downs 1957: 209)

So when voters have the information they need, they evaluate each policy adopted by a party, transform these single evaluations into an overall evaluation for each party, and finally compare their overall evaluations of the competing parties to make their vote choice. To judge the parties' policies voters compare these to their own view on what the ideal society looks like. Hence,

> A man's evaluation of each party depends ultimately upon (1) the information he has about its policies and (2) the relation between those of its policies he knows about and his conception of the good society. (Downs 1957: 46)

If governments consist of a single party, voters just have to evaluate the platforms of the various parties. In a system with coalitions government, policies will not match a single party's platform. Then it is relevant which government coalitions the parties are likely to join and what the coalition policies would be. Hence, in multiparty systems with coalition governments voting rationally is more difficult. This may lead voters to behave irrationally. Voters may merely support their favourite party and treat elections "as expressions of preference instead of government selectors" (pp. 152-153). About this form of irrationality Downs noted:

> When we call such behavior irrational, we do not mean that it is unintelligent
> or not in the best interest of the voters. In fact, it may be the most rational thing
> for them to do as individuals. The only sense in which it is irrational is from
> the point of view of elections as direct government selectors. (Downs 1957: 154)

An additional rule for multi-party systems in Downs' theory is that voters will not
vote for their favourite party if it has no chance of winning. Voters do not want to
'waste their vote' and choose between parties that have 'a reasonable chance'.[20] An
exception to this rule is made for future-oriented voters, who want to improve their
favourite party's future chances. Voters may also support a party that has no chance
of winning in order to warn another party to change its policies (pp. 48-49).

A major problem of this model, Downs set out, is an assumption that in practice
will never be met.

> This is how a voter would behave in a world of complete and costless informa-
> tion. (...) In the real world, uncertainty and lack of information prevent even
> the most intelligent and well-informed voter from behaving in precisely the
> fashion we have described. (Downs 1957: 45-46)

To meet these limitations Downs modified the model in a number of ways. First, vot-
ers base the utility incomes only on those areas where differences between parties
are "great enough to impress" (p. 46). Second, the difference between the parties has
to be large enough, so that voters are not indifferent about which party wins the elec-
tion. Only when a so-called *party differential threshold* is passed, do voters not abstain
(p. 46). Third, if in consecutive elections careful deliberation has repeatedly resulted
in the same party choice, voters may vote for the same party out of habit. Such a vote
may be rational because it saves information costs (p. 85). Fourth, it may be rational
for voters to delegate steps in this decision-making process to others in order to re-
duce information costs. The most important modification, however, was the intro-
duction of the concept of ideology. Downs argued that for parties it is rational to
adopt ideologies and be consistent in these across time. For voters it may be rational
to use ideology as a short cut, because they cannot become fully informed about all
policies (ch. 7).

The notion of ideology laid the foundation for an analysis of party platforms in
terms of a single dimension, referred to as a 'political space'. Downs used the anal-
ogy from previous research of competition in the context of shops in a street
(Hotelling 1929; Smithies 1941) (p. 115), and made use of a scale with values ranging
from 0 to 100 on which political preferences could be ordered meaningfully from left
to right. He assumed that parties take stands on many issues, which all can be plot-
ted on the left-right dimension. The parties' net position would correspond with a
weighted average of all its issue positions. By positioning voters and parties on such
a single dimension the expected behaviour of parties was analysed (ch. 8). An under-

lying assumption was that voters vote for the party that is closest to them in the po-
litical space (the smallest distance hypothesis).

Downs' study is not an empirical study. Downs did not apply his theory to vot-
ing empirically. However, numerous empirical studies have been inspired by his
theory. A well-known way in which his work has been influential is by the founda-
tion it laid for so-called spatial models of voting (Davis et al. 1970; Enelow and
Hinich 1984; Van der Eijk and Niemöller 1983). Several studies centre around the
idea that voters base their choice on policy preferences as if they are consumers
(Himmelweit et al. 1981), while others focus on the impact of ideology (Heath et al.
1985, ch. 8; Middendorp 1991). Another way in which his views have been followed
can be seen in research that focuses on the information-processing of voters (Popkin
1991). An element of Downs' theory that has received less attention is the idea that
voters may use different mechanisms to make a vote choice.

SPATIAL MODELS OF IDEOLOGICAL VOTING IN THE NETHERLANDS

Building on Downs' theory, Van der Eijk and Niemöller (1983, ch. 7) employed the
left-right dimension to study voting in the Netherlands. Voters' positions were
operationalised as self-ratings on a ten-point scale of left-right. On the same scale
voters assessed the positions of the political parties that were represented in parlia-
ment. In line with the smallest distance hypothesis voters were expected to vote for
the party that was closest to them on the scale. The distances were based on a voter's
self-rating and *that voter's* party ratings. Van der Eijk and Niemöller found that in the
1981 parliamentary election 60 per cent of all voters indeed had voted for a party that
was closest to them in terms of left-right (p. 278).[21] In another study similar results
were obtained with respect to the 1989 election (Hermsen 1992, ch. 5). Perceived
agreement in terms of left-right has since repeatedly been put forward as the most
important variable for explaining vote choice in the Netherlands (Tillie 1995, ch. 6;
Oppenhuis 1995, ch. 6; Van Wijnen 2001, ch. 8).

The notion of an ideological space has also been used in other ways. Of particu-
lar interest is the 'heartland model' that Galen Irwin and Joop van Holsteyn (1989b,
1997; Van Holsteyn and Irwin 2003) developed.[22] In this model the ideological space
was defined in terms of two dimensions rather than one.[23] The dimensions were
operationalised on the basis of two issues: income inequality and abortion. Two
seven-point scales at which the extremes indicated opposite policy positions were
used to construct the space, which consequently consisted of 49 positions. The two
issues were thought to represent the major ideological differences in Dutch politics.
The dimension defined by income inequality corresponds largely with the meaning
of left-right. The dimension defined by abortion is related to religious and moral val-
ues. The political parties were not assigned a single point in the political space, but
areas, their 'heartlands'. The area that corresponded to a leftist position with respect

to income inequality ('income differences should become smaller') and a liberal point of view on abortion ('woman decides') was defined as the Labour heartland. A rightist position on income inequality ('income differences should remain as they are') in combination with a liberal position on abortion was considered the Liberal heartland. The area that corresponded with opposition to abortion ('forbid abortion') was regarded as the Christian Democratic heartland, irrespective of the position on income inequality.[24] The area not defined as heartland of any of the three major parties was referred to as 'battlefield'. The ideological space consequently consisted of four areas.[25] Clear and strong relationships between voters' positions in the space and vote choice were found. Across the six parliamentary elections between 1977 and 1994 the three main parties (Labour Party, Liberal Party, and Christian Democrats) received about half of the vote in their own heartlands (Irwin and Van Holsteyn 1997: 106).[26] In the battlefield the distribution of votes was more balanced, although from 1981 until 1989 the Christian Democrats clearly received more votes in this area than the other parties. In recent years, the explanatory power of the heartland model has decreased considerably (Van Holsteyn and Irwin 2003).[27]

Although the spatial framework may be used to analyse the impact of ideology on voting, it need not be. On the basis of other kinds of analyses ideology has also been found in the Netherlands to be structured by two ideological dimensions. C. P. Middendorp (1989; 1991) concluded that the left-right self-identification measure that Van der Eijk and Niemöller (1983) employed was a mixture of two ideological orientations: a social-economic left-right orientation (which is fairly closely related to socialism and liberalism) and a libertarian-authoritarian value orientation (related to conservatism).[28] According to Middendorp, whose analyses built on the idea that electoral politics could be well understood in the Netherlands on the basis of a progressive-conservative dimension, a problem of the left-right self-image was that its meaning was ambiguous (unlike measures based on concrete issues). Related to this is J. W. van Deth's (1986) objection that the use of concepts as left-right placement is too trivial to explain vote choice. He argued that examining the impact of such perceptions should be nothing but "a sideline in a much broader research program" (p. 193) in which the more important questions are answered by going deeper into the funnel of causality, so to speak.

DOWNS' THEORY AND THE PSYCHOLOGICAL PERSPECTIVE

Downs (1957) argued that his theory was not a psychological theory. The model only explains how voters would behave if they were to act rationally within the framework provided.

> The model is not an attempt to describe reality accurately. (...) The statements
> in our analysis are true of the model world, not the real world. (...) We are

studying rational political behavior, not psychology or the psychology of po-
litical behavior. (Downs 1957: 9-10, 34)

So the model of voting Downs set out is not an accurate description of how voters
actually make up their mind, nor was it intended to be. As argued above, neither was
the theory meant to be normative. What then is the value of the model? According to
Downs, this value was in something else.

> Our model could be described as a study of political rationality from an eco-
> nomic point of view. By comparing the picture of rational behavior which
> emerges from this study with what is known about actual political behavior,
> the reader should be able to draw some interesting conclusions about the op-
> eration of democratic politics. (Downs 1957: 14)

According to Downs, comparing the outcomes of real life to the outcomes of the
model is interesting even while the model does not describe accurately what hap-
pens in reality. The model thus provides a framework to analyse voting behaviour. It
can be tested whether voters in fact vote rationally, that is, to what extent they con-
form to the model. This is an empirical question. If voters do appear to act rationally,
we have a framework to interpret vote choice.[29]

To answer the question whether voters act rationally, two interpretations of
what 'voting rationally' means are possible. First, one may compare how voters actu-
ally voted to how they would have voted according to the model of a rational voter.
In this interpretation the process by which voters determine their vote choice is irrel-
evant. The only thing that matters in this view is the ultimate behaviour, not how it is
reached. In an alternative interpretation the process by which voters make up their
mind is taken into account. In that case voters are said to vote rationally only if they
follow the procedure set out by the model. In this interpretation the demands to vot-
ers are much higher: not only should the outcome correspond with a rational vote, so
should the process by which it is reached. In empirical studies the common use of
Downs' theory is in line with the first interpretation: researchers compare what they
consider to be rational with how voters actually voted (see, for example, Van der Eijk
and Niemöller 1983). From a psychological perspective this is not satisfactory. To un-
derstand why people vote as they do, the processes that underlie those choices are
also of interest. For the same reason studies of voting that explain voting on the basis
of voters' and parties' positions in an ideological space are of limited value from a
psychological perspective: such studies are silent about the psychological processes
underlying vote choices.

Downs' way of thinking is not only inspired by economics, but also shows a
great similarity with economic theories and models about consumer behaviour. This
is clear from the vocabulary that was used and the concepts that were focused on.
Hence, in terms of the concepts used Downs' explanation for voting differs from

those offered by the Columbia and Michigan scholars, who focused on group belonging, social and partisan identity, and attitudes. The use of different concepts, however, does not imply that a different way of thinking is involved. In terms of the three methods the Michigan scholars distinguished for the study of voting (studying external events, studying social settings, and studying psychological variables), Downs' theory clearly fits the 'psychological approach'. His theory does not focus on external events or social settings, but on the psychological process that intervenes between external events and vote choice. Downs' theory concerns processes that (may) occur in voters' minds. In that sense his theory should be regarded as another example of a *psychological* approach.

The fact that, according to Downs, his model does not describe the psychological processes of voters, does not mean the model cannot be used as a framework to analyse those processes. Adopting the line of argument Downs discussed with respect to the normative implications of the model can show this. Downs indicated that the model is not prescriptive of behaviour, but that it can be used for such purposes. In a similar way the model itself is not descriptive, but it can be used as if it is. Downs' model can be interpreted *as if* it gives an explanation of the real world.

Downs' theory draws attention to particular psychological processes that may operate when voters face an election. Downs regarded voters as individuals who make deliberate choices from a number of alternatives based on a calculation of costs and benefits of possible election outcomes. The Michigan scholars, on the other hand, did not specify any decision-making process. In their view vote choices are a result of several psychological forces. No calculation need be made, the psychological forces are automatically weighed and this results in a vote choice. Another difference between both approaches may be found in terms of affect: Downs' approach seems a rather cognitive one, whereas the Michigan approach involves values, evaluation, and affect. Rational voters would not let their vote choice be (mis)directed by non-rational influences such as emotional attachments. But the major difference is arguably that whereas in the Michigan approach voting is viewed as expressive, in Downs' approach it is seen as instrumental: voters are assumed to behave goal-oriented (cf. Harrop and Miller 1987: 130, 145).

Although the Michigan and Downsian approaches breathe very different atmospheres, they complement rather than contradict one another, just as the Columbia and Michigan approaches do. The Michigan approach clarifies why social characteristics have an impact on voting, namely through mediating psychological concepts. Downs in a sense explains why certain psychological concepts, like those focused on in the Michigan studies, have an impact on voting, namely through some sort of decision-making process in which voters take into account possible election outcomes. Downs' theory does not violate the Columbia or Michigan findings, but tells another part of the story.

THEORIES OF ISSUE VOTING

THE ISSUE-ORIENTED, RESPONSIBLE VOTER

The Columbia scholars, Michigan scholars, and Downs seem to have agreed upon the fact that for voting issues are of paramount importance. They differ, however, in the way they viewed issues and handled them in their research. The Columbia scholars emphasised the relationship between issues and the underlying cleavages and corresponding social structure. The Michigan scholars emphasised that what matters is voters' perceptions of the candidates, of which their positions on domestic and foreign issues are an important aspect. Downs argued that voters seek to maximise utility, which they derive from issue positions that governments take.

Although issues were not unimportant in the Columbia and Michigan studies, the image of the voter that arose from these empirical studies was experienced as being at odds with the democratic ideal of voters who base their vote choice on their policy preferences.

> They can be added up to a conception of voting not as a civic decision but as an almost purely deterministic act. (...) The actions of persons are made to appear to be only predictable and automatic responses to campaign stimuli. (Key 1966: 5)

In *The Responsible Electorate* (1966) V. O. Key contested the idea that voters' choices at the polls were predetermined socially or directed by blind party loyalty. He argued that politicians falsely acted as if voters are manageable fools.

> The perverse and unorthodox argument of this little book is that voters are not fools. To be sure, many individual voters act in odd ways; yet in the large the electorate behaves about as rationally and responsibly as we should expect, given the clarity of the alternatives presented to it and the character of the information available. (Key 1966: 7)

Key analysed the vote choices of different groups of voters and found that vote choice strongly paralleled policy preferences.

Various other studies have examined the impact of issues and policy preferences. The idea that issues are crucial for voters when they decide for whom to vote is referred to by the notions of 'policy voting' and 'issue voting'. What kind of issues are relevant and how their impact of vote choice has to be modelled, has been debated. Three well-known models of issue voting that deal with this matter will be discussed in some more detail.

PROXIMITY MODEL OF ISSUE VOTING

The analogy of spatial competition that Downs applied to the election process has become the basis of a specific class of voting models that have been used to examine the impact of issues: spatial models of voting. Spatial models of voting assume that voters are rational and make a choice on the basis of their self-interest. Self-interest is not meant to be economic self-interest, but self-interest may concern a whole variety of non-economic issues.

> What spatial theory assumes is that the voter has a given stake or interest in the outcome of the vote, which he recognizes, and which leads him to vote as he does. The form of this self-interest is subjectively determined by the voter. Spatial theory does not explain the source or form that this self-interest takes. The theory merely assumes that the voter recognizes his own self-interest, evaluates alternative policies or candidates on the basis of which will best serve his self-interest, and casts his vote for the policy or candidate most favorably evaluated. In short, the voter is *rational*. (Enelow and Hinich 1984: 3)

The notion of space enters the theory when the self-interest is conceptualised. James Enelow and Melvin Hinich (1984) argued that the self-interest of the voter is related to the policy outcomes that are associated with the future government. Who wins the election determines which policies will be adopted, and these policies 'serve' or 'violate' the interest of the voter. Enelow and Hinich argued that policy positions can be conceptualised as 'predictive dimensions' that together make up the political space in which electoral competition takes place (p. 38). The positions that parties and voters take in the space depend on their policy preferences. In line with the smallest distance hypothesis voters are expected to prefer the party that is closest to them in the space. This model has been referred to as the proximity model of issue voting.

In empirical analyses spatial models of voting have been applied in two different ways, which can be referred to as a deductive method and an inductive method. In the deductive method first voters' and parties' positions on the dimensions of the political space are determined, for example in terms of their positions on a number of issues. On the basis of these positions and the smallest distance hypothesis predictions are made about voters' party preferences or vote choice, which are then tested empirically (see, for example, Van Cuilenburg et al. 1980; Middendorp et al. 1993).

In the inductive method the starting point is voters' evaluations of the parties or candidates. On the basis of statistical analyses of such evaluations a political space can be constructed that best fits the data. The result is a space in which parties and voters have a position, but which has no meaning (yet). What the spatial dimensions stand for remains undefined. By analysing relationship between voters' and parties' positions in the space and stands on issues (or ideological positions), the dimensions of the space can be interpreted (see, for example, Enelow and Hinich 1984, ch. 9).

DIRECTIONAL THEORY OF ISSUE VOTING

George Rabinowitz and Stuart Elaine Macdonald (1989) formulated an alternative theory of issue voting. In electoral research voters' stands with respect to issues are usually operationalised by showing them a line with a certain number of positions, while both end-points of the scale are labelled with opposite policies. Voters are then asked to indicate their own position on this scale. In a similar way their perceptions of parties and candidates are assessed. The differences between two scale positions are interpreted as a distance that indicates the degree of agreement on the issue, for example between a voter and a party. Rabinowitz and Macdonald agreed with Donald Stokes (1963) that operationalising issues this way only makes sense if the scale can be conceived of as a set of ordered alternatives. According to Stokes, this assumption is false.

Rabinowitz and Macdonald proposed to view voters' positions on such scales in a different way. They argued that the positions indicate two things about a certain 'political symbol': direction and intensity.[30] In terms of direction the scale has three positions, namely 'favourable, 'unfavourable', and 'neutral'. The intensity refers to the strength of the feeling concerning the issue: the end-points represent strong feelings, whereas a position close to the neutral mid-point indicates weak feelings.[31]

According to Rabinowitz and Macdonald, the impact of an issue on voters' feelings towards candidates is determined by both the voters' and the candidates' positions on the scale.[32] The directional components determine whether the voter likes the candidate more or less due to the issue. If both take a 'favourable' position or both take an 'unfavourable' position, the voter will like the candidate better; if they take opposite positions, the voter will like the candidate less. If either the voter or the candidate takes a neutral position the effect is assumed to be zero. The intensity components indicate the amount of feeling the issue evokes. The intensity of the candidate position indicates how much the candidate stirs feelings on the issue (p. 96) and how central the issue is for judgements about the candidate (p. 98). The intensity of the voter's position indicates how much feeling the issue evokes in the person and how central the issue is for judgements by the voter. More extreme positions indicate that the issue evokes stronger feelings and has a larger impact on how voters evaluate candidates.

The directional theory results in different expectations about the relationship between voters' positions on an issue scale and their feelings towards a party or candidate than the proximity model. For example, if a scale has values ranging from one to seven and a party takes position two, then the proximity model predicts voters at position two to like the party best. The directional theory predicts voters at position one to like the party best, since the issue affects them most strongly (and they favour the same side as the party).

To a certain extent one may conceive of Rabinowitz and Macdonald's theory as one concerning a methodological question, namely how to interpret issue scales. From a psychological point of view another aspect of their theory is especially interesting, namely that they put central the notion of feelings or emotions. According to their theory, issues matter because they evoke emotional responses. These may vary across individuals and how much a certain issue matters may vary across parties and candidates.

THEORY OF ISSUE OWNERSHIP

Another theory of issue voting was outlined by Ian Budge and Dennis Farlie (1979). In this context the distinction that Stokes (1963: 373) made between 'position issues' and 'valence issues' is relevant. Position issues involve alternative actions of government (e.g. the issue of abortion), while valence issues concern the strength of the link between a party and a certain positively or negatively evaluated condition (e.g. the issue of unemployment). Budge and Farlie argued that party competition cannot be characterised best by parties who take opposite or different positions on certain (position) issues. With respect to many issues parties do not differ much in terms of direction, but in the degree to which these issues are important to them. Parties focus on a limited number of (valence) issues and more or less ignore the issues that other parties are talking about. Consequently, each party has 'its own issues'.

Because parties are regarded as the 'owners' of particular issues, the theory has been referred to as the theory of issue ownership. Party competition then takes place in terms of differences in the importance assigned to issues. What matters is the saliency of issues and hence the theory has also been referred to as 'saliency theory'. If voters regard the same issues important as a party, they are more strongly inclined to vote for it. The match between parties and voters in terms of the saliency of the valence issues is regarded as the key to voters' choices. This implies that the proximity model and the directional theory miss the point, since these focus on disagreement with respect to position issues.[33]

THEORIES OF ISSUE VOTING AND THE PSYCHOLOGICAL PERSPECTIVE

Theories of issue voting may be considered psychological in the sense that issue positions and policy preferences concern the voters' mind. But whether the concepts used and analyses performed provide insight in how the mind works may be doubted.

With respect to a certain issue a number of alternative actions of government exist and voters' like or dislike these alternatives to certain degrees. The alternative that voters like best may be said to be their policy preference or issue position. This implies that a single policy preference is in fact based on voters' feelings with respect

to more than one object, namely each alternative action of government. We may refer to the degree to which voters like or dislike such underlying single policies as policy evaluations. Hence, the scales that have been used in electoral research to operationalise policy preferences or issue positions combine a number of psychological entities. If the end-points are labelled with policies X and Y, the scale may be regarded as an analytical construct that combines a like-dislike rating of policy X and a like-dislike rating of policy Y: the scale position indicates the degree to which policy X is liked more, or less, than policy Y. The mid-point then indicates that policies X and Y are liked equally well. What is important, is that from a psychological perspective issue scales should thus be viewed as analytical constructs, rather than measurements of truly psychological concepts.

From a psychological perspective it is also important to note that to explain voting on the basis of issue positions or policy preferences, these must be stored as such in voters' memory (or at least the underlying policy evaluations must). Only if they exist as such in the voters' mind, can they influence their vote choice.

Another important point is that if empirical analyses show that a relationship exists between voters' policy preferences and their vote choice, this does not imply that the issue in question as such had an impact. It is possible that the relationship is found because the issue was empirically related to another issue that influenced the vote. If, for example, voters' choices are influenced by their opinions about euthanasia, their vote choice can be predicted on the basis of their opinions about abortion, assuming opinions on both issues are related. Analyses could then show that policy preferences with respect to abortion predict vote choice well, while not a single voter thought about that issue when deciding for whom to vote. A related possibility is that voters decide on the basis of group belonging or ideology, which may also be related to particular issue stands. Yet another possibility is that voters' policy preferences are caused by, rather than causes of, vote choice (see, for example, Thomassen 1976a: ch. 2-3, 6-7). Voters may use political parties as a point of reference and form policy preferences on the basis of parties' issue stands (Belknap and Campbell 1952). Hence, strong relationships between policy preferences and vote choice need not indicate that the former caused the latter.

Note, finally, that in most research on issue voting the analyses merely show the empirical relationships between policy preferences and vote choice. The psychological process by which both are related usually remains a sort of black box. What happens in voters' minds is an important question that remains to be answered to understand why and how issues play their role.

THE PSEPHOLOGICAL PARADIGM

The models of voting discussed may be regarded as complementary, rather than contradictory. Each tells a part of the story. The models are also related in the sense that they share a set of ideas. These may jointly be referred to as the orthodoxy of voting theory.

Helena Catt (1996, ch. 2) argued that there is 'voting behaviour orthodoxy' and identified four orthodoxies.[34] First, voting theories assume that in elections voters decide "which party they like best" (p. 23). It is assumed that all voters decide in the same fashion, and that voters of a particular party like it for the same reason. Second, votes are regarded as a form of support for the party or candidate voted for. Third, models of voting assume that voters make 'rational decisions'. Catt mentioned four elements of rationality: "the traditional 'economic' self-interest; a consistency of views; decisions based on 'objective facts' rather than emotions; and seeing the world in the same way as the analyst" (p. 30). Fourth, election studies typically ignore system biases, which result from the party system, the electoral system, or the local context. These four aspects of the orthodoxy have constraining effects. Catt listed three types of votes that cannot be accounted for as a result of the orthodoxy: protest votes, tactical votes, and votes resulting from negative motivations.

This section elaborates further upon the similarities between models of voting from a psychological perspective. The discussion shows that most models share a set of underlying ideas about how the minds of voters work. They are discussed in terms of ten assumptions that underlie most studies of voting. The assumptions are discussed as separate points, but are all related to one another. Together they make up what may be called a psephological paradigm. How we can go beyond this paradigm is indicated by discussing research in which certain orthodoxies were not taken for granted.

THE ASSUMPTION OF VOTING AS A TWO-DECISION PROCESS

A first assumption that underlies most studies of voting is that voters make two decisions: they decide whether to vote or to abstain, and they decide for whom to vote. For voters both choices may be related. To know for whom to vote may be an incentive to cast a vote, and not to know for whom to vote may be a reason to abstain. Therefore, one may argue that voting studies should abandon the idea that two separate decisions are involved. In an alternative view the option to abstain and the options to vote for particular parties or candidates constitute a single choice set.

Some theories deal simultaneously with both decisions in the sense that they use the same concepts to explain the decision whether to vote and the decision for whom to vote (for example, Downs 1957; Davis et al. 1970). However, using the same framework to study both decisions does not imply that the choice is conceived of as

one out of a single set of alternatives. Both aspects remain dealt with separately and are conceived of as two choices. Hence, these studies in fact fit the orthodoxy.

A model in which both aspects are treated as a single choice, is one that states that if voters like one party better than the other, they will vote for that party; if they like both parties equally well (or poorly), they will abstain. Such a model explains voting in terms of voting versus non-voting and party choice simultaneously. In this example non-voting is not evaluated by voters as such, but is a result of equal evaluations of the competing parties. Another possibility is to include voters' attitude towards abstention as such. The options of voting for each of the competing parties, as well as the option of non-voting, can be viewed as alternatives to which voters may be attracted to different degrees. Voters may then be hypothesised to choose the option they feel attracted to most strongly.

THE ASSUMPTION OF A SINGLE OBJECT OF VOTING

Most voting models have as an underlying assumption that in a particular system all voters either vote for parties or vote for candidates. Hence, the 'for whom to vote' is conceptualised as a choice for one specific object: parties *or* candidates.[35]

It may sound plausible that in parliamentary elections voters choose parties, but in many countries, such as Britain and the Netherlands, voters do not have this possibility. Voters can only pick a single candidate from the ballot paper and thus cannot cast a 'party vote'. So formally these voters do not vote for parties, but for candidates. From a psychological perspective one could counter-argue that what matters is not this formal procedure, but the subjective experience of voters.

If we adopt this perspective, another possibility arises. In a single election some voters may feel they voted for a party, whereas others feel they voted for a candidate. Another possibility is that some voters experience their vote as one for a government. In two-party systems in particular, like Britain, voters may feel that they cast a vote for a Conservative or Labour *government*, rather than for the Conservative or Labour *party*. In multi-party systems with coalition governments, such as the Netherlands, this is presumably less easy, although considerations about the future government may play a role. In elections that focus on candidates researchers may similarly falsely assume that candidates are the objects of voting. Voters may feel they voted for a party, rather than for a candidate. In U.S. presidential elections there is another possible flaw in the assumption that voters vote for a presidential candidate. The voters also elect a vice-president and thus vote for *a ticket* that comprises two candidates. Consequently, voters may regard their vote as one for such a ticket, rather than for a single candidate. Yet another possibility is that some voters regard their vote as being cast for more than one object; for example, for a party *and* for a candidate.

One research strategy is to leave this matter aside, and for analytical purposes define voting in terms of a single object: even if voters feel they cast their votes for

candidates, these may still be analysed in terms of the parties who (in a sense) received them. But from a psychological point of view this is not satisfactorily. To abandon this orthodoxy, electoral researchers need to identify for whom voters cast their vote in their own experience.

THE ASSUMPTION OF PARTIES AS SINGLE, UNITARY ACTORS

Another assumption that underlies most voting research is that political parties can be conceived of as single, unitary actors; and that voters view them that way. The possibility that within a party different persons or groups may have different policy preferences, for example, is usually not taken into account. Often, however, people speak about parties as if they are not unitary actors. For example, the idea that there exists a left wing of the Labour Party may be seen as an indication that parties are not unitary actors; or one may think about candidates of a party who are known for taking different stands on particular issues.[36]

Another way in which this assumption manifests itself is that the same political parties operate at different levels: in local, regional, national, and supranational elections often the same parties participate. Usually, it is assumed that at these various levels the participating parties are the same. However, it may well be that some voters see differences between parties at different levels and consequently have different attitudes towards the same party at those levels.[37]

THE ASSUMPTION OF CAUSAL HOMOGENEITY IN VOTE CHOICE

Most models share the assumption that all voters make up their mind in a similar fashion and hence that all voters fit one single causal model. Variation among voters is allowed in terms of the attributes of the variables included, but for each voter the same set of variables is assumed to be relevant. If the model allows voters to put different weights on different variables, all voters are usually nevertheless assumed to put equal weight on each variable. This orthodoxy can be referred to as the assumption of 'causal homogeneity' (see, for example, Green and Shapiro 1994: 17).

In some studies the homogeneity assumption has been loosened. Studies on issue voting that include the notion of (issue) saliency are an example. When voters decide for whom to vote, they are assumed to put different weights on the various issues. Some voters, for example, may base their choice primarily on economic issues such as inflation and unemployment, while others base their choice primarily on moral issues as abortion and euthanasia. To include issue saliency in the analysis, voters may simply be asked how important various issues are to them (see, for example, McGraw et al. 1990).

Another way in which the assumption of causal homogeneity has been loosened is by performing analyses separately for different groups of voters. For exam-

ple, Paul Sniderman and his colleagues (1990; 1991, ch. 9) examined whether in U.S. presidential elections voters made up their mind differently depending on their level of education. They found that, at least in the 1980 election between Reagan and Mondale, incumbent approval was important especially for the less educated, and that perceived competence was especially important for the more educated (p. 171). Another example is a study by C. J. Pattie and R. J. Johnston (2001). They found that in Britain voters' education had no impact on the influence of retrospective economic evaluations on vote choice, but they observed differences with respect to ideology and policy preferences. With respect to the Netherlands Pieter van Wijnen (2001, ch. 7) found that perceived ideological differences in terms of left-right had a stronger impact on vote choice among highly-educated voters.

According to Douglas Rivers (1988), the two methods discussed above do not solve the problem that arises if voters decide in different ways. The notion of saliency does not solve the problem, because people are "bad reporters of their own decision processes" (p. 738). Distinguishing between groups does not solve it, because within those groups homogeneity is still assumed; an additional problem is which groups to distinguish. Rivers showed that an alternative method to cope with the problem can be employed if instead of vote choice the dependent variable analysed is a preference rank-ordering of candidates. This allows each voter to put a different weight on each variable. After the set of variables to be used as independent variables has been determined, empirical analyses can determine for each voter how much weight was put on each variable. Rivers' analysis showed that in the 1980 U.S. presidential election the impact of two variables, party identification and ideology (liberal versus conservative), indeed varied across voters.

Another type of research that seems to have few problems with the idea of causal heterogeneity, is the more qualitatively oriented research based on voters' own motivations of their vote choice (see, for example, Van Holsteyn 1994). When voters themselves are asked why they voted as they did, they provide researchers with many different reasons. Various motives can be distinguished; for example, group interests, ideology, policy preferences, and candidate preferences. This indicates that different voters may vote for the same party for different reasons.

THE ASSUMPTION OF A SINCERE VOTE

Models of voting by and large have as an underlying assumption that voters make their choice by simply picking the most positively evaluated party or candidate. In so-called economic models this more or less corresponds with the notion of utility (or party utility, cf. Tillie 1995), and in social-psychological models with the notion of attitudes. Because a vote for the best-liked party or candidate has been referred to as a sincere vote (see Catt 1989), this may be referred to as the assumption of a sincere vote.

The problem of this assumption can be clarified on the basis of the notion of strategic or tactical voting. Voters may have reasons to give their vote to another party or candidate than the one they like best. A well-known example is related to the first-past-the-post electoral system, as in Britain. Voters may vote for another party or candidate than the one they liked best, because their original preference has no chance of winning the constituency seat. Research has shown that this indeed has happened (Catt 1989). This shows that the assumption that all voters vote for the party or candidate they like best is false; a theory of voting should explicitly allow for the possibility that voters do not.

THE ASSUMPTION OF MEMORY-BASED CANDIDATE AND PARTY EVALUATIONS

The assumption of a sincere vote implies that although voting models are usually tested by examining how well they predict vote choice, in fact they explain why voters like or dislike parties or candidates. The explanations provided for those evaluations generally build on the idea that voters have certain images of parties and candidates, and their appraisal of these images determines how much they like or dislike them. This means that candidate and party evaluations are assumed to be memory-based.

With respect to candidate evaluations there is evidence that this assumption is (at least partly) false. According to Milton Lodge and his colleagues (1989, 1995; McGraw et al. 1990; Lodge and Stroh 1993), when voters process information about candidates, they immediately adjust an overall judgement of the candidate. They 'update a running tally' that indicates how much they like or dislike the candidate. This idea is known as the on-line model, because it implies that candidate evaluations are made 'on-line', when information about the candidate is processed. A key difference with the traditional view is that voters may forget the information they have processed, while the effect on candidate or party evaluations remains. For example, voters may hear about a policy proposal of a certain party and therefore like the party better. Later these voters do not remember the proposal, but nevertheless still like the party better than if they had not heard about the proposal. This implies that the overall evaluation of the party need not be in balance with the information voters have stored in memory about that party. Lodge and his colleagues found that candidate evaluations indeed operated like running tallies: they were affected by information that individuals could not recall. This suggests that candidate and party evaluations are not memory-based and implies that we should regard voters as *information-processing*, rather than *information-possessing* beings.

THE ASSUMPTION OF COGNITIVE AND SEMANTIC MEMORY

The idea that the images of parties and candidates that voters have stored in their memory are the key to understanding their party and candidate evaluations is in itself biased in another way, namely in terms of the kind of information in memory that is taken into account. In psychology it is common to distinguish between different kinds of memory (Squire 1987; Schacter 1996; LeDoux 1998). Distinctions that are important in this context, are those between cognitive and affective or emotional memory, and between semantic and episodic memory. Electoral research takes into account only 'cognitive' and 'semantic' memory; 'affective' and 'episodic' memory are neglected.

The distinction between semantic and episodic memory corresponds with that between 'facts about' and 'experiences with'. Semantic memory concerns the image of a party or candidate in terms of traits and characteristics or other facts, whereas the episodic memory concerns memories of one's past experiences with those parties and candidates. This means that semantic memory includes, for example, beliefs about the ideological positions that parties take, or about the traits that candidates possess. Episodic memory includes recollections of speeches by a candidate heard, or certain actions by a party or government witnessed.[38]

Voters not only have an image about what parties are like and what they stand for, but they may also remember things the parties have done in the past. What matters is not only the *image*, but also the *memories* one has of a party. If voters remember things that parties have done which they like, they may be expected to be more likely to like them and vote for them. Such experiences may be independent of the image as stored in semantic memory. Therefore, not only the semantic memory but also the episodic memory is relevant when studying voters' minds.

Another way in which the study of voters' memory is biased concerns the distinction between cognitive and affective memory. Electoral researchers usually study memory in terms of voters' cognitions or beliefs, not their emotional responses to parties or candidates.

An exception to the neglect of both kinds of memory is a study by Robert Abelson and colleagues (1982). They explained voters' evaluations of presidential candidates on the basis of their recall of past emotional experiences with those candidates. Studies by George Marcus and his colleagues (Marcus 1988; Marcus and MacKuen 1993; Marcus et al. 2000) have provided further evidence for the impact of emotional phenomena in addition to candidate characteristics, policy preferences, and party identification.

Another orthodoxy in voting theory is that what matters with respect to how voters feel about parties or candidates is the same across all parties or candidates. The same set of characteristics that make up the image one has of a party or candidate is assumed to be relevant for how voters evaluate each party or candidate. For example, the proximity model of issue voting assumes that voters evaluate all parties or candidates on the basis of the same set of issues. Each issue is assumed to be equally important for each party or candidate.

To some extent Rabinowitz and Macdonald's (1989) directional theory of issue voting is different, since their model allowed for differences in the importance for each issue across parties. In a sense the heartland model of Irwin and Van Holsteyn (1989b) also does not fit this assumption. Their model suggests that in the Netherlands Labour and the Liberals are evaluated on the basis of two ideological dimensions (those related to the issues of abortion and income inequality), whereas the Christian Democrats are evaluated on the basis of only one (related to abortion).

The idea that different parties may be evaluated on the basis of different criteria not only applies to the kinds of issues, but also to the kinds of characteristics. It is possible that one party is liked or disliked because of its policy positions, while another is because of the personal competence of its leader or because of the way it performed in the government. In voting theories such differences have often not been taken into account.

THE ASSUMPTION OF CONSTRUCTABLE EVALUATIONS

Most models of voting not only share the idea that evaluations of a particular set of characteristics determine how much voters like parties or candidates, they also share the idea that those evaluations can be constructed (by researchers).

With respect to some characteristics the evaluation is assumed to be similar across all voters. For example, if a candidate is perceived as honest, all voters are assumed to evaluate this characteristic positively. Moreover, they are assumed to like this characteristic equally well. In most cases, however, voters are not assumed to evaluate a characteristic similarly; some voters like a certain characteristic, whereas others dislike it. This is the case, for example, with respect to parties' and candidates' issue positions. The question then arises how voters evaluate that characteristic and why they do so. Many models of voting answer these two questions simultaneously by pointing out that the evaluation of a party or candidate characteristic can be determined by the match between that party or candidate characteristic on the one hand, and a certain corresponding voter characteristic on the other hand. For example, the proximity model of issue voting assumes that voters like an issue position of

a party to the extent that it matches their own position. 'Evaluations' are constructed on the basis of the match between party characteristics and voter characteristics.

A more appropriate method is to assess the evaluation of the party or candidate characteristics more directly. If a certain party is of the opinion that abortion should be forbidden, rather than ask voters about their own opinions about abortion and assume that this position results in a specific evaluation of the party's stand, one could ask voters directly how they feel about the party's issue position.

THE ASSUMPTION OF RESEARCHER FOREKNOWLEDGE

Another assumption that appears to underlie voting research is that researchers know beforehand which party and candidate characteristics are important. Typically, to explain their vote choice, voters are asked to indicate their positions on a selected number of issues. Hence, the researcher knows beforehand which issues are important. We may refer to his as the assumption of researcher foreknowledge.

An exception is the research by Stanley Kelley and Thad Mirer (1974; Kelley 1983). To explain why voters preferred a particular candidate, they made use of voters' answers to open-ended questions about what they liked and what they disliked about the candidates. The research based on these questions is much more open in terms of the kind of characteristics that are taken into consideration to explain vote choice.

THE PSYCHOLOGICAL PROCESS AS A BLACK BOX

The last orthodoxy concerns not what models of voting say about how voters decide about for whom to vote, but what they do not say. In particular, models of voting are silent about psychological processes that operate. The models are analytical tools to analyse the impact of certain phenomena on voting, but which psychological processes take place that make that those phenomena are related in a certain way to vote choice is not elaborated upon. Even the most important representatives of a so-called psychological approach, the Michigan scholars, clearly stated that their theory does not describe the psychological processes that actually take place in voters' minds.

What is missing in particular, is a view on what decision-making mechanisms operate. How do voters know for which party to vote? Do voters really compute evaluations of each party or candidate characteristic on the basis of the match with their own characteristics, integrate these in overall evaluations, and then choose the party they like best? Are there other ways in which evaluations of parties or candidates can be formed? Are there other choice mechanisms at work? And if so, which are these choice mechanisms? These are important questions about which most models of voting are silent. To understand well why people vote as they do, the black box must be opened and the psychological processes must be revealed.

CHAPTER 3

ATTITUDE-BEHAVIOUR MODELS
AND VOTING

Attitudes have long been regarded as one of the main concepts of social psychology. Gordon Allport's (1935: 798) much-cited words that "the concept of attitudes is probably the most distinctive and indispensable concept in contemporary American social psychology" still seems to be true, probably even world-wide (Fishbein and Ajzen 1975: 1; McGuire 1985: 235; Petty et al. 1997: 610). Two main reasons why attitudes are important are that they influence perception and direct behaviour (Fazio 1986, 1990). Because of this, when studying voting behaviour from a psychological perspective, the attitude concept may be considered important. Insights from social psychology about the impact of attitudes on behaviour may be useful for the study of voting.

As in this research the psychological perspective on attitudes is adopted, it is useful to first take a close look at the conceptualisation of attitudes in psychology. An additional reason to do so, is that various measurements used in electoral research can be related to discussions of attitudes in social psychology. By discussing the latter, the underlying conceptual differences between various measurements from electoral research may be illuminated.

THE CONCEPT OF AN ATTITUDE

CONCEPTUAL DEFINITIONS OF ATTITUDES

The question how to define an attitude is not easy to answer. Despite many decades of research on attitudes – or perhaps because of it – there has not been a single agreed-upon conceptual definition (McGuire 1985: 239-240). The introduction of the concept is generally credited to William Thomas and Florian Znaniecki (Allport

1935: 802). Thomas and Znaniecki's (1918/1958: 22-23) conception of attitudes was not very psychological. In *The Polish Peasant* they argued that attitudes were primarily 'towards something', not 'a state of somebody'. Hence, in their view attitudes were not a psychic state or a psychological process. Later definitions differ from Thomas and Znaniecki's original conception. Attitudes became regarded as 'a state of somebody'. More specifically, attitudes became to be viewed as individuals' readiness to respond in a certain way. In the words of Droba (1933), "a mental disposition of the human individual to act for or against a definite object" (cited in Allport 1935: 804). A similar view is reflected in Allport's (1935: 810) definition of an attitude as "a mental and neural state of readiness, organized through experience, exerting a directive or dynamic influence upon the individual's response to all objects and situations with which it is related". Martin Fishbein and Icek Ajzen (1975: 6, 10) adopted a fairly similar view in their definition of an attitude as "a learned predisposition to respond in a consistently favorable or unfavorable manner with respect to a given object".

Milton Rosenberg and Carl Hovland (1960) made an influential contribution by elaborating upon the kind of responses that attitudes evoke. They argued that attitudes cannot be observed and measured directly; only the responses they evoke can. These responses, Rosenberg and Hovland argued, fall in three categories: affective, cognitive, and behavioural.[1] At the beginning of the 1960s, they concluded that for most researchers "evaluation of the affective component has been central" and that "the bulk of attitude research (…) has involved some index of 'affect' (or 'evaluative response') as the prime measure of attitude" (p. 5). Fishbein and Ajzen (1975: 11) came to similar conclusions: "there is widespread agreement that affect is the most essential part of the attitude concept". In the 1990s Richard Petty and John Cacioppo (1996: 7) concluded that there was "widespread agreement among social psychologists that the term *attitude* should be used to refer to a general and enduring positive or negative feeling about some person, object, or issue". The use of the word 'feeling' indicates that attitudes were viewed as affective phenomena.[2]

In the view of various authors 'evaluation' and 'affect' are synonymous, or at least they treated them as such (see Rosenberg and Hovland 1960: 5; Fishbein and Ajzen 1975: 11). An evaluation is viewed as an affective phenomenon. In the 1980s and 1990s the notion of evaluation is arguably the most central element of how attitudes are conceived. For example, Petty and Cacioppo (1986: 25) defined an attitude as "a general favorable, unfavorable, or neutral evaluation of a person, object, or issue"; and Russell Fazio (1990: 81) defined an attitude as "an association in memory between a given object and one's evaluation of that object". Alice Eagly and Shelly Chaiken's (1993: 1) definition of an attitude, which is widely used today, speaks about "a psychological tendency that is expressed by evaluating a particular entity with some degree of favor or disfavor".[3] Evaluation in terms of favour versus disfavour has become the central element in the definition of an attitude.[4] In later defini-

tions the notion of affect is not explicitly included, but this does not reflect a change in the conceptualisation. It is a consequence of the fact that today the term affect is mostly reserved for other concepts than attitudes, namely moods (such as happiness) and emotions (such as fear) (Ajzen 2001: 29). Hence, attitudes are still regarded as an affective phenomenon.

Despite disagreement about the conceptual definition of attitudes, William McGuire (1985: 239) observed considerable agreement on the operational definition of attitudes as "responses that locate 'objects of thought' on 'dimensions of judgment'." Despite this agreement, there has been a variety of ways in which the 'dimensions of judgement' have been operationalised. This holds also with respect to voting research. Individuals' attitudes towards parties and candidates, which are the most important 'objects of thought', have been assessed in a variety of ways. There appears to be a similarity between these measurements in electoral research and different definitions of attitudes in social psychology. Various operations in voting research reflect different views on attitudes.

The measurement of party evaluations in British voting research, for example, strongly corresponds with one particular view on attitudes. In the British Election Studies party evaluations have been measured by questions like, "How do you feel about the Conservative Party?" The answer categories included 'strongly in favour', 'in favour', 'neither in favour, nor against', 'against', 'strongly against', and 'don't know' (Heath et al. 1993). The categories 'in favour' and 'against' reflect a general evaluative positive-negative dimension, which corresponds largely with the view on attitudes as evaluations of objects.

According to other definitions, attitudes are affective phenomena. This view is reflected in the way candidate evaluations have been measured in American electoral research. In the American National Election Studies candidate evaluations have been measured on the basis of a so-called feeling thermometer (see Chapter 2). The question wording and the labels that are used in relation to the thermometer define the evaluation in affective terms. The labels include wordings like 'very warm or favorable feeling' and negative equivalents as 'fairly cold or unfavorable feeling'. The words 'warm' and 'cold' indicate that an affective evaluation is involved.

In another view on attitudes these are defined as tendencies to respond. Electoral research has usually not included questions about voters' general readiness to respond favourably or unfavourably towards the competing parties or candidates. However, in Dutch and European electoral research voters have been asked how likely they thought it was that they would ever vote for a certain party (Tillie 1995; Oppenhuis 1995; Van der Eijk, Franklin, et al. 1996). This so-called future vote probability measure can be regarded as a very specific evaluation of parties, namely one

in terms of behavioural tendency. This reflects the conception of attitudes as readiness to respond with a certain degree of favour or disfavour. However, the response is limited to the notion of voting, which is an important difference with the attitude concept.

Attitudes can also be assessed indirectly, as proposed by Fishbein and Ajzen (1975), by combining measures concerning beliefs about attitude objects and evaluations of those beliefs. Some electoral research has adopted an approach related to this strategy. Voters have often been asked to scale themselves and the competing political parties along certain dimensions, for example in terms of left-right or in terms of their stand on certain issues. By comparing the party position with voters' own positions, scores can be computed that indicate an 'expected party evaluation' (see, for example, Markus and Converse 1979; Van der Eijk and Niemöller 1983). Voters' perceptions of parties' positions correspond with what attitude research refers to as beliefs about the attitude object.[5] Evaluations about those beliefs are constructed by comparing the perceived party position with voters' own positions.

From the perspective of this research, in which attitudes are conceived of as affective evaluations of objects, the operationalisation in the American National Election Studies on the basis of a so-called feeling thermometer is preferable. This operationalisation includes the notion of evaluation as well as the notion of affect. The Dutch Parliamentary Election Studies contain an equivalent of this question, which does not include the notion of a feeling thermometer, but which does concern an affective evaluation of parties.

ATTITUDES AND BEHAVIOUR

THE ATTITUDE-BEHAVIOUR RELATIONSHIP

Attitudes concern the degree to which an individual likes or dislikes a certain object. R. B. Zajonc (1980, 1984) convincingly argued that like-dislike ratings are basic and do not even need cognitive deliberation (but see Lazarus 1982, 1984). Affective reactions, as Zajonc referred to them, are often the first reactions to stimuli and they occur automatically.

> One cannot be introduced to a person without experiencing some immediate feeling of attraction or repulsion and without gauging such feelings on the part of the other. We evaluate each other constantly, we evaluate each others' behavior, and we evaluate the motives and the consequences of their behavior. (Zajonc 1980: 153)

Affective reactions also appear immediately and automatically when something is retrieved from memory.

> When we try to recall, recognize, or retrieve an episode, a person, a piece of music, a story, a name, in fact, anything at all, the affective quality of the original input is the first element to emerge. (Zajonc 1980: 154)

The idea that in feeling and thinking affective evaluations are central is supported by research on response latencies, which indicates that individuals can produce like-dislike ratings very quickly. This implies that attitudes can be retrieved from memory directly and easily, which indicates their centrality. Moreover, this research indicates that attitudes are activated automatically. Whenever individuals think about a certain object, the evaluation associated with it is also activated (Fazio et al. 1986; Fazio 1986, 2001; Bargh et al. 1992; Bargh 1997). The centrality of evaluations was also stressed by Charles Osgood, George Suci and Percy Tannenbaum (1957), who analysed the dimensionality of the meaning that individuals attribute to concepts. They found that "a pervasive *evaluative factor* in human judgment regularly appears first and accounts for approximately half to three-quarters of the extractable variance" (p. 72).

A main reason that attitudes are important is to be found in their presumed relationship with behaviour. As Fazio (2001: 130) put it, "by forming attitudes, individuals structure their social world into classes of objects that merit either approach or avoidance behaviour". Several scholars have stressed the relationship between evaluations of objects and behaviour with respect to those objects – often this has been done in terms of a mediating motivation system and the approach-avoidance dichotomy (see Bargh 1997). Behaviour can be explained on the basis of attitudes towards the objects related to it. The general finding is that if the attitude towards an object is more positive, behaviour 'in favour of the object' is more likely. This has been reported in numerous studies and several overviews and meta-analyses (Ajzen and Fishbein 1977; Farley et al. 1981; Sheppard et al. 1988; Ajzen 1991, 2001; Kim and Hunter 1993; Van den Putte 1993; Kraus 1995; Sutton 1998).

If attitudes are viewed as explanatory variables, this seems to imply that attitude-behaviour models describe the psychological process that underlies behaviour. Fazio (2001: 129) argued that if people need to make decisions with respect to particular objects, the automatic activation of attitudes already formed obviates the need to evaluate the alternatives on the spot and thus facilitates the decision making. Consequently, "possessing an attitude is functional in the sense that it increases the ease, speed, and quality of decision making" (Fazio et al. 1992: 389).[6] Zajonc (1980: 155) argued that in many decisions affective evaluations play a larger role than most are willing to admit. Information about alternatives, then, serves more as a justification afterwards (to both oneself and others) than for making the decision as such. This means that behaviour is performed not only *in line with* certain attitudes, but also *because of* those attitudes.

Another view on the relation between attitudes and behaviour can be seen in the words of Fishbein and Ajzen (1975: 10), who argued that "since a person's complete history is not available to the investigator, he often turns to variables that reflect residues of past experience. Attitudes are generally assumed to constitute such residues". The use of attitudes to explain behaviour may then be regarded not as a reflection of the underlying psychological process, but as a substitute for the analysis of the impact of all past experiences. This implies that there is no direct causal link between attitudes and behaviour as such. Consequently, the explanatory power of attitude-behaviour models is more limited than the strength of the attitude-behaviour relationship might suggest.

There is also another reason why the explanatory power of attitude-behaviour models may be limited. Various scholars have questioned the supposed impact of attitudes on behaviour, arguing that the causal direction may well be reversed (see, for example, Festinger 1957; Bem 1972). Sometimes people do not behave in a particular way because they hold certain attitudes, but they hold certain attitudes because they behave in a particular way. In other words, people sometimes bring their attitudes in line with their behaviour.[7] This does not mean, however, that attitudes cannot be used to explain behaviour. Attitudes are caused by behaviour only in particular circumstances. The general pattern remains that in which attitudes influence behaviour, rather than the other way round (see Eagly and Chaiken 1993, ch. 4 and 11). In as far as individuals' attitudes are the result of their behaviour, the question arises what other factors then caused the behaviour. This points to the need to also focus on such other factors, such as the influence of other people.

THEORY OF REASONED ACTION

Much research on the relationship between attitudes and behaviour has been done within the framework of specific attitude-behavioural models. Martin Fishbein and Icek Ajzen's (1975; Ajzen and Fishbein 1980) Theory of Reasoned Action has generally been regarded as the most important model (Tesser and Shaffer 1990: 489-491; Olson and Zanna 1993: 131-133; Petty et al. 1997: 635-636).[8]

The Theory of Reasoned Action was outlined by Ajzen and Fishbein (1980) as follows.

> Our theory views a person's *intention* to perform (or not to perform) a behavior as the immediate determinant of the action. (...) A person's intention is a function of two basic determinants, one personal in nature and the other reflecting social influence. The personal factor is the individual's positive or negative evaluation of performing the behavior; this factor is termed *attitude toward the behavior*. It simply refers to the person's judgment that performing the behavior is good or bad, that he is in favor of or against performing the behavior. (...)

The second determinant of intention is the person's perception of the social pressures put on him to perform or not perform the behavior in question. Since it deals with perceived prescriptions, this factor is termed *subjective norm*. (...) According to the theory, attitudes are a function of beliefs. (...) The beliefs that underlie a person's attitude toward the behavior are termed *behavioral beliefs*. (...) Subjective norms are also a function of beliefs, but beliefs of a different kind, namely the person's beliefs that specific individuals or groups think he should or should not perform the behavior. These beliefs underlying a person's subjective norm are termed *normative beliefs*. (…) Within our theory, a behavior is explained once its determinants have been traced to the underlying beliefs. (Ajzen and Fishbein 1980: 5-7, 90)[9]

Some concepts of the theory need further explanation. Behavioural beliefs are beliefs that the behaviour leads to certain outcomes, including the likelihood of their occurrence. Combined with evaluations of the outcomes they determine the attitude towards the behaviour. Normative beliefs determine the subjective norm in combination with the motivation to comply with specific referents. The extent to which the attitude towards the behaviour and the subjective norm determine the intention depends on the *relative importance* of attitudinal and normative considerations, which depends on the behaviour under consideration and which may vary from person to person (see Trafimow and Finlay 1996). According to Ajzen and Fishbein (1980: 59), the relative importance cannot be measured directly, and should be derived from multiple regression analysis. Other factors that are related to the behaviour, but are not considered part of the theory, are termed *external variables*.

A number of additional remarks have to be made. First, the theory is accompanied by a *principle of correspondence*.[10] The measurement of the attitudinal and behavioural entities should correspond with regard to four different elements: "the *action*, the *target* at which the action is directed, the *context* in which the action is performed, and the *time* at which it is performed" (Ajzen and Fishbein 1977: 889). This means that, for example, to explain why someone voted for the Republican candidate in the U.S. presidential election in 2000 (specific behaviour), one should look at the attitude towards voting (action) for the Republican candidate (target) in the U.S. presidential election (context) in 2000 (time). The intention and subjective norm have to be defined in the same terms. This implies that the kind of attitude that should be measured is the attitude towards the behaviour, not the attitude towards the object of that behaviour. According to the Theory of Reasoned Action, it is not a candidate or party that is evaluated, but the act of voting for that candidate or party in a certain election. The degree to which individuals like or dislike the candidates or parties concern external variables.[11]

A second remark concerns the alternatives involved. At least one alternative to the behaviour under investigation is present, namely not performing it. Often the

number of options exceeds these two. Ajzen and Fishbein (1980: 79) emphasised that in such cases beliefs with respect to each behavioural alternative have to be identified.

Third, since intentions can change over time, they argued that it is important to measure the intention as closely as possible to the behavioural observation in order to obtain an accurate prediction (p. 47).

Fourth, they also stressed that the attitude concerns a person's own performance of the behaviour, not its performance in general (p. 56). This principle could be regarded as a fifth element to be added to the principle of correspondence: also the *actor* who performs the behaviour has to correspond between the attitudinal and behavioural entities.

Although the Theory of Reasoned Action has been applied and discussed predominantly in the sub-field of attitude research, Eagly and Chaiken (1993: 175) indicated that especially when applied to choices between alternatives the model is similar to so-called subjective expected utility models of decision-making. The essence of these models is that

> each alternative course of action or choice option should be evaluated by weighting its global expected satisfaction-dissatisfaction with the probabilities that the component consequences will occur and be experienced. (Hastie 2001: 658)

This is exactly what the Theory of Reasoned Action assumes. In essence it states that individuals base their decision to perform certain behaviour on their assessment of the consequences of performing the behaviour. Hence, one could classify it as a model of 'rational choice'.

MODE MODEL AND COMPOSITE MODEL

In the Theory of Reasoned Action attitudes concern evaluations of the performance of specific behaviour (involving an object). According to the theory, such attitudes result from evaluations of the anticipated consequences of the behaviour. Russell Fazio (1986, 1990; Fazio and Towles-Schwen 1999) emphasised that behaviour is often not the result of such conscious deliberations about the consequences of behaviour. Instead, many kinds of behaviour are more or less automatically evoked by positive attitudes towards the objects of the behaviour. According to Fazio, deliberate reasoning takes place only if individuals are motivated and have the opportunity to do so. Hence, his model he referred to as the MODE model – MODE is an acronym for Motivation and Opportunity as DEterminants.

Alice Eagly and Shelly Chaiken (1993: 206) emphasised that Fazio's and Fishbein and Ajzen's models are not mutually exclusive. In some instances the psychological process may correspond more closely to Fazio's model, whereas in other

instances to Fishbein and Ajzen's. This idea matches nicely with dual-process models of persuasion (Petty and Cacioppo 1986; Chaiken 1980), according to which individuals sometimes elaborately process relevant information, whereas in other instances they rely on certain cues or shortcuts (Eagly and Chaiken 1993: 206; Fazio and Towles-Schwen 1999). Eagly and Chaiken furthermore argued that both models may focus on different phases in the psychological process underlying behaviour. Fazio's model concerns how behaviour is initiated, whereas the Theory of Reasoned Action presumably focuses on the most proximal determinants of behaviour.

Eagly and Chaiken (1993, ch. 4) consequently included both kinds of attitudes in their model of the attitude-behaviour relationship, as well as some other concepts. According to their Composite Model, behaviour may originate in five phenomena: (1) a habit of performing the behaviour, (2) a positive attitude towards the object of the behaviour, (3) utilitarian outcomes, (4) normative outcomes (resulting from social norms or personal norms), and (5) self-identity outcomes ("affirmations or repudiations of the self-concept that are anticipated to follow from engaging in the behavior", p. 210). According to the Composite Model, these five concepts, which may influence one another, can lead to specific behaviour after being translated into a positive attitude towards the behaviour, which in turn may be translated into an intention to perform the behaviour. When this intention is executed, the behaviour results.[12]

The Composite Model indicates that performing certain behaviour may be a mere reflection of a positive attitude towards the object of the behaviour, but it also identifies other mechanisms that may underlie the performance of behaviour. With respect to voting this means that individuals may vote for a certain party simply because they like that party well, but also because they habitually vote for that party, because they identify with voting for that party, because they think they are supposed to do so (or feel obliged to, that is, experience a social or personal norm), or because they think that voting for that party will bring them a certain utility, that is, because they evaluate positively the consequences of voting for that party.

ATTITUDES AND VOTING BEHAVIOUR

THE KIND OF ATTITUDES THAT EXPLAIN VOTING

In social psychology attitude-behaviour research has been done on various subjects, including electoral behaviour. With respect to voting the relation between attitudes and behaviour appears to be fairly strong. In a meta-analysis in comparison to eight other domains, voting was found to show the strongest attitude-behaviour relationships (Kraus 1995: 66-67). Voting has been regarded as behaviour to which attitude-

behaviour models apply well.[13] Moreover, attitude-behaviour research on voting has resulted in some important additional insights.

A first set of insights concerns the kind of attitudes that explain voting best. According to the principle of correspondence, attitudes towards objects (parties or candidates) predict behaviour less accurately than attitudes towards behaviour (voting for those parties or candidates). With respect to voting this indeed was found to be the case (Fishbein, Ajzen and Hinkle 1980; Fishbein, Bowman, et al. 1980; Fishbein et al. 1985). This means that both kinds of attitudes can be distinguished meaningfully. The size of the differences, however, was limited.[14] Hence, even Ajzen and Fishbein, who generally do not proclaim the use of attitudes *towards objects*, argued that "under most circumstances, however, the act of signing a petition or voting for a given candidate involves little more than expressing an evaluation of the target in question" (Ajzen and Fishbein 1977: 891). This merits a focus on attitudes towards candidates and attitudes towards parties, rather than attitudes towards voting for them. However, in some cases, or for some voters, voting involves more than just expressing which party or candidate they like best.

Most attitude research seems to assume that vote choices are expressions of voters' feelings towards the competing candidates or parties, for it focuses on those attitudes. The question then arises which attitudes are more important. Electoral researchers would presumably argue that this depends on the context: in some political systems elections centre around candidates, in others around parties. Attitude-behaviour research supports this view: in some elections attitudes towards candidates predicted voting behaviour better, in other elections attitudes towards parties did. For example, in the 1976 U.S. presidential election between Ford and Carter attitudes towards candidates showed a stronger relationship with vote choice than attitudes towards parties (Fishbein, Ajzen and Hinkle 1980). Similar findings were obtained with respect to the 1968 presidential election between Johnson and Goldwater and with respect to a senatorial and congressional election that year (Fishbein and Ajzen 1981). In the 1988 Singapore general election attitudes towards the People's Action Party showed a weaker relationship with voting intentions that attitudes towards the typical candidate of this party (Singh et al. 1995).[15] Other studies found attitudes towards parties to be more important. In the 1974 British parliamentary election in the four constituencies examined attitudes towards the Conservative Party, the Labour Party, and the Liberal Party showed stronger relationships with vote choice than attitudes towards their candidates (Fishbein, Bowman, et al. 1980).

The importance of attitudes has been found to also differ in another way. Sometimes attitudes towards particular candidates or parties had a stronger impact on vote choice than attitudes towards other candidates or parties. For example, in the 1984 U.S. presidential election attitudes towards Reagan predicted voting better than attitudes towards Mondale (Fazio and Williams 1986). The notion of retrospective

voting presumably provides the theoretical explanation. If voting is retrospective in nature, attitudes towards incumbent candidates or parties should predict vote choice better than those towards challengers. In the 1974 British parliamentary election, on the other hand, no differences were found between the explanatory power of attitudes towards the incumbent Conservative Party and attitudes towards the Labour Party (Fishbein, Bowman, et al. 1980).

THE IMPACT OF SOCIAL NORMS, INTENTIONS, AND PAST BEHAVIOUR

Attitude-behaviour research has resulted in insight about the role of phenomena that may influence behaviour in addition to attitudes. One insight concerns the role of intentions. According to various attitude-behaviour models, behaviour results from an intention to perform it. Hence, attitudes are related to behaviour only indirectly, namely via intentions. Empirical findings suggests that the relationship between attitudes and voting behaviour is indeed mediated: voting intentions correlated with voting behaviour more strongly than attitudes (Fishbein, Bowman, et al. 1980; Fishbein and Ajzen 1981; Fishbein, Ajzen and Hinkle 1980; Fishbein and Coombs 1974; Fishbein et al. 1985), and in multiple regression analyses intentions showed stronger relationships with behaviour than expectancy-value measures of attitudes (Echebarria Echabe et al. 1988; Echebarria Echabe and Valencia Garate 1994). The support for this part of attitude-behaviour models indicates that it is possible to distinguish between the degree to which voters like parties or candidates, and whether or not they intend to vote for them.

With respect to the impact of social norms not much support has been found. Various analyses indicated that in the domain of voting social norms show weaker relationships than, and add little to the predictive power of, attitudes (Ajzen 1985; Fishbein and Ajzen 1981; Fishbein, Ajzen and Hinkle 1980; Fishbein, Bowman et al. 1980; Fishbein et al. 1985; Montgomery 1989; Singh et al. 1995; Gerganov et al. 1995; Echebarria Echabe et al. 1988; Echebarria Echabe and Valencia Garate 1994). Moreover, the effects found may be methodological artefacts due to invalid or unreliable attitude measurements and false consensus effects (Marks and Miller 1987; see also reviews of attitude-behaviour research listed above). Nevertheless, reversed findings sometimes occurred: in a senatorial election subjective norms were found to be more important than attitudes (Fishbein and Ajzen 1981).[16]

Another variable that has been suggested for inclusion in attitude-behaviour models concerns past or previous behaviour (Bentler and Speckart 1979, 1981). Various studies have found that including previous voting behaviour in a model in addition to attitudes, increases the accuracy with which voting intentions as well as voting behaviour can be predicted (Echebarria Echabe et al. 1988; Echebarria Echabe and Valencia Garate 1994; Fishbein and Ajzen 1981; Sample and Warland 1973; Granberg and Holmberg 1990). Two remarks have to be made, however. First, prob-

lems related to the validity and reliability of the measurements of other concepts may have caused empirical correlations between past voting and current voting.[17] Second, empirical relationships between past voting and current voting have to be interpreted theoretically. Do voters vote for a certain party *because* they did so before? If not, what theoretical explanation can be given? One possibility is that voters develop a voting habit, upon which they base their vote choice in any upcoming election. Having performed behaviour in the past and a habit are not the same, however. So although including past behaviour may enhance the prediction of voting, some questions need to be answered before it is included in an attitude-behaviour model aimed at *explaining* voting behaviour.[18]

Another topic that has received attention concerns the possible explanations of differences in the strength of the attitude-behaviour relationship, as well as the attitude-intention relationship. One explanation is the method by which attitudes are measured. Three different methods have been employed frequently: single evaluative measures, semantic differential measures, and expectancy-value measures. Martin Fishbein and Fred Coombs (1974) assessed attitudes towards candidates in two ways: by expectancy-value measures and by semantic differential measures. Although both measures strongly correlated, the expectancy-value measures showed stronger correlations with voting behaviour and voting intention than the semantic differential measures. Kulwant Singh and colleagues (1995) also assessed attitudes towards candidates and towards parties by expectancy-value measures based on possible characteristics of the parties and candidates (a cognitive measure). Additionally, they used a measure based on affective or emotional responses to candidates and parties. The affective measures predicted voting intentions better than the cognitive measures, and the authors concluded that the affective measures mediated the effects of the cognitive measures (p. 45). These findings indicate that the method by which attitudes are measured may have an effect on the strength of the relationship found between attitudes and vote choice.

Another methodological issue concerns the research design. The relationship between attitudes and intentions, and attitudes and behaviour, can be analysed 'across subjects' and 'within subjects'. In an across-subjects analysis attitudes are compared across voters; voters are compared to each other. Voters are expected to be more likely to vote for a certain party than other voters when their attitude towards the party is more positive than the attitude of other voters. In a within-subjects analysis attitudes are compared within voters; parties are compared to each other. Voters are expected to be more likely to vote for a certain party than another party when their attitude towards this party is more positive than their attitude towards the other party. Within-subjects analyses have been found to show stronger attitude-

intention and attitude-behaviour relationships than across-subjects analyses (Davidson and Morrison 1983; Ahlering 1987).

In a sense both analyses correspond with different questions. An across-subjects analysis addresses the question why some people vote for a certain party, but others do not. A within-subjects analysis addresses the question why some people vote for a certain party, but not for another. The latter question is of primary interest for voting research. Therefore, a so-called within subjects analysis is preferable.

Although the corresponding hypothesis, which states that voters vote for the party they like best, may seem straightforward, most analyses of voting in attitude-behaviour research have adopted an across-subjects design. One reason for this may be that attitude-behaviour models are often applied to explain the single act of performing or not performing certain behaviour. If a single act is involved rather than a choice among alternatives, then comparisons among different attitudes (towards each of the alternatives) are not applicable. Another reason may be found in the use of multiple regression analyses, which were suggested by Fishbein and Ajzen (1975; Ajzen and Fishbein 1980) as a means to apply their model. If such an analysis is used to examine the relationship between attitudes and intentions or behaviour, and if the attitude measures are used as independent variables, almost automatically an across-subjects design is adopted.

IMPLICATIONS FOR THE STUDY OF VOTING

The attitude-behaviour research discussed leads to a number of conclusions. The single most important conclusion is that attitudes towards parties and candidates go a long way in explaining the vote. How people vote appears to be determined strongly by the degree to which they like or dislike the competing parties or candidates. Usually, voters simply vote for the party or candidate they like best. Such attitudes should thus be central in models of voting.

Second, attitude-behaviour research has shown that certain kinds of attitudes explain voting behaviour better than other kinds. This means that electoral researchers need to specify in what circumstances particular attitudes can be expected to be more important. The sort of election involved (presidential or parliamentary) and the position of the incumbent (eligible for re-election or not) are factors that might be expected relevant.

A third set of related conclusions concerns the research design and statistical method used to analyse the impact of attitudes. When behaviour concerns a choice among a set of alternatives, like voting, it is important to focus not on the attitudes independently, but on their mutual relationships. What is relevant is how attitudes of an individual relate to each other. The basic hypothesis is that voters vote for the party (or candidate) towards which they hold the most favourable attitude. This

means that multiple regression analyses in which attitudes are the independent variables are not appropriate. In multiple-choice contexts, a possible solution is to create a preference measure on the basis of the configuration of the attitudes. The preference is that alternative towards which the attitude is most positive. The strength of this so-called preference can be determined on the basis of comparisons between the attitudes involved.

A fourth conclusion is that attitudes towards parties and candidates can be distinguished meaningfully from voting intentions: voters do not always intend to vote for the party or candidate they like best. A related finding is that attitudes towards voting behaviour have been found to show somewhat stronger relationships with voting (intentions) than attitudes towards the objects of that behaviour (parties or candidates). This implies that although voting usually does not involve much more than the expression of a favourable attitude towards a party or candidate, sometimes it does involve more. There are situations where voters do not like the idea of voting for a certain party as much as they like the party itself. Consequently, it may be useful to distinguish between whether voters prefer parties and whether they prefer to vote for them.

A fifth conclusion concerns the role of intentions, which mediate the influence of attitudes on behaviour. Although voting intentions usually strongly correlated with voting behaviour, these relationships were not perfect. Voters sometimes supported another party or candidate than the one they initially intended to vote for. So once voters have decided for whom to vote, they may still change their mind. For electoral researchers this may be a reason to examine when voters form voting intentions and under what circumstances they change them.

A final conclusion is that voting, like other behaviour, may result from different psychological processes. Voters may rely on their attitudes towards the competing parties or candidates and simply vote for the one they like best. Voters may also elaborate upon the consequences of their behaviour, for example in terms of the outcome of the election. This reasoning may make voters decide to vote strategically and support another party than the one they like best. Other ways in which voters may make a choice is by relying on a habit or following the advice of someone else. This may lead them to vote for a party they did not like best, but it need not. This implies that if voters support the party towards which their attitude is most positive, we do not know what choice mechanism resulted in that vote. It seems that by focusing on prediction instead of explanation, attitude-behaviour research has given this issue too little attention. Many studies show strong attitude-behaviour relations, but they do not always shed light on the causal mechanisms involved.

In the next part these insights from psychological research will be used in combination with the previously discussed insights from the study of voting. The aim of the following chapters is to increase our understanding of voting behaviour at the theoretical level on the basis of 'a psychological-psephological synthesis'.

PART II

A Psychological-Psephological

Synthesis

CHAPTER 4

THE SINCERE VOTE MODEL

The question why people vote as they do will be answered in this chapter by present-ing the sincere vote model. This name refers to the notion of a sincere vote, which indicates that a vote is cast for the party an individual likes best. A sincere vote is usually contrasted with a so-called strategic or tactical vote, which is a vote cast for a party other than one's favourite (see Catt 1989; Blais and Nadeau 1996). (For a more elaborate discussion of the concept of a sincere vote, which originates in social choice theory, refer to Appendix A.)

The sincere vote model is based on five observations, which were discussed in the preceding chapter: (1) behaviour is guided by attitudes, (2) attitudes towards performing certain behaviour must be distinguished from attitudes towards the ob-ject of that behaviour, (3) what matters in a choice situation is how attitudes form a preference, (4) attitudes and preferences determine behaviour through mediating in-tentions, and (5) across time attitudes, preferences, and intentions may change.

Attitudes indicate how much an individual likes or dislikes a certain object. They are important because they influence behaviour. Why people vote as they do can thus be understood on the basis of their attitudes towards the objects of their voting. Because this research is based on the assumption that, in general, elections may be conceived of as primarily a competition between parties, voters' attitudes to-wards parties are considered of paramount importance. In line with the idea that evaluation is a central aspect of an attitude we do not speak about 'attitudes', how-ever, but about 'evaluations'. When discussing evaluations of parties we may incor-porate the object involved and consequently speak about 'party evaluations' (and likewise about 'candidate evaluations'). The use of the term 'evaluation' instead of 'attitude' might help to limit possible confusion, as in political science 'attitudes' are conceived of differently than in social psychology, and in social psychology attitudes have sometimes been defined more broadly than the use here (see Chapter 3).[1]

If behaviour involves a choice among a set of alternatives, then the attitudes to-
wards each alternative matter in relation to one another. In such a case an individual
is expected to behave favourably towards the object towards which the attitude is
more positive than that toward any other object. Hence, an individual will choose
the object the individual evaluates most positively. In this context the concept of a
preference may be useful. With respect to political parties we may refer to such pref-
erences as party preferences. They indicate which party among a set of alternative
parties a voter likes best. Voters are expected to vote for their party preference.

Although strong relationships have been found between attitudes and behav-
iour, those relationships were not perfect. One of the reasons for such discrepancies
has to do with the distinction between attitudes towards objects and attitudes to-
wards behaviour. According to Fishbein and Ajzen (1975; Ajzen and Fishbein 1977,
1980), what matters is not the attitude *towards the object* of the behaviour, but the atti-
tude *towards the behaviour*. Individuals decide whether they will perform certain be-
haviour or not on the basis of an evaluation of that behaviour (in combination with
evaluations of alternative behaviour). Fishbein and Ajzen's view implies that a dis-
tinction should be made between an attitude towards a political party (an object) and
an attitude towards voting for that party (behaviour). This kind of distinction can
also be made at the level of preferences by distinguishing between a party preference
and a vote preference. The former indicates which party an individual evaluates
most positively, while the latter indicates which party an individual prefers to vote
for. Because this need not involve the same party, voters may form the intention to
vote for another party than their party preference. For that reason, in electoral re-
search it is important to distinguish between voters' party preferences on the one
hand, and their intention to vote for a particular party on the other.

Fishbein and Ajzen's argument that we should focus on attitudes towards be-
haviour follows from their so-called principle of correspondence (Ajzen and
Fishbein 1977). According to this principle, any specificity of the behaviour to be ex-
plained should be reflected in the attitude that is focused on. Not only should atti-
tudes towards behaviour be focused on, but the 'specifications' of that behaviour
should be incorporated in the attitude concept. For example, if one is interested in
explaining why voters voted for a certain party *in a specific election*, then the attitude
towards voting for that party *in that specific election* should be focused on. The same
argument applies to voting intentions. What matters is voters' intention to vote for a
particular party *in a specific election*. Analogous with this idea voting intentions are
conceived of in this research as election-specific phenomena. Party evaluations and
party preferences, on the other hand, are phenomena that exist independently of any
specific election. These correspond with the notion of attitudes towards objects,
which are not related to a particular behavioural situation.

A final 'observation' is that distinguishing between vote preferences and voting
intentions does not appear useful.[2] When making a choice between both concepts for

FIGURE 4.1 Concepts to be distinguished in studies of voting

party evaluation:	degree to which a voter likes or dislikes an individual party
party preference:	party (or parties) that a voter likes best
voting intention:	party for whom a voter intends to vote in a specific election
voting behaviour:	party for whom a voter actually votes in a specific election

the inclusion in a model of voting, there are good reasons to opt for voting intentions. The model presented then links up with attitude-behaviour models, in which intentions are central, as well as with the common distinction in psychology and neuroscience between an evaluative or emotional system and a motivational system (see Bargh 1997: 6; LeDoux 2002: 237).

All this means that it is important to distinguish between four concepts: party evaluations, party preferences, voting intentions, and voting behaviour (see Figure 4.1). These concepts are the building blocks of the sincere vote model.

OUTLINE OF THE SINCERE VOTE MODEL

The sincere vote model is directed at explaining why in a specific election individuals vote for (a candidate of) a particular party. According to the model, the single most important concept to explain voting behaviour is that of party evaluations. Which party people vote for depends on how much they like or dislike the individual competing parties. The core idea of the sincere vote model is that voters simply vote for the party they like best. This expectation is certainly not spectacular. But as we shall see later, making it explicit and testing its validity may lead to some important insights.

To specify how party evaluations determine voting behaviour the model includes two additional concepts: party preferences and voting intentions. Party evaluations indicate how much voters like an individual party. What matters, however, is not how much a party is liked as such, but whether or not it is liked more than the other parties.[3] So party evaluations have to be focused on in terms of how by their configuration they form party preferences. Voters are said to prefer a party if they like it more than any other party. The party preference thus consists of the party (or parties) that a voter evaluates most positively. This means that by comparing individuals' party evaluations their party preference can be determined.[4]

When voters are faced with an election, they form a voting intention in accordance with their party preference.[5] Voting intentions concern the plan to vote for (a

candidate of) a particular party in a specific upcoming election. At what moment voters decide for whom to vote, and thus form a voting intention, may vary across them. Some may decide long in advance, whereas others may not know for whom to vote until election day. At some point of time, however, voters will form a voting intention and, according to the model, they do in line with their party preference. The model presumes that when voters stand in the polling booth, the only thing that they do is transforming an existing voting intention into voting behaviour. At that moment voters do not have to weigh all kinds of information about the parties or their candidates. Instead, they only have to recall which party they intended to vote for and vote accordingly.[6]

The sincere vote model is presented graphically in Figure 4.2. The solid arrows indicate the relationships between party evaluations, party preference, voting intention, and voting behaviour. The starting point to explain voting behaviour are party evaluations. They jointly constitute a party preference. The party preference is transformed into a voting intention, which in turn is transformed into voting behaviour. Taken together, this means that voters will vote for the party they evaluate most positively. This can be referred to as the 'sincere vote hypothesis'.

Variables that are not specified in the model (exogenous variables) are presumed to influence voting behaviour primarily through their impact on party evaluations. In some cases, however, such variables may influence voting intentions or voting behaviour directly. These influences of exogenous variables are indicated in Figure 4.2 by dashed arrows. Obviously, the question arises what (exogenous) variables influence party evaluations, that is, why voters evaluate parties with certain degrees of favour or disfavour. This question will be treated in Chapter 6. In the sincere vote model party evaluations are merely taken as a given.

CONCEPTS OF THE MODEL AND THEIR RELATIONSHIPS

Some additional comments with respect to the concepts of the model and the relationships between them are in order. First, with respect to party preferences a distinction can be made between single and multiple party preferences. If voters evaluate one party more positively than all others, we speak of a single party preference. Voters may also evaluate more than one party most positively; in that case we speak of a multiple party preference. In the case of a single party preference the model results in a unique prediction concerning the voting intention (and voting behaviour). If a voter has a multiple party preference, it does not; the model does not indicate which of the parties of the party preference voters with a multiple party preference are expected (to intend) to vote for. A possible solution is the introduction of an additional decision rule for voters with multiple party preferences. This will be discussed in Chapter 5.

FIGURE 4.2 The sincere vote model

Second, with respect to party preferences a distinction can further be made between direction and strength. In the sincere vote model the only thing that matters is which party voters prefer. This aspect may be referred to as the direction of the preference. Voters are expected to form an intention in favour of the party they like most, irrespective of how much they like it more than other parties. However, if we assume that in addition to party preferences other factors may influence voting intentions (as suggested by the arrow in Figure 4.2 from exogenous variables to voting intentions), then the intensity of the preference may matter. If voters like the party they prefer much more than all other parties, then the chance that they form a voting intention in favour of another party due to such additional influences is presumably smaller than in a situation where voters like the preferred party only slightly more than other parties. It may therefore be considered useful to not only ask the question which party is evaluated most positively, but also how much more positively it is evaluated than other parties. This study refers to this aspect as the strength of the preference. With respect to individual parties the question is therefore not only whether it is preferred or not, but also how strongly. With respect to preferred parties the strength of the preference is defined as the degree to which the party is evaluated more positively than any other party. With respect to non-preferred parties the strength of the preference is defined as the degree to which the party is evaluated less positively than the preferred party.[7]

Third, party evaluations, party preferences, and voting intentions may change across time. This implies that voting intentions, once established, are not fixed. During the campaign voters may reconsider their voting intention and change it.[8] Consequently, if intentions are measured some time before the election, discrepancies may occur in the voting intention–voting behaviour relationship. The model suggests that changes in voting intentions can be expected if voters' party preferences change. Changes in party preferences can in turn result from one of three scenario's (or a combination thereof): (1) the evaluation of a preferred party has become more negative, (2) the evaluation of a non-preferred party has become more positive, or (3) a new party has entered the choice set and is evaluated more positively than the other parties. Note that changes in party preferences are more likely if voters' party preference is relatively weak: less change in evaluations is then needed to change the party preference.

In principle, there may also be other reasons for discrepancies between intentions and behaviour (other than changes in those intentions). Attitude-behaviour research has shown that discrepancies between intentions and behaviour may occur if behaviour is not fully under volitional control, for example because certain skills or cooperation of others are required. In the context of voting, however, these kinds of phenomena play virtually no role. It is not likely that voters will be prevented from voting for the party they wish to vote for. Because the explanations from attitude research for discrepancies between intentions and behaviour do not seem applicable to

the electoral context, discrepancies between voting intentions and voting behaviour may be conceived of as primarily a consequence of changes in voting intentions.[9]

A final matter concerns the notion of a sincere vote. Voting behaviour is called sincere if the vote is cast for a party that the voter evaluates most positively, that is, if party preference and voting behaviour are in line with each other (see Appendix A). A sincere vote is usually contrasted with a strategic vote, which may be defined as a vote for a party that a voter does not evaluate most positively. According to the view presented in this research, however, not any vote for another party than the party preference can be regarded as a strategic vote. The notion of 'strategic' implies that the vote is cast with a specific purpose, which has to do with the outcome of the election. Yet voters may have other reasons than strategic considerations to vote for a non-preferred party (see Chapter 5). For example, in party-centred elections voters may base their vote choice on their candidate preference rather than their party preference; or voters may base their choice on the advice of someone else. This means that a vote that is not sincere, need not be strategic. In the following the opposite of a sincere vote is therefore referred to as a 'non-sincere vote' – the terminology does deliberately not speak of 'insincere' in order to emphasise that the notions sincere and non-sincere are merely analytical constructs. A non-sincere vote can be defined as a vote for a party that is not evaluated most positively. This means that any vote is either a sincere or a non-sincere vote. In a similar way a sincere and non-sincere voting intention can be distinguished.

USE OF THE MODEL

The sincere vote model may be used to study voting in at least three ways. First, the model can be used to explain voting behaviour on the basis of the concepts included, in particular party evaluations. This may be considered the basic application of the model. Second, the model may be used to analyse electoral change at the individual level. According to the model, if voters switch party between two elections, this can be explained on the basis of changes in their evaluations of the competing parties. In a similar way, changes in voting intentions can also be traced back to changes in party evaluations.[10] Third, the model provides a framework for the analysis of factors that are related to discrepancies between party preferences and voting intentions.

Discrepancies between party preferences and voting intentions may be used to study the impact of various phenomena. First, because such discrepancies are exactly what strategic voting is about, the model provides precisely the kind of framework that is needed to analyse strategic voting.[11] Discrepancies between party preferences and voting intentions may also result from an impact of candidate preferences. One of the debates among electoral researchers concerns the degree to which voters' evaluations of candidates influence their vote choice in addition to

party evaluations (Van Wijnen 2000; Aarts 2001; King 2002). By examining how can-
didate preferences are related to discrepancies between party preferences and voting
intentions, this can be analysed.

In as far as there are no discrepancies between party preferences, voting inten-
tions, and voting behaviour, the sincere vote model in a sense shifts the task of elec-
toral researchers from explaining voting behaviour to explaining party evaluations.
Such a shift in focus may be considered an important consequence of the use of the
model. In this respect the argument that Richard Brody and Benjamin Page (1973)
presented regarding presidential elections is relevant. In that context the idea corre-
sponding with the sincere vote model is that voters vote for the candidate they evalu-
ate most positively. Brody and Page tested this 'decision rule' and found that in the
1968 U.S. presidential election of all voters with a single candidate preference 95 per
cent voted for the corresponding candidate. They argued:

> In a very real sense, these findings serve to shift the analytical task from an
> explanation of the vote to an explanation of attitudes toward the candidates.
> Such a shift is particularly useful in the confusing context of multi-candidate
> elections. It also makes possible the study of evaluations of candidates before
> nomination and throughout the election year, with the assurance that these
> evaluations can be linked to potential voting decisions. Moreover, candidate
> evaluations, which can vary over a wide range of magnitude, permit much
> more precise analysis than do dichotomous voting choices. (Brody and Page
> 1973: 16-17)

In the context of party-centred elections the same advantages apply: to study party
evaluations rather than vote choice is useful in multi-party elections, makes possible
analyses independent of an election, and permits more precise analyses than when a
categorical vote choice variable would be focused on.

Another reason that focusing on party evaluations may be useful is that it may
clarify *why* and *how* certain factors (exogenous variables) influence vote choice. An
example may clarify this. If a relationship exists between voters' positions concern-
ing the issue of abortion and vote choice, insight in how and why abortion has an
influence on vote choice can be reached by incorporating party evaluations in the
analysis. It may be that positions on the issue affect the evaluation of each party
equally, but the issue might also be relevant with respect to the evaluation of one
party only. So by examining how voters' positions with respect to abortion affect
their party evaluations, one can clarify how the issue has an impact on their vote. If
this strategy would be adopted to analyse the impact of the various phenomena that
have traditionally been used to explain vote choice, our insight in why and how
these phenomena influence vote choice may be significantly increased.

A fourth way in which the sincere vote model can be used, one could argue, is
as a basis for an analysis of the vote at the aggregate level. One might conceive of the

notion of a sincere vote as an individual level equivalent of the normal vote, a concept introduced by Philip Converse (1966). The normal vote is a hypothetical distribution of the vote at the aggregate level, one devoid of short-term influences (like those stemming from particular candidates or salient issues).[12] On the basis of the sincere vote model changes in the distribution of the vote at the aggregate level may be analysed in terms of changes in party evaluations at the individual level (in combination with changes in the discrepancies between party preferences and voting behaviour).[13] As this research is solely about explaining vote choice at the individual level, the possibility of using the model for analyses at the aggregate level will not be elaborated upon.

CHAPTER 5

VOTE CHOICE HEURISTICS

According to the sincere vote model, voters' choices at the polls can be explained on the basis of their evaluations of the competing parties. However, there is more to voting than merely comparing party evaluations. The aim of this chapter is to shed light on what more there is by focusing on the different choice mechanisms voters may use. This may be considered important for one reason in particular: it clarifies why voters may choose to support another party than one evaluated most positively, that is, why voters may decide to vote non-sincerely. Furthermore, the alternative choice mechanisms discussed may be of use for voters with multiple party preferences.

The view presented in this chapter is based on two assumptions. First, it is assumed that people's information-processing ability and willingness is limited. When individuals make a judgement they rely on a limited amount of information and use simple judgement rules, or short cuts (cf. Kahneman et al. 1982).[1] Hence, voters do not weigh all the pros and cons involved in their choice, but rely on simple decision rules, or *heuristics* (cf. Herstein 1980; Sniderman et al. 1991; Lau and Redlawsk 2001). The second assumption is that there are a number of heuristics that voters may make use of. Usually, models of voting assume that voters all make up their mind in the same way (the assumption of causal homogeneity); for example, by just voting for the party they like best (the assumption of a sincere vote). An alternative view would be that voters may follow a range of possible causal pathways and may decide in different ways (the assumption of causal heterogeneity; cf. Sniderman et al. 1991, esp. ch. 2; see also Pattie and Johnston 2001). According to the resulting perspective, there is not one single answer to the question why people vote as they do. Voters make up their mind by using heuristics, and different voters use a different heuristic. The first task of electoral researchers is to identity those heuristics. This view fits well the 'plea for mechanisms' by Jon Elster (1999, ch. 1). Rather than adopt the traditional view on causation and explain behaviour in terms of its single causes or in terms of

universal laws, he argued, social scientists should strive for understanding mechanisms as they operate in life.

Various authors have emphasised that voters make use of short cuts or heuristics (for example, Downs 1957; Popkin 1991; Sniderman et al. 1991). Richard Lau and David Redlawsk (2001) identified five: a candidate's appearance, a candidate's party affiliation, a candidate's ideology, a candidate's position in the polls, and the endorsement of a candidate by certain groups or persons. They referred to these as 'cognitive heuristics' and described them as "heuristics that citizens employ to make sense of politics" (p. 953) and "to make sense of a political campaign and decide how to vote" (p. 954). In this chapter the focus is slightly different, since we are only interested in 'how voters decide for whom to vote'. Moreover, in this study the focus is on parties instead of candidates.

In studies of voting as well as in attitude-behaviour research elements of causal heterogeneity can be recognised. On the basis of research in both domains, alternative choice mechanisms can be identified that voters may employ when they decide for whom to vote. Six heuristics will be distinguished and discussed: (1) election outcome preference heuristic, (2) incumbent approval heuristic, (3) party preference heuristic, (4) candidate preference heuristic, (5) voting habit heuristic, and (6) endorsement heuristic. These heuristics have to be regarded as ideal types. They clarify how voters *may* make up their mind and which mechanisms *may* be involved in voting.[2] (Illustrations of the use of these heuristics are provided in Appendix B.)

ELECTION OUTCOME PREFERENCE HEURISTIC

The essence of human behaviour, according to many authors, is that it is goal-oriented. Behaviour is instrumental: it is regarded as a means to reach certain ends (see, for example, James 1890ab; Lewin 1951; Maslow 1954). This also applies to voting. Downs (1957), for example, argued that in principle voters seek to maximise utility, which they derive from *future government policies*.[3] The core of this view is that in making their choice voters decide about the future. Voters may then be hypothesised to think about this future and base their choice on their evaluations of possible election outcomes. We may refer to such possible outcomes as 'prospects' and to the evaluations of these outcomes as 'prospect evaluations'. The corresponding choice mechanism may be referred to as the election outcome preference heuristic.

There is a paradox with the idea of voting as a prospective and instrumental act, since a single vote has virtually no chance of making any difference (Meehl 1977; Green and Shapiro 1994, ch. 4). A single vote has no instrumental value, one might argue, because it has no consequences. This, however, does not mean that the idea of voting as an instrumental act has to be abandoned. Voters may reason *as if* their vote has instrumental value (see Quattrone and Tversky 1988: 732-734). If they do, voters

may focus on consequences at the aggregate level. One could say that for voters not the *consequences of the vote* matter, but the *consequences of the election*. Whether an individual vote might make a difference or not, is irrelevant. What is relevant, is the kind of reasoning involved when voters decide for whom to vote. If this involves prospective considerations related to the election outcome, then calling voting prospective and instrumental is appropriate.

The notion of prospective voting is related to attitude-behaviour models that focus on consequences of the behaviour. According to the Theory of Reasoned Action behaviour is determined by individuals' intention to perform the behaviour, which in turn is determined by their attitude towards performing the behaviour (Fishbein and Ajzen 1975; Ajzen and Fishbein 1980). What is relevant here in particular, is what the theory says about why attitudes are as they are. They result from two components: the beliefs that the behaviour leads to certain outcomes and the evaluations of those outcomes. With respect to voting this means that voters are expected to take into consideration what the consequences are (or may be) of voting for a particular party. The theory therefore fits well the notion of prospective voting. The Composite Model also includes the idea that individuals take into account anticipated consequences of performing behaviour (Eagly and Chaiken 1993).

Research in neuroscience about decision-making also provides support, although indirect, for the idea that voting can be considered a prospective act. According to Antonio Damasio (1994, ch. 8), individuals base their decisions on the emotional response evoked by imagined future scenarios.[4] With respect to voting, which Damasio referred to explicitly (p. 167), this means that when voters are faced with an election, they envision alternative scenario's that correspond with possible election outcomes. Voters evaluate these scenarios and associate them with alternative choice options. Voters may be presumed to choose the option that is associated with the best-liked scenario. For example, in the United States in a gubernatorial election voters imagine that the Republican candidate becomes governor and this image evokes a certain emotional response. They also imagine that the Democratic candidate becomes governor, which evokes another emotional response. Which scenario evokes the most positive emotional response, determines whether people vote Republican or Democratic. Clearly, in this view voting is prospective: the degree to which voters like or dislike the prospects associated with the behaviour (at the aggregate level) determines which alternative option they choose.

If voters take into account future scenarios or possible consequences of the election, the question arises how election outcomes have to be defined. In the example above, the outcome is either that the Republican or the Democratic candidate becomes governor. In parliamentary and presidential elections the outcomes may be defined in several other ways. These are discussed below in terms of a number of sub-types of the election outcome preference heuristic. They are distinguished on the basis of the kind of prospect on which voters base their decision.

GOVERNMENT PREFERENCE HEURISTIC

Downs (1957) and Key (1966) both emphasised that the sole function of elections is the selection of government: some parties or candidates get governmental power, whereas others do not. This implies that the consequence of an election can be conceived of in terms of the government that is selected, and voters can be expected to vote in a way associated with establishing the government they prefer.

In parliamentary elections the corresponding heuristic can be applied most easily in a two-party system. In Britain, for example, voters may base their choice on their evaluation of two future scenario's: the prospect that the Conservative Party forms the government and the prospect that the Labour Party forms the government (due to the British electoral system a single party usually wins a majority of seats and forms the government; for simplicity's sake, we ignore the role of other parties). If voters like the prospect of a Conservative government better than the prospect of a Labour government, they simply vote Conservatives; if they prefer the prospect of a Labour government, they vote Labour. We may refer to this decision rule as the government preference heuristic.

If governments constitute of coalitions of parties, as in the Netherlands, the use of this heuristic is less easy. Elections determine how many seats each party gets in parliament, but what kind of government is formed depends on the negotiations following the election. This, however, does not mean that voters cannot use the government preference heuristic. Voters may prefer a particular government coalition and they may be of the opinion that to bring about that coalition they best vote for one particular party. For example, in the 1998 Dutch parliamentary election many voters of D66 said they voted for the party in order to help establish the second so-called purple coalition.[5] Another possibility is that voters prefer a particular party to take part in the government, irrespective of which coalition this would concern, and therefore vote for that party. Yet another possibility is that voters hope that a particular coalition will not be formed and vote for a particular party for that reason. So in multi-party systems with coalition governments voters may base their choice on considerations about the future government and use the government preference heuristic.

GOVERNMENT LEADER PREFERENCE HEURISTIC

In presidential elections it seems straightforward to define the outcome of the election in terms of the candidate who becomes president. In U.S. presidential elections, for example, the outcome is either that the Republican candidate becomes president or that the Democratic candidate does. If voters like the idea that one candidate becomes president better than the idea that the other does, they simply vote for that

one candidate. The corresponding decision rule may be referred to as the govern-
ment leader preference heuristic.[6]

In parliamentary elections voters may also take into account who will become
government leader. Voters may cast their vote as if who becomes prime minister is
the central question in the election (Bartle and Crewe 2002). We could then speak
about 'quasi-presidential voting'.[7] An example of an election in which this appears to
have played an important role is the 2001 Italian parliamentary election. The ques-
tion who would become prime minister was so central, in particular whether or not it
would be Silvio Berlusconi, that the election was perceived by many as "a referen-
dum for or against Berlusconi" (Allum 2001: 27). Note that this means that voters
presumably used the government leader preference heuristic in a positive as well as
a negative sense.

In Dutch parliamentary elections prime minister preferences may also have
played a role. In 1986, for example, the Christian Democrats used the campaign slo-
gan "Let Lubbers finish his job" (at that time Ruud Lubbers was prime minister of
his first cabinet with the Liberals). Selection of the prime minister was also central in
1977, when the main slogan of Labour was "Choose the prime minister" (Brants et al.
1982: 31). Labour's ten seats gain nevertheless did not bring Joop den Uyl the desired
position, which illustrates that who becomes prime minister may depend more on
the cabinet formation process after the election, than on the result of the election it-
self. Nevertheless, voters may base their choice on their prime minister preference.

PARTY SIZE PREFERENCE HEURISTIC

A distinction can be made between direct and indirect consequences of an election.
Direct consequences are those that depend solely on how the electorate cast their
votes, like who gets elected as president and the number of parliamentary seats a
party gets. Such consequences of an election may in turn lead to indirect conse-
quences. Examples are what coalition government is formed, and who becomes
prime minister, in a multi-party system. This depends not only on how the electorate
cast their votes, but also on negotiations between parties after the election.

In multi-party systems voters may base their choice on indirect consequences of
the election, like discussed above, but they may also focus on the direct conse-
quences. More specifically, voters may focus on the outcome of the election in terms
of the number of seats a party gets, as whether a party becomes largest in parliament
or not, or as whether a party passes the electoral threshold. If voters hope that a par-
ticular party becomes largest, or if they fear that a particular party might not pass the
electoral threshold, this may lead them to vote for that party. For example, in the
1988 Swedish election about a fourth of the Green Party voters supported this party
(although they did not prefer them), in order to prevent the party from disappearing
from parliament by not passing the four per cent threshold (Holmberg 1994b: 316).

FIGURE 5.1 Sub-types of the election outcome preference heuristic

government preference heuristic:	vote for the party you want to go into government
government leader preference heuristic:	vote for the party you want to deliver the president or prime minister
party size preference heuristic:	vote for the party you want to increase in size
policy preference heuristic:	vote for the party that wants the policies you want

With respect to parties that are large enough not to be in danger of not passing the threshold, but not large enough to make a chance of becoming largest, other prospects related to party size may play a role. Moreover, even the prospect that one's favourite party will perform well or poorly in the election may motivate voters to cast a vote in favour of this party. Because all these considerations are related to the size of parties, we may refer to the corresponding choice mechanism(s) as the party size preference heuristic.

POLICY PREFERENCE HEURISTIC

According to Downs (1957), voters base their choice on one particular indirect outcome of the election: the policies of the future government. Various models regard voters' policy preferences the key to their choice. They assume that voters base their choice on their own stands on various issues in relation to the perceived stands of the parties. Policy voting as an example of the use of the election outcome preference heuristic only applies if voters view policies as election outcomes and take these as such into consideration when they make their choice. In that case we could regard it as a choice mechanism and speak about the policy preference heuristic.

If only one issue plays a role, the election is much like a referendum and we could speak about 'quasi-referendum voting'. Voters may also take into account a whole range of issues and base their choice on the degree to which they agree with parties more in general (in their perception). So-called 'vote selectors' on the world wide web (like the American 'Vote Smart' or the Dutch 'StemWijzer') facilitate voters to make use of this heuristic. Typically, such programs contain a wide variety of statements about policies. By comparing the opinions of voters with those of the participating parties, scores are computed that indicate which party voters agree with

most. If voters base their choice on such 'advice', and they use it in order to get the desired policies in the future, then they may be conceived of as having used the policy preference heuristic.[8] Voters who base their choice on perceived ideological agreement, and regard this as a key to future policies (as in Downs' theory), fit this mode of voting too. In all these cases it is essential, however, that voters conceive these policies in terms of possible consequences of the election and thereby of their vote.

The policy preference heuristic completes the sub-types of the election outcome preference heuristic (see Figure 5.1).[9] We will now turn to other heuristics voters may employ.

INCUMBENT APPROVAL HEURISTIC

The function of elections is to hold the past government accountable and to provide the future government with a mandate (Powell 2000). The use of the election outcome preference heuristic reflects the mandate aspect. Voters may, however, focus on the accountability. In that case voters' feelings about the performance of the incumbent government are the key to their choice. The corresponding decision rule is simple: if individuals are satisfied with the performance of incumbents, they vote for them; if they are dissatisfied, they support the opposition.[10] The key to voters' choices, then, is their evaluations of the incumbent government. Because this means that voters base their choice on their approval (or disapproval) of the performance of the incumbent, this choice mechanism may be referred to as the incumbent approval heuristic.[11] As this implies that voters are backward-looking and judge retrospectively, we may refer to this mode of voting as retrospective voting.

In its simplest form the incumbent approval heuristic can only be applied if there are two parties or candidates, of which one held office. Only then do approval and disapproval automatically result in the choice for one particular party or candidate. If incumbent parties or candidates do not participate in the election, it is difficult to hold them accountable and use this heuristic. Although, one can imagine that in U.S. presidential elections, for example, disapproval of a Republican president would result in a vote for the Democratic candidate, even if the Republican candidate would not be the incumbent. For example, in the 1952 U.S. presidential election Eisenhower beat Stevenson mainly because voters were dissatisfied with the Democratic administration of President Truman (cf. Key 1966: 66-67, 74-75). Multi-party systems and coalition governments complicate this kind of decision-making. Which coalition party should be credited if one is satisfied with the government? Which opposition party should be supported if one is dissatisfied? The fact that applying this heuristic is less simple in such circumstances, however, does not mean that it cannot be used. Voters may credit one party in particular for their satisfaction with the gov-

ernment performance. Or voters may limit their choice set on the basis of this heuristic, and then choose among the remaining parties on the basis of another heuristic (cf. Tversky 1972).

The idea of retrospective voting has been central in various studies of voting (Key 1966; Fiorina 1981). According to Key (1966: 9, 58), voters rely on their experiences during the latest government period. The notions of reward and punishment provide the link to vote choice: if voters are satisfied with incumbents, they *reward* them with a vote; if they are dissatisfied, they *punish* them with a vote for the opposition.[12] Morris Fiorina's (1981) theory of retrospective voting emphasises the importance of retrospective evaluations concerning the incumbent. Various other models included incumbent approval explicitly as a central concept (for example, Sniderman et al. 1990; 1991, ch. 9).

In attitude-behaviour models the idea of the incumbent approval heuristic comes close to a model in which only one attitude is incorporated, namely that towards the incumbent.[13] As individuals' attitude towards the incumbent is more positive, they are more likely to give the incumbent their vote. Such a model corresponds with a so-called across-subjects design (Davidson and Morrison 1983). Empirical support for attitude-behaviour models in the domain of voting has frequently been based on such a design (see, for example, Fishbein and Coombs 1974; Fishbein and Ajzen 1981; Echebarria Echabe et al. 1988; see also Fazio and Williams 1986).[14]

Protest voting may be considered an example of retrospective voting: in protesting against something voters express their disapproval. Protest may at the same time be prospective and instrumental, however, namely if its aim is to influence the future. According to Rudy Andeweg (1982, ch. 5), in the 1967 Dutch parliamentary election protesting was an important factor. There would have been virtually no electoral change without the 16 per cent of the voters who confirmed that they had voted "to protest against something" (p. 187). The question remains, however, what exactly those voters (and other voters who say they vote for a particular party out of protest) were protesting against.[15]

Three additional remarks need to be made. First, the notions of reward and punishment have been applied in relation to the *overall* approval or disapproval of the performance of the incumbent. Another possibility is that voters approve, or disapprove, so strongly of *one particular act*, that this alone provides them with a reason to vote, or not to vote, for the incumbent. Second, the notions of reward and punishment may be applied with respect to other objects than incumbent governments or presidents. For example, voters may vote for an opposition party because they are particularly satisfied with one of its acts, or with its overall performance, as an opposition party.[16] In this research, however, the notion of retrospective voting will be reserved for the use of the *incumbent* approval heuristic, and consequently is only spoken about when evaluative judgements with respect to the incumbent government (leader) are involved. Third, if voters strongly approve of a specific act of a particular

party, they may credit them for this by voting for them in more than one election. For example, in the 1990s in the Netherlands some Labour voters motivated their choice by referring to the introduction of social benefits for the elderly (AOW) by Willem Drees, their former leader, a couple of decades earlier.[17] In a similar way disapproval may be a reason not to vote for a particular party for a longer time period. Consequently, the time frame of approval (and reward and punishment) may exceed that of a single election period.

PARTY PREFERENCE HEURISTIC

Voters may leave considerations about the performance of the incumbent government or possible outcomes of the election aside, and choose on the basis of their evaluations of the competing parties. According to the corresponding heuristic, voters simply vote for the party they like best. Because in this research that party is referred to as the party preference, the corresponding heuristic may be referred to as the party preference heuristic.[18]

Although a vote in line with one's party preference has been referred to as a sincere vote, there is a difference between voting sincerely and voting on the basis of the party preference heuristic. The party preference heuristic implies that individuals vote for a particular party *because* they like it best. The notion of sincere voting is used *irrespective* of the choice mechanism. If, for example, voters vote for a certain party because they preferred the leader of this party to become prime minister, their voting would be classified as sincere if they liked the party of this politician best. However, they did not employ the party preference heuristic; the choice mechanism would then be the election outcome preference heuristic. Hence, whereas a vote based on the party preference heuristic is by definition sincere, a sincere vote need not be based on the party preference heuristic.[19]

In attitude-behaviour models individuals are usually hypothesised to choose the alternative towards which their attitude is most positive. The corresponding analysis corresponds with that of a so-called within-subjects design (Davidson and Morrison 1983). In the case of an election that centres around parties this means that voters are expected to vote for the party towards which their attitude is most favourable.

In candidate-centred elections voters may also rely on their party preference. This idea matches well with Lau and Redlawsk's (2001) emphasis on party affiliation as a possible heuristic. This means that voters who rely on their party identification, the concept central in electoral research in the United States, fit this mode of voting. Voters who support the Republican or Democratic candidate because the candidate represents the party they identify with, can be said to have made use of the party preference heuristic.

CANDIDATE PREFERENCE HEURISTIC

In some elections the focus is on candidates. The candidates may represent certain parties, but the focus is on the candidates themselves. In that case voters may be hypothesised to rely on their evaluations of those candidates. According to the corresponding candidate preference heuristic, voters simply vote for the candidate they like best.

In American electoral research, in particular that on presidential elections, this heuristic has been central. Brody and Page (1973), for example, defined a decision rule that corresponds exactly with this heuristic. The same idea was adopted, albeit sometimes rather implicitly, in research by the Michigan scholars (Campbell et al. 1954, 1960), in spatial models of voting (Davis et al. 1970; Enelow and Hinich 1984), and in various other voting models. For example, in the model outlined by Markus and Converse (1979) vote choice is determined directly by candidate evaluations (see also Page and Jones 1979; Rahn et al. 1990).

In elections that centre around parties, candidates may also play a role. The relevant candidates may be both local candidates and party leaders. Presumably the latter are particularly important. Candidate evaluations may influence vote choices in two ways: directly and indirectly (King 2002). The latter possibility implies that voters' evaluations of the candidates have an impact on their evaluations of the parties, and when voters use the party preference heuristic candidate evaluations indirectly have an impact on their vote. In that case candidate evaluations do not enter the choice mechanism. Another possibility is that voters base their choice on the evaluations of the candidates, rather than the evaluations of the parties (see Crewe and King 1994). In that case they use the candidate preference heuristic.

VOTING HABIT HEURISTIC

Rather than elaborate upon for whom to vote at every election, voters may develop a habit of voting for (candidates of) one particular party.[20] When faced with an election, these voters transform their voting habit into still another vote. We may refer to this choice mechanism as the voting habit heuristic.

Downs (1957) acknowledged that voters may rely on a habit when facing an election.

> Finally, some rational men habitually vote for the same party in every election. In several preceding elections, they carefully informed themselves about all the competing parties, and all the issues of the moment; yet they always came to the same decision about how to vote. Therefore they have resolved to repeat this decision automatically without becoming well-informed, unless some ca-

tastrophe makes them realize it no longer expresses their best interests. (Downs 1957: 85)[21]

Although the Michigan scholars (Campbell et al. 1954, 1960) did not focus on habit explicitly, the central concept of their studies – party identification – may be linked to it. They more or less assumed that voters habitually vote for the candidates of one particular party, namely the party they identified with, unless short-term influences made them decide to deflect. This idea laid the foundation for the concept of a normal vote, which indicated a long-term preference for either the Democrats or the Republicans (Converse 1966).[22] The idea that the notion of party identification can be linked to the voting habit heuristic is only valid, however, if one conceives of party identification as a direct determinant of vote choice.[23] So the choice of voters who rely on their party identification, which above was said to point to the use of the party preference heuristic, may also have an element of a voting habit.

Habit is among the concepts that have been suggested as additions to attitude-behaviour models. Habits predict behaviour in addition to intentions and predict intentions in addition to attitudes (Eagly and Chaiken 1993: 178-182). The route from habit to behaviour via intentions is relevant here, because votes are not cast without the formation of an intention. As determinant of voting intentions habits may add to our understanding. They point to a psychological mechanism that differs from forming an intention on the basis of attitudes.

Empirical evidence about the impact of habits on vote choice has been provided in several ways. First, research based on attitude-behaviour models showed that previous voting influenced vote choice in addition to attitudes and social norms (Echebarria Echabe et al. 1988; Echebarria Echabe and Valencia Garate 1994). Second, in research that asked voters directly whether they voted for a particular party out of habit, voters sometimes confirmed that they had done so. In a survey following the 1992 British general election, for example, about a quarter of the voters said that they had voted for a party out of habit (Heath et al. 1993). Finally, in research that asked voters why they voted for a particular party in an open-ended question, many spontaneously mentioned the word 'habit', or used phrases that indicate the impact of a habit, such as 'out of tradition' or 'always voted that way'. Since the 1970s, in Dutch parliamentary elections typically about ten per cent of the voters provided such motives (Van Holsteyn 2000: 112).

ENDORSEMENT HEURISTIC

Voters may base their choice on the endorsement of a particular party or candidate by someone else – specific individuals, groups, or organisations. If voters base their choice on such an endorsement, we may refer to the choice mechanism as the en-

FIGURE 5.2 Six heuristics to decide how to vote

election outcome preference heuristic:	vote such, that what you want to happen becomes more likely
incumbent approval heuristic:	if you approve of the latest government, vote for them; if you disapprove, vote for the opposition
party preference heuristic:	vote for the party that you like best
candidate preference heuristic:	vote for the candidate that you like best
voting habit heuristic:	vote for the party you always vote for (or did last time)
endorsement heuristic:	vote for the party or candidate others say you should

dorsement heuristic. Recall that Lau and Redlawsk (2001), too, identified endorsement as one of the heuristics that voters may use.

Many models of voting are based on the assumption that voters make up their mind by themselves. This is not to say that other people are not important. In the early Columbia studies, for example, it was argued that the social environment is important for understanding why people vote as they do (Lazarsfeld et al. 1944; Berelson et al. 1954). It was not assumed, however, that the ultimate judgement might have been left to someone else to whom voters then would conform. Downs (1957), on the other hand, discussed this possibility. After he had identified a number of steps which would lead to a vote choice, Downs argued: "Every one of these steps except the last can be delegated to someone other than the voter himself" (p. 209). This included the step of making a choice from the competing parties or candidates. The last step, which a voter could not delegate according to Downs, was actually voting or abstaining. The possibility of a proxy vote, however, enables voters to delegate even this last step.

Attitude-behaviour models have acknowledged that individuals may base their decision to perform certain behaviour on the opinions of others. Individuals' behaviour and intentions are expected to be influenced by the perceived opinions of relevant others (cf. Ajzen and Fishbein 1980; Eagly and Chaiken 1993, ch. 4). In attitude-behaviour models, however, this influence has been conceptualised in terms of social pressure or social norms, which the notion of endorsement does not imply. Empirical applications of attitude-behaviour models to voting have shown that social norms

have predictive value, but their impact is relatively weak in comparison with attitudes (see, for example, Ajzen 1985, 1991). Hence, applications of attitude-behaviour models to voting have not provided convincing evidence that endorsements play an important role.

THE HEURISTIC MODEL OF VOTING

The various heuristics have been described more or less as mutually exclusive, as if voters decide on the basis of only one of them (see Figure 5.2).[24] However, voters may combine heuristics. First, it is possible that voters base their decision on two (or more) heuristics that point towards the same party. For example, voters may vote for a particular party both because they like the party best and because they hope that their leader becomes prime minister. Another possibility is that one heuristic is used to limit the choice set, and another to choose between the remaining options (cf. Tversky 1972). For example, voters may limit their choice set to a few parties on the basis of the party preference heuristic (perhaps those that constitute a multiple party preference), and then choose between these parties on the basis of the candidate preference heuristic.

Another thing to note is that the different kinds of evaluations on the basis of which voters may decide for whom to vote, are related to each other. More specific, as the prospects associated with an election usually involve particular parties, candidates, or governments, voters' evaluations of those prospects will depend on their evaluations of the parties, candidates, or governments involved. For example, voters' evaluation of the prospect that a particular candidate will become prime minister will depend on their evaluation of that candidate. Voting intentions may then be based on both kinds of evaluations: voters may vote for the party of a particular candidate because they prefer that candidate to become prime minister, or merely because they like that candidate.

How prospect evaluations, government evaluation (incumbent approval), party evaluations, candidate evaluations, voting habit, and perceived endorsement are related to one another, and how they can be fit into a single model of voting, is illustrated in Figure 5.3. The model presented, which is referred to as the heuristic model of voting, states that a voting intention may originate in any of the six phenomena distinguished. This fits the principle of causal heterogeneity. How the six phenomena may lead to a particular voting intention has been discussed above in terms of the six heuristics. Additionally, the model states that government evaluation, party evaluations, and candidate evaluations may also influence voting intentions indirectly, namely through their impact on prospect evaluations.[25]

The relationship between government evaluation and prospect evaluations will not come as a surprise to those familiar with electoral research. Various studies

FIGURE 5.3 The heuristic model of voting

stressed that retrospective and prospective judgements are closely related: if voters are satisfied about the incumbent, they presumably prefer the same candidate or party to take office after the election. The relationship between party evaluations and prospect evaluations is also straightforward. If voters evaluate a particular party more positively than other parties, they may be expected, for example, to prefer that party to win seats or participate in the new government. Similarly, if voters like a particular candidate best, they may be expected to prefer that candidate to become president or prime minister. Hence, candidate evaluations influence prospect evaluations. Government evaluations, party evaluations, and candidate evaluations may thus influence voting intentions indirectly (through their impact on prospect evaluations and the use of the election outcome preference heuristic) as well as directly (through the use of the incumbent approval heuristic, party preference heuristic, or candidate preference heuristic).

Prospect evaluations come in a variety of kinds. One could argue that this should preferably be specified in the model. A reason not to do so, however, is that across elections different prospects may play a role. Arguably, the best strategy is to operationalise the prospect evaluations with in mind the election that the model is applied to. For example, in presidential elections measures are needed that indicate voters' evaluations of the prospects that specific candidates will become president. In some elections the prospect of a particular vice president may also play a role. In parliamentary elections measures are needed to find out how voters feel about the possibility that specific government coalitions will be formed, that specific parties will become largest, and that specific persons will become prime minister. If parliamentary elections are held under a system with an electoral threshold, and if some parties are conceived of being in danger of not passing the threshold (and if voters are expected to take this into consideration), corresponding measures are needed. In short, to apply the model to a specific election, the prospect evaluations need to be further specified.

There are various other factors that have often been used to explain voting; for example, social characteristics, policy preferences, and ideological positions. According to the model, these factors do not influence voting intentions directly. Therefore, they are not included in the model and are referred to as exogenous variables. This means that any influence of such phenomena on voting intentions is assumed to be mediated by the concepts in the model. An important implication of this is that to reach full insight in voting, such other factors should not be studied in relation to voting intentions (or behaviour), but in relation to the concepts that mediate their impact.

Finally, the heuristic model of voting is related to the sincere vote model in three ways. First, the heuristic model indicates that party evaluations may influence voting intentions directly (through the use of the party preference heuristic) as well as indirectly (through their impact on prospect evaluations and the use of the election outcome preference heuristic). Second, the heuristic model indicates what decision rules voters with multiple party preferences may employ in order to choose between the parties they evaluate equally positively. Third, the heuristic model indicates what more there is to voting than simply expressing one's party preference. Discrepancies between party preferences and voting intentions may result if prospect evaluations, government evaluation, candidate evaluations, voting habits, or perceived endorsements direct voters towards another party than the one they evaluated most positively. The heuristic model of voting may thus be used to explain non-sincere voting.

CHAPTER 6

THREE MODELS TO EXPLAIN

PARTY EVALUATIONS

If voting behaviour is influenced strongly by voters' evaluations of the competing parties, as the models presented in the preceding two chapters suggest, the question is why voters like or dislike parties.

This chapter discusses three models that may be used to explain party evaluations. First, it will be shown that to explain party evaluations we may use theories that focus on explaining vote choice. The strategy of applying concepts used in such theories is referred to as a traditional approach. The model that integrates the corresponding concepts into a general framework is referred to as the orthodox model of party evaluations; this model links up with the voting research orthodoxy discussed in Chapter 2. Second, the on-line model of party evaluations will be discussed. This model builds on the idea that party evaluations have to be conceived of as 'running tallies' that are updated whenever individuals process information about a party. Next, it will be shown that the on-line model has some anomalies as well, which are related to the functioning of memory and emotions. Third, therefore, a model will be presented that synthesises ideas from the orthodox model and the on-line model, and which incorporates the idea that emotions play a role. This model is referred to as the emotion-integration model of party evaluations.

The three models describe different psychological processes that may underlie the formation and change of party evaluations. Understanding those processes is necessary to have insight in why people evaluate parties as they do, but not sufficient. Additional questions need to be answered to reach fuller insight. For example, if voters' evaluations of parties are based on their images of those parties, as the orthodox model suggests, then the question arises what elements comprise those images. Are parties seen as representing particular interests (e.g., the labour force), adopting a particular ideology (e.g., socialism), or holding specific policy preferences (e.g., oppose abortion)? Or are parties viewed primarily as having done a good

FIGURE 6.1 A traditional model of voting (an example)

job in the latest government, or as having good plans for the future government? Such questions need also to be answered to understand why voters evaluate parties in a certain way. However, these questions do not point to different psychological processes. Moreover, what distinguishes these questions from those concerning the psychological processes, is that they can only be answered within the context of a particular political system and with respect to specific parties. In this chapter such questions will therefore not be answered. The discussion will be limited to the underlying psychological processes, which operate irrespective of the kind of system or the particular party one is interested in.

THE ORTHODOX MODEL

A TRADITIONAL APPROACH TO EXPLAIN PARTY EVALUATIONS

One thing that many voting studies have in common, is that voting behaviour is regarded as the sole dependent variable and one set of independent variables is used to explain voting.[1] We may refer to such models as traditional models of voting. Figure 6.1 shows an example. In this model two voter characteristics are regarded as the determinants of voting behaviour: religious identity and social class identity.

According to the perspective adopted in this research, party evaluations mediate the influence of concepts as religion and social class on voting behaviour. Such social characteristics have an impact on voting, because they influence how voters evaluate the competing parties. Those evaluations in turn determine for whom peo-

FIGURE 6.2 A traditional model of party evaluations and voting (an example)

ple vote. The corresponding model, of which an example is shown in Figure 6.2, is referred to as a traditional model of party evaluations and voting. For simplicity's sake, the figure includes only two parties (parties X and Y). According to this model, voters' religious identity and social class identity have an impact on the evaluation of party X as well as on the evaluation of party Y. Voters' evaluations of both parties jointly determine their voting behaviour.

To understand the impact of religion, two relationships need to be examined: that between voters' religious identity and their evaluation of party X, and that between voters' religious identity and their evaluation of party Y. The first question to be answered is whether or not those evaluations are affected by voters' religious identity. Four possible scenarios result: (1) religion has an effect on the evaluations of both parties; (2) religion has an effect on the evaluations of party X, but not on the evaluation of party Y; (3) religion has an effect on the evaluation of party Y, but not on the evaluation of party X; and (4) religion has no effect on the evaluations of either party. If one of the first three scenarios applies, the direction and size of the effect(s) need to be examined. In a similar way the impact of social class can be analysed. This would result in substantial insight in the impact of religion and social class in the vote choice process, which goes further than the mere observation that voters with a specific social background vote for particular parties more (or less) often.

This kind of analysis may be performed with respect to many concepts that have been used to explain voting behaviour, such as social identity, policy preferences, ideological positions, government satisfaction, and party leader evaluations. These are not discussed elaborately here.[2]

FIGURE 6.3 The orthodox model of voting

THE ORTHODOX MODEL OF PARTY EVALUATIONS

A related way to explain party evaluations is to construct a model on the basis of the psephological paradigm, the orthodoxy that characterises voting research. Such a model is referred to as the orthodox model of voting. Although the model is directed at explaining voting behaviour, it may also be used to explain party evaluations, because the model explicitly includes those evaluations.

Figure 6.3 outlines the orthodox model of voting. The phenomenon to be explained is an individual's *voting behaviour*. In line with the assumption that voters support the party they like best (the assumption of a sincere vote), voting behaviour is determined by *overall evaluations of the parties*. This shifts the question to why voters evaluate parties as they do. According to the model, this depends on both *perceived characteristics of the parties* and *characteristics of the voter*. Party characteristics are not just perceived by voters, they are evaluated as well. Hence, what matters are voters' *evaluations of (perceived) party characteristics*. If a party favours legalisation of abortion, for example, voters who favour legalisation will evaluate this characteristic positively and those who oppose it negatively. How voters evaluate parties thus depends on the characteristics of what is evaluated (parties), as well as on the characteristics of those who evaluate (voters).

If we were to focus solely on party evaluations, the orthodox model of voting would result in a specific model of party evaluations. This model, which is referred to as the orthodox model of party evaluations, is presented in Figure 6.4. According to this model, the overall evaluation of a party is determined by the evaluations of the perceived characteristics of that party. For simplicity's sake, the figure includes only two (characteristics A and B). How each characteristic is evaluated depends on

FIGURE 6.4 The orthodox model of party evaluations

the characteristics themselves, as well as on the characteristics of the voter. It is the interaction between both that determines the evaluation.

The orthodox model provides a framework for the analysis of party evaluations, but cannot be applied directly. The main reason for this is that the model does not indicate *which* characteristics are important. Only by specifying which characteristics are to be taken into account, can the model be applied to analyse voting behaviour or party evaluations. Note that the model neither specifies *how* the single evaluations are integrated into one overall party evaluation. A rule has to be formulated before the model can be applied.[3] Although this rule as well as the characteristics included may, in principle, vary across parties and voters, in most voting research homogeneity in bases of evaluation is assumed.[4]

KELLEY AND MIRER: THE SIMPLE ACT OF VOTING

The studies of voting discussed in Chapter 2 differ in terms of which aspect of the model they focus on, what kind of characteristics are included, and how evaluations are presumably reached and integrated. However, they do not challenge the idea that the processes described take place.

A model of voting that fits the orthodox model perhaps even better was presented by Stanley Kelley and Thad Mirer (1974).[5] In "The simple act of voting" they argued that the Michigan scholars had perhaps "identified the ingredients that go into voting decisions, but not the recipe for mixing the ingredients" (p. 573). In the Michigan model the weights assigned to the various forces could be identified only by means of regression analyses in which vote choices were entered; vote choices

could thus be predicted only 'after the fact'. Kelley and Mirer formulated a simple
rule according to which voters were expected to cast their votes and which could be
applied without knowing their vote choice ('before the fact').

> The voter canvasses his likes and dislikes of the leading candidates and major
> parties involved in an election. Weighing each like and dislike equally, he votes
> for the candidate toward whom he has the greatest net number of favorable
> attitudes, if there is such a candidate. If no candidate has such an advantage,
> the voter votes consistently with his party affiliation, if he has one. If his atti-
> tudes do not incline him toward one candidate more than toward another, and
> if he does not identify with one of the major parties, the voter reaches a null
> decision. (Kelley and Mirer 1974: 574)

Kelley and Mirer tested this decision rule in the context of U.S. presidential
elections on the basis of voters' answers to a number of open-ended questions about
their so-called likes and dislikes with respect to the competing parties and candi-
dates. The questions asked were the following.

> I'd like to ask you what you think are the good and bad points about the two
> parties. Is there anything in particular that you (like, don't like) about the
> (Democratic, Republican) Party? What is that?

> Now I'd like to ask you about the good and bad points of the (two, three) can-
> didates for president. Is there anything in particular about (name of candidate)
> that might you make want to vote (for him, against him)? What is that? (Kelley
> and Mirer 1974: 573, note 4)

Across the five elections between 1952 and 1968 on average they classified correctly
86 per cent of the votes. The decision rule permitted prediction in more cases and
had higher accuracy than party identification.

Some aspects of these questions are particularly interesting. First, voters are free
to mention any type of characteristic they like. Second, which characteristics voters
mention may vary across voters. Third, the questions concern both parties and can-
didates. And fourth, the questions about the parties refer in no way explicitly to the
act of voting and thus seem to concern characteristics underlying party evaluations.
However, the questions concerning candidates explicitly include the notion of voting
for them. Hence, answers to these questions may include considerations that do not
underlie candidate or party preferences, but which do play a role with respect to
vote preferences.

Kelley and Mirer's model matches well with various aspects of the orthodox
model. The notions of 'likes' and 'dislikes' correspond with the notions of evalua-
tions of single characteristics of the orthodox model. By integrating these sub-evalua-
tions voters reach an overall evaluation of each candidate and by comparing these a

vote choice is reached. What characteristics are important is not defined in the model, since every characteristic can be listed as a like or dislike. Why characteristics are evaluated positively or negatively is also not explained in the model; the direction of the evaluation is taken for granted. In that respect the orthodox model provides a fuller explanation than Kelley and Mirer's.

According to Kelley and Mirer's model, evaluations of the candidates are constructed on the basis of likes and dislikes that are retrieved from memory. According to an alternative view, candidate evaluations can be retrieved from memory directly, more or less irrespective of any consideration underlying such evaluations. The corresponding decision rule was formulated by Brody and Page (1973: 13) as follows: "if a voter favors one candidate even slightly more than the others, he will vote for that candidate". According to this model, only one summary judgement with respect to each candidate has to be retrieved from memory in order to make a vote choice. Apparently, voting is an even simpler act than Kelley and Mirer hypothesised.

THE ON-LINE MODEL

THE ON-LINE MODEL OF CANDIDATE EVALUATIONS

According to the orthodox model, the key to understanding why voters evaluate parties as they do is the representation of parties in voters' memory. Milton Lodge and his colleagues (1989, 1990, 1995; McGraw et al. 1990; Lodge and Stroh 1993) put forward an alternative view. Central in this view is the distinction between memory-based judgement and on-line judgement (Hastie and Park 1986; Lichtenstein and Srull 1987). When individuals make a judgement, sometimes they search their memory for information that is relevant to that judgement and make the judgement on the basis of that information. Such judgements are referred to as 'memory-based'. In other cases the judgement can be retrieved from memory directly. This is possible only if the judgement has been made before, while information relevant for the judgement was being processed, and was then stored in memory. Such judgements are referred to as 'on-line'.

According to Lodge and his colleagues, the process underlying candidate evaluations is that of on-line judgements. They formulated a model in line with these ideas. The model has been referred to as an impression-driven model of candidate evaluations, but also as the on-line model (of candidate evaluations). According to the model, whenever voters process information with respect to a candidate, they update an overall evaluation of the candidate, a so-called running tally. If, with respect to a particular candidate, voters hear or read things they like, they may adjust the running tally positively; whereas if voters hear or read things they dislike, they may adjust it negatively.[6] The key argument is that the information on the basis of

which evaluations of candidates are adjusted may well be forgotten, while the impact on the evaluation lasts. Consequently, there need not be a match between the information stored with respect to a candidate in voters' memory and the way they evaluate that candidate. Memory and evaluation need not be in line with each other. This is a fundamental difference with the orthodox model. With respect to voting the on-line model implies that the only thing voters do when deciding for whom to vote, is, like Brody and Page (1973) suggested, comparing their candidate evaluations; they only have to "retrieve the on-line tally" (Lodge et al. 1989: 416). An implication of the on-line model is that the reasons voters themselves provide to motivate why they like or dislike candidates, or why they voted for them, should be seen as rationalisations (Rahn et al. 1994).

To test the model, Lodge and his colleagues (1989, 1995; McGraw et al. 1990) conducted a number of experiments.[7] Individuals were typically asked to evaluate a brochure of a candidate who ran for Congress; they did not know this was a fictitious person. The brochure contained information about the candidate's party affiliation, some biographical information, and information about the candidate's policy positions. Individuals were asked while reading the brochure to rate how much they liked or disliked the various policy positions (Lodge et al. 1989), or how strongly they agreed or disagreed with them (McGraw et al. 1990); single bipolar scales were used for this. After they had read the brochure and performed a distraction task – the aim of this was to let information about the candidate fade from short-term memory – individuals were asked to evaluate the candidate in terms of an overall evaluation and in terms of various traits related to the candidate's competence and integrity. Next, individuals' recall about the candidate was assessed: they were asked to indicate which policy positions were in the brochure.

The actual test of the on-line model consisted of a comparison of two methods to predict individuals' candidate evaluations. If candidate evaluations were memory-based, they should be predicted best on the basis of the information that individuals could recall. On the other hand, if evaluations were made on-line, they should be predicted best on the basis of all information that individuals had processed, including the information they could no longer recall. The results of the subsequent analyses indicated, as hypothesised, that candidate evaluations could be predicted better on the basis of all information voters had processed than on the basis of recalled information. Even if information could not be recalled, it apparently had an impact on how individuals evaluated the candidate. Moreover, when individuals had been instructed in the experiment in such a way that they formed a general impression of the candidate, the impact of the recalled information in addition to the processed information was virtually absent. Hence, the experiments provided clear support for the on-line model.[8] Lodge and his colleagues assumed that in real life voters form overall impressions of candidates, and that the on-line model explains better what psychological process underlies their liking or disliking of candidates.[9]

FIGURE 6.5 The on-line evaluation model of voting

   With respect to parties we may formulate an alternative model of voting by combining the on-line model with the idea that voters vote for the party they evaluate most positively (the assumption of a sincere vote). The resulting model can be referred to as the on-line evaluation model of voting (see Figure 6.5). According to this model, voting behaviour is based on overall evaluations of the competing parties. As in the orthodox model, voters are expected to vote for the party they evaluate most positively. The basis of this evaluation, however, differs. According to the on-line model, overall evaluations of parties are based on evaluations of the information processed with respect to the parties. How the information is evaluated depends on characteristics of the voter. In this sense there is no difference between the orthodox model and the on-line model. The difference concerns what is being evaluated: perceptions stored in memory, or information that has been processed but which need not be stored in memory. Note that the question that arises on the basis of on-line model, but which is obviously not answered by adopting the model, is what information voters process about particular parties. This question can only be answered in the context of a particular political system with respect to specific parties.

   The on-line evaluation model of voting links up with dominant models of attitude change in social psychology (about these models, refer to Olson and Zanna 1993; Petty et al. 1997; Petty and Wegener 1999; Chen and Chaiken 1999). In such models changes in evaluations are mostly regarded as the result of information-processing. The models emphasise that evaluations may change on the basis of information-processing in two ways: either by conscious deliberation, or through a more superficial, partly unconscious, process. For example, in Richard Petty and John Cacioppo's (1986) elaboration likelihood model (ELM) a so-called central route and a peripheral route are distinguished. In the central route individuals process informa-

tion about the attitude object consciously and if the information results in new posi-
tive or negative thoughts about the object, the attitude will be adjusted accordingly.
The likelihood of this kind of elaboration depends on the individual's motivation
and ability to process the information. The model also describes a peripheral route,
on the basis of which attitudes may change without much cognitive processing. The
latter changes, which may be due to cues like message length or credibility of the
message source, are assumed to be relatively temporarily and more susceptible to
counter-persuasion (Petty and Wegener 1999: 43). The heuristic-systematic model
that was outlined by Shelly Chaiken (1980) describes two fairly similar routes.
Clearly, these models of attitude change provide a different view on why individuals
like or dislike parties than the orthodox model. They shift the focus from information
stored in long-term memory to information processed in short-term memory. Moreo-
ver, they indicate that evaluations need not be based solely on conscious, systematic
reasoning.

ANOMALIES IN THE ON-LINE MODEL

The empirical findings seem to support the on-line model. However, one could ar-
gue that those studies concerned candidates, not parties, and that it remains to be
seen whether party evaluations are based on similar processes. Another objection
that has been made is that the evidence provided concerns experimental settings,
which may differ from the real world (Redlawsk 2001). More important is that the
on-line model and its tests do not take into account two important ways in which
memory may still play a role. First, voters may use information to form general im-
ages of the parties or candidates and base their evaluations on those general images.
Second, information that has been stored in memory may be retrieved and could
then influence the evaluation in a similar way as when it would have been processed
after visual or auditory perception. Both points will be explained.

The conclusion that candidate evaluations are not memory-based was founded
primarily on the fact that such evaluations could be predicted more accurately on the
basis of the information processed than on the basis of the information recalled. This
does not imply, however, that evaluations are independent of information stored in
memory. It may be that when voters process information about a party or candidate,
they do not store this information as such in memory, but use it to form a general
image of the party or candidate. For example, when information about a candidate's
issue stands is processed, voters may conclude that the candidate is a conservative.
Voters may forget which issue stands the candidate took, while they remember that
the candidate is a conservative. When asked to evaluate the candidate, they may base
the evaluation on the image of the candidate that they have stored in memory, which
says that the candidate is a conservative. The evaluation would then be memory-
based, although the initial information could be forgotten and the recalled stands of

the candidate need not be in line with the evaluation. Such processes underlie the working of memory (Schacter 1996). Individuals do not remember all information they process as such, but use it to create or update general images of persons, objects, situations, and so on. Hence, a first assumption that underlies the tests of the on-line model and that may well be false is that the image of a candidate consists (only) of information as it was processed.

There is another way in which memory may still play a role. If, for example, voters process information from a television broadcast about a party, this information will trigger other information that voters had already stored in their memory. The information that is then retrieved from memory influences the perception and interpretation of the information from the television broadcast. What information voters process thus depends not only on what information they come across in terms of sensory perception, but also on what information they retrieve from memory when processing such information. Moreover, even without processing sensory perception voters may re-process information from memory: they may think about parties without being engaged in a conversation or paying attention to media.

The fact that in information-processing information is activated from memory is important not only because it influences perception, but also because it may influence the adjustment of party or candidate evaluations. The information that is retrieved from memory is processed again and this may establish an adjustment of evaluations in the same way as information that is perceived through the senses. These ideas match with Antonio Damasio's (2000) discussion about how the brain works. On the basis of neurological research he came to the conclusion that the thought of a phenomenon and the actual encounter of that same phenomenon evoke emotional responses in a similar way. There is not a fundamental difference between the emotional response of seeing a snake and imagining seeing a snake (although the intensity may differ). A similar observation was already made by William James (1890b). He emphasised that objects of emotions can be those actually present as well as those only thought of.

> With emotions, the mere memory or imagination of the object may suffice to liberate the excitement. One may get angrier in thinking over one's insult than at the moment of receiving it; and we melt more over a mother who is dead than we ever did when she was living. In the rest of the chapter I shall use the word *object* of emotion indifferently to mean one which is physically present or one which is merely thought of. (James 1890b/1950: 442-443)

Hence, information recalled from memory may affect party evaluations in a similar way as information that reaches voters through their senses. The way such information is processed and responded to is not different.

THE EMOTION-INTEGRATION MODEL

THE IMPACT OF EMOTIONS ON CANDIDATE EVALUATIONS

Another critique of traditional voting models is that they do not take into account the role of emotions. Most studies of voting focus on memory in terms of cognitive and semantic judgements. However, several studies have shown that emotions have impact as well (Abelson et al. 1982; Christ 1985; Conover and Feldman 1986; Marcus 1988; Ragsdale 1991; Marcus and MacKuen 1993; Goren 1997; Glaser and Salovey 1998; Lavine et al. 1999; Marcus et al. 2000). For example, Pamela Johnston Conover and Stanley Feldman (1986) examined whether emotional reactions to the economy had an impact on judgements about the performance of the U.S. president. They found that how voters evaluated President Reagan's general performance was determined only to a limited extent by cognitive judgements about the economy. Considerably stronger effects were found with respect to whether the national economy or the personal economic situation had made voters feel happy, proud, or hopeful.

The question is whether such emotions influence voters' attitudes towards parties and candidates. Various studies have shown that they do. Liking and disliking candidates and parties appear not to be the mere result of cognitive processes. Instead, emotional responses play an important role. A seminal study that showed this, is that by Robert Abelson and his colleagues (1982). They made use of voters' reports about whether competing U.S. presidential candidates had evoked certain emotional responses. The following questions were asked.

> Now I want to ask you about (candidate). Think about your feelings when I mention (candidate). Now, has (candidate) – because of the kind of person he is or because of something he has done – ever made you feel: Angry? … Happy? … Hopeful? … (and so on) (Abelson et al. 1982: 620-621)

The emotions included were: fear, anger, disgust, uneasiness, hope, pride, and sympathy. For each emotion the answers were coded as 'yes' or 'no'.

Abelson and his colleagues showed that the emotional responses represented two factors that were to a considerable extent independent of each other: one factor corresponded with positive emotions (hope, pride, and sympathy) and the other with negative emotions (fear, anger, disgust, and uneasiness).[10] Indices for positive and negative emotions were constructed by counting the number of different emotions that candidates had evoked.[11] The authors examined the relationship between both indices and candidate evaluations, which were operationalised as feeling thermometer scores that ranged between 0 and 100. Both indices strongly correlated with candidate evaluations. On average across the six candidates examined (Carter, Kennedy, Connally, Reagan, Bush, and Baker) each positive emotion increased the evaluation by 9 points, whereas each negative emotion decreased it by 7 points.[12]

Even more interesting is that the emotion scores contributed substantially to the prediction of evaluation scores in addition to perceived positive and negative traits – respondents had been asked to rate candidates in those terms also. Apparently, what mattered with respect to whether voters liked or disliked the candidates was not solely their image of the candidates in terms of candidate characteristics, but also the extent to which the candidates had evoked emotions. This finding has been replicated with respect to parties, in other countries, and by the use of different measurements (Ottati et al. 1992; Innes and Ahrens 1994; Eagly et al. 1994).[13] These studies showed that the degree to which emotions play a role may vary considerably across candidates and parties, and some evaluations appeared to be based solely on cognitive judgements. A study that focused on emotions with respect to three Australian political leaders, showed that in one case (Bob Hawke) the negative emotions represented two factors: one for feeling angry and disgusted, and another for feeling afraid and uneasy (Innes and Ahrens 1994). The overall evaluations correlated more strongly with the factor that represented anger and disgust, but none of the emotion measures added to the predictive power of trait measures. These findings do not, however, violate the conclusion that emotions at least *may* play a role with respect to how much voters like or dislike candidates and parties.

The independence of positive and negative emotions that Abelson and his colleagues (1982) found came somewhat as a surprise for two reasons. First, with respect to traits, research had shown that positive and negative judgements correlated negatively. Second, emotions had previously been conceptualised in terms of a single bipolar valence dimension. It was expected that the experience of positive and negative emotions would be correlated negatively to each other. To understand why they were not, insight in how emotions operate is helpful.[14] In this respect the studies by George Marcus and his colleagues (Marcus 1988; Marcus and MacKuen 1993; Marcus et al. 2000) have provided useful insight (see also Cacioppo et al. 1997). They emphasised that emotions do not stem from a single 'emotion system', but from two independent systems that operate in the brain. One system scans for success (and failure) in engaged actions. The output of this system is emotions like enthusiasm and excitement. Another system continuously scans the environment for threat. The output of this system is emotions like anxiety and fear. The first system has been referred to as the disposition system, the latter as the surveillance system.[15] Marcus and his colleagues emphasised that as different emotions originate in different systems, we need not expect them to be correlated.

George Marcus (1988) studied the 1984 U.S. presidential election on the basis of the same emotions and similar question wordings as Abelson and his colleagues (1982) had used. He found that positive and negative emotions both played a role, but in different ways. The impact of issues was related more strongly to negative emotions stemming from the surveillance system. Overall candidate evaluations, however, correlated more strongly with positive emotions stemming from the dispo-

sition system. The effects could not be accounted for by party identification, policy preferences, and perceived candidate characteristics. In a later study that focused on the 1988 U.S. presidential election George Marcus and Michael MacKuen (1993) conceptualised the emotional responses not as positive and negative emotions, but as enthusiasm and anxiety. To operationalise these, the following question was asked.

> When we talk to people about the major Presidential candidates, they use different words to describe how they feel about them. For both Vice President Bush and Governor Dukakis, I'd like to read you some pairs of words. For each pair, let's use one (1) for the lowest possible rating and 100 as the highest possible rating. Let's start with Vice President Bush. Would you say you feel "unenthusiastic" or "enthusiastic" about him? One (1) would be the most unenthusiastic rating and 100 would be the most enthusiastic rating. (Marcus and MacKuen 1993: 674-675)

Voters rated the candidates using four pairs of words: enthusiastic–unenthusiastic, interested–indifferent, anxious–safe, and upset–comfortable. The scores of the first two pairs were transformed into a single score for enthusiasm, and the other two into one for anxiety. The hypothesis that both dimensions have different effects was supported by the empirical findings. The main effect of anxiety was that it discouraged reliance on habitual cues and stimulated attention and learning. Enthusiasm stimulated interest in the campaign and influenced candidate evaluations as such (and thereby the direction of the vote).[16]

On the basis of these findings George Marcus, Russell Neuman and Michael MacKuen (2000) developed a theory about how emotions direct (political) behaviour, which they referred to as affective intelligence. According to their theory, people rely heavily on habits and routine actions. The successes and failures of the execution of the corresponding behaviour are monitored continuously by the disposition system. If it detects success, feelings of enthusiasm or satisfaction result, whereas failures result in depression or frustration. Simultaneously, the surveillance system operates, scanning the environment for novelty and threat. If it detects novel circumstances, the system draws attention to them and consequently individuals no longer rely on their habitual behaviour. Instead, they involve in more deliberate reasoning processes. Hence, emotions such as anxiety, uneasiness, and fear lead voters to pay closer attention and learn more about the situation. As long as such responses are not evoked, calmness and relaxation are the typical outcomes of the system. This theory implies that there is a double role for emotions: they influence candidate evaluations as such (through enthusiasm), and they have an impact on the influence of cognitive judgements (through anxiety).[17] This view implies that reason and emotion are not each other's opposites: they operate in tandem against habitual behaviour. This is drawn attention to by the name of the theory: affective intelligence.

There are two important questions that are usually not answered in this kind of research, namely what voters are emotional about and why they are emotional in a particular way. If we know that some voters like a candidate because they were enthusiastic about him, whereas others dislike the candidate because he made them angry, then we know something, but not enough. Without insight in what made voters enthusiastic or angry, and why it did, our understanding remains limited. To understand the impact of emotions, those questions will also have to be answered.

THE EMOTION-INTEGRATION MODEL OF PARTY EVALUATIONS

Two major shortcomings in traditional theories of voting have been identified. They neglect the role of emotions, and they do not take into account the possibility that party and candidate evaluations are influenced by information that is no longer stored in voters' memory. The on-line model, on the other hand, neglects the role that information stored in long-term memory plays. Moreover, this model is as silent about the role of emotions as most traditional theories of voting. To explain why voters evaluate parties as they do and illuminate the psychological processes involved, these limitations have to be overcome. This may be done by formulating a model that synthesises the various ideas presented.

The resulting model builds on the idea that it is possible to distinguish between long-term memory and short-term memory (or working memory), as well as between episodic memory and semantic memory (see Appendix C, which discusses the conceptualisation of memory). Furthermore, it builds on the idea that a distinction can be made between temporal emotional states (emotion episodes) and enduring emotional states (sentiments) (see Appendix D, which discusses the conceptualisation of emotions). Party evaluations are an example of enduring states.

According to the model, party evaluations are formed as well as changed on the basis of temporary emotional responses that result from information-processing in working memory. Information may reach working memory in two ways: through sensory perception (for example, by reading a newspaper or speaking with friends) and through retrieval of information that has been stored in long-term memory (see Figure 6.6).

Working memory and long-term memory are related to each other reciprocally; information flows in both directions. First, information processed in working memory may be stored in long-term memory. This may happen both in terms of the encounter itself (episodic memory) as well as in more general terms, dissociated from that particular moment (semantic memory). Information with respect to parties may be stored as such in long-term memory, but may also be used to create or update the images of parties. Second, information stored may travel back from long-term memory to working memory. Whenever information is processed in working memory, information from long-term memory is more or less automatically re-

FIGURE 6.6 The emotion-integration model of party evaluations

trieved. Information retrieved from memory is used to comprehend and interpret in-
formation from media messages and personal communication.

When individuals process information, they automatically evaluate the infor-
mation (cf. Zajonc 1980, 1984). This may be referred to by the notion of emotional
response. Often the response will be rather weak. In that case we may speak about
liking or disliking the information. If the response is strong, this may lead to so-
called emotion episodes (cf. Russell 2003). For example, if voters hear about a policy
proposal made by a particular party, they may occasionally respond with emotions
as sadness, disgust, anger, happiness, enthusiasm, and so on. What kind of emotion

individuals experience, as well as the intensity of the response, depends on the cognitive processes involved (Ortony et al. 1988). In as far as such temporary emotional responses are attributed to political parties, they may lead to an adjustment of the evaluation of that party and thus have a lasting impact. These are the processes that James Russell (2003) referred to by the notions of attributed affect and perception of affective quality; Nico Frijda (1994) referred to the latter as sentiments (see Appendix D).[18]

The model indicates that the information that leads to an emotional response may be information perceived, but also information retrieved from memory. The latter is also automatically evaluated. The resulting emotional response may establish an adjustment of the party evaluations in the same way as information that reaches individuals through the senses. For example, if voters think about something a particular party has proposed, they may (again) experience a certain emotion.

The emotional response, whatever the origin of the information it is based on, may become represented in working memory. This means that individuals become conscious of their emotional response: they know whether they liked or disliked the information they processed and they know whether it made them disgusted, angry, enthusiastic, and so on (LeDoux and Phelps 2000: 167-168).[19] The knowledge of those feelings may as such be stored in long-term memory. These are the memories that Abelson and his colleagues (1982) focused on.[20]

Information that has been stored in long-term memory need not be kept. It may lose its accessibility and ultimately be forgotten. This applies in particular to information in episodic memory: after a few weeks such information is usually no longer available (Robinson and Clore 2002b). This does not mean, however, that the effect the information had on the evaluations of the parties involved is lost as well. After all, party evaluations are stored in memory independently of the other (cognitive) information about the party stored in long-term memory. Consequently, party evaluations may be affected by information that voters have once processed but no longer remember. This view is shared with Lodge and his colleagues (1989).[21]

The model is referred to as the emotion-integration model of party evaluations, because party evaluations are regarded as a result of emotions experienced with respect to parties; these emotions are integrated by individuals into general evaluations of the parties. The model in a sense integrates the idea from the orthodox model that there is a relationship between the image of a party as stored in long-term memory and the evaluation of that party, and the idea from the on-line model that evaluations are based on information processed in working memory. It adds to this the idea that voters' emotional responses play a key role, because these are what party evaluations are based on. Note that the model does not indicate what kind of information about parties voters respond to emotionally, neither which type of emotional response they show. These are the kind of additional questions that can only be answered in a specific context.

PART III

Analysis of Four
Dutch Parliamentary Elections

CHAPTER 7

EMPIRICAL TEST OF

THE SINCERE VOTE MODEL

According to the sincere vote model, voting behaviour results from voters' evaluations of the competing parties through a sort of causal chain. The chain starts with voters' overall positive or negative feelings towards the various parties, which are referred to as party evaluations. Party evaluations form party preferences. The party preference is the party (or parties) a voter evaluates most positively. When voters are faced with an election, they form a voting intention in accordance with their party preference. Voting intentions can be formed any moment before voters actually cast their vote. The voting intention of voters with a multiple party preference may consist of any of the parties their party preference consists of. The final step is from voting intention to voting behaviour. According to the model, in the polling booth voters retrieve their voting intention from memory and vote accordingly.

In this chapter the sincere vote model will be tested empirically by applying it to the Dutch parliamentary elections in 1986, 1994, 1998, and 2002 on the basis of data from the respective Dutch Parliamentary Election Studies (DPES).[1] These years were selected for the simple reason that party evaluation measures were incorporated in the surveys. The main part of the DPES consisted of two face-to-face interviews with a large sample of voters. A first wave of interviews was held in the weeks preceding the election, while a second wave of interviews was held shortly after the election. Questions concerning party evaluations and voting intentions were asked in the pre-election interview; questions regarding respondents' actual voting behaviour were asked in the post-election interview.[2]

OPERATIONALISATION OF THE CONCEPTS

MEASUREMENT OF PARTY EVALUATIONS

Party evaluations have been measured in electoral research by various procedures. The method used in the DPES corresponds with the feeling thermometer that has been used to measure candidate evaluations in the American National Election Studies, which was discussed in Chapter 2. The question was worded as follows.[3]

> There are many political parties in our country. I would like to know from you how sympathetic you find these parties. You can give each party a score between 0 and 100. The more sympathetic you find a party, the higher the score you give. A score of 50 means that you find a party neither sympathetic nor unsympathetic. If you don't know a party, please feel free to say so. First we take the Labour Party. Which score would you give the Labour Party?

Respondents were shown a card with a horizontal line with at equal distance eleven numbers, which ranged from 0 to 100 (all multiples of ten). Both end-points and the mid-point were labelled. The score of 0 was labelled "very unsympathetic", the score of 50 was labelled "neither sympathetic, nor unsympathetic", and the score of 100 was labelled "very sympathetic".[4]

To indicate their feelings, respondents could mention any value between 0 and 100, so the measure can be regarded as a 101-point scale. However, in practice the measurement operated more as an eleven-point scale. In 1998, for example, only one and a half per cent of the answers did not fit an eleven-point format. In this research such answers have been transformed in line with the eleven-point format by rounding off the figures to the nearest multiple of ten. This procedure has some disadvantages (the number of multiple party preferences may be overestimated), but safeguards against some more severe problems and possible critiques.[5] Therefore, the following analyses are all based on evaluation scores that have been rounded off. It is worth noting that in as far as this procedure affects the results, it only weakens the support found for the principal claims of this study that voting can be accurately predicted on the basis of party evaluations and that partisanship can at the same time be distinguished from voting.

In each study respondents were asked to evaluate all parties that were represented in the Second Chamber of Dutch parliament at that time. In 2002 two new parties that were doing well in the opinion polls (List Pim Fortuyn and Liveable Netherlands) were also included.[6] Table 7.1 lists the parties and shows how many voters apparently knew each party, since they awarded it an evaluation score.[7] In 2002 the figures are relatively high for all parties. Presumably, the campaign in which Pim Fortuyn played such a dominant role, made voters pay closer attention to the election than they had done in previous years. Note also that the number of vot-

TABLE 7.1 Percentage of voters who knew (how much they liked) the parties

		1986	1994	1998	2002
Labour Party	PvdA	97	97	97	99
Liberal Party	VVD	95	95	96	99
Christian Democrats	CDA	97	97	96	99
Democrats 66	D66	88	93	95	98
Political Party Radicals	PPR	79	-	-	-
Communist Party	CPN	87	-	-	-
Evangelist Party	EVP	77	-	-	-
GreenLeft	GL	-	88	93	98
Socialist Party	SP	-	-	80	94
Political Reformed Party	SGP	74	72	71	86
Reformed Political League	GPV	73	71	75	-
Reformed Political Federation	RPF	67	63	66	-
ChristianUnion	CU	-	-	-	87
Centre Party/Centre Democrats	CP/CD	92	95	93	-
Elderly Alliance	AOV	-	-	74	-
List Pim Fortuyn	LPF	-	-	-	98
Liveable Netherlands	LN	-	-	-	93
	(N)	(1630)	(1812)	(2101)	(1908)

Notes: Abbreviations listed for GreenLeft (GL), ChristianUnion (CU), and Liveable Netherlands (LN) are not as common as the others, but will be used in this study for practical purposes. In this research the Centre Party (CP) and Centre Democrats (CD) will sometimes be referred to jointly as Centre Democrats.

ers who knew the various parties varied. The Labour Party, Liberal Party, and Christian Democrats were well-known in each year: between 95 and 99 per cent of the voters could indicate how much they liked them. In the elections in which they participated, the Centre Democrats, List Pim Fortuyn, and Liveable Netherlands were also well-known: between 92 and 98 per cent of the voters awarded them a score.[8] In 1986 D66 was slightly less well-known (88 per cent), but since 1994 this party was about as well-known as the major parties. GreenLeft and the Socialist Party were only slightly less well-known. Large majorities of voters were also familiar with the three small left-wing predecessors of GreenLeft in 1986 (PPR, CPN, and EVP) and with the Elderly Alliance in 1994 (between 74 and 87 per cent). Finally, the orthodox Protestant parties (SGP, GPV, RPF, and ChristianUnion) were not as well-known as most others, but a majority knew them too.

Table 7.2 to Table 7.5 show how voters evaluated the various parties. For each party the number of voters is shown who awarded each evaluation score, as well as the number of voters who did not know the party. Additionally, the mean evaluation score awarded to each party, as well as the standard deviation, is presented.

TABLE 7.2 Evaluation scores awarded to parties in 1986 (%) (N = 1630)

	PvdA	VVD	CDA	D66	PPR	CPN	EVP	SGP	GPV	RPF	CP
100	9	2	5	1	1	0	0	1	1	1	0
90	11	5	9	2	2	1	1	1	1	1	0
80	15	8	13	7	4	3	1	2	2	1	0
70	8	8	13	13	6	3	2	3	3	2	0
60	10	13	12	18	10	6	6	5	5	3	1
50	14	15	13	22	12	11	11	11	10	9	2
40	7	13	8	10	10	7	8	8	7	6	2
30	7	10	7	6	9	8	6	6	7	6	2
20	5	8	6	4	8	9	8	10	9	8	3
10	6	7	6	3	10	16	16	13	13	14	9
0	4	6	4	2	8	23	17	14	14	16	72
don't know	3	5	3	12	21	13	23	26	27	33	8
total	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100
mean score	59	46	56	53	39	27	27	30	30	26	5
(std)	(29)	(26)	(27)	(20)	(25)	(25)	(24)	(25)	(25)	(25)	(14)

TABLE 7.3 Evaluation scores awarded to parties in 1994 (%) (N = 1812)

	PvdA	VVD	CDA	D66	GL	SGP	GPV	RPF	CD
100	3	1	2	2	1	0	0	1	0
90	5	5	5	5	5	1	1	1	0
80	14	8	11	13	8	2	2	2	0
70	15	12	12	18	10	2	3	2	1
60	15	16	14	18	13	5	5	4	0
50	21	18	21	19	15	12	11	9	2
40	9	13	11	7	10	9	8	6	2
30	7	9	7	5	9	11	11	10	3
20	3	6	7	3	6	9	10	9	4
10	2	4	4	2	6	12	12	11	7
0	2	3	3	2	6	10	9	8	75
don't know	3	5	3	7	12	28	29	37	5
total	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100
mean score	57	51	52	58	48	32	32	31	6
(std)	(22)	(23)	(23)	(21)	(25)	(23)	(23)	(23)	(15)

TABLE 7.4 Evaluation scores awarded to parties in 1998 (%) (N = 2101)

	PvdA	VVD	CDA	D66	GL	SP	SGP	GPV	RPF	CD	AOV
100	4	1	2	1	2	1	1	1	1	0	1
90	8	3	4	3	5	2	1	1	1	0	1
80	18	9	9	8	13	7	2	3	3	0	4
70	21	14	15	15	17	7	3	4	3	1	7
60	18	15	18	19	14	8	4	5	4	1	9
50	17	18	23	22	15	15	14	15	13	3	21
40	6	15	12	11	10	10	9	10	8	2	7
30	3	9	6	7	8	9	12	11	10	2	7
20	2	5	4	5	5	8	11	11	11	5	6
10	1	4	2	3	3	7	10	10	8	9	7
0	1	2	1	1	2	5	6	5	5	70	4
don't know	3	4	4	5	7	20	29	25	34	7	26
total	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100
mean score	64	52	55	54	55	44	34	36	36	6	44
(std)	(19)	(22)	(20)	(20)	(23)	(25)	(22)	(22)	(23)	(15)	(23)

TABLE 7.5 Evaluation scores awarded to parties in 2002 (%) (N = 1908)

	PvdA	VVD	CDA	D66	GL	SP	SGP	CU	LPF	LN
100	2	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	2	0
90	5	3	5	3	5	4	1	3	3	1
80	11	10	13	9	13	9	2	4	7	3
70	17	16	19	15	17	13	4	7	7	6
60	18	18	19	18	16	13	6	9	7	9
50	18	16	17	19	14	13	13	15	9	14
40	12	16	12	14	11	11	10	12	9	12
30	7	9	7	8	10	10	14	12	9	13
20	4	6	3	6	6	10	13	10	9	12
10	3	3	3	4	4	8	16	11	16	15
0	1	1	1	2	1	3	7	4	19	7
don't know	1	1	1	2	2	6	14	13	2	7
total	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100
mean score	56	53	57	51	55	48	33	41	35	36
(std)	(21)	(20)	(20)	(21)	(22)	(24)	(23)	(24)	(29)	(23)

In 1986 the average score awarded to the Labour Party was highest (mean score of 59). The Centre Party, on the other hand, was evaluated very negatively (mean score of 5). The mean score awarded to other parties varied between 26 and 56. In 1994 D66 and the Labour Party were evaluated most positively (mean scores of 58 and 57), and the Centre Democrats again very negatively (mean score of 6). The average scores awarded to the Christian Democrats, Liberal Party, and GreenLeft were fairly similar (mean scores of about 50). The orthodox Protestant parties were evaluated more negatively (mean scores of about 30). The major change in 1998 concerned the mean evaluation of the Labour Party, which increased to 64 – the highest average of any party in all four years. The Socialist Party and Elderly Alliance were evaluated less positively than the Christian Democrats, Liberal Party, D66, and GreenLeft, but more positively than the orthodox Protestant parties. Four years later, in 2002, the most striking change is arguably that of the Labour Party, whose average score decreased to 56. The Christian Democrats, Liberal Party, D66, and GreenLeft were again evaluated fairly similarly. The two new parties – List Pim Fortuyn and Liveable Netherlands – were on average evaluated fairly negatively (scores of about 35).

Whereas the average evaluation score varied considerably across the parties, the variation in these scores was remarkably similar. Some differences can be observed, however. First, in 1986 the scores awarded to the Labour Party varied more strongly than those of other parties, whereas scores awarded to Democrats 66 varied less. The figures of the Centre Party and Centre Democrats showed least deviation. Large majorities awarded them the same, negative evaluation score (0). From 1994 until 2002 the variation in scores of the various other parties was about the same, although slightly lower than in 1986, with one exception. In 2002 the evaluations awarded to List Pim Fortuyn varied more strongly than those of any other party.

Although the average evaluation scores and their variation tell something about how the parties were evaluated, the frequency distributions provide more useful information. We may expect that a party has a reasonable chance to be preferred only if it is awarded a fairly high evaluation score. If we focus on the three highest evaluation scores (80, 90, and 100), the following observations can be made (see Table 7.6). In 1986 the Labour Party was awarded such positive scores most often, namely by 35 per cent of all voters. In no other year was any party liked that much that often. The same year the Christian Democrats received such scores from 27 per cent of the voters. The corresponding figures for the other parties were considerably lower. In 1994 fewer voters awarded a score of at least 80 to the Labour Party and the Christian Democrats, and more did so with respect to D66. Consequently, the figures of these three parties no longer differed very much. The Liberal Party and GreenLeft were both evaluated that positively somewhat less frequently, while the figure of the orthodox Protestant parties was still low at 5 per cent.

TABLE 7.6 Percentage of voters who awarded parties evaluation scores of 80 or more

	1986	1994	1998	2002
Labour Party	35	22	29	18
Liberal Party	15	14	14	13
Christian Democrats	27	17	15	19
D66	10	20	12	12
GreenLeft	10	14	19	20
Socialist Party	-	-	10	14
Orthodox Protestant	5	5	7	10
Centre Democrats	1	1	0	-
Elderly Alliance	-	-	5	-
List Pim Fortuyn	-	-	-	12
Liveable Netherlands	-	-	-	4
(N)	(1630)	(1812)	(2101)	(1908)

Note: The 1986 figure of GreenLeft concerns the small left-wing parties jointly (PPR, CPN, EVP).

In 1998 the Labour Party was awarded scores of 80 and above by more voters again (29 per cent), and the party was by far liked well most often. The party that came closest was GreenLeft; this party was awarded such scores more often than before. The corresponding figure for the Christian Democrats, Liberal Party, D66, and the Socialist Party were lower and varied between 10 and 15 per cent. For D66 this implied a large decrease. For the three orthodox Protestant parties the figure rose slightly to 7 per cent. In 2002 Labour's position became much weaker again, since the number of voters who awarded them scores of at least 80 decreased to 18 per cent. The Christian Democrats and GreenLeft were awarded such high scores about equally often as the Labour Party (each about 20 per cent). The corresponding figures of the Liberal Party, D66, Socialist Party, and List Pim Fortuyn were lower and varied between 12 and 14 per cent. The orthodox Protestant parties were liked that well by more voters than in any previous year, namely by 10 per cent.[9] Finally, 4 per cent of the voters awarded these scores to Liveable Netherlands.

It is clear that average evaluation scores do not tell us much about how often parties were liked well. For example, in 2002 List Pim Fortuyn and Liveable Netherlands were on average evaluated about equally positively (or better: negatively – both had a mean evaluation score of about 35). However, if we focus on the number of voters who awarded them very positive evaluation scores, there are large differences: List Pim Fortuyn was liked well by 12 per cent of the voters, Liveable Netherlands by only 4 per cent. Average scores, which are often focused on, are of limited use.

MEASUREMENT OF PARTY PREFERENCES

How voters evaluated an individual party still says nothing about whether they preferred that party or not. That depends on the evaluation of the party *in comparison to*
the evaluations of other parties. What matters is whether a party was evaluated most
positively. Only if voters awarded a party a higher evaluation score than any other
party, can this party be said to be preferred. Recall that voters may award their highest evaluation score to more than one party. In that case they have a multiple party
preference.

The highest evaluation score that voters awarded to a party varied considerably
across voters (Table 7.7). Some voters awarded at least one party the highest possible
evaluation score, namely a score of 100. A majority of the voters did not evaluate any
party this positively, and awarded the party they liked best scores between 70 and 90.
Few voters did not like any party and evaluated a party at best neutrally (a score of
50), or disliked each party and awarded all of them even lower scores. This pattern is
similar across the years, with two notable exceptions. First, in 1986 20 per cent of the
voters awarded a score of 100, while in the other three years only about 10 per cent
did. Second, in 1994 almost 10 per cent of the voters did not like any party – about
twice as many as in the other years.

Table 7.7 furthermore shows that only 2 per cent or less of the voters did not
evaluate any party. Consequently, in each year a party preference measure could be
created on the basis of the party evaluation scores for at least 98 per cent of the voters. This means that the sincere vote model can be investigated for virtually all voters.[10]

Whether a particular party was preferred or not, and how strongly so, can be
examined by determining the difference between the evaluation score awarded to
that party and the highest evaluation score awarded to any other party. The values
indicate how strongly the party was preferred, or how strongly it was not preferred.
To facilitate the discussion these scores have been transformed into seven categories:
strongly preferred (scores of 30 or higher), moderately preferred (score of 20),
weakly preferred (score of 10), multiple preference (score of 0), weakly not preferred
(score of –10), moderately not preferred (score of –20), and strongly not preferred
(scores of –30 and lower). An additional category includes voters who did not know
(how much they liked) a party. How strongly voters preferred each party is shown in
Table 7.8 to Table 7.11.

The measures regarding the individual parties can be combined to determine
the direction as well as the strength of voters' party preference. The directional component is the party that voters preferred, while the strength component indicates
how strongly that party was preferred. With respect to the directional component a
distinction can be made between voters with a single and those with a multiple party
preference. The basis for this distinction is the number of parties that voters evalu-

TABLE 7.7 Highest evaluation score awarded to any party (%)

	1986	1994	1998	2002
100	20	9	11	10
90	27	21	19	24
80	29	31	35	34
70	13	20	20	21
60	6	9	8	8
50	3	6	4	2
0-40	1	3	1	1
none evaluated	2	2	2	1
total	100	100	100	100
(N)	(1630)	(1812)	(2101)	(1908)
mean score	83	77	79	80

ated most positively.[11] In each election, a majority of the voters evaluated one party more positively than any other (Table 7.12). The number of voters with a single party preference decreased, however, from 80 per cent in 1986 to about 65 per cent in 1998 and 2002. Table 7.12 furthermore shows that other voters mostly preferred two parties, but some liked three or even more parties equally well.[12]

Which party voters with a single party preference preferred is shown in Table 7.13. In 1986 the Labour Party was preferred most often, namely by 33 per cent of the voters. The number of voters who evaluated the Christian Democrats more positively than any other party equalled 24 per cent. The Liberal Party and D66 were liked best by 11 and 5 per cent, respectively. Even fewer voters preferred the orthodox Protestant parties or the Centre Democrats. If these figures are compared to those concerning party evaluations, an observation is that the relatively small parties (D66, the small left-wing parties, and the orthodox Protestant parties) were preferred less often than one might have expected on the basis of the evaluation scores. Voters who liked these parties well were likely to like another party still better. This illustrates the importance of focusing on party evaluations in terms of party preferences.

In 1994 the Labour Party and Christian Democrats were preferred less often than in 1986, whereas in particular D66 and GreenLeft were preferred more often. Four years later the number of voters who liked the Christian Democrats best had decreased to only 9 per cent. The number of voters who preferred D66 also decreased strongly. The two parties that in 1998 were included in the survey for the first time, the Socialist Party and the Elderly Alliance, were preferred by 4 and 3 per cent, respectively. In 2002 the two most striking changes are the decrease in the number of voters who preferred the Labour Party (from 19 to 11 per cent), and the emergence of

TABLE 7.8 Preferences for parties in 1986 (%) (N=1630)

	PvdA	VVD	CDA	D66	PPR	CPN	EVP	SGP	GPV	RPF	CP
strongly preferred	13	2	8	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
moderately preferred	9	3	7	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
weakly preferred	10	6	8	3	2	1	0	0	1	0	0
multiple preference	9	7	11	7	4	3	2	3	3	2	1
weakly not preferred	10	9	9	12	7	4	3	4	4	3	0
moderately not preferred	8	12	10	16	8	6	5	6	5	3	1
strongly not preferred	38	57	43	48	79	73	66	60	61	57	89
don't know party	3	5	3	12	21	13	23	26	27	33	8
total	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100

TABLE 7.9 Preferences for parties in 1994 (%) (N=1812)

	PvdA	VVD	CDA	D66	GL	SGP	GPV	RPF	CD
strongly preferred	4	3	3	1	1	0	0	0	1
moderately preferred	4	4	3	4	3	0	0	0	0
weakly preferred	9	7	8	7	5	0	0	1	0
multiple preference	14	11	12	17	10	3	3	3	1
weakly not preferred	17	13	12	18	12	5	5	3	1
moderately not preferred	17	14	14	17	12	7	7	5	1
strongly not preferred	34	44	44	29	45	57	56	50	89
don't know party	3	5	3	7	12	28	29	37	5
total	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100

Note: Categories in Tables 7.8 to 7.10 are based on the difference between the evaluation score awarded to a party and the highest score awarded to any other party. Resulting scores have been transformed into seven categories that indicate the strength of the preference for a party (see discussion in text).

List Pim Fortuyn (preferred by 7 per cent). Other changes were that fewer voters preferred the Liberal Party, and that the Christian Democrats, Socialist Party, and orthodox Protestant parties were preferred somewhat more often than before.

All these changes largely reflect those that were observed with respect to the way voters evaluated the various individual parties, but the shifts are not identical. For example, in 1998 considerably more voters awarded GreenLeft evaluation scores of 80 or higher than in 1994 (14 versus 19 per cent), but the number of voters who preferred them did not increase (9 versus 8 per cent). This illustrates that changes in the number of voters who prefer a party depend also on changes in evaluations of other parties.

TABLE 7.10 Preferences for parties in 1998 (%) (N=2101)

	PvdA	VVD	CDA	D66	GL	SP	SGP	GPV	RPF	CD	AOV
strongly preferred	3	2	1	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	0
moderately preferred	5	3	3	1	2	1	0	0	0	0	0
weakly preferred	11	6	5	3	5	3	1	1	1	0	2
multiple preference	21	13	14	11	15	8	2	3	3	1	5
weakly not preferred	21	12	15	17	17	8	4	5	3	1	8
moderately not preferred	15	13	17	20	16	10	7	9	7	2	10
strongly not preferred	22	47	42	42	37	51	57	57	51	89	47
don't know party	3	4	4	5	7	20	29	25	34	7	26
total	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100

TABLE 7.11 Preferences for parties in 2002 (%) (N=1908)

	PvdA	VVD	CDA	D66	GL	SP	SGP	CU	LPF	LN
strongly preferred	1	1	1	0	0	0	0	0	1	0
moderately preferred	3	2	3	1	2	1	0	1	2	0
weakly preferred	7	5	8	4	6	4	1	2	4	1
multiple preference	12	11	14	10	14	10	2	4	8	5
weakly not preferred	19	17	17	17	20	13	5	9	7	8
moderately not preferred	17	17	17	20	16	14	8	10	8	9
strongly not preferred	40	46	39	46	40	51	69	59	67	70
don't know party	1	1	1	2	2	6	14	13	2	7
total	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100

Which combinations of parties were preferred by voters who liked two or more parties equally positively, is shown in Table 7.14. All multiple party preferences that occurred among at least 1.0 per cent of the voters in at least one of the years are listed. The preferences are grouped into three categories on the basis of the question whether the preference consisted of left-wing parties, right-wing parties, or a mixture of both.[13] In each election, a wide variety of different multiple preferences existed; these were spread across all three categories. Furthermore, no particular multiple party preference was held very often (the highest figure was 3.3 per cent) and across the years different combinations were preferred most often. In 1986 the three most common combinations were those of the Christian Democrats and Liberals, Labour and Christian Democrats, and combinations of Labour with one or more small left-wing parties. In 1994 multiple party preferences of D66 with either GreenLeft or

TABLE 7.12 Number of parties in party preferences (%)

	1986	1994	1998	2002
1	80	71	64	64
2	15	20	22	23
3	4	5	9	8
4 or more	2	4	6	4
total	100	100	100	100
(N)	(1593)	(1783)	(2064)	(1894)
mean number	1.3	1.5	1.6	1.6

Note: Party preferences that include only one party are referred to as single party preferences; those that include two or more parties are referred to as multiple party preferences.

TABLE 7.13 Distribution of single party preferences (%)

	1986	1994	1998	2002
Labour Party	33	17	19	11
Liberal Party	11	14	12	8
Christian Democrats	24	15	9	13
D66	5	12	5	5
GreenLeft	4	9	8	9
Socialist Party	-	-	4	6
Orthodox Protestant	2	2	3	5
Centre Democrats	1	2	1	-
Elderly Alliance	-	-	3	-
List Pim Fortuyn	-	-	-	7
Liveable Netherlands	-	-	-	1
total	80	71	64	64
(N)	(1593)	(1783)	(2064)	(1894)

Note: The 1986 figure of GreenLeft concerns the small left-wing parties jointly (PPR, CPN, EVP).

Labour were most common. In 1998 the combinations of Labour with the Christian Democrats or GreenLeft occurred most frequently. Finally, in 2002 the combination of parties that was preferred most often was that of GreenLeft and Socialist Party.

The final question is how strongly voters preferred the party they evaluated most positively. The strength of the party preference has been determined by subtracting the evaluation score awarded to the second-best liked party from the score awarded to the best-liked party.[14] For voters with a multiple party preference the

TABLE 7.14 Distribution of multiple party preferences (%)

		1986	1994	1998	2002
left-wing	SP & GL	-	-	2.1	2.5
combinations:	PvdA & GL	2.2	2.0	2.7	1.9
	PvdA, D66 & GL	0.4	1.0	0.7	0.9
	PvdA & D66	1.6	3.0	1.8	1.3
	D66 & GL	0.4	3.3	0.9	1.0
	other combinations	0.9	-	2.5	2.3
	subtotal	5.5	9.3	10.8	10.0
right-wing	CDA & Orthodox Protestant	1.2	0.7	0.8	1.6
combinations:	CDA & VVD	3.3	2.2	2.1	1.8
	CDA & LPF	-	-	-	1.1
	VVD & LPF	-	-	-	1.8
	Orthodox Protestant	1.4	1.2	1.2	0.8
	other combinations	0.4	0.9	1.7	3.0
	subtotal	6.3	5.0	5.8	10.1
mixed	PvdA & CDA	2.1	2.1	2.8	1.3
combinations:	PvdA & VVD	0.3	0.6	1.9	0.7
	CDA & GL	0.4	0.4	0.5	1.0
	CDA & D66	1.4	1.6	0.1	0.5
	VVD & D66	0.7	2.4	0.8	0.5
	other combinations	3.8	7.6	13.1	11.9
	subtotal	8.7	14.8	19.3	15.7
	total	20.5	29.1	35.9	35.9
	(N)	(1593)	(1783)	(2064)	(1894)

Note: All combinations mentioned by at least 1 per cent in at least one year are listed; other combinations are listed together as 'other combinations'. The figures of GreenLeft in 1986 concern combinations with one or more of their predecessors (PPR, CPN, EVP).

score by definition equals 0, which indicates that the second-best liked party was liked as much as the best-liked party. For voters with a single party preference the score may vary between 10 (weak preference) and 100 (extremely strong preference). The scores have been transformed into a four-point scale by combining values of 30 and up. The resulting categories are referred to as strong, moderate, weak, and multiple party preferences.

In 1986 voters were distributed fairly equally across the four categories (Table 7.15). In 1994 strong and moderate party preferences were less common, and weak and multiple party preferences were more common. Four years later, strong party preferences had again become less common and multiple party preferences again more common. The figures of 2002 were fairly similar to those of 1998. Consequently, in the two latter years approximately 10 per cent of the voters had a strong party preference, 15 per cent a moderate party preference, 40 per cent a weak party preference, and 35 per cent a multiple party preference. Hence, whereas in 1986 the number of voters with multiple and weak party preferences equalled the number with moderate and strong party preferences, in 2002 the former outnumbered the latter by a ratio of 4 to 1. Due to these changes, the average difference between the score awarded to the best-liked party and that awarded to the second-best liked party dropped from 18 points in 1986 to 9 points in 2002. This means that the strength of voters' party preferences decreased substantially.

MEASUREMENTS OF VOTING INTENTIONS AND VOTING BEHAVIOUR

The pre-election interview of the DPES included questions concerning respondents' voting intentions. First, they were asked whether they intended to vote in the upcoming parliamentary election or not. In 1998 the question read as follows.

> As you may know, elections for the Second Chamber will be held in May of this year. Do you intend to vote or not, or don't you know yet?

If they said they intended to vote, they were asked which party they intended to vote for.

> Which party do you intend to vote for on May 6?[15]

The answer to the second question is used in this research as a measure for voting intention.[16]

Voters can be classified into four categories regarding their voting intentions: (1) voters who intended to vote and knew for which party, (2) voters who intended to vote, but did not know for which party, (3) voters who did not know whether they would vote or not, and (4) voters who intended not to vote. Table 7.16 shows the distribution of the voters across the four categories. The figures indicate that when they were interviewed in the weeks before the election, of all respondents between 63 and 79 per cent intended to vote and knew for which party.

We may expect that the strength of the party preference played a role, and that voters with strong party preferences were more likely to know for whom to vote. The figures in Table 7.17 show this was indeed the case. On the whole, voters with strong party preferences were more likely to have formed a voting intention than those with moderate party preferences, who in turn were more likely to have formed

TABLE 7.15 Strength of party preferences (%)

strength score		1986	1994	1998	2002
30	strong party preference	26	14	9	7
20	moderate party preference	22	18	17	14
10	weak party preference	32	39	39	43
0	multiple party preference	20	29	36	36
	total	100	100	100	100
	(N)	(1593)	(1783)	(2064)	(1894)
	mean score	18.3	13.5	10.8	9.2

Note: The strength score indicates the difference between the evaluation score awarded to the best-liked party and the evaluation score awarded to the second-best liked party.

TABLE 7.16 Distribution of voting intention categories (%)

	1986	1994	1998	2002
intended to vote and knew for whom	79	63	68	76
intended to vote and did not know for whom	12	24	18	20
did not know whether to vote	4	8	7	2
intended to abstain	5	5	7	2
total	100	100	100	100
(N)	(1473)	(1812)	(2101)	(1908)

Note: The 1986 data file contains 157 voters for whom the vote intention variable did not contain valid data. These voters are not included in this table.

TABLE 7.17 Party preference strength and voting intention categories: percentage of voters who knew for whom to vote

	1986	1994	1998	2002
strong party preference	90	72	76	92
moderate party preference	85	75	79	84
weak party preference	75	65	73	78
multiple party preference	68	49	59	67
all voters	79	63	68	76

Reading example: In 1986 of all voters with a strong party preference 90 per cent intended to vote and knew for whom when they were interviewed before the election.

TABLE 7.18 Distribution of voting intentions (%)

	1986	1994	1998	2002
Labour Party	43	23	28	18
Liberal Party	17	22	23	14
Christian Democrats	27	21	21	26
D66	5	17	7	5
GreenLeft	4	8	9	11
Socialist Party	-	1	5	6
Orthodox Protestant	4	4	6	7
Centre Democrats	0	2	0	-
Elderly Alliance	-	2	1	-
List Pim Fortuyn	-	-	-	11
Liveable Netherlands	-	-	-	1
others	0	0	1	1
total	100	100	100	100
(N)	(1166)	(1134)	(1416)	(1444)

an intention than those with weak party preferences. Voters with a multiple party preference were least likely to know for whom to vote when they were interviewed. The findings show that the differences across the years found in Table 7.16 cannot be attributed to differences in the strength of the party preferences, since the figures in Table 7.17 also vary across the years.

The frequency distribution of voting intentions is shown in Table 7.18. In 1986 a voting intention for the Labour Party occurred most often: 43 per cent of the voters said they intended to vote for them. In 1994 the Labour Party, Christian Democrats, and Liberal Party were each mentioned by about 22 per cent of the voters. In 1998 the Labour Party was referred to most often again (28 per cent), whereas in 2002 voters intended to vote most often for the Christian Democrats (26 per cent).

How voters actually voted, that is, their voting behaviour, was determined by asking voters in the post-election interview. Literally, in 1998 they were asked:

Did you vote in the parliamentary election on May 6?

If voters indicated that they had voted, they were asked next:

Which party did you vote for?

These self-report measures are certainly not ideal, since voters may be mistaken in reporting particular voting behaviour. However, because in the Netherlands there are no records of actual voting behaviour, research has to rely on the voting behaviour as reported by voters themselves.[17]

TABLE 7.19 Distribution of voting behaviour (%)

	1986	1994	1998	2002
Labour Party	35	25	29	17
Liberal Party	17	22	22	14
Christian Democrats	32	20	18	28
D66	7	18	12	6
GreenLeft	4	6	9	10
Socialist Party	-	1	4	8
Orthodox Protestant	3	3	5	6
Centre Democrats	0	1	0	-
Elderly Alliance	-	4	0	-
List Pim Fortuyn	-	-	-	11
Liveable Netherlands	-	-	-	1
others	1	1	1	0
total	100	100	100	100
(N)	(1255)	(1393)	(1630)	(1514)

In 1986 of all voters who participated in the post-election interview 93 per cent reported having voted, whereas 7 per cent said they did not vote. In 1994 and 1998 fairly similar numbers said they had voted: 92 and 91 per cent, respectively. In 2002 remarkably many voters said they had voted, namely 97 per cent.[18] Among those who voted virtually all (99 per cent) reported a party that they said they had voted for.[19] The distribution of these votes across the parties is shown in Table 7.19.

One may be tempted to compare the figures of the voting intentions and voting behaviour and conclude that both figures match each other fairly well, even though some differences can be observed. For example, in 1986 the Labour Party was voted for less often than voting intention figures would suggest, and the Christian Democrats were voted for more often than those figures suggested. What is more important, however, is how at the individual level voting intentions and voting behaviour are related to each other, as well as how these concepts were related to party evaluations and party preferences.[20]

A TEST OF THE SINCERE VOTE MODEL

RELATIONSHIPS BETWEEN PARTY PREFERENCES, VOTING INTENTIONS, AND VOTING
BEHAVIOUR

The sincere vote model makes predictions about two relationships: voters are ex-
pected to form a voting intention that favours the party that they evaluate most posi-
tively, and they are expected to vote according to their voting intention. Conse-
quently, voters are expected to vote for the party they evaluate most positively. The
model will now be tested. Because the explanatory power of the model differs be-
tween voters with single and multiple party preferences, these will be treated sepa-
rately.[21]

For voters with single party preferences, Table 7.20 indicates to what extent vot-
ers intended to vote for the party they evaluated most positively. In 1986 and 1994
about 92 per cent intended to vote for their party preference, and 8 per cent intended
to vote for another party. In 1998 and 2002 fewer voters intended to vote for the party
preference, namely 85 per cent. For voters with multiple party preferences the fig-
ures are fairly similar, although the differences across the years are less marked (Ta-
ble 7.21). In each election, about 90 per cent intended to vote for one of the parties
they evaluated most positively.

By combining the figures of voters with single and multiple party preferences,
it becomes clear to what extent voting intentions could be predicted accurately on
the basis of the model (Table 7.22). The voters for whom it could, are those who had a
single party preference and intended to vote for that party. In each election, this con-
cerned a majority of the voters. However, the size of this group of voters decreased
from 78 per cent in 1986 to 58 per cent in 2002. Most other voters also had a sincere
voting intention, but the model could not predict for whom they intended to vote
because they had a multiple party preference. The size of this group increased from
15 per cent in 1986 to 28 per cent in 2002. Only a small minority of voters intended to
vote for a party they did not like best. The size of this group increased from 7 per
cent in 1986 to 14 per cent in 2002. Nevertheless, the findings provide strong support
for the hypothesis that voters form voting intentions in accordance with their party
preferences.

According to the sincere vote model, voting intentions are transformed into cor-
responding voting behaviour. Table 7.23 shows to what extent voters with single
party preferences voted for the party they intended to vote for when they were inter-
viewed before the election.[22] As expected, in each election a large majority (between
86 and 90 per cent) did. Only between 10 and 14 per cent of the voters ultimately
voted for another party. Voters with multiple party preferences were somewhat less
likely to stick to their voting intention, but large majorities voted as they intended as
well (Table 7.24). The differences between voters with single and multiple party pref-

TABLE 7.20 Relationship between party preferences and voting intentions – voters with single party preferences (%)

	1986	1994	1998	2002
intended to vote for party preference	93	92	85	85
intended to vote for another party	7	8	15	15
total	100	100	100	100
(N)	(941)	(847)	(976)	(979)

TABLE 7.21 Relationship between party preferences and voting intentions – voters with multiple party preferences (%)

	1986	1994	1998	2002
intended to vote for party preference	91	93	90	88
intended to vote for another party	9	7	10	12
total	100	100	100	100
(N)	(186)	(244)	(420)	(447)

TABLE 7.22 Percentage of voters with sincere and non-sincere voting intentions

	1986	1994	1998	2002
sincere voting intention (single preference)	78	71	59	58
sincere voting intention (multiple preference)	15	21	27	28
non-sincere voting intention	7	8	13	14
total	100	100	100	100
(N)	(1127)	(1091)	(1396)	(1426)

erences can be understood within the framework of the model. Voters with a single party preference have only one option, whereas voters with a multiple party preference have at least two equally good options. Whatever party these voters intend to vote for, there is always another party that they can turn to while still voting sincerely.[23]

How well voting behaviour could be predicted on the basis of the voting intentions that voters had formed, becomes clear if the figures of voters with single and multiple party preferences are combined (Table 7.25). In each election, about 85 per cent of the voters cast their vote for the party they intended to vote for when inter-

TABLE 7.23 Relationship between voting intentions and voting behaviour – voters with single party preferences (%)

	1986	1994	1998	2002
voted as intended	90	86	89	87
voted for another party	10	14	11	13
total	100	100	100	100
(N)	(766)	(737)	(843)	(802)

TABLE 7.24 Relationship between voting intentions and voting behaviour – voters with multiple party preferences (%)

	1986	1994	1998	2002
voted as intended	73	80	82	80
voted for another party	27	20	18	20
total	100	100	100	100
(N)	(165)	(202)	(365)	(365)

TABLE 7.25 Percentage of voters who voted as initially intended and who did not

	1986	1994	1998	2002
voted as initially intended	87	85	87	85
voted for another party	13	15	13	15
total	100	100	100	100
(N)	(931)	(939)	(1208)	(1167)

viewed, while about 15 per cent ultimately voted for another party. The findings provide strong support for the hypothesis that on election day voters vote on the basis of a previously formed voting intention.[24]

Some voters did not know yet for whom they would vote when they were interviewed before the election. We may refer to them as undecided voters. For these voters the party preference–voting intention and voting intention–voting behaviour relationship cannot be examined. On the basis of the sincere vote model another expectation can be formulated for undecided voters. We may hypothesise that some time between the moment of interview and the moment they stood in the polling

TABLE 7.26 Relationship between party preferences and voting behaviour – undecided voters with single party preferences (%)

	1986	1994	1998	2002
voted for party preference	79	59	49	41
voted for another party	21	41	52	59
total	100	100	100	100
(N)	(197)	(232)	(200)	(164)

TABLE 7.27 Relationship between party preferences and voting behaviour – undecided voters with multiple party preferences (%)

	1986	1994	1998	2002
voted for party preference	87	84	73	66
voted for another party	13	16	27	34
total	100	100	100	100
(N)	(87)	(158)	(187)	(168)

TABLE 7.28 Percentage of undecided voters who voted sincerely and non-sincerely

	1986	1994	1998	2002
voted sincerely (single preference)	55	35	25	20
voted sincerely (multiple preference)	27	34	35	33
voted non-sincerely	19	31	40	46
total	100	100	100	100
(N)	(284)	(390)	(387)	(332)

booth, these voters formed a voting intention on the basis of their party preferences and ultimately voted accordingly. Hence, we expect that undecided voters voted in line with their party preferences.

In each election, approximately 25 per cent of those who voted belonged to the undecided voters category; they formed a voting intention only after the pre-election interview.[25] Table 7.26 and Table 7.27 show the relationship between party preferences and voting behaviour for these voters. Unsurprisingly, voters with a multiple party preference were more likely to vote for a preferred party than voters with a single party preference.[26] More striking is the fact that the number of undecided vot-

TABLE 7.29 Relationship between party preferences and voting behaviour – voters with single party preferences (%)

	1986	1994	1998	2002
voted party preference	85	79	74	72
voted for another party	15	21	26	28
total	100	100	100	100
(N)	(950)	(936)	(1041)	(969)

TABLE 7.30 Relationship between party preferences and voting behaviour – voters with multiple party preferences (%)

	1986	1994	1998	2002
voted party preference	86	86	82	78
voted for another party	14	14	18	22
total	100	100	100	100
(N)	(242)	(346)	(555)	(536)

TABLE 7.31 Percentage of voters who voted sincerely and non-sincerely

	1986	1994	1998	2002
voted sincerely (single preference)	68	58	48	46
voted sincerely (multiple preference)	17	24	29	28
voted non-sincerely	15	19	23	26
total	100	100	100	100
(N)	(1192)	(1282)	(1596)	(1505)

ers who behaved as expected was rather low compared to the figures concerning 'decided voters'. Furthermore, across the years the number of voters who voted for a preferred party decreased. Consequently, the number of undecided voters whose voting behaviour could be predicted accurately on the basis of the sincere vote model decreased from 55 per cent in 1986 to only 20 per cent in 2002 (Table 7.28). A development in the opposite direction can be observed with respect to voters who voted non-sincerely: among undecided voters the size of this group increased from 19 per cent in 1986 to 46 per cent in 2002. Hence, although most undecided voters ultimately voted for a party they preferred when interviewed before the election,

their majority has become rather narrow. Apparently, undecided voters met the expectations based on the sincere vote model less often than voters who formed their voting intention longer in advance. So either undecided voters ultimately decided on the basis of considerations other than how much they liked the competing parties, or they changed their party evaluations relatively often (and then voted sincerely).

How strong is the support for the sincere vote model when it comes to explaining voting behaviour directly on the basis of party preferences for the electorate as a whole?[27] Table 7.29 shows the relationship between party preferences and voting behaviour for all voters with a single party preference. In each election, a large majority voted for the party they evaluated most positively. However, this number decreased substantially. While in 1986 85 per cent voted for the party they preferred, in 2002 this figure had decreased to 72 per cent. Voters with multiple party preferences also became less likely to vote for a preferred party, since the number who did decreased from 86 to 78 per cent (Table 7.30). Voters with a multiple party preference were generally somewhat more likely to vote in line with their party preference than voters with a single party preference.

By combining the figures of voters with single and multiple party preferences, it becomes clear to what extent the electorate as a whole voted as expected, and to what extent this could be accurately predicted on the basis of the sincere vote model. While in 1986 the voting behaviour of 68 per cent of the voters could be accurately predicted, this figure decreased to 46 per cent in 2002 (Table 7.31). The other voters either voted sincerely but had a multiple party preference, due to which their choice could not be predicted, or they voted non-sincerely. Most striking is the increase in the number of voters who voted non-sincerely: from 15 per cent in 1986 to 26 per cent in 2002. Hence, although overall the support for the sincere vote hypothesis is strong, across the years the strength of it declined.

PATTERNS OF RELATIONSHIPS

Building on the previous analyses, voters can be classified regarding four characteristics: (1) the type of party preference (single or multiple party preference) (2) the relationship between party preference and voting intention (match or discrepancy), (3) the relationship between voting intention and voting behaviour (match or discrepancy), and (4) the relationship between party preference and voting behaviour (match or discrepancy). By combining these characteristics in total 15 different 'patterns' can be distinguished.[28]

Table 7.32 shows the patterns of combinations as well as the number of voters who fit each pattern. In the table parties are represented by a letter. The letter A refers to the party of the party preference. If a party preference consists of two (or more) parties, one of these parties is indicated by the letter A, and the other(s) by A_2. So 'A' indicates a single party preference, while 'A A_2' indicates a multiple party preference.

TABLE 7.32 Patterns of party preference–voting intention–voting behaviour relationships (%)

	party preference	voting intention	voting behaviour	1986	1994	1998	2002
1.	A	A	A	54.3	45.8	41.1	40.4
2.	A A$_2$	A	A	9.0	11.2	17.0	17.3
3.	A	-	A	13.1	11.2	6.4	4.7
4.	A A$_2$	-	A	6.5	10.4	9.1	7.5
			subtotal	82.9	78.5	73.6	69.9
5.	A	B	B	2.9	2.7	5.5	5.6
6.	A A$_2$	B	B	0.8	0.9	1.6	2.0
7.	A A$_2$	A	A$_2$	1.7	1.5	2.2	2.5
8.	A	A	B	4.5	4.7	4.0	4.7
9.	A A$_2$	A	B	1.1	0.7	1.2	1.7
10.	A	B	A	0.7	0.6	0.8	1.1
11.	A A$_2$	B	A	0.2	0.1	0.3	0.3
12.	A	B	C	0.5	0.4	0.9	1.1
13.	A A$_2$	B	C	0.1	0.0	0.2	0.4
14.	A	-	B	3.7	7.7	6.5	6.9
15.	A A$_2$	-	B	0.9	2.2	3.3	3.9
			subtotal	17.1	21.5	26.4	30.1
			total	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0
			(N)	(1192)	(1282)	(1596)	(1505)

Reading example: In 1986 the pattern of the 'party preference-voting intention-voting behaviour rela-tionship' was 'A/A/A' for 54.3 per cent of all 1192 voters. This means that they had a party prefer-ence for one party (A), a voting intention for this same party (A), and they voted for this same party (A).

The letter in the voting intention column indicates whether or not the voting inten-tion consisted of a party from the party preference. The letter A indicates that the party preference also was the voting intention, whereas the letter B indicates that the voting intention involved another party. If no letter is listed, then the voter did not express a voting intention in the pre-election interview. In a similar way the letter in the voting behaviour column indicates whether the party that was voted for matched the party preference and whether it matched the voting intention. If letters are the same across a row this indicates a match concerning the parties involved, whereas different letters indicate a discrepancy.

The fifteen different patterns have been numbered in order to facilitate discus-sion. The first pattern concerns voters who had a single party preference (A), who

had a voting intention for this party, and who also voted for this party. In 1986 this pattern applied to 54 per cent of the voters; the number decreased to 40 per cent in 2002. The second pattern is similar to the first, except that these voters had a multiple party preference (A A_2) instead of a single party preference. The third and fourth pattern concern voters who did not express a voting intention, and who voted for their party preference. These are the four patterns that show no discrepancies. In 1986 this applied to 83 per cent of the voters, in 1994 to 79 per cent, in 1998 to 74 per cent, and in 2002 to 70 per cent.

Voters who fit patterns five to fifteen in some way violated the expectations. Patterns five and six consist of voters whose voting intentions were not in line with their party preferences. Pattern seven represents voters with a multiple party preference who did not vote in line with their voting intention. Patterns eight and nine concern voters who intended to vote for their party preference, but who voted for another party than they initially intended. The next four patterns all concern voters who had a discrepancy both between party preferences and voting intentions and between voting intentions and voting behaviour. Finally, patterns fourteen and fifteen concern voters who did not express a voting intention and whose voting behaviour was not in line with their party preferences. In 1986 in total 17 per cent of the voters fit one of the eleven patterns that involve some kind of discrepancy. In subsequent years this number increased to 30 per cent.

The decline of the number of voters who showed no discrepancy appears to stem primarily from an increase in non-sincere voting, and not from less stable voting intentions. Two changes are particularly noteworthy. First, in 1994 undecided voters had become more likely to vote for a party they did not evaluate most positively. The size of this group increased from 5 per cent in 1986 to 10 per cent in 1994 (patterns fourteen and fifteen combined).[29] Second, in 1998 voters who decided earlier had become more likely to intend to vote for a party they did not like best. The number of voters with a non-sincere voting intention increased from 5 per cent in 1994 to 9 per cent in 1998 (patterns five and six, and ten to thirteen). Furthermore, between 1998 and 2002 in virtually each category that involves a discrepancy the number of voters increased slightly. Combined with the fairly stable number of voters who changed their voting intention, these developments accounted for the fact that the number of voters who met the expectations decreased from 83 to 70 per cent.

The fact that large numbers of voters met the expectations based on the sincere vote model, does not imply that the voting behaviour of the same number of voters could be predicted accurately. For voters who evaluated two or more parties most positively the model does not result in a unique prediction concerning their voting intention and voting behaviour. According to the model, voters with a so-called multiple party preference will intend to vote for one of the parties of their party preference, but the model does not indicate for which of them. Consequently, the number

of voters for whom the model predicted voting behaviour accurately and completely (patterns one and three), varied between 68 per cent in 1986 and 46 per cent in 2002.

THE IMPACT OF PARTY PREFERENCE STRENGTH

The findings suggest that across the years voters became less likely to base their voting intentions solely on their evaluations of the competing parties. One possible explanation for this development is that the strength of voters' party preferences changed. If party preferences become weaker, the chance that the influence of other factors leads to an intention to vote for another party may be expected to increase. Furthermore, if party preferences become weaker, the chance that voters change their intention (to vote for those parties) may also be expected to increase.

In line with this argument, we may formulate three hypotheses. First, we may hypothesise that voters with strong party preferences are less inclined to form non-sincere voting intentions than voters with weak party preferences. Additionally, we may hypothesise that voters with strong party preferences are more inclined to stick to their intention than other voters. If both hypotheses are supported by empirical evidence, we may further hypothesise that once the strength of party preferences is taken into account, the number of voters with non-sincere voting intentions and the number voters who voted differently than they initially intended was stable across the years. This would mean that the changes in the number of voters who showed no discrepancies between party preferences, voting intentions, and voting behaviour could be attributed to changes in the strength of party preferences.

Additional analyses support the first two hypotheses. Voters with strong party preferences were less likely to form non-sincere voting intentions than voters with moderate party preferences, who in turn were less likely to form non-sincere voting intentions than voters with weak party preferences (Table 7.33). Voters with multiple party preferences took an intermediate position. Regarding the relationship between voting intentions and voting behaviour, the findings show that voters with strong party preferences were most likely to stick to their voting intention, followed in turn by those with moderate, weak, and multiple party preferences (Table 7.34). So party preference strength plays the hypothesised role.

The third hypothesis, however, is not supported by the findings. The figures in Table 7.33 indicate that across all four categories non-sincere voting intentions became somewhat more likely across the years. The fact that within the various categories the increase is not as large as among the electorate as a whole, indicates that the development resulted in part from changes in the strength of party preferences. But the fact that within each category the figures increase, indicates that the development was also due to a weaker relationship between party preferences and voting intentions as such. So the increase in the number of voters with a non-sincere voting intention was not merely the result of changes in the strength of party preferences.

TABLE 7.33 Party preference strength and non-sincere voting intentions (%)

	1986	1994	1998	2002
strong party preference	2	4	3	5
moderate party preference	5	4	11	7
weak party preference	14	12	19	20
multiple party preference	9	7	10	12
unweighted mean across categories	8	7	11	11
all voters (weighted mean)	7	8	13	14

Reading example: In 1986 of all voters with a strong party preference 2 per cent had a non-sincere voting intention. The mean across the four categories, unweighted for the number of voters fitting each category, was 8 per cent. The weighted mean, which indicates the number of all voters who had a non-sincere voting intention, equalled 7 per cent.

TABLE 7.34 Party preference strength and changes in voting intentions (%)

	1986	1994	1998	2002
strong party preference	7	7	5	6
moderate party preference	10	18	10	12
weak party preference	14	14	13	15
multiple party preference	27	20	18	20
unweighted mean across categories	15	15	12	13
all voters (weighted mean)	13	15	13	15

Reading example: In 1986 of all voters with a strong party preference 7 per cent had changed their intention about for whom to vote. The mean across the four categories, unweighted for the number of voters fitting each category, was 15 per cent. The weighted mean, which indicates the number of all voters who changed their intention, equalled 13 per cent.

SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION

The analysis presented in this chapter has resulted in strong support for the sincere vote model. Party preferences have been found to predict voting intentions, which in turn were transformed into corresponding voting behaviour. Consequently, a large majority of voters met the expectations derived from the sincere vote model. However, this proportion decreased from 83 per cent in 1986 to 70 per cent in 2002. Furthermore, it must be noted that up to 26 per cent of the voters met the expectations, but evaluated at least two parties equally positively. On the basis of the sincere vote model we cannot explain why these voters preferred to vote for one of these parties in particular.

The lack of fit results in part from the simple fact that voters sometimes change their mind about for whom to vote. Discrepancies in the voting intention–voting behaviour relationship are found if a time difference distinguishes both. One might argue that this is more a methodological problem (resulting from the typical design of election surveys with a pre-election interview held weeks before the actual election), than a theoretical problem. However, the question remains why these voters changed their voting intention. Furthermore, the analysis indicated that another factor was also important: various voters intended to voted for another party than the one they liked best at that moment; across the years this applied to more voters, which could only partly be accounted for by changes in the strength of party preferences.

If the correlations between party preferences and voting intentions and between voting intentions and voting behaviour were (almost) perfect, then this would have implied that to explain voting behaviour we 'only' have to explain party evaluations. The findings suggest that this is only part of the story, although an important part. Explaining party evaluations is necessary, because they are strongly related to voting intentions and thereby indirectly determine for whom people vote. Chapter 9 will therefore focus on this aspect. However, the findings indicate that at least three other questions need to be answered. One question is how voters choose between the parties of a multiple party preference. A second question is why certain voters prefer to vote for another party than one they evaluate most positively. A third question is why certain voters cast their vote differently than they initially intended.

To answer these questions additional analyses are needed. With respect to the first two questions some will be presented in the next chapter. The third question is in fact one concerning electoral change at the individual level: why do voters change their mind about for whom to vote? The sincere vote model suggests that if voting intentions change, either the party evaluations underlying those intentions have changed, or the impact of additional phenomena has changed. Although this question is important, in this research it will not be answered. The data upon which this research is based are not suited well to analyse changes in voting intentions. The concepts involved have not been measured at more than one point in time, which is necessary to perform the required analyses.[30] Therefore, phenomena that may explain why some voters choose to support another party than the one they like best will next be focused on. This is the major question that follows from the findings presented in this chapter. Additionally, voters with multiple party preferences will be focused on.

CHAPTER 8

THE NON-SINCERE VOTE

The test of the sincere vote model has revealed that voters do not always meet the expectations. For some voters a discrepancy was observed between party preferences and voting intentions. A second discrepancy concerned a difference between voters' voting intentions and their actual voting behaviour. This chapter focuses on the first discrepancy: the central question is why voters prefer to vote for another party than one they evaluate most positively. A second question that is focused on in this chapter, is how voters choose between parties of multiple party preferences; the sincere vote model does not indicate which party voters are expected to vote for, if they evaluate more than one party most positively.

Analogous with the notions of a sincere and non-sincere vote, we may distinguish between a sincere and non-sincere voting intention. A sincere voting intention can be defined as the intention to vote in a specific election for a party that is evaluated most positively, whereas a non-sincere voting intention corresponds with the intention to vote for a party that is not evaluated most positively. Although the sincere vote model acknowledges that voting intentions may differ from party preferences, the model does not indicate on the basis of what factors such discrepancies may occur. In this context the vote choice heuristics discussed in Chapter 5 may be particularly useful. They show that party evaluations are not the only phenomenon that voters may base their vote choice on. Voters may also decide on the basis of candidate evaluations, incumbent approval, prospect evaluations, voting habits, and endorsements. Except for the endorsement heuristic, the heuristics discussed can be analysed on the basis of measures available in the surveys upon which this research is based.[1] (For an analysis of the impact of another factor that may be deemed relevant, party size, see Appendix E.)

THE IMPACT OF ELECTION OUTCOME PREFERENCES

Voters may base their choice on election outcome preferences. This means that their choice is based on so-called prospect evaluations. Prospects may take various forms, but those that concern who forms the government are arguably the most important ones; recall that the selection of government has been regarded as the sole function of elections (Downs 1957; Key 1966).

In countries with coalition governments, like the Netherlands, it is not straight-forward what kind of prospects voters can base their vote choice on. The election result does not determine what government will be formed. Nevertheless, voters may base their choice on their preferences regarding the partisan composition of the future government. For example, voters may prefer the new government to consist of a particular set of parties and may be of the opinion that in order to establishing it they best vote for one particular party. Voters may also prefer the government to include at least one party in particular (perhaps 'just' their favourite party) and be indifferent about what other parties participate. Voters' preferences regarding the future government may also be negative: their desire may be that a particular party (or set of parties) *does not* take part in the new government.

In the Dutch Parliamentary Election Studies (DPES) voters' preferences regarding the future government have been assessed by asking them in the pre-election interview what government coalition they preferred to be formed after the election. In 1998 the question read as follows.

> After the elections for the Second Chamber, a new cabinet must be formed. In the Netherlands, a cabinet is mostly formed by different parties. According to you which parties should be part of the next cabinet?

If voters mentioned only one party, they were additionally asked:

> Are there perhaps parties which according to you should be part of this cabinet as well?

In the other years the DPES included similar questions, but one difference has to be mentioned. In 1986 and 1994 voters were only allowed to mention the four major parties, which were listed on a card shown (Labour Party, Liberal Party, Christian Democrats, and D66). Voters were asked to mention at least two of these parties. The problem of this procedure is that if voters preferred a coalition that included one or more of the minor parties, this was not noticed. Another problem of the question format is that voters were more or less forced to mention at least two parties. If voters' government preferences were of the kind 'any government that includes party X', the survey did not detect this. Neither were voters' government preferences detected if they were of the negative kind – 'a government without party X'.

TABLE 8.1 Percentage of voters who preferred specific coalitions

		1986	1994	1998	2002
(centre-) left	PvdA, D66 & GreenLeft	-	-	5	3
coalitions:	PvdA & D66	19	18	2	1
	PvdA & CDA	20	11	7	4
	PvdA, CDA & GreenLeft	-	-	4	10
	PvdA, CDA & D66	4	12	5	3
	other (centre-) left coalitions	-	-	6	10
	subtotal	43	41	28	32
(centre-) right	CDA & VVD	28	12	3	9
coalitions:	CDA, VVD & LPF	-	-	-	13
	CDA, VVD & D66	4	5	1	3
	VVD & D66	1	10	0	0
	other (centre-) right coalitions	-	-	2	8
	subtotal	34	27	6	33
other	PvdA, VVD & D66	2	10	22	3
coalitions:	PvdA & VVD	5	5	4	2
	PvdA, CDA & VVD	2	3	13	6
	CDA & D66	3	6	0	0
	other coalitions	1	2	16	21
	subtotal	12	25	56	32
	only one party mentioned	1	0	3	0
	don't know	11	7	8	2
	total	100	100	100	100
	(N)	(1630)	(1812)	(2101)	(1908)

Note: A coalition is listed as such if it was mentioned by at least 5 per cent in at least one year; voters for whom data were not available are included in the don't know category.

Nevertheless, the answers to the questions may be used to examine whether government preferences provide an explanation for discrepancies between party preferences and voting intentions. If they do, a relationship exists between the kind of coalition preference and the extent to which voting intentions are sincere or non-sincere: voters who prefer a coalition that does not include their party preference have a non-sincere voting intention more often. Furthermore, in that case voters with

TABLE 8.2 Percentage of voters who preferred specific parties in the coalition

	1986	1994	1998	2002
Labour Party	53	60	82	53
Liberal Party	44	46	60	57
Christian Democrats	62	50	44	71
D66	34	62	46	24
GreenLeft	-	-	24	35
Socialist Party	-	-	5	8
Orthodox Protestant	-	-	3	5
Centre Democrats	-	-	0	-
Elderly Alliance	-	-	2	-
List Pim Fortuyn	-	-	-	24
Liveable Netherlands	-	-	-	4
(N)	(1630)	(1812)	(2101)	(1908)

non-sincere voting intentions intend to vote for parties that they want to participate in the new government relatively often.[2]

Table 8.1 shows what combinations of parties voters mentioned when they were asked what parties should be part of the next cabinet. The table lists these coalitions separately if they were mentioned by at least 5 per cent of the voters in at least one of the years. The coalitions are grouped into three categories: (centre-) left coalitions, (centre-) right coalitions, and other coalitions.[3] The table also indicates that the number of voters who did not know what government coalition they preferred was already low in 1986 (11 per cent) and decreased to a mere 2 per cent in 2002.[4] Hence, in each year a large majority of the voters could say what kind of coalition they preferred. The number of voters who provided the name of only one party was also low: the proportion never exceeded 3 per cent (a logical consequence of the question format). Consequently, a large majority indicated that they preferred a particular coalition of two or more parties to form the new cabinet.

In none of the years much agreement existed concerning what parties should be part of the cabinet. Voters' preferences were spread across the various categories, and within each category across various combinations. In 1986 most voters preferred either a (centre-) left coalition or a (centre-) right coalition. Three combinations of parties were mentioned relatively often: Labour Party and Christian Democrats, Labour Party and D66, and above all the two parties of the incumbent government: Christian Democrats and Liberal Party (28 per cent). In 1994 the most frequently mentioned combination was that of the Labour Party and D66 (18 per cent); additionally, five other combinations of two or three parties were referred to by about 10 per cent each. In 1998 one combination was clearly mentioned most often, namely that of the incumbent government of that time: Labour Party, Liberal Party, and D66 (22 per cent).

TABLE 8.3 Percentage of voters who preferred their party preference in the coalition

party preference:	1986	1994	1998	2002
Labour Party	95	92	96	87
Liberal Party	92	92	93	92
Christian Democrats	96	91	82	95
D66	68	90	81	56
GreenLeft	-	-	60	72
Socialist Party	-	-	32	29
Orthodox Protestant	-	-	32	34
Centre Democrats	-	-	30	-
Elderly Alliance	-	-	10	-
List Pim Fortuyn	-	-	-	74
Liveable Netherlands	-	-	-	19

Notes: Party preferences include both single and multiple party preferences. The numbers of voters upon whom the proportions are based include voters who did not express a coalition preference.
Reading example: In 1986 of all voters who preferred the Labour Party, 95 per cent preferred a coalition that included this party.

In this year remarkably few voters preferred a (centre-) right coalition. In 2002 there was less agreement concerning the composition of the new cabinet. The coalition that was preferred most often was that of the Christian Democrats, Liberal Party, and List Pim Fortuyn, although only 13 per cent referred to this combination.

After the change in question format in 1998, many voters mentioned other combinations than those listed; in 2002 they mentioned more than 150 different combinations. Because voters mentioned such a wide variety of combinations, one may regard the presentation of coalition preferences as problematic. Another way to look at coalition preferences, which overcomes that problem, is in terms of the frequency that each party was mentioned. Table 8.2 provides these data. In 1986 the Christian Democrats were preferred in government most often (62 per cent). The number of voters who mentioned the three other major parties varied between 34 per cent (D66) and 53 per cent (Labour Party). The most striking difference between 1986 and 1994 is that many more voters preferred a coalition that included D66: the number of voters who mentioned this party increased to 62 per cent. In 1998 the most striking figure is that of the Labour Party: 82 per cent of the voters preferred a coalition that included this party. In 2002 the figure of the Labour Party was considerably lower (53 per cent). This time the Christian Democrats were preferred most often (71 per cent).

We may expect that voters' coalition preferences are related to their party preferences. Additionally, we may expect that especially those voters who preferred small parties have included other parties than their party preference in their coalition preference. After all, the chance of such parties to participate in a government may be considered smaller than the chance of larger parties. Table 8.3 shows that this

was indeed the case.[5] Voters who preferred the Labour Party, Liberal Party, or Christian Democrats were very likely to mention this party when asked which parties should form the new cabinet: across the years this proportion varied between 82 and 96 per cent. In 1994 and 1998 voters who preferred D66 showed similar figures, but in 1986 and 2002 fewer included them in the coalition preference. Voters who preferred various small parties (Socialist Party, orthodox Protestant parties, Centre Democrats, Elderly Alliance, and Liveable Netherlands) were fairly unlikely to mention these parties when asked about their coalition preference: the proportion never exceeded 35 per cent. Figures of GreenLeft (since 1998) and List Pim Fortuyn (in 2002) take an intermediate position: a majority of the voters who preferred these parties included them in their coalition preference, but the proportion was not as large as that for the Labour Party, Liberal Party, and Christian Democrats.

These findings imply that a majority of voters preferred the party (or parties) of their party preference in the new coalition. Table 8.4, which shows the relationship between party preferences and coalition preferences, supports this. Across the years between 64 and 70 per cent of the voters mentioned their party preference when they were asked which parties should form the new cabinet. Some voters held a multiple party preference and mentioned at least one of these parties, but not all. The proportion of voters to whom this applied increased from 10 per cent in 1986 tot 21 per cent in 2002. Such an increase is not surprising, given the fact that in those years the proportion of voters with a multiple party preference increased from 20 to 36 per cent. A small minority of the voters (between 10 and 15 per cent) mentioned only parties that did not belong to their party preference. In 1986 and 1994 this could be the result of the question format. In 1998 and 2002, however, this methodological issue played no role and similar proportions of voters preferred a coalition that did not include the party they evaluated most positively.

The voters that are of particular interest here are those who included other parties in their coalition preference than the ones they evaluated most positively. If coalition preferences account for discrepancies between party preferences and voting intentions, these voters are expected to show such discrepancies relatively often. Table 8.5 shows the proportions of voters who had a non-sincere voting intention in relation to the kind of coalition preference they had expressed.[6] As expected, voters who did not include their party preference in their coalition preference were relatively likely to have a non-sincere voting intention: across the years this proportion varied between 26 and 51 per cent. Voters who included their party preference in their coalition preference, on the other hand, were less likely to have a non-sincere voting intention. Consequently, across the years voters who preferred a coalition that did not include their party preference were about six times as likely to have a non-sincere voting intention as others. Hence, non-sincere voting intentions can be explained – at least partly – on the basis of voters' coalition preferences.

TABLE 8.4 Relationship between party preferences and coalition preferences (%)

	1986	1994	1998	2002
party preference preferred in coalition	70	64	64	65
party preference partly preferred in coalition	10	15	17	21
party preference not preferred in coalition	10	15	12	12
no coalition preference expressed	10	6	7	2
	——	——	——	——
total	100	100	100	100
(N)	(1593)	(1783)	(2064)	(1894)

Note: Comparisons across years should be made with care, because in 1998 the question format changed (see discussion in text).

TABLE 8.5 Coalition preferences and the party preference–voting intention relationship (percentage of non-sincere voting intentions)

coalition preference:	1986	1994	1998	2002
party preference preferred in coalition	4	5	8	9
party preference partly preferred in coalition	4	5	12	11
party preference not preferred in coalition	42	26	46	51
all voters	7	8	13	14

Note: The numbers of observations upon which the figures are based are as follows. In 1986: 924, 97, 104, and 1127; in 1994: 764, 131, 169, and 1091; in 1998: 978, 220, 163, and 1396; and in 2002: 983, 257, 171, and 1426.
Reading example: In 1986 of all voters who preferred the party (or parties) of their party preference to participate in the new government coalition, 4 per cent had a non-sincere voting intention.

TABLE 8.6 Relationship between coalition preferences, party preferences, and voting intentions (%)

voting intention in line with:	1986	1994	1998	2002
party preference and coalition preference	86	76	76	77
party preference only	7	16	10	9
coalition preference only	6	6	11	12
neither	1	2	2	2
	——	——	——	——
total	100	100	100	100
(N)	(1127)	(1091)	(1396)	(1426)

The data have not shown whether voters with non-sincere voting intentions in-deed intended to vote for parties that they wanted to participate in the new cabinet. Table 8.6 therefore shows the relationship between coalition preferences, party pref-erences, and voting intentions. The figures indicate to what extent in each year vot-ing intentions were in line with both coalition preferences and party preferences, with only one of these phenomena, or with neither. In each year most voters in-tended to vote for a party they liked best and wanted to participate in the new coali-tion as well (between 76 and 86 per cent). Voters with non-sincere voting intentions mostly had a voting intention that was in line with their coalition preference. Voters who intended to vote for a party that was included in their coalition preference (third group) largely outnumbered voters who intended to vote for another party (fourth group). The size of the group of voters that is of special interest here – those who had a voting intention that was not in line with their party preference, but which was in line with their coalition preference – varied across the years between 6 and 12 per cent. This suggests that for various voters coalition preferences may have been the reason that they had a non-sincere voting intention.

The overall conclusion is that discrepancies between party preferences and vot-ing intentions can be explained to a considerable extent on the basis of voters' prefer-ences regarding the partisan composition of the new government. Non-sincere vot-ing intentions were much more likely among voters whose coalition preference did not include their party preference. Moreover, voters with non-sincere voting inten-tions often turned to parties they wanted to participate in the new government. What has to be mentioned, however, is that voting intentions nevertheless cannot be ex-plained well on the basis of coalition preferences, simply because virtually without exception coalition preferences included more than one party. Hence, if voters wish to vote for one of the parties they want to form a coalition, the question remains why they prefer to vote for one of these parties in particular.

THE IMPACT OF INCUMBENT APPROVAL

Another heuristic voters may use to decide for whom to vote, is the incumbent ap-proval heuristic. If voters are satisfied with incumbents, they may reward them with a vote; if voters are dissatisfied, they may punish them by supporting the opposition. Although in multi-party systems with coalition governments the use of this heuristic is less straightforward, it may still be used.

If incumbent approval has a direct impact on vote choice, this may explain non-sincere voting intentions. This would imply that at least some voters either preferred a government party, but did not intend to vote for them because they were dissatis-fied with the government, or they preferred an opposition party, but intended to vote for a party of the government they were satisfied with. Whether this indeed hap-

TABLE 8.7 Parties that participated in government coalitions (1982–2002)

period	government	prime minister's party	second party	third party
1982–1986	Lubbers-I	Christian Democrats	Liberal Party	-
1986–1989	Lubbers-II	Christian Democrats	Liberal Party	-
1989–1994	Lubbers-III	Christian Democrats	Labour Party	-
1994–1998	Kok-I	Labour Party	Liberal Party	D66
1998–2002	Kok-II	Labour Party	Liberal Party	D66

TABLE 8.8 Percentage of voters who were satisfied or dissatisfied with the government

	1986	1994	1998	2002
very satisfied	3	0	1	1
satisfied	37	18	43	33
neither satisfied, nor dissatisfied	30	49	41	43
dissatisfied	22	27	11	19
very dissatisfied	6	4	1	3
don't know	2	2	2	1
total	100	100	100	100
(N)	(1630)	(1812)	(2101)	(1908)

pened, can be examined on the basis of the following question that has been asked in the DPES.

> With the help of this card, could you indicate how satisfied you are in general with what the government has done during the past four years?

Respondents were given a card that listed five possible answers: very satisfied, satisfied, neither satisfied nor dissatisfied, dissatisfied, and very dissatisfied.[7]

The various governments that voters were asked to evaluate in terms of satisfaction are listed in Table 8.7. From 1982 until 1989 the Christian Democrats of Prime Minister Ruud Lubbers formed a coalition with the Liberal Party. In 1989 Lubbers' third government was installed, but this time the Christian Democrats formed a coalition with the Labour Party. From 1994 until 2002 the two so-called 'purple' coalitions of the Labour Party, Liberal Party, and D66 were in office.

To what extent voters were satisfied with what these governments had done is shown in Table 8.8. In each year, virtually all voters could say whether or not they were satisfied: only 2 per cent said they did not know.[8] Few voters said they were *very* satisfied or *very* dissatisfied: in 1986 only 9 per cent of the voters said they were, and in the other years even fewer did. Furthermore, the findings show that in each year a large number of voters had no strong feelings: between 30 and 50 per cent said

TABLE 8.9 Relationship between government satisfaction and party preferences (I) (percentage of voters who preferred a government party)

government satisfaction:	1986	1994	1998	2002
(very) satisfied	69	51	51	40
neither satisfied, nor dissatisfied	27	36	37	25
(very) dissatisfied	6	20	23	11
all voters	38	34	41	27
(N)	(1593)	(1783)	(2064)	(1894)

Note: Proportions do not include voters who preferred both a government and an opposition party. *Reading example*: In 1986 of all voters who were satisfied with what the government had done 69 per cent preferred a government party.

TABLE 8.10 Relationship between government satisfaction and party preferences (II) (percentage of voters who preferred an opposition party)

government satisfaction:	1986	1994	1998	2002
(very) satisfied	21	31	24	35
neither satisfied, nor dissatisfied	59	45	39	53
(very) dissatisfied	90	62	56	76
all voters	52	48	35	52
(N)	(1593)	(1783)	(2064)	(1894)

Note: Proportions do not include voters who preferred both a government and an opposition party. *Reading example*: In 1986 of all voters who were satisfied with what the government had done 21 per cent preferred an opposition party.

they were neither satisfied, nor dissatisfied. The proportion that was satisfied and the proportion that was dissatisfied also varied across the years. For the incumbent government the figures were most positive in 1998: whereas 44 per cent said they were satisfied, only 12 per cent said they were dissatisfied. In 1986 and 2002 satisfied voters also outnumbered dissatisfied voters, but not as strongly as in 1998. The only year in which dissatisfaction was more common than satisfaction, was 1994: whereas 18 per cent of the voters was satisfied, 31 per cent was dissatisfied.

Government satisfaction was closely related to party preferences. Table 8.9 shows how often various groups of voters preferred a government party.[9] In each year, voters who were satisfied with the government preferred a government party considerably more often than voters who were dissatisfied. This pattern was clearest in 1986: of the satisfied voters about 70 per cent preferred a government party, while only 6 per cent of the dissatisfied voters did. In 1994 and 1998 the number of voters who preferred a government party, even though they were dissatisfied with what the

government had done, was about 20 per cent; in 2002 the corresponding figure was 11 per cent.[10]

The reverse occurred also. Table 8.10 shows how many voters preferred opposition parties in relation to their satisfaction with the government. Some voters who were satisfied nevertheless preferred an opposition party. Across the years this amounted to between 20 and 35 per cent of the satisfied voters. As expected, a party preference for an opposition party was especially likely among dissatisfied voters. In 1986 the proportion of dissatisfied voters who preferred an opposition party was as high as 90 per cent. In the other years this varied between approximately 55 and 75 per cent.

How can these findings be related to explanations for non-sincere voting intentions? There are two groups of voters for whom incumbent approval matched their party preferences: voters who were satisfied with the government and preferred a government party, and voters who were dissatisfied with the government and preferred an opposition party. For these voters incumbent approval provided no reason to vote for another party than their party preference, quite the contrary. If voters were neither satisfied nor dissatisfied, incumbent approval could also not be the reason. For two other groups of voters, however, the use of the incumbent approval heuristic would result in a non-sincere voting intention. These are the voters who were satisfied with the government, but nevertheless preferred an opposition party, and voters who were dissatisfied with the government, but nevertheless preferred a government party. If incumbent approval influences vote choice independently of party preferences, these voters are expected to have non-sincere voting intentions relatively often.

By combining voters' government satisfaction (satisfied or dissatisfied) and their party preference (government party or opposition party), four categories are distinguished. In the analysis the two categories that involve a 'match' between government satisfaction and party preferences are combined, and so are the two categories that involve a 'mismatch' (Table 8.11).[11] Voters who were neither satisfied nor dissatisfied, as well as voters with a multiple party preference that included both a government party and an opposition party, jointly form a fifth category that is labelled 'other voters'. The findings support the idea that incumbent approval plays a role. Among satisfied voters who preferred an opposition party and dissatisfied voters who preferred a government party, the proportion of non-sincere voting intentions was remarkably large; it varied between 14 and 23 per cent. These voters were about twice as likely to have a non-sincere voting intention as others. However, these voters were still much more likely to vote in line with the party preference heuristic than in line with the incumbent approval heuristic: the proportions of non-sincere voting intentions are all far below 50 per cent.

The final matter to be discussed is the relationship between government satisfaction, party preferences, and voting intentions. Table 8.12 shows to what extent

TABLE 8.11 Government satisfaction and the party preference–voting intention relationship (percentage of non-sincere voting intentions)

	government sat-isfaction:	party preference:	1986	1994	1998	2002
(1)	satisfied	government party	4	7	12	14
(2)	dissatisfied	opposition party				
(3)	satisfied	opposition party	19	14	23	20
(4)	dissatisfied	government party20				
(5)		other voters	9	7	12	13
		all voters	7	8	13	14

Note: The numbers of observations upon which the figures are based are as follows. In 1986: 656, 108, 363 and 1127; in 1994: 347, 131, 613 and 1091; in 1998: 471, 197, 728 and 1396; and in 2002: 475, 203, 748 and 1426.

Reading example: In 1986 of all voters who were satisfied about what the government had done and who preferred a government party, or who were dissatisfied and preferred an opposition party, 4 per cent had a non-sincere voting intention.

TABLE 8.12 Relationship between government satisfaction, party preferences, and voting intentions (%)

voting intention in line with:	1986	1994	1998	2002
party preference and government satisfaction	59	33	36	35
party preference only	33	59	51	51
government satisfaction only	4	3	5	5
neither	4	5	8	9
total	100	100	100	100
(N)	(1127)	(1091)	(1396)	(1426)

Note: Voters who were neither satisfied, nor dissatisfied are included in the second and fourth category.

voting intentions were in line with government satisfaction and party preferences. A first observation is that since 1994 only a minority of the voters had a voting intention that was in line with both the party preference and government satisfaction. This is largely due to the fact that many voters were neither satisfied, nor dissatisfied with what the government had done. They had no reason to reward the government, but none to punish them either. Hence, these voters just could not decide on the basis of the incumbent approval heuristic. The category that is of special interest, is that of voters whose voting intention was in line with government satisfaction only. Across

the years between 3 and 5 per cent of the voters fit this category. This means that for a minority of the voters who had a non-sincere voting intention, expressing their approval (or disapproval) of what the incumbent government had done may have been the underlying reason. This does not mean that the voting intention of these voters can be explained fully on the basis of their satisfaction with the government. The question why they prefer to vote for a particular government or opposition party still remains to be answered.

THE IMPACT OF CANDIDATE EVALUATIONS

In the Netherlands the candidates that are of paramount importance are those who head the lists: the party leaders. Party leader evaluations may influence voting intentions directly as well as indirectly. The latter possibility, namely an effect of party leader evaluations on voting intentions through an impact on party evaluations, will be examined in Chapter 9. What is of interest here, is whether party leader evaluations affect voting intentions directly. If they do, party leader evaluations may have both 'negative' and 'positive' effects. On the negative side, voters may be repelled from their party preference by a negative evaluation of that party's leader. On the positive side, voters may be attracted towards another party than their party preference by a positive evaluation of that other party's leader. Voters may even base their choice solely on their feelings towards the party leaders and ignore their party preference. In that case they would make use of the candidate preference heuristic.

Feelings towards party leaders may have an impact in the Netherlands. G. A. Irwin (1983), for example, showed that in the 1981 election if voters were closest to a party in terms of left-right but evaluated the leader of another party most positively (in terms of trust in the politician as a future prime minister), they were likely to vote for the party of this politician. Hans Anker (1992, ch. 5) showed that in the 1986 and 1989 elections voters voted more often for parties if they liked their leaders better and less often if they liked them worse, and that they did so in proportions that were beyond those that were expected on the basis of long-term influences on the vote. Pieter van Wijnen (2000) found that vote choice could be predicted substantially better when party leader evaluations were included in a model, even if factors such as left-right ideology, issue positions, government satisfaction, social class, and religiosity had already been taken into account. Based on such findings, the question arises whether voters' feelings towards party leaders may account for discrepancies in the party preference–voting intention relationship.

In the DPES respondents were asked to award various party leaders a score between 0 and 100. The higher the score, the more positive their feeling towards that person. In 1998 the question, which was asked immediately after respondents had evaluated the various parties, read as follows.

I would also like to know how sympathetic you find the following politicians.
If you don't know a politician, please feel free to say so.

First Wim Kok. Which score would you give him?

Table 8.13 lists the party leaders that voters were asked to evaluate in the various years. Each study included the leaders of the Labour Party (Joop den Uyl, Wim Kok, and Ad Melkert), Liberal Party (Ed Nijpels, Frits Bolkestein, and Hans Dijkstal), Christian Democrats (Ruud Lubbers, Elco Brinkman, Jaap de Hoop Scheffer, and Jan Peter Balkenende) and D66 (Hans van Mierlo, Els Borst, and Thom de Graaf). Since 1994 leaders of the other parties have been included also, except that in 1998 only one of the orthodox Protestant leaders was included.

Previous research has shown that most Dutch voters knew the leaders of the major parties, while they were somewhat less familiar with leaders of smaller parties (Irwin 1983: 186-188; Irwin 1998: 142-144; see also Irwin and Van Holsteyn 1999: 138-140). Similar findings are obtained here (see Appendix F for details). In general the leaders of the Labour Party, Liberal Party, and Christian Democrats were well-known. Most of the years fewer than 5 per cent of the voters did not know them. The only two exceptions are that 11 per cent of the voters did not know Frits Bolkestein of the Liberal Party in 1994, and 21 per cent did not know Jaap de Hoop Scheffer of the Christian Democrats in 1998. The leaders of D66, Hans Janmaat of the Centre Democrats, as well as Pim Fortuyn were also well-known. Until 2002 the leaders of GreenLeft were not that well-known. In 1986 27 per cent did not know Ina Brouwer and 48 per cent did not know Mohammed Rabbae, while four years later 20 per cent was not familiar with Paul Rosenmöller. However, in 2002 virtually all voters knew him. Jan Marijnissen, too, was better known in 2002 than in 1998 (11 versus 43 per cent did not know him). In 2002 Fred Teeven from Liveable Netherlands was unknown to 33 per cent. Finally, in each election a majority of the voters did not know the leaders of the orthodox Protestant parties (between 52 and 89 per cent).[12]

What evaluation scores voters awarded the various party leaders is not discussed here (details are provided in Appendix F). Suffice it to say that across the parties, as well as across the years, considerable differences existed.

Party leader evaluations were strongly correlated to party evaluations (Table 8.14). Voters who evaluated a certain party more positively than other voters, evaluated the party's leader more positively as well. The strength of the correlations, however, varied. The two strongest relationships were those between voters' evaluations of Pim Fortuyn and his List Pim Fortuyn (r = 0.87) and between the evaluations of Joop den Uyl and the Labour Party (r = 0.80). The weakest relationships were those between the evaluations of Hans Dijkstal and the Liberal Party (r = 0.48) and between the evaluations of Els Borst and D66 (r = 0.52). However, even in these cases a fairly strong relationship existed between voters' feelings towards the party leaders and voters' feelings towards their parties.

TABLE 8.13 Names and parties of the leaders who were evaluated

	1986	1994	1998	2002
PvdA	Den Uyl	Kok	Kok	Melkert
VVD	Nijpels	Bolkestein	Bolkestein	Dijkstal
CDA	Lubbers	Brinkman	De Hoop Scheffer	Balkenende
D66	Van Mierlo	Van Mierlo	Borst	De Graaf
GL	-	Brouwer/Rabbae	Rosenmöller	Rosenmöller
SP	-	-	Marijnissen	Marijnissen
SGP	-	Van der Vlies	-	Van der Vlies
GPV	-	Schutte	Schutte	-
RPF	-	Van Dijke	-	-
CU	-	-	-	Veling
CD	-	Janmaat	Janmaat	-
LPF	-	-	-	Fortuyn
LN	-	-	-	Teeven

TABLE 8.14 Relationship between party leader evaluations and party evaluations (Pearson's correlation coefficient)

	1986	1994	1998	2002
Labour Party	0.80	0.68	0.63	0.64
Liberal Party	0.72	0.68	0.72	0.48
Christian Democrats	0.72	0.69	0.65	0.69
D66	0.64	0.70	0.52	0.72
GreenLeft	-	0.67	0.68	0.74
Socialist Party	-	-	0.72	0.74
SGP	-	0.65	-	0.75
GPV	-	0.75	0.72	-
RPF	-	0.77	-	-
ChristianUnion	-	-	-	0.71
Centre Democrats	-	0.77	0.73	-
List Pim Fortuyn	-	-	-	0.87
Liveable Netherlands	-	-	-	0.67

Reading example: In 1986 the correlation between voters' evaluations of the Labour Party and their evaluations of the leader of the Labour Party (Den Uyl, see Table 8.13) was 0.80.

Correlations between party leader evaluations and party evaluations were not perfect. This implies that party leader evaluations might have influenced voting intentions in addition to party evaluations. First, if voters did not like the leader of their favourite party, they might have intended to vote for another party. Table 8.15

TABLE 8.15 Evaluation scores awarded to leaders of preferred parties (%)

	1986	1994	1998	2002
100	15	7	10	8
90	19	15	19	20
80	23	23	26	30
70	13	21	18	21
60	9	12	9	10
50	7	9	6	5
0-40	4	10	4	5
leader not evaluated	10	4	10	2
total	100	100	100	100
(N)	(1593)	(1783)	(2064)	(1894)
mean score	77	70	76	76

Note: For voters with multiple party preferences evaluation scores are those awarded to the best-liked leader of the preferred parties.

FIGURE 8.1 Evaluation of the leader of the preferred party and the chance of a non-sincere voting intention

therefore shows what evaluation scores voters awarded to the leader of the party they preferred (if voters had a multiple party preference, the evaluation score awarded to the party leader they liked best is taken).[13] Obviously, voters could only evaluate party leaders if they had been included in the survey and if voters knew them. Both conditions were not always met; across the years between 2 and 10 per cent of the voters did not evaluate the leader of their party preference.[14] The table furthermore shows that considerable differences existed across voters. Some liked the leaders of their party preference very well, since they awarded them scores as high as 90 or even 100 (between 22 and 34 per cent). Other voters, however, did not seem to like the leaders of their favourite party much and awarded them scores of 60 or lower (between 19 and 31 per cent).

To determine to what extent evaluations of the leader of the preferred party had an impact on discrepancies between party preferences and voting intentions, logistic regression analyses have been performed. The dependent variable is a so-called dummy variable that indicates whether or not voters had a non-sincere voting intention, while the evaluation score awarded to the leader of the preferred party is the independent variable. The results are presented in Figure 8.1.[15] The figure shows for each year the chance of a non-sincere voting intention in relation to the evaluation of the leader of the party that voters preferred.[16] Three observations are important. First, in each election the chance of a non-sincere voting intention decreased as voters liked the leader of their party preference better. So party leader evaluations had the hypothesised effect. Second, the effect was fairly similar across the years; the slopes of the four curves are similar.[17] Third, at each evaluation score the chance of a non-sincere voting intention was lowest in 1986, somewhat higher in 1994, again higher in 1998, and highest in 2002.

Discrepancies between party preferences and voting intentions can also result if voters feel attracted to leaders of parties they do not prefer. Therefore, the impact of evaluations of the other party leaders is also analysed. Table 8.16 shows what evaluation scores voters awarded to the leaders of the parties they did not prefer. Some voters liked at least one of the leaders of the non-preferred parties much, since they awarded them scores of 90 or 100 (between 10 and 15 per cent did so). Another 20 to 30 per cent of the voters awarded one or more leaders of non-preferred parties a score of 80, while still another 20 to 30 per cent awarded a score of 70. The remaining voters did not like any of the other party leaders much (between 25 and 50 per cent).

To what extent evaluations of leaders of non-preferred parties had an impact on non-sincere voting intentions is shown on the basis of logistic regression analyses in Figure 8.2.[18] In each year party leader evaluations had the expected effect: if the evaluation of the leader of non-preferred parties increased, so did the chance of a non-sincere voting intention. Besides this, two observations are relevant. First, the slope of the four curves clearly differs. The slope of the 1986 curve is not very steep, which indicates that evaluations of leaders of non-preferred parties did not have

TABLE 8.16 Evaluation scores awarded to leaders of non-preferred parties (%)

	1986	1994	1998	2002
100	3	2	4	2
90	11	8	11	11
80	19	22	27	31
70	18	27	27	29
60	20	18	14	15
50	15	11	9	6
0-40	13	11	7	4
none of the leaders evaluated	2	1	2	0
total	100	100	100	100
(N)	(1593)	(1783)	(2064)	(1894)
mean score	64	65	70	72

Note: Evaluation scores are those awarded to the best-liked leader of the non-preferred parties.

FIGURE 8.2 Evaluation of the best-liked leader of non preferred parties and the chance of a non-sincere voting intention

much impact. The slope of the 1994 and 1998 curves are considerably steeper, and the slope of the 2002 curve was still steeper, which suggests that this year voters' feelings towards the leaders of non-preferred parties had the largest impact. Second, the slopes in Figure 8.2 are steeper than those in Figure 8.1. This indicates that evaluations of the leaders of non-preferred parties had a stronger impact than evaluations of the leader of the preferred party. Apparently, the effect of being attracted to a party whose leader voters liked was stronger than the effect of being repelled from a party whose leader voters did not like.

So far, evaluations of leaders of preferred parties and evaluations of leaders of non-preferred parties have been focused on in isolation. We may expect, however, that what matters predominantly is how these evaluations relate to each other. If voters like the leader of their party preference better than any other leader, they may be expected to prefer to vote for their party preference (and consequently have a sincere voting intention). If voters like the leader of another party better, this may lead to a non-sincere voting intention. What matters is the difference between the evaluation score awarded to the leader of the preferred party and the highest score awarded to the leaders of the non-preferred parties.

Table 8.17 shows the differences between the evaluation scores awarded to leaders of preferred and non-preferred parties. The figures in the top four rows combined indicate how many voters liked the leader of the party they preferred better than the leaders of any other party. In 1986 a majority of the voters evaluated the leader of the preferred party most positively: for 64 per cent of the voters the difference between both scores was positive. In the other years this applied to about 50 per cent. In each year, some voters evaluated at least one leader of the non-preferred parties exactly as positively as the leader of their favourite party (between 17 and 29 per cent). Finally, between 20 and 27 per cent of the voters liked at least one other party leader better than the leader of the party they preferred. These voters in particular may be expected to have had a non-sincere voting intention relatively often, especially if the difference between the evaluation scores was large.

The results of logistic regression analyses based on these difference-scores are shown in Figure 8.3.[19] A number of observations can be made. First, the curves show the expected pattern. The more voters liked the leader of the preferred party, compared to the leaders of other parties, the smaller the chance that they intended to vote for another party. For example, if voters liked the leader of their party preference considerably better than any other party leader (difference of 30 points on the 101-point evaluation scale), in 2002 the chance of a non-sincere voting intention was only 7 per cent. If voters liked at least one of the other party leaders equally well, the chance of a non-sincere voting intention was 15 per cent. And if voters liked another leader even better – say, awarded another leader a score of 20 points more –, then the chance of a non-sincere voting intention increased to 25 per cent. Note that even if voters liked another party leader considerably better, they were still more likely to

TABLE 8.17 Differences in evaluations of leaders of preferred and non-preferred parties (%)

	1986	1994	1998	2002
40 and above	19	7	7	3
30	12	6	6	5
20	15	14	15	13
10	18	22	26	28
0	17	23	25	29
- 10	9	14	11	12
- 20	5	7	5	5
- 30 and below	6	6	5	5
total	100	100	100	100
(N)	(1413)	(1698)	(1847)	(1847)
mean score	14	6	7	4

Note: Positive values mean that the leader of the preferred party was evaluated more positively than all leaders of non-preferred parties; a score of zero means that at least one leader of non-preferred parties was evaluated similarly; negative scores indicate that at least one leader of non-preferred parties was evaluated more positively than the leader of the preferred party.

FIGURE 8.3 Difference between evaluations of the leaders of preferred and non-preferred parties and the chance of a non-sincere voting intention

TABLE 8.18 Relationship between party leader preferences, party preferences, and voting intentions (%)

voting intention in line with:	1986	1994	1998	2002
party preference and party leader preference	67	63	58	63
party preference only	25	29	29	22
leader preference only	4	3	5	6
neither	4	5	9	9
total	100	100	100	100
(N)	(1131)	(1095)	(1403)	(1430)

vote for their party preference (the chance of a non-sincere voting intention remains below 50 per cent). This shows that party leader evaluations were considerably less important than party evaluations.

The slopes of the curves are about equally steep in all years, except 1986. Hence, if party leader evaluations are not focused on in isolation, but in terms of the party leader preferences they constitute, their impact appears to be fairly equal across the years. Note that the deviating result in 1986 may be a methodological artefact, resulting from fact that the survey only included the leaders of the four major parties. So the analyses provide no convincing evidence for the hypothesis that the impact of party leader preferences increased in the most recent elections.[20]

A final matter to be examined is to what extent voters with non-sincere voting intentions intended to vote for the party of the leader they preferred. Table 8.18 shows the relationship between party leader preferences, party preferences, and voting intentions.[21] The third and fourth row are particularly relevant: those figures indicate that only a minority of the non-sincere voting intentions were in line with party leader preferences. Across the years between 3 and 6 per cent of the voters belonged to the category that is of special interest here. Their voting intention was not in line with the party preference, but it was in line with the party leader preference. Hence, approximately 5 per cent of the voters show the pattern that is expected if they prefer to vote for another party than their party preference because of their party leader preference.

THE IMPACT OF VOTING HABITS

Some people habitually vote for the same party in each election. The question is whether voting habits may account for discrepancies in the party preference–voting intention relationship. This would be the case, if voters who habitually vote for a par-

ticular party evaluate another party more positively, but nevertheless stick to their old choice when it comes to casting their vote.

The DPES has included a number of questions that may be used to explore the impact of voting habits. For example, in the post-election interview voters who reported a vote were asked whether they had always voted for that party or whether before they had voted for another party. The disadvantage of this question is that voters who had always voted for the same party can only be identified if in this election they again voted for that party. Voters who always voted for the same party but voted for another party in this election, cannot be identified. That is problematic, because we are interested in whether a party preference for another party ends a voting habit or not; that cannot be examined if voters who ended a voting habit cannot be identified. Therefore, in this research another pair of questions is made use of. In the interviews (the post-election interview in 1986, the pre-election interview in later years), voters were asked about their voting behaviour at the previous parliamentary election. In 1998 the corresponding questions read as follows.

> The previous elections for the Second Chamber were held in 1994. Did you vote in these elections, or not?

> For which party did you vote then?

This question has one major disadvantage. It is a well-known fact – in psychology in general, as well as in electoral research – that voters' memories can be flawed. Voters are frequently mistaken when it comes to how they voted in a previous election. Moreover, these mistakes are biased in a particular way: voters tend to think that they voted for the same party as the one they currently prefer (to vote for). Due to such false recall, effects of habits or previous voting may be overestimated in analyses based on these questions. The results should therefore be interpreted with care. Furthermore, previous voting behaviour is certainly not the same as a voting habit. However, if voters stuck to a voting habit even though they liked another party somewhat better, we expect to see a particular relationship with respect to previous voting. More specifically, we expect that voting intentions were in line with previous vote choices beyond the level expected on the basis of party preferences. A second reason to focus on this pair of questions is that voters may base their vote choice in part on their previous vote. Even if voters do not have the habit of always voting for the same party, they may have a kind of standing vote decision. If voters are faced with an election, they may recall for whom they voted last time and stick to that choice unless they feel there is a specific reason not to. This mechanism is similar to that of the voting habit heuristic, except that a habit implies a more automatic process (or absence of elaboration).

Table 8.19 shows what proportions of voters responded with an answer concerning their vote in the previous parliamentary election. In each election, a large

TABLE 8.19 Percentage of voters who recalled their previous vote choice

	1986	1994	1998	2002
previous vote choice recalled	70	79	78	85
did not vote in previous election	10	17	19	8
previous vote choice not recalled	19	4	3	7
total	100	100	100	100
(N)	(1630)	(1812)	(2101)	(1908)

Notes: The vote choice concerns the previous parliamentary election. The third category includes voters for whom the measure was not available (see discussion in text)

TABLE 8.20 Relationship between previous vote choice and party preferences (%)

	1986	1994	1998	2002
previous vote included in party preference	57	60	55	57
previous vote not included in party preference	14	19	24	28
did not vote in previous parliamentary election	29	20	21	14
total	100	100	100	100
(N)	(1593)	(1783)	(2064)	(1894)

Note: The third category includes voters for whom the previous vote choice measure was not available.

majority said they had voted and provided the name of a party. Other voters said they did not vote in the previous election; sometimes they were not yet entitled to vote. Finally, a minority of voters said they did not know whether they had voted, or did not know for whom they had voted (usually about 5 per cent). Because in 1986 the question was still part of the post-election interview (in which some voters did not participate), in that year previous vote choice measures were available for fewer voters.

Voters' previous vote choice was related fairly strongly to their party preferences (Table 8.20). In each election, between 55 and 60 per cent of the voters preferred the party that they said they had voted for in the previous parliamentary election.[22] These figures suggest a stable relationship between previous vote choice and party preferences. However, the figures are influenced by differences in the proportions that said they did not vote in the previous election and those for whom data were not available. If we focus on the proportion of voters who preferred another party than the one they voted for in the previous parliamentary election, a clear increase can be observed: from 14 per cent in 1986 to 28 per cent in 2002.[23] In other words, across the

TABLE 8.21 Previous vote choice and the party preference–voting intention relationship (percentage of non-sincere voting intentions)

	1986	1994	1998	2002
previous vote included in party preference	1	2	3	5
previous vote not included in party preference	40	31	43	36
did not vote in previous parliamentary election	8	11	13	16
all voters	7	8	13	14

Notes: The third category includes voters for whom previous the vote choice measure was not available. The numbers of observations upon which the figures are based are as follows. In 1986: 733, 123, 271, and 1127; in 1994: 787, 173, 131, and 1091; in 1998: 912, 328, 156, and 1396; and in 2002: 897, 384, 145, and 1426.
Reading example: In 1986 of all voters who included the party of their previous vote in their current party preference, 1 per cent had a non-sincere voting intention.

TABLE 8.22 Relationship between previous vote choice, party preferences, and voting intentions (%)

voting intention in line with:	1986	1994	1998	2002
party preference and previous vote choice	62	68	60	54
party preference only	30	24	27	31
previous vote choice only	3	4	8	7
neither	4	4	6	8
total	100	100	100	100
(N)	(1127)	(1091)	(1396)	(1426)

Note: Voters who previously did not vote are included in the second and fourth category.

years an increasing number of voters had a party preference that deviated from their previous vote choice.

If previous vote choice influences voting intentions independently from party evaluations, a relationship should be present between previous vote choice and the frequency that non-sincere voting intentions occurred. Voters who preferred another party than their previous vote choice should have a non-sincere voting intention more often; voters who preferred the party of their previous vote choice are expected to seldom have a non-sincere voting intention. Table 8.21 shows that this was the case. Of the voters who included the party of their previous vote in the party preference, very few had a non-sincere voting intention (between 1 and 5 per cent), whereas voters who preferred another party relatively often had a non-sincere voting intention (between 31 and 43 per cent). Voters who did not vote in the previous elec-

tion (and those for whom no measures were available) took an intermediate position, which did not deviate much from the overall figures.

These findings suggest that when voters decide for whom to vote, their choice is based in part on how they voted previously. However, the impact of voting habits may have been overestimated due to false recall. In the analysis above this is problematic, because it means that the causal direction is not from previous vote choice to current party preferences or voting intentions, but the other way round: voters current party preferences and voting intentions influences *the recall of* their previous vote choice. What remains relevant, however, is that the findings are consistent with what is expected if voting habits and previous vote choice play the hypothesised role.

How previous vote choice, party preferences, and voting intentions were related is shown in Table 8.22. A majority of the voters had a voting intention that was in line with both their party preference and their previous vote choice. Other voters intended to vote for their party preference, which was another party than the one they previously voted for. What is most relevant here, is that some voters with a non-sincere voting intention intended to vote for the same party as they had voted for in the previous election (between 3 and 8 per cent show this pattern). This means that voters who stuck to their voting habit, even though they liked another party better, may account for some of the non-sincere voting intentions.

MULTIVARIATE ANALYSES

Non-sincere voting intentions of many voters can be understood on the basis of other heuristics than the party preference heuristic. If voters intended to vote for a party they did not evaluate most positively, often they preferred this party to participate in the future coalition, were satisfied about the performance of the government in which that party participated, liked the leader of the party best, or had already voted for the party in the previous election. What remains to be examined, is to what extent specific non-sincere voting intentions can be understood on the basis of only one heuristic or more heuristics. If for some voters an explanation can only be given on the basis of one particular heuristic, this would underline the importance of that heuristic. Furthermore, the question arises how well non-sincere voting intentions can be explained if the various concepts are combined in one model, and how much each heuristic then contributes. It is also worth examining whether the strength of party preferences then still plays the hypothesised role.

To what extent non-sincere voting intentions can be explained on the basis of different heuristics, is shown in Table 8.23. The figures of the four years are combined, because the number of observations in each year was fairly limited. A number of conclusions can be drawn. First, in 20 per cent of the cases one particular heuristic

TABLE 8.23 Which concepts non-sincere voting intentions were in line with (%)

coalition preference	incumbent approval	leader preference	previous vote	1986	1994	1998	2002	all years
+	+	+	+	15	8	9	4	8
+	+	+	-	9	9	4	9	7
+	+	-	+	11	6	17	11	12
+	-	+	+	12	11	11	11	11
-	+	+	+	-	-	-	1	0
+	+	-	-	12	1	8	9	8
+	-	+	-	13	10	7	12	10
+	-	-	+	5	18	15	16	14
-	+	+	-	-	1	-	1	1
-	+	-	+	-	1	3	1	2
-	-	+	+	-	-	1	0	0
+	-	-	-	9	15	12	14	13
-	+	-	-	4	11	1	2	3
-	-	+	-	1	-	1	2	1
-	-	-	+	4	-	4	2	3
-	-	-	-	6	7	9	4	6
			total	100	100	100	100	100
			(N)	(82)	(87)	(186)	(204)	(559)

Reading example: In 1986 of all non-sincere voting intentions 15 per cent was in line with voters' coalition preference, incumbent approval, party leader preference, and previous vote; 9 per cent of the non-sincere voting intentions was in line with voters' coalition preference, incumbent approval, and leader preference, but not with their previous vote.

could be singled out as the only explanation, which more often than not involved the coalition preference. About 75 per cent of the non-sincere voting intentions could be understood on the basis of at least two heuristics. In other words, in most instances more than one heuristic could have done the trick, and it remains unclear what exactly made those voters prefer to vote for a particular party. Only 6 per cent of the non-sincere voting intentions could not be understood on the basis of any heuristic. Combined with the fact that across the years on average only about 11 per cent of the voters had a non-sincere voting intention, this means that the proportion of the voters whose voting intention could not be understood at all was only 1 per cent.[24]

The relative importance of each heuristic, as well as the degree to which they collectively explain non-sincere voting intentions, has been examined further by performing logistic regression analyses. In these analyses the dependent variable indicates whether voters had a sincere or non-sincere voting intention, while the independent variables indicate whether or not voters included the party preference in

their coalition preference, whether their government satisfaction and party preference showed a 'match' or a 'mismatch', how much they evaluated leaders of the preferred party better or worse than leaders of non-preferred parties, and whether in the previous parliamentary election they voted for the preferred party or for another party. Additionally, two control variables are included. The first (evaluation of the preferred party) is of minor importance for the interpretation of the results. The second control variable indicates to what extent the strength of the party preference explaining non-sincere voting intentions.[25]

Table 8.24 presents the results of the analyses. The proportion of voters whose voting intention could be classified correctly (as either sincere or non-sincere) on the basis of the models varied between 89 and 95 per cent. These figures may seem very large, but one should take into account that large numbers of voters had sincere voting intentions (between 86 and 93 per cent). Consequently, these figures are not very suitable to judge the explanatory power of the models.[26] A more appropriate measure is the amount of explained variance (as indicated by Nagelkerke R^2). This varied between 0.38 and 0.48, which means that the four phenomena collectively go a fairly long way in explaining a non-sincere voting intention. Across the years there were some differences, but in general the models performed about equally well.

At least as interesting is to what degree each phenomenon contributed to the explanation. In each year coalition preferences influenced non-sincere voting intentions significantly: if voters' coalition preference did not include their party preference, the chance of a non-sincere voting intention was considerably larger (indicated by the positive sign of the b-values). The size of the effects (indicated by the size of the b-values) varied across the years. The impact was largest in 1986 and 2002, and considerably smaller in the other years. Nevertheless, in 1994 and 1998 coalition preferences also played a role. The degree to which non-sincere voting intentions could be explained on the basis of coalition preferences (indicated by the R statistic), reflected the differences in size of the effects and was somewhat larger in 1986 and 2002 than in the two other years.[27]

Government satisfaction had no impact on non-sincere voting intentions. The effect was not significant: once the impact of the other concepts is taken into account, non-sincere voting intentions could not be explained better by including measures of incumbent approval.[28]

Party leader evaluations influenced non-sincere voting intentions in three of the four years. In 1986 no significant effect was found, but this may be a methodological artefact (only four party leaders were included). Since 1994, party leader evaluations have had an impact. As expected, if voters liked the leader of their favourite party better compared to other leaders, the chance of a non-sincere voting intention decreased (as indicated by the negative b-values).[29] Across the years there are some differences in the size of the effect and consequently in the extent to which party leader preferences contributed to the explanation of non-sincere voting intentions, but these

TABLE 8.24 A multivariate model of non-sincere voting intentions
(results of logistic regression analysis)

		1986	1994	1998	2002
EFFECT COALITION PREFERENCES					
party preference not included	b	2.38	1.34	1.16	2.12
	(S.E.)	(0.34)	(0.28)	(0.22)	(0.21)
	R	0.28	0.19	0.15	0.29
EFFECT GOVERNMENT SATISFACTION					
'match' with party preference	b	- 0.55	- 0.37	- 0.24	0.20
	(S.E.)	(0.33)	(0.31)	(0.22)	(0.21)
'mismatch' with party preference	b	- 0.08	0.38	- 0.20	0.20
	(S.E.)	(0.43)	(0.37)	(0.27)	(0.26)
	R	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00
EFFECT PARTY LEADER EVALUATIONS					
party leader preference score*	b	- 0.007	- 0.031	- 0.025	- 0.038
	(S.E.)	(0.008)	(0.007)	(0.006)	(0.006)
	R	0.00	- 0.16	- 0.12	- 0.19
EFFECT PREVIOUS VOTE CHOICE					
previous vote for party preference	b	- 1.82	- 1.30	- 1.64	- 1.54
	(S.E.)	(0.40)	(0.39)	(0.32)	(0.30)
previous vote for another party	b	1.73	1.23	1.38	0.94
	(S.E.)	(0.33)	(0.36)	(0.28)	(0.27)
	R	0.36	0.33	0.37	0.33
CONTROL VARIABLES					
party evaluation score	b	- 0.018	- 0.023	0.006	- 0.019
	(S.E.)	(0.012)	(0.009)	(0.009)	(0.008)
	R	- 0.03	- 0.09	- 0.00	- 0.06
party preference strength score*	b	- 0.032	- 0.049	- 0.024	- 0.031
	(S.E.)	(0.016)	(0.019)	(0.014)	(0.013)
	R	- 0.06	- 0.09	- 0.03	- 0.06
	constant	- 0.44	- 0.05	- 2.06	- 0.02
	(N)	(1127)	(1091)	(1396)	(1426)
correct predictions (%)		95.2	93.4	88.7	89.7
explained variance (Nagelkerke R^2)		0.48	0.38	0.42	0.42

* equals the difference in evaluations of (leaders of) preferred and non-preferred parties

TABLE 8.25 A multivariate model of non-sincere voting behaviour
(results of logistic regression analysis)

		1986	1994	1998	2002
EFFECT COALITION PREFERENCES					
party preference not included	b	0.29	1.12	1.34	1.41
	(S.E.)	(0.21)	(0.19)	(0.18)	(0.17)
	R	0.00	0.17	0.18	0.19
EFFECT GOVERNMENT SATISFACTION					
'match' with party preference	b	- 0.40	0.02	- 0.46	- 0.06
	(S.E.)	(0.20)	(0.18)	(0.17)	(0.16)
'mismatch' with party preference	b	0.10	0.45	- 0.06	- 0.15
	(S.E.)	(0.29)	(0.23)	(0.21)	(0.20)
	R	0.04	0.00	0.05	0.00
EFFECT PARTY LEADER EVALUATIONS					
party leader preference score*	b	- 0.018	- 0.020	- 0.021	- 0.029
	(S.E.)	(0.004)	(0.004)	(0.004)	(0.004)
	R	- 0.13	- 0.11	- 0.11	- 0.17
EFFECT PREVIOUS VOTE CHOICE					
previous vote for party preference	b	- 1.06	- 0.86	- 1.25	- 1.38
	(S.E.)	(0.25)	(0.22)	(0.20)	(0.19)
previous vote for another party	b	1.09	0.88	1.07	0.30
	(S.E.)	(0.27)	(0.23)	(0.19)	(0.19)
	R	0.31	0.26	0.33	0.28
CONTROL VARIABLES					
party evaluation score	b	0.008	- 0.004	- 0.004	- 0.017
	(S.E.)	(0.008)	(0.006)	(0.006)	(0.006)
	R	0.00	0.00	0.00	- 0.06
party preference strength score*	b	- 0.023	- 0.032	- 0.032	- 0.007
	(S.E.)	(0.009)	(0.010)	(0.010)	(0.008)
	R	- 0.06	- 0.08	- 0.07	0.00
	constant	- 1.38	- 0.66	- 0.27	0.81
	(N)	(1192)	(1282)	(1596)	(1505)
correct predictions (%)		86.4	84.0	83.3	80.5
explained variance (Nagelkerke R^2)		0.25	0.28	0.26	0.20

* equals the difference in evaluations of (leaders of) preferred and non-preferred parties

differences are limited. On average, the impact of party leader evaluations was somewhat weaker than that of coalition preferences (especially in 1986 and 2002).

Previous vote choice also had an effect. In each election, voters who had voted for their current party preference in the previous election were considerably less likely than other voters to have a non-sincere voting intention; voters who before had voted for another party were more likely to have a non-sincere voting intention. This effect was strongest in 1986 and weakest in 1994 and 2002 (the mean of the two b-values decreased from 1.8 tot 1.2), suggesting voters relied on their previous vote choice less often in those two elections. Nevertheless, previous vote choice contributed to the explanation of non-sincere voting intentions about equally in all four years. Furthermore, the analyses suggest that previous vote choice did so more strongly than any other phenomenon. With respect to this latter finding, however, a warning of caution is necessary: due to false recall the impact of previous vote choice may be overestimated. But even if the results are in part a methodological artefact, the findings remain consistent with the idea that voters are creatures of habit, and that voting intentions can be explained – at least in part – on the basis of previous vote choice.[30]

A final observation is that the strength of party preferences played the hypothesised role. As the strength of voters' party preference increased, the chance on a non-sincere voting intention decreased. Hence, the relationship between party preference strength and the chance on a non-sincere voting intention observed in the previous chapter, cannot be accounted for – at least not fully – by the fact that voters with relatively weak party preferences more often preferred a coalition with other parties, more often preferred the leader of another party, or more often had the habit to vote for another party. Party preference strength as such had an additional effect on the chance on a non-sincere voting intention. At the same time, the fact that the impact of party preference strength was rather weak, indicates that its strong relationship with non-sincere voting intentions found in the previous chapter can be partly accounted for by the fact that voters with weak party preferences are more likely to be in a position in which the use of another heuristic than the party preference heuristic results in the choice for a non-preferred party.

So far we have focused on voting intentions, not voting behaviour. The question arises to what extent the same phenomena can explain actual non-sincere voting. Because voting intentions are ultimately transformed into voting behaviour, we may expect the same phenomena to influence whether voters actually voted sincerely or non-sincerely. However, the analyses in Chapter 5 showed that the amount of non-sincere voting was considerably greater than the amount of non-sincere voting intentions. This can be understood if one realises that voting intentions may change for various reasons. First, the underlying party evaluations may change, which may lead to shifts in party preferences, which in turn may lead to shifts in voting intentions. Second, changes may take place with respect to the other phenomena – election out-

come preferences, incumbent approval, and party leader evaluations – which may in turn affect voting intentions. Because data about all such changes are not available, this will not be analysed here. A third reason why voting intentions may change, concerns the relative weight of the various phenomena. It is possible that the importance of the phenomena that underlie voting intentions changed. For example, perhaps prospective considerations influenced voting intentions more strongly in the latest phase of the campaign than weeks in advance. Or maybe party leader evaluations became more important shortly before the election. If such changes occur, this may lead to shifts in voting intentions and discrepancies will occur between voting intentions some weeks before the election and actual voting behaviour. Moreover, changes may then be observed in the impact of the various phenomena in relation to non-sincere voting behaviour.

To examine whether the relative weight of different phenomena changed, similar logistic regression analyses have been performed with actual voting behaviour as the dependent variable (instead of voting intentions). The results are shown in Table 8.25. If the results are compared with those in Table 8.24, a number of observations can be made. First, the explanatory power of the models that focus on voting behaviour is lower than that of the models that focus on voting intentions. On average, the proportion of correct predictions decreased from 92 to 84 per cent, and the explained variance as indicated by Nagelkerke R^2 decreased from 0.43 to 0.25. This is no surprise, because the models do not take into account two important causes of discrepancies between party evaluations and voting behaviour (changes in party evaluations and changes in other factors that influence voting intentions). Second, for each phenomenon on average the size of the effect (as indicated by the b-values) is somewhat smaller in the models that focus on voting behaviour. Overall there were no major differences in the relative importance of the various phenomena. That is confirmed by R statistics. Previous vote choice had the strongest impact, coalition preferences and party leader evaluations had a weaker impact, and government satisfaction had virtually no impact.

There is one election, however, in which the impact of the various phenomena on actual voting behaviour differed from their impact on voting intentions: the 1986 election. In that year voting intentions were influenced strongly by coalition preferences, and not by party leader preferences. Actual voting behaviour, however, was not influenced by coalition preferences, but by party leader preferences. These findings are consistent with the then unexpected results of the 1986 election (see Andeweg 1988). Opinion polls indicated that the Labour Party would become larger than the Christian Democrats, but the outcome of the election was reversed. This was apparently the result of changes in the voting intentions shortly before the election. The analyses presented here suggest that those changes stemmed from the fact that voters were ultimately motivated less by which coalition they preferred, and more by which leader they preferred. The decreased impact of coalition preferences pre-

sumably affected the electoral support for Labour negatively, while the increased im-
pact of party leader preferences affected the electoral support for the Christian
Democrats positively. This illustrates that changes in the weight that voters put on
strategic considerations and candidate preferences may account for discrepancies
between initial voting intentions and actual voting behaviour.

MULTIPLE PARTY PREFERENCES: HEURISTICS AS TIE-BREAKER

The findings presented suggest that voters sometimes choose to vote non-sincerely
because of their government preference, candidate preference, or voting habit. These
phenomena may also influence voting intentions in another way: voters with multi-
ple party preferences may use them as tie-breaker. This means that voters with a
multiple party preference use the party preference heuristic to eliminate the parties
they do not evaluate most positively, and then choose between the remaining parties
on the basis of one of the other heuristics.

    The possibility that voters chose from the parties of their multiple party prefer-
ence by using their government preference, candidate preference, or voting habit as
a tie-breaker, can be examined by answering two questions. The first question is
whether it was possible for voters, in principle, to use the corresponding heuristics to
break the tie. This was only the case if voters included only one of the preferred par-
ties in their coalition preference, if they liked the leader of one of the preferred par-
ties better than those of the other parties, and if they voted before for one of the pre-
ferred parties. Furthermore, although incumbent approval was not found to explain
non-sincere voting, we may still examine whether voters used the corresponding
heuristic to break ties.

    Additional analyses indicate that the government preference heuristic and the
incumbent approval heuristic could only be used as a tie-breaker by a minority of
voters (Table 8.26).[31] Government preferences could often not provide a solution, be-
cause voters preferred a government coalition that included two or more of the pre-
ferred parties.[32] Incumbent approval was mostly neither of much use, either because
voters were not satisfied or dissatisfied with the government, or, if they were
(dis)satisfied, because they preferred two or more government or opposition parties.
The candidate preference heuristic and the voting habit heuristic, on the other hand,
both provided a majority of voters the opportunity to break the tie. In each election,
about 60 per cent of the voters had a candidate preference that included the leader of
only one of the parties they preferred, while about 75 per cent of the voters had
voted for one of those parties in the previous parliamentary election.

    The next question is whether in the cases where the heuristics could have been
used to break a tie, voters formed a voting intention as expected on the basis of that
heuristic. With respect to two heuristics the corresponding figures are as high as 80

TABLE 8.26 Percentage of voters for whom each heuristic could break the tie

	1986	1994	1998	2002
government preference heuristic	40	38	28	38
incumbent approval heuristic	21	23	30	22
candidate preference heuristic	61	58	60	55
voting habit heuristic	72	75	74	76

Reading example: In 1986 of all voters (with a multiple party preference), the government preference heuristic could additionally be used to break the tie by 40 per cent of the voters.

TABLE 8.27 Percentage of voters who broke tie as expected on the basis of each heuristic

	1986	1994	1998	2002
government preference heuristic	84	78	81	84
incumbent approval heuristic	80	61	57	63
candidate preference heuristic	56	56	55	69
voting habit heuristic	84	82	81	73

Reading example: In 1986 of all voters (with a multiple party preference) who could use the government preference heuristic to break the tie, 84 per cent intended to vote for the corresponding party (and thus broke the tie as expected on the basis of this heuristic).

per cent: the government preference heuristic and the voting habit heuristic (Table 8.27). If these heuristics could be used to break a tie, large majorities intended to vote as expected on the basis of that heuristic. This supports the view that voters are creatures of habit, but at the same time take into account strategic considerations. Although the support for the idea that the incumbent approval heuristic and the candidate preference heuristic are used to break ties is less strong, a majority of voters who could use this heuristic intended to vote as expected on that basis. This suggests that some voters may have used these heuristics to break ties.

SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION

This chapter has shown that three of the heuristics discussed in Chapter 5 may provide an explanation of why some voters preferred to vote for parties they did not evaluate most positively. First, sometimes voters preferred a particular government to be formed after the election that did not include the party they liked best. This happened relatively often if voters preferred small parties; these are often not regarded as potential government parties. Such voters may be expected to award their vote to a party they liked somewhat worse, in the hope that this party will be in-

cluded in the future government. The findings suggest that this indeed happened. Across the four elections analysed, about 10 to 15 per cent preferred a government coalition that did not include their party preference. Moreover, these voters preferred to vote non-sincerely relatively often. Coalition preferences played a role in each election, but most strongly in those of 1986 and 2002.

Another reason why voters may provide electoral support to non-preferred parties, is to be found in their evaluations of the party leaders. Voters may either not really like the leader of the party they like best, or they may like the leader of another party particularly well. This may be a reason not to support the best-liked party, as well as a reason to support another party. The findings indicate that usually 20 to 25 per cent of the voters preferred the leader of a party other than the one they liked best, and those voters were indeed more likely to prefer to vote non-sincerely. The size of the overall impact of party leader preferences was fairly stable across the various elections, and usually somewhat smaller than that of coalition preferences.

The findings presented are consistent with the hypothesis that voters sometimes stick to a habitual vote choice, even though there is another party that they in fact like more. In the polling booth people turn out to be creatures of habit. It must be noted, however, that methodological problems may have influenced the findings, which therefore should be interpreted with much care.

Incumbent approval did not provide an explanation for non-sincere voting once other phenomena had been taken into account. In as far as satisfaction with the incumbent government affected voters' choices, this effect seems to have been mediated by voters' party evaluations, candidate evaluations, and preferences regarding the composition of the future government. Mechanisms of reward and punishment did not surpass the impact of those phenomena and thus did not influence voting intentions directly.

As hypothesised on the basis of the sincere vote model, the chance that one of the phenomena identified resulted in a non-sincere vote also depended on the strength of voters' party preference: the stronger their preference for a particular party, the smaller the chance on a non-sincere vote

CHAPTER 9

EXPLAINING PARTY EVALUATIONS:
A TRADITIONAL APPROACH

In each of the elections analysed, voters mostly voted in line with their party evalua-tions. If party evaluations determine voting behaviour so strongly, the question arises why voters evaluate parties with certain degrees of favour or disfavour.

This matter was discussed in Chapter 6. But the ideas presented about how in-formation-processing, representation in memory, and emotional response determine party evaluations, unfortunately cannot be tested on the basis of the surveys upon which this research is based. There are a number of reasons. First, the survey method is more or less by definition just not well suited to analyse information-processing. Individuals usually forget information they process as such, but only use it to update specific aspects of their memory. Therefore, reconstructing what information voters processed on the basis of a survey is virtually impossible. Second, how parties are represented in memory has usually not been assessed properly. Typically, only a lim-ited number of closed-ended questions have been asked about how voters perceived parties' stands in terms of a few issues and a left-right continuum. No questions have been included about voters' images of parties in various possible other terms – for example, which interests parties represented (labour force, entrepreneurs, farmers), which other organisations they were associated with (church, trade unions, environ-mental movement), what ideological terms other than left and right applied to them (socialist, liberal, conservative, Christian), or what other terms characterised the par-ties (social, clear, arrogant). Moreover, no questions are available that reveal voters' memories of things parties have said or done (so-called episodic information). Third, the surveys have not included questions about voters' emotional responses to par-ties. Whether parties (or their candidates) made voters feel angry, anxious, enthusias-tic, or whatever other emotions parties evoked, remains unknown.

This does not mean that party evaluations cannot be explained at all. The least that can be done, is to attempt to explain party evaluations on the basis of concepts

that have traditionally been used to explain voting behaviour and which have been included in election surveys. This traditional approach will be adopted in this chapter. Using the data from the Dutch Parliamentary Elections Studies (DPES), party evaluations will be analysed in relation to voters' social characteristics, policy preferences, ideological positions, government satisfaction, and party leader evaluations. The analyses concern the same four elections as those central in the previous chapters (1986, 1994, 1998, and 2002). The parties that will be focused on are the Labour Party, Liberal Party, Christian Democrats, D66, GreenLeft, Socialist Party, orthodox Protestant parties, and List Pim Fortuyn.[1]

Self-evidently, such analyses cannot provide full insight in the psychological processes that underlie the formation and change of party evaluations. What psychological mechanisms operate that make that voters with a particular ideological position like certain parties better or worse, for example, is a question that cannot be answered by merely examining these relationships. The same argument applies as that put forward in Chapter 1 with respect to sociological explanations of voting behaviour: the mere observation that voters with a particular social identity like certain parties much, leaves the question open why they do. One possibility is that the relationship is spurious: for example, voters may 'inherit' their social identity as well as their party evaluations from their parents. The following analyses therefore do not provide definite answers regarding the psychological mechanisms involved. They have to be considered as illustrations of how party evaluations may be explained if one focuses on concepts that have traditionally been used to explain voting behaviour.[2]

The strategy adopted may be considered interesting for one reason in particular. Performing separate analyses for each party provides a basis to judge the validity of a key element of the psephological paradigm: the assumption of homogeneity in bases of evaluation. Models of voting are usually based on the assumption that voters like or dislike different parties for the same reasons. If this is the case, then we should find that the various phenomena have a similar impact on voters' evaluations, irrespective of which party is focused on.[3]

THE IMPACT OF RELIGIOUS AND SOCIAL CLASS IDENTITY

In earlier decades, vote choice in the Netherlands could be explained successfully on the basis of a so-called sociological approach (Lipset and Rokkan 1967; Lijphart 1974; Andeweg 1982). If one knew voters' religious denomination, frequency of church attendance, and social class self-image, their choice at the polls could be predicted fairly accurately. Across the years, however, the impact of religion and social class has decreased substantially (Irwin and Van Holsteyn 1989a; Van Holsteyn and Irwin 2003; Van der Kolk 2000). Nevertheless, in response to the 1994 election Rudy

Andeweg (1995: 125) concluded that with the present speed of developments it would still take three decades before their impact had disappeared.

Although religion and social class have usually been regarded as sociological concepts, they may well be used in a psychological study of voting. After all, what both concepts are about is voters' social identity; identity is a psychological concept. The central idea appears to be that for whom people vote, depends on which groups they identify with. This more or less implies that party evaluations can also be explained in those terms. If voters define their identity in terms of belonging to a particular social class, they will presumably like parties better if these represent the interest of that social class. If voters define their identity in terms of a religious community, they will presumably like parties better if these are associated with that religious community. Additionally, we may expect that if such an identity is more central in a person's self-image, so will be the effect on how voters evaluate the associated parties.

Voters' religious identity can be operationalised on the basis of questions about church membership and attendance of religious services. In the DPES the questions read as follows.[4]

> Do you consider yourself a member of a particular church or religious community, and if so, which one?

> How often do you attend religious services?

While the first question indicates what religious community voters identify with, the second question can be used as a proxy measure for the strength of this identification. Voters who attend religious services more often, presumably identify more strongly with that religious community than voters who attend such services less often.

Social class identity has been operationalised on the basis of another question.

> One sometimes speaks of the existence of various social classes and groups. If you were to assign yourself to a particular social class, which one would that be?

Respondents were shown a card with five possible answers: upper class, upper middle class, ordinary middle class, upper working class, and ordinary working class. The format of this question differs from that concerning voters' religious identity. The social class question only asks voters *which* social class they belong to; *whether* they think of themselves as belonging to a particular social class, is not asked. Note that while religious identity is operationalised in terms of direction and intensity, there is no equivalent regarding the intensity of social class identity.

There were no major differences across the four years studied in the number of voters who considered themselves a member of a particular church or religious com-

TABLE 9.1 Percentage of voters who considered themselves member of a particular church

	1986	1994	1998	2002
Roman Catholic	31	25	28	25
Dutch Reformed	14	14	11	12
Calvinist	6	6	7	9
other Christian	-	-	5	-
other	4	4	2	5
none	44	50	47	49
total	100	100	100	100
(N)	(1630)	(1812)	(2101)	(1908)

Note: The category 'none' includes few voters who said they did not know or gave no answer.

TABLE 9.2 Percentage of Christian church members who attended religious services with a particular frequency

	1986	1994	1998	2002
at least once a week	16	12	13	11
at least once a month	9	10	11	10
several times a year	13	11	15	14
(almost) never	13	12	12	11
not a member of a Christian church	49	55	50	54
total	100	100	100	100
(N)	(1630)	(1812)	(2101)	(1908)

Note: The category '(almost) never' includes few voters who said they did not know/gave no answer.

TABLE 9.3 Percentage of voters who assigned themselves to a particular social class

	1986	1994	1998	2002
upper class	2	2	1	4
upper middle class	14	14	16	22
ordinary middle class	44	53	56	55
upper working class	11	6	7	5
ordinary working class	26	21	18	12
don't know	4	4	2	3
total	100	100	100	100
(N)	(1630)	(1812)	(2101)	(1908)

Note: The category 'don't know' includes few voters for whom data are missing.

munity (Table 9.1). In general, about half of the voters considered themselves not a member of a church, and the other half considered themselves Roman Catholic, Dutch Reformed, or Calvinist. The frequency with which they attended religious services did not change much either (Table 9.2).[5] In terms of social class, on the other hand, the composition changed substantially (Table 9.3). The size of the upper middle class increased from 14 to 22 per cent, and the size of the middle class from 44 to about 55 per cent. Consequently, the number of voters who thought of themselves as working class declined strongly. In 1986 still 37 per cent thought of themselves as upper working class or ordinary working class, but in subsequent years this figure decreased to only 17 per cent.

To determine the impact of voters' religious and social class identity on party evaluations, for each party and each year multiple regression analyses have been performed. The evaluation score awarded to a particular party is the dependent variable, and religious identity and social class identity are the independent variables.[6] Religious and social class identity have been operationalised in the form of four so-called dummy variables, which indicate whether voters had a particular identity (coded 1 if voters had such an identity, coded 0 if not). If voters considered themselves member of a Christian church and attended religious services at least once a week, they are classified as having a strong Christian identity. If they considered themselves member of a Christian church and attended religious services less often, they are classified as having a weak Christian identity. If voters assigned themselves to the ordinary working class or the upper working class, they are classified as having a working class identity. If voters assigned themselves to the upper middle class or the upper class, they are classified as having an upper middle class identity.[7] This means that evaluation scores awarded by secular middle class voters are in a sense used as a baseline. Thus, the so-called constant in the regression analyses indicates the evaluation expected for those voters, while the b values indicate the effect to be expected if voters had a particular other religious or social class identity.[8]

Two additional remarks need to be made. First, for the sake of convenience the evaluations of the orthodox Protestant parties, and in 1986 also those of the predecessors of GreenLeft, are analysed jointly.[9] Second, in analyses that involve the orthodox Protestant parties, religious identity has been conceptualised in terms of a *Protestant* (instead of a Christian) identity. Hence, in those analyses voters are classified not on the basis of whether or not they considered themselves member of a Christian church, but whether they considered themselves member of a Protestant church.

The evaluation scores that voters awarded to the various parties clearly differed across the different groups (Table 9.4). Voters who had a weak Christian identity awarded the Christian Democrats scores that were about 15 points higher (in terms of the 0-100 evaluation scale) than those awarded by secular voters. For the orthodox Protestant parties the effect of a weak Protestant identity was about 10 points. A strong Christian identity had an even stronger impact on evaluations of the Christian

TABLE 9.4 The impact of religious and social class identity on party evaluations (b values in multiple regression analysis, constant, adjusted R^2)

	Labour Party				Liberal Party			
	1986	1994	1998	2002	1986	1994	1998	2002
weak Christian identity	- 9.7	n.s.	- 1.8	- 4.5	6.6	6.8	3.1	3.8
strong Christian identity	- 22.0	n.s.	- 7.0	- 9.4	4.5	n.s.	- 4.5	- 3.5
working class identity	14.0	2.7	3.2	4.8	- 11.0	- 7.5	- 6.4	- 4.9
upper middle class identity	- 7.0	- 3.0	n.s.	n.s.	10.1	3.5	2.6	3.1
constant	61.5	57.6	65.7	57.8	45.7	50.0	52.6	51.9
explained variance	0.15	0.01	0.02	0.03	0.09	0.05	0.03	0.03

	Christian Democrats				D66			
	1986	1994	1998	2002	1986	1994	1998	2002
weak Christian identity	16.9	14.7	12.2	13.2	n.s.	- 2.1	- 4.4	- 4.5
strong Christian identity	27.1	24.9	18.8	19.8	- 9.4	- 11.0	- 15.2	- 21.3
working class identity	- 8.0	- 5.9	- 2.3	n.s.	n.s.	- 4.1	- 2.8	n.s.
upper middle class identity	n.s.	- 3.2	- 2.6	n.s.	6.2	3.1	4.0	4.2
constant	48.8	46.1	49.2	50.9	54.8	60.8	57.1	54.5
explained variance	0.17	0.17	0.14	0.15	0.04	0.04	0.07	0.11

	GreenLeft				Socialist Party	
	1986	1994	1998	2002	1998	2002
weak Christian identity	- 8.5	- 9.7	- 6.7	- 4.5	- 7.1	- 6.9
strong Christian identity	- 9.7	- 16.0	- 9.4	- 9.3	- 12.3	- 10.6
working class identity	n.s.	- 2.9	n.s.	n.s.	n.s.	n.s.
upper middle class identity	n.s.	n.s.	n.s.	4.6	n.s.	3.9
constant	47.8	53.5	58.5	56.3	48.0	50.6
explained variance	0.03	0.05	0.03	0.03	0.03	0.03

	Orthodox Protestant				List Pim Fortuyn
	1986	1994	1998	2002	2002
weak Christian identity	8.1	10.7	8.0	11.5	n.s.
strong Christian identity	35.2	36.5	33.7	36.7	n.s.
working class identity	- 3.3	n.s.	n.s.	n.s.	- 4.1
upper middle class identity	n.s.	n.s.	- 4.4	n.s.	n.s.
constant	29.9	30.6	38.0	37.9	35.4
explained variance	0.16	0.18	0.19	0.20	0.00

Notes: The constant indicates the evaluation score expected for secular middle class voters.
n.s. indicates an effect is not significant. With respect to the orthodox Protestant parties the effects of a religious identity concern a Protestant identity instead of a Christian identity.

Democrats (approximately 20 to 25 points), while a strong Protestant identity had a still stronger impact on evaluations of the orthodox Protestant parties (about 35 points). While the effects were equally strong across the years with respect to the orthodox Protestant parties, the impact on evaluations of the Christian Democrats weakened somewhat between 1986 and 1998. So voters' feelings towards this party became less strongly influenced by their Christian identity.

Evaluations of the other parties were also affected by voters' religious identity, but usually not as strongly as those of the Christian parties. In 1986 the most notable effect concerned the Labour Party. Voters with a weak Christian identity on average awarded Labour an evaluation score that was 10 points lower than the score awarded by secular voters. Among voters with a strong Christian identity the effect was about 20 points. In 1994 these negative effects are not found. Christian voters awarded Labour scores similar to those of secular voters. In later elections there were again some effects, but these were fairly weak. The most noteworthy exception is D66. Voters with a strong Christian identity evaluated this party relatively negatively. Moreover, the size of this effect increased from about 10 points in 1986 to about 20 points in 2002. Finally, voters with a (weak or strong) Christian identity evaluated GreenLeft and Socialist Party somewhat more negatively than secular voters did (usually about 10 points).

The effects of social class were much weaker. Moreover, the impact of social class decreased across the years and ultimately this characteristic played virtually no role. The strongest effect found concerns that of a working class identity in relation to evaluations of the Labour Party. In 1986 working class voters awarded Labour scores that were on average about 15 points higher than those awarded by middle class voters. A negative effect of an upper middle class identity was also present, but this effect was only half as large. Since 1994, social class no longer had an impact on evaluations of Labour. The most noteworthy other effect concerned a mirror image of Labour. In 1986 working class voters awarded the Liberal Party relatively low scores, and upper middle class voters awarded them relatively high scores. The size of both effects was about 10 points. These effects have since weakened, and in 2002 neither exceeded 5 points.

The degree to which party evaluations could be explained on the basis of the model that included both religious and social class identity varied considerably across parties, and within some parties also across years. In each year, evaluations of the Christian Democrats and the orthodox Protestant parties could be explained relatively well by the model (explained variance varied between 14 and 20 per cent). In 1986 evaluations of the Labour Party could be explained relatively well too, but since 1994 this was no longer the case. Evaluations of the Liberal Party could also be explained to some extent in 1986, but less so in later years. One party shows the reversed pattern. While evaluations of D66 could initially be explained poorly, in later years the model performed better. With respect to GreenLeft (and their predeces-

sors), Socialist Party, and List Pim Fortuyn, the model did not contribute to the explanation of how voters evaluated them in any year.

The differences in the explanatory power of the model appear to result predominantly from differences in the effect of religion.[10] The fairly strong explanatory power of the model with respect to evaluations of the Christian Democrats and orthodox Protestant parties stemmed, unsurprisingly, from the effect of voters' Christian or Protestant identity. Moreover, the explanatory power of the model with respect to evaluations of the Labour Party appears to be the result not only of an effect of voters' social class identity, but also of an even stronger negative effect of voters' religious identity. A related finding is that the decrease in the explanatory power with respect to Labour resulted from two simultaneous developments. First, whereas in 1986 Labour was evaluated relatively positively by working class voters and relatively negatively by upper middle class voters, in 1994 these effects were not present. Second, whereas in 1986 voters with a Christian identity felt more negatively about Labour than other voters, in 1994 this effect was not present either. Finally, note that the unanticipated increase of the explanatory power of the model with respect to evaluations of D66 stemmed from increasingly negative feelings among voters with a strong Christian identity.

THE IMPACT OF POLICY PREFERENCES

The decline of the explanatory power of models of voting based on religion and social class has resulted in a search for other explanations. Among the alternatives proposed are the notions of policy voting and issue voting (Van Cuilenburg et al. 1980; Middendorp et al. 1993; Van Wijnen 2001). According to these notions, voters regard political parties as packages of policy preferences or issue stands. When faced with an election, voters are expected to choose the party whose package comes closest to their own policy preferences. The corresponding model assumes that the agreement or disagreement between voters and parties in terms of a number of salient issues determines how voters evaluate the various parties, which in turn determines their vote choice.

In the DPES voters have been questioned about several issues. With respect to each issue respondents were shown a card with a seven-point scale at which both end-points were labelled. Voters were then asked to indicate how they perceived the positions of various political parties and what their own position was. With respect to the issue of euthanasia, for example, the following question was asked.

> When a doctor ends a life of a person at the latter's request, this is called *euthanasia*. Some people think that euthanasia should be forbidden by law. Others feel that a doctor should always be allowed to end a life, if the patient makes

that request. Of course, there are people whose opinion lie somewhere in be-
tween. Suppose that the people (and parties) who think that euthanasia should
be forbidden are at the beginning of this line (at number 1) and the people (and
parties) who feel that a doctor should always be allowed to end a life upon a
patient's request are at the end of the line (at number 7). I will ask you first to
place some parties on the line. If you have no idea at all which position a party
has, then please feel free to say so. Where would you place the CDA on this
line? And where the PvdA? … And where would you place yourself?

In a similar fashion voters were asked about policies concerning income inequality,
building nuclear plants, pace of the European integration, government action against
crime, integration of ethnic minorities, and admission of asylum seekers (see Ta-
ble 9.5).[11] To facilitate the discussion, the polar positions are labelled in this research
– admittedly, somewhat arbitrarily – left-wing and right-wing.[12]

Most voters appeared to be able to express their personal opinion on the vari-
ous issues. At most 7 per cent of the voters said they did not know what their posi-
tion was.[13] To examine the impact of policy preferences on party evaluations, for each
party and each year multiple regression analyses have again been performed. The
dependent variables are the evaluation scores awarded to the various parties, and
the independent variables are voters' policy preferences.[14] To facilitate the interpreta-
tion, the scales have been recoded such that the mid-point corresponds with a score
of zero and the end-points correspond with scores of plus and minus one (the left-
wing position was coded plus one, the right-wing position minus one). Conse-
quently, the constant in the regression analysis indicates the evaluation score ex-
pected for voters who positioned themselves at the mid-point of each scale, and the
b-values indicate the effect to be expected for voters who positioned themselves at
one of the end-points of the scale. Positive values indicate that voters who took a left-
wing position evaluated the party more positively than voters who took a right-wing
position, while negative values indicate the reversed. Because voters' opinions re-
garding the integration of ethnic minorities and the admission of asylum seekers
were fairly strongly correlated, only one of these issues has been included in the
analyses (in 1994 that of ethnic minorities, in 1998 and 2002 that of asylum seekers).[15]

Policy preferences clearly had an impact on how voters evaluated the various
parties (Table 9.6). Some policy preferences mattered more strongly than others.
What is arguably even more interesting, is that the impact of particular policy prefer-
ences varied across parties. Opinions about euthanasia, for example, had a fairly
strong impact on evaluations of the orthodox Protestant parties. Voters who posi-
tioned themselves at an end-point of the scale awarded these parties an evaluation
score that differed, on average, 15 points from the score awarded by neutral voters.
Unsurprisingly, voters who felt euthanasia should be allowed liked these parties
worse, and those who felt euthanasia should be forbidden liked them better. A simi-

TABLE 9.5 Policies about which voters indicated their positions

issue	'left-wing position'	'right-wing position'	when included
euthanasia	A doctor should always be allowed to end the life of a patient when the latter requests so	It should be forbidden that a doctor ends the life of a patient at the latter's request	1986–2002
income nequality	The differences in income in our country should be decreased	The differences in income in our country should be increased	1986–2002
nuclear plants	No nuclear plants should be built at all in the Netherlands	Additional nuclear plants should be built in the Netherlands	1986–2002
European integration	The European unification should go further	The European unification has gone too far	1998–2002
ethnic minorities	Foreigners and ethnic minorities should be able to live in the Netherlands while preserving all customs of their own culture	Foreigners and ethnic minorities in the Netherlands should fully adjust themselves to the Dutch culture	1994–2002
asylum seekers	The Netherlands should allow more asylum seekers to enter	The Netherlands should send back as many asylum seekers as possible	1998–2002
crime	Government acts too tough on crime	Government should act tougher on crime	1994, 2002

lar effect, but of a smaller size, can be observed regarding the Christian Democrats. With respect to the other parties the effect was either small and reversed, or absent. The only exception concerns the evaluations of D66 in 2002, which showed a reversed effect of 10 points.

Voters' preferences regarding income inequality mattered most strongly with respect to the Liberal Party. Voters who thought income inequality should be decreased awarded this party evaluation scores that were about 10 to 15 points lower than those awarded by neutral voters, while voters who thought income inequality should be increased awarded them scores that were equally much higher. With respect to the Christian Democrats in 1986 a similar effect was found, but in later years

income inequality did not matter much for how voters evaluated them. With respect to the Labour Party, GreenLeft, and Socialist Party reversed effects can be observed. The size usually varied between a modest 5 and 10 points, except for an effect of 16 points regarding evaluations of the Labour Party in 1986.

With respect to the issue of building nuclear plants some effects were found, but these were smaller in size than those concerning euthanasia and income inequality. The largest effects found (9 points) concerned the Labour Party and Liberal Party in 1986. Voters who opposed building new nuclear plants evaluated the former somewhat more positively and the latter somewhat more negatively. Across the four elections the average effect reached 5 points for only two parties: Liberal Party and GreenLeft. The issue of European integration, which was only included in the surveys of 1998 and 2002, played an even smaller role: no effect exceeded 5 points.

In 1994, when the crime issue was included for the first time, its impact on party evaluations was weak: none of the effects exceeded 5 points. In 2002 the impact was somewhat stronger. Voters who thought government should act tougher on crime evaluated the Christian Democrats and List Pim Fortuyn somewhat more positively, and the Labour Party, D66, GreenLeft, and Socialist Party somewhat more negatively (effects varied between 5 and 10 points). With respect to the issue of asylum seekers, the effects are in the same direction, but of a considerable greater magnitude. One effect stands out in particular. Voters who took a right-wing position, which states that as many asylum seekers as possible should be send back, awarded List Pim Fortuyn scores that were 22 points higher than those awarded by neutral voters. This is the largest effect found with respect to any party, in any year. With respect to the Liberal Party there was an effect in the same direction, but of a limited magnitude. With respect to GreenLeft the effect was fairly strong too (about 12 points), but reversed. For the Labour Party, D66, and Socialist Party the effects were in the same direction as those concerning GreenLeft, but they were smaller in size. Evaluations of the Christian Democrats and orthodox Protestant parties were unaffected.

How well party evaluations could be explained on the basis of the various effects jointly varied across parties, and within parties across years. In 1986 evaluations of the Labour Party and the Liberal Party could be explained fairly well on the basis of voters' policy preferences (the explained variance was 20 per cent), while evaluations of the Christian Democrats and orthodox Protestant parties could be explained only slightly worse. Evaluations of GreenLeft and D66, however, could not be explained well. In later years the evaluations of the Labour Party, Liberal Party, and Christian Democrats could not be explained as well as in 1986, but policy preferences still mattered.[16] With respect to GreenLeft and D66, the explanatory power of the model increased. In fact, none of the party evaluations could be explained as well as those of GreenLeft in 2002 (explained variance equalled 25 per cent). Evaluations of the orthodox Protestant parties could also be explained fairly well in 2002, and so could those of List Pim Fortuyn.

TABLE 9.6 The impact of policy preferences on party evaluations
(b values in multiple regression analysis, constant, adjusted R²)

	Labour Party				Liberal Party			
	1986	1994	1998	2002	1986	1994	1998	2002
euthanasia	6.3	n.s.	2.7	4.7	n.s.	2.3	1.9	2.3
income inequality	16.2	7.9	4.5	6.1	- 15.3	- 10.8	- 11.9	- 9.2
nuclear plants	8.5	n.s.	2.7	3.8	- 8.8	- 5.1	- 3.9	- 5.3
European integration	n.a.	n.a.	4.8	4.0	n.a.	n.a.	2.6	1.9
crime	n.a.	2.7	n.a.	5.2	n.a.	- 1.9	n.a.	- 2.6
asylum seekers	n.a.	6.5	3.7	7.0	n.a.	- 5.1	- 8.8	- 6.3
constant	50.6	58.8	61.1	55.9	53.3	51.4	55.4	53.5
explained variance	0.20	0.10	0.07	0.15	0.20	0.16	0.16	0.14

	Christian Democrats				D66			
	1986	1994	1998	2002	1986	1994	1998	2002
euthanasia	- 9.5	- 7.5	- 8.6	- 8.0	4.5	4.8	6.1	9.7
income inequality	- 10.3	- 4.4	n.s.	- 2.4	n.s.	n.s.	n.s.	3.2
nuclear plants	- 6.1	- 4.0	n.s.	- 3.5	2.2	1.6	2.5	1.6
European integration	n.a.	n.a.	4.5	n.s.	n.a.	n.a.	4.8	5.0
crime	n.a.	n.s.	n.a.	- 7.0	n.a.	n.s.	n.a.	6.1
asylum seekers	n.a.	n.s.	- 2.8	n.s.	n.a.	5.0	5.4	4.4
constant	62.3	57.5	58.0	57.8	51.2	56.9	50.7	51.2
explained variance	0.15	0.08	0.08	0.10	0.02	0.04	0.09	0.16

	GreenLeft				Socialist Party			
	1986	1994	1998	2002	1998	2002		
euthanasia	n.s.	5.0	5.5	5.4	5.0	4.4		
income inequality	8.5	5.4	6.3	9.4	5.8	8.7		
nuclear plants	5.7	6.0	5.1	4.2	3.1	4.0		
European integration	n.a.	n.a.	n.s.	5.2	n.s.	n.s.		
crime	n.a.	4.5	n.a.	6.3	n.a.	4.6		
asylum seekers	n.a.	12.3	13.0	11.1	10.9	7.9		
constant	38.8	48.1	50.6	54.9	39.9	46.9		
explained variance	0.07	0.20	0.17	0.25	0.10	0.12		

Notes: The constant indicates the evaluation score expected for voters who positioned themselves at the mid-point of each scale. The 1994 figures concern the issue of ethnic minorities (instead of asylum seekers).

n.s. indicates an effect is not significant; n.a. indicates policy preference scores are not available

TABLE 9.6 (continued)
(b values in multiple regression analysis, constant, adjusted R^2)

	Orthodox Protestant				List Pim Fortuyn
	1986	1994	1998	2002	2002
euthanasia	- 14.2	- 11.6	- 14.8	- 18.0	n.s.
income inequality	- 6.0	n.s.	n.s.	n.s.	- 6.5
nuclear plants	n.s.	- 3.3	- 2.0	- 1.7	- 3.3
European integration	n.a.	n.a.	- 2.2	n.s.	- 2.5
crime	n.a.	n.s.	n.a.	n.s.	- 7.5
asylum seekers	n.a.	n.s.	n.s.	n.s.	- 22.3
constant	37.1	41.4	47.7	49.2	28.9
explained variance	0.14	0.10	0.17	0.22	0.24

THE IMPACT OF IDEOLOGY IN TERMS OF LEFT-RIGHT

Another explanation of vote choice that has been suggested after the decline of models based on voters' social identity, is that of ideology in terms of left-right. Downs (1957) argued that if voters want to vote for a party whose policy proposals they prefer, they do not need to know the positions of political parties on all kinds of issues. They may rely on ideological agreement as a short cut, for example in terms of a left-right continuum. Van der Eijk and Niemöller (1983) argued that in the Netherlands both voters and parties can indeed be characterised by a particular position on an ideological continuum of left-right, and that voters' choices at the polls can be explained well in those terms. The model states that voters perceive the left-right positions of the various parties, compare these to their own left-right position, and vote for the party that is closest to them.

This view implies that party evaluations can be explained on the basis of ideological agreement in terms of left-right. This can be tested on the basis of the following question, which has been asked in both the pre-election and the post-election interview of the DPES.[17]

> Political opinions are often described in terms of left or right. When you think of your own political opinions, where would you place yourself on this line? Please mention the number that applies to you.

Respondents were shown a card with a horizontal line with either ten positions (numbered 1 through 10) or eleven positions (numbered 0 through 10).[18] The first position was labelled 'left' and the last position was labelled 'right'. Additionally, each card showed a position labelled 'don't know'. In the post-election interview voters were additionally asked to rate the various parties on the basis of the same scale.[19]

It is also said of political parties that they are left or right. Would you please indicate the degree to which you think that a party is left or right. The Labour Party? And the Liberal Party? …

Measures that indicate how much agreement voters perceived between their own position and those of the various parties, have been constructed by subtracting the score voters assigned to a particular party from the score they said applied to themselves; the absolute values of the resulting figures have been taken.[20] Hence, a value of 0 means that voters perceived no difference between their own left-right position and that of the party in question. As the ideological difference increases, so does the measure. The maximum score on this scale equals 9; this score results if respondents position themselves at one end of the scale, and the party at the other end.

To analyse how well party evaluations can be explained on the basis of left-right ideology, multiple regression analyses have again been performed. The dependent variables are the evaluation scores awarded to the various parties. The independent variables are the measures that indicate the perceived agreement between voters and parties in terms of the left-right continuum. The constant in the regression analyses corresponds with the evaluation that the model predicts for voters who put themselves and the party at the same left-right position. The b-values indicate how much the evaluation score would change if the perceived ideological disagreement would increase with one point (on the ten-point scale of left-right).[21]

The impact of perceived ideological agreement in terms of left-right on party evaluations was relatively stable across the years, as well as across parties (Table 9.7). In most cases, the size of the effect was about four to five points. This means that voters who saw a minor difference between the ideological position of a particular party and their own ideological position (equal to one point on the ten-point scale of left right), awarded that party an evaluation score that was about 5 points lower than the score awarded by voters who perceived full ideological agreement. Although the size of the effects was fairly similar across the parties, some differences can be observed. These concern the Labour Party in particular. The strongest effect found concerns the Labour Party in 1986 (7 points), and the weakest effect concerns that same party in 1998 (3 points).

Although the size of the effects was fairly similar, the explanatory power of the left-right agreement model varied considerably across parties and across years. This means that other factors than perceived agreement in terms of left-right were more important for some parties than for others. In 1986 the model performed best with respect to evaluations of the Labour Party (the explained variance was 40 per cent). In that year the model also performed fairly well with respect to the Liberal Party and the Christian Democrats (explained variance was about 30 per cent). Regarding the other parties the corresponding figures varied between 10 and 20 per cent. On the whole, between 1994 and 2002 the explanatory power of the model was some-

TABLE 9.7 The impact of left-right agreement on party evaluations
(b values in multiple regression analysis, constant, adjusted R²)

	Labour Party				Liberal Party			
	1986	1994	1998	2002	1986	1994	1998	2002
effect of disagreement	- 7.2	- 4.6	- 3.2	- 4.5	- 5.7	- 5.4	- 5.1	- 4.9
constant	81.1	68.2	70.8	66.0	65.7	65.7	64.7	64.3
explained variance	0.40	0.17	0.08	0.16	0.30	0.25	0.23	0.20

	Christian Democrats				D66			
	1986	1994	1998	2002	1986	1994	1998	2002
effect of disagreement	- 6.0	- 5.1	- 3.8	- 4.8	- 3.5	- 4.0	- 3.5	- 4.2
constant	73.4	63.3	62.6	65.8	62.4	66.7	60.1	59.6
explained variance	0.29	0.17	0.11	0.15	0.11	0.09	0.07	0.10

	GreenLeft				Socialist Party			
	1986	1994	1998	2002	1998	2002		
effect of disagreement	- 4.5	- 5.6	- 4.4	- 5.2	- 4.5	- 4.3		
constant	53.5	67.6	68.5	69.6	59.4	61.5		
explained variance	0.14	0.22	0.15	0.22	0.14	0.12		

	Orthodox Protestant				List Pim Fortuyn			
	1986	1994	1998	2002	2002			
effect of disagreement	- 4.4	- 4.1	- 4.1	- 4.3	- 5.8			
constant	48.5	48.0	52.5	53.4	50.7			
explained variance	0.18	0.14	0.14	0.11	0.18			

Note: Entries indicate effects of one point distance at the ten-point scale; constants indicate the evaluation score expected for voters who put themselves and a party at the same position.

what weaker, but ideological agreement in terms of left-right still mattered. In 2002 the explained variance was about 20 per cent with respect to GreenLeft, Liberal Party, and List Pim Fortuyn, about 15 per cent with respect to Labour Party and Christian Democrats, and about 10 per cent with respect to Socialist Party, orthodox Protestant parties, and D66. The most striking differences across the years concern the Labour Party. While in 1986 the explanatory power was 40 per cent, by 1998 it had decreased to only 8 per cent. In 2002 the figure was again higher, but still far behind that of 1986.

Another striking finding is that the evaluation that is predicted by the model for voters who perceive full agreement with a party in terms of left-right, differs markedly across the parties. In 1986, for example, voters who placed the Labour Party at the same position as themselves awarded them a score of about 80, while voters who

placed the Liberal Party at the same position as themselves awarded them a score of about 65. The values also varied across time. While with respect to the Labour Party in 1986 the evaluation predicted for those voters was about 80, in 1994 and 1998 it was about 70, and in 2002 it was about 65. This suggests that other factors that play a role favour some parties more than others; the degree to which they do may vary across time.

THE IMPACT OF GOVERNMENT SATISFACTION

Among the other factors that may influence how voters evaluate parties are their feelings about the performance of the latest government. According to the notion of retrospective voting, voters' choices are based primarily on judgements about the past. The notion of government satisfaction is closely related to this. Government parties may be expected to benefit from satisfaction with the government, whereas opposition parties may benefit from dissatisfaction with the government.

Government satisfaction has been operationalised on the basis of the following question.

> With the help of this card, could you indicate how satisfied you are in general with what the government has done during the past four years?

A card listed five alternative answers: very satisfied, satisfied, neither satisfied nor dissatisfied, dissatisfied, and very dissatisfied.

Virtually all voters could say whether or not they were satisfied: only 2 per cent said they did not know how satisfied they were (see Table 8.8 in Chapter 8). Multiple regression analyses have again been performed to examine the impact of government satisfaction on party evaluations. Because few voters indicated they were *very* satisfied or *very* dissatisfied, these are joined with those who said they were satisfied or dissatisfied, respectively. The dependent variables are the evaluation scores awarded to the individual parties. The independent variables are two dummy variables that indicate whether or not voters were satisfied, and whether or not voters were dissatisfied (each coded 1 if they were, coded 0 if they were not). This means that the constant in the regression analyses indicates the evaluation score expected from voters who were neither satisfied, nor dissatisfied with the government; these individuals will be referred to as 'neutral voters'. The b-values indicate the effects of satisfaction and dissatisfaction.

Various effects are possible. One possibility is that we will see a positive effect of satisfaction for the government parties and a negative effect for opposition parties. With respect to dissatisfaction a reversed pattern may be expected. These expectations are based on the idea that government parties benefit from satisfaction with the government, and opposition parties from dissatisfaction. Another possibility is that

government satisfaction affects only voters' evaluations of the government parties, and that evaluations of the opposition parties are thus based solely on other factors. A third possibility is that some government parties benefit from satisfaction with the government, whereas others do not. Likewise, some opposition parties may benefit from dissatisfaction with the government, while others do not.

The results of the analyses provide some support for each expectation (Table 9.8). First, voters who were satisfied with the incumbent government evaluated the parties that had participated in the government more positively than neutral voters, and voters who were dissatisfied with the government evaluated those same parties more negatively. For example, in 1986 voters who were satisfied with the Lubbers-I government awarded the Christian Democrats and the Liberal Party evaluation scores that were about 15 points higher than those awarded by neutral voters. If voters were dissatisfied with the government, they awarded those parties scores that were about 20 points lower. In later years government parties were awarded evaluation scores that were about 5 to 10 points higher among satisfied voters than among neutral voters, while dissatisfied voters awarded the government parties scores that were about 8 to 15 points lower. The only exception concerns the Liberal Party in relation to the two purple coalitions, which showed some weaker effects.

Without exception, in each year the largest effects found – positive as well as negative – involved the party of the incumbent prime minister (Lubbers' Christian Democrats in 1986 and 1994, Kok's Labour Party in 1998 and 2002). Apparently, the prime minister's party got the credits as well as the debits of the performance of the government more strongly than other coalition partners. The differences are limited, however, and other coalition parties usually benefited or suffered only slightly less.

On the whole, dissatisfaction had a stronger effect on evaluations of the government parties than satisfaction. In each election, the mean negative effect of dissatisfaction was about 4 points larger than the positive effect of satisfaction; across parties and years the mean effect was 8.5 for satisfaction and 12.5 for dissatisfaction.

Evaluation scores awarded to opposition parties were affected by government satisfaction too, but in different ways. In some cases voters who were satisfied with the government awarded particular opposition parties lower scores than neutral voters did, while dissatisfied voters awarded them higher scores. For example, in 1986 with respect to the Labour Party the effects were as large as with respect to the governments parties (between 15 and 20 points), but in the opposite direction. A similar pattern can be observed that same year with respect to the predecessors of GreenLeft, and in 2002 with respect to List Pim Fortuyn (most effects were about 10 points). In other cases, however, the patterns were reversed and evaluation scores of opposition parties were affected similarly as those of the government parties. For example, in 1986 and 1994 voters who were satisfied with the government awarded the orthodox Protestant parties higher scores than neutral voters, while dissatisfied vot-

TABLE 9.8 The impact of government satisfaction on party evaluations
(b values in multiple regression analysis, constant, adjusted R²)

	Labour Party				Liberal Party			
	1986	1994	1998	2002	1986	1994	1998	2002
effect of satisfaction	- 20.3	5.1	6.9	7.3	15.2	n.s.	3.3	2.2
effect of dissatisfaction	15.8	- 8.1	- 8.7	- 14.8	- 17.4	n.s.	- 8.2	- 3.3
constant	62.2	58.6	62.4	56.6	45.2	51.1	51.6	52.8
explained variance	0.27	0.05	008	0.15	0.27	0.00	0.03	0.01

	Christian Democrats				D66			
	1986	1994	1998	2002	1986	1994	1998	2002
effect of satisfaction	16.9	10.9	n.s.	- 2.3	- 4.4	n.s.	6.9	5.6
effect of dissatisfaction	- 22.6	- 14.3	- 5.1	n.s.	- 3.1	- 4.2	- 8.3	- 12.5
constant	55.5	54.3	55.8	58.2	55.5	59.6	51.6	52.2
explained variance	0.35	0.14	0.01	0.00	0.01	0.01	0.07	0.10

	GreenLeft				Socialist Party			
	1986	1994	1998	2002	1998	2002		
effect of satisfaction	- 11.0	n.s.	n.s.	3.2	n.s.	n.s.		
effect of dissatisfaction	9.1	- 2.9	- 4.7	- 10.0	4.4	- 3.7		
constant	44.8	49.2	55.9	55.8	43.2	48.8		
explained variance	0.11	0.00	0.00	0.05	0.00	0.00		

	Orthodox Protestant				List Pim Fortuyn			
	1986	1994	1998	2002	2002			
effect of satisfaction	7.2	8.1	n.s.	- 3.3	- 6.3			
effect of dissatisfaction	- 14.3	- 3.6	5.3	6.5	11.3			
constant	34.4	34.7	40.6	42.4	34.4			
explained variance	0.11	0.03	0.01	0.02	0.05			

n.s. indicates an effect is not significant

ers awarded them lower scores. The effects were not as large as those regarding the government parties, but they were still of a considerable magnitude (between 4 and 14 points). In 1998 and 2002, on the other hand, voters who were satisfied with the government awarded the orthodox Protestant parties similar or slightly lower scores, and dissatisfied voters awarded them slightly higher scores. These differences can be understood if one realises that the first two cabinets included the Christian Democrats, whereas the latter two did not.[22] Finally, in some cases government satisfaction had virtually no effect on how voters evaluated a particular party. For example, effects did not exceed 5 points with respect to the evaluations of D66 in 1986, the Lib-

eral Party in 1994, GreenLeft in 1994 and 1998, and the Christian Democrats and So-cialist Party in 1998 and 2002.

The explanatory power of the model based on government satisfaction largely reflects the size of the effects just discussed. In 1986 evaluations of the Labour Party, Liberal Party, and Christian Democrats could be explained particularly well. The explained variance was 25 per cent with respect to the former two parties, and even 35 per cent with respect to the latter. Evaluations of the predecessors of GreenLeft and orthodox Protestant parties could be explained to some extent too (explained variance equalled 11 per cent). In subsequent years with respect to the government parties the explained variance was at most as high as 15 per cent (Christian Democrats in 1994 and Labour Party in 2002), but sometimes as low as 1 per cent (Liberal Party in 2002). After 1986, the only two opposition parties for whom the model resulted in an explained variance of 5 per cent were GreenLeft and List Pim Fortuyn in 2002. In all other cases the explanatory power of the model was very limited. Hence, the model based on government satisfaction cannot be applied successfully with respect to all parties and all years. However, in some instances government satisfaction appeared to play an important role, in particular in relation to government parties.

THE IMPACT OF PARTY LEADER EVALUATIONS AND MULTIVARIATE ANALYSES

Another reason why voters may like or dislike parties, is because of their leaders. Leadership effects may be analysed in several ways. Anthony King (2002) distin-guished three strategies researchers may employ. One of these, the so-called im-proved-prediction strategy, links up well with the approach adopted here.[23] In this strategy the question asked is: suppose we already know a lot about voters in terms of their social characteristics, ideological position, policy preferences, partisan loyal-ties, and the like; what does knowing judgements of party leaders then add to our ability to predict vote choice? The main reason for employing such a strategy is that it prevents researchers to falsely attribute effects of the listed factors to the impact of party leaders (King 2002; cf. Miller and Shanks 1996). Although in this chapter the aim is different, namely to predict party evaluations, the same strategy may be em-ployed for the same reasons. The impact of party leader evaluations will thus be as-sessed in terms of the additional explanatory power they provide. Therefore, the ex-planatory power of a model that includes all factors discussed so far will first be examined. This is useful for the analysis of the impact of party leader evaluations, but may also be considered interesting in its own right. Such multivariate analyses indicate how much each factor attributes to the explanation of party evaluations once the others are taken into account.

To determine the joint impact of religious identity, social class identity, policy preferences, perceived ideological agreement, and government satisfaction, regression analyses have again been performed. The dependent variables are the evaluation scores awarded to the various parties. The independent variables are all measures discussed previously in this chapter. To facilitate comparisons across the various variables, standardised coefficients (beta weights) are presented.[24]

All factors influenced party evaluations to some extent (Table 9.9). Since the results of the analyses indicate the effect of each factor while the effects of the other factors are controlled for, this implies that the effect of none of the factors was mediated – at least not fully – by other factors.[25] So the effects of religious and social class identity were not mediated fully by policy preferences, and the effects of policy preferences were not mediated fully by perceived left-right agreement either (nor the other way round). Second, the size of the impact of the various factors varied clearly across parties, and within parties sometimes across time. Third, earlier conclusions concerning the size of the impact of the various factors are supported by the multivariate analyses. Let us focus on these in some more detail.

The size of the impact of social identity varied strongly across parties, and within parties to a limited extent across time. Voters' religious identity had a strong impact on their evaluations of the Christian Democrats (beta varied roughly between 0.15 and 0.25) and, especially among voters with a strong Protestant identity, on their evaluations of the orthodox Protestant parties (beta varied between 0.25 and 0.30). Evaluations of D66, GreenLeft, and Socialist Party were sometimes also affected by voters' religious identity (four beta's varied between 0.10 to 0.20), while evaluations of the Labour Party, Liberal Party, and List Pim Fortuyn were virtually unaffected. The impact of social class identity was limited with respect to all parties. If effects were at all significant, their size was limited (beta's mostly varied between 0.05 and 0.10).

The impact of policy preferences also differed across parties. With respect to the Labour Party and Liberal Party the issue of income inequality mattered most (beta's varied between 0.12 and 0.18), while the influence of the asylum seekers issue was only slightly weaker (beta's varied between 0.09 and 0.14). Evaluations of the Christian Democrats and D66 were not affected that strongly by opinions on any issue, although various issues mattered somewhat. The position of GreenLeft, and to a more limited extent also that of the Socialist Party, was different. Their evaluations were affected fairly strongly by various issues, in particular those of asylum seekers and income inequality. The orthodox Protestant parties and List Pim Fortuyn took a different position: only one issue mattered, and it did so strongly. In the case of the orthodox Protestant parties this concerned the euthanasia issue (beta's varied between 0.14 and 0.27), while voters' evaluations of List Pim Fortuyn were affected very strongly by their opinions about asylum seekers (beta equalled 0.32). No issue had such a strong impact in any year.

The only factor that had a relatively similar impact across parties, was left-right agreement. In general, evaluations of the various parties were affected fairly strongly by perceived ideological disagreement (most beta's were close to 0.25). The most notable exceptions are that evaluations of the Labour Party in 1986 and of the Liberal Party in 1994, 1998, and 2002 were affected by left-right disagreement more strongly (beta's varied between 0.35 and 0.41), while in 2002 evaluations of D66 were affected by left-right ideology less strongly (beta equalled 0.17).

Finally, the impact of government satisfaction varied across parties in a particular way. Among government parties satisfaction and dissatisfaction usually had a fairly strong impact, while evaluations of the opposition parties were not affected much. An exception concerns the evaluations of the Labour Party in 1986, which were affected in the opposite way. With respect to the evaluations of government parties it is noteworthy that the effect of satisfaction was slightly weaker than that of dissatisfaction (the mean values of beta equalled 0.12 and 0.16, respectively). Note also that evaluations of the Christian Democrats in 1986 were affected relatively strongly by satisfaction and dissatisfaction with the Lubbers-I government, while evaluations of the Liberal Party in 1998 and 2002 were not affected much by voters' evaluations of the two purple coalitions led by Kok. Another thing to note is that if voters were satisfied with the Lubbers-III government of the Christian Democrats and Labour in 1994, this did not affect their evaluations of the Labour Party. Hence, the degree to which satisfaction or dissatisfaction with the government affected evaluations of government parties, varied somewhat across them. In each election, the strongest effects found involved the prime minister's party.

Given the differences across parties in the size of the effect of various factors, it is no surprise that a similar observation can be made regarding the explanatory power of the multivariate model. In particular, evaluations of the Labour Party, Liberal Party, and Christian Democrats could be explained well in 1986 (explained variance was about 50 per cent), while in later years the model performed less well. Nevertheless, evaluations of these three parties could also be explained to a considerable extent in later years (explained variance varied between 20 and 35 per cent). Figures regarding the evaluations of the orthodox Protestant parties and GreenLeft did not deviate much. The same applies to evaluations of List Pim Fortuyn in 2002, which could be explained as well as those of most other parties. The model performed relatively poorly, on the other hand, with respect to evaluations of the Socialist Party (explained variance equalled 20 per cent) and with respect to D66 when they were in opposition (explained variance equalled 13 per cent).

Another thing to note concerns the constants in the regression analyses, which varied across parties and time as well. These values refer to a rather peculiar class of voters: secular middle class voters who had no pronounced views on the various issues, perceived full agreement in terms of left-right, and were neither satisfied nor dissatisfied with the government. Nevertheless, these values do tell us something

TABLE 9.9 The multivariate model and party evaluations
(beta coefficients, constant, and adjusted R^2 in multiple regression analysis)

	Labour Party				Liberal Party			
	1986	1994	1998	2002	1986	1994	1998	2002
weak Christian identity	n.s.	0.05	n.s.	- 0.04	- 0.05	0.06	n.s.	n.s.
strong Christian identity	n.s.	n.s.	- 0.08	n.s.	- 0.07	n.s.	- 0.08	- 0.05
working class identity	0.11	0.05	0.06	0.06	- 0.05	- 0.08	- 0.10	- 0.05
upper middle class identity	n.s.	- 0.06	- 0.05	n.s.	0.09	n.s.	n.s.	0.07
euthanasia	0.05	n.s.	n.s.	0.08	0.06	0.08	n.s.	0.07
income inequality	0.16	0.16	0.14	0.14	- 0.15	- 0.18	- 0.18	- 0.12
nuclear plants	0.08	n.s.	0.06	0.09	- 0.12	- 0.11	- 0.04	- 0.09
European integration	n.a.	n.a.	0.08	0.07	n.a.	n.a.	n.s.	n.s.
crime	n.a.	0.06	n.a.	0.06	n.a.	n.s.	n.a.	n.s.
asylum seekers	n.a.	0.13	0.09	0.10	n.a.	- 0.09	- 0.14	- 0.12
left-right disagreement	- 0.41	- 0.31	- 0.21	- 0.22	- 0.27	- 0.39	- 0.35	- 0.37
satisfied with government	- 0.13	n.s.	0.17	0.14	0.17	n.s.	0.06	0.07
dissatisfied with government	0.10	- 0.17	- 0.16	-0.20	- 0.18	n.s.	- 0.08	-0.09
constant	67.5	68.3	65.6	60.7	60.7	62.2	65.0	63.3
explained variance	0.52	0.25	0.21	0.31	0.46	0.32	0.32	0.28

	Christian Democrats				D66			
	1986	1994	1998	2002	1986	1994	1998	2002
weak Christian identity	0.13	0.23	0.26	0.24	- 0.06	n.s.	- 0.07	- 0.05
strong Christian identity	0.16	0.26	0.24	0.22	- 0.09	- 0.08	- 0.19	- 0.18
working class identity	n.s.	n.s.	n.s.	n.s.	n.s.	- 0.06	n.s.	n.s.
upper middle class identity	- 0.04	- 0.07	- 0.05	n.s.	0.10	n.s.	0.07	0.07
euthanasia	- 0.11	n.s.	- 0.10	- 0.08	0.07	0.10	0.06	0.14
income inequality	n.s.	- 0.09	n.s.	n.s.	n.s.	n.s.	0.08	0.10
nuclear plants	- 0.05	- 0.06	n.s.	n.s.	0.07	n.s.	0.07	0.05
European integration	n.a.	n.a.	0.08	0.05	n.a.	n.a.	0.08	0.10
crime	n.a.	n.s.	n.a.	- 0.08	n.a.	n.s.	n.a.	0.07
asylum seekers	n.a.	n.s.	n.s.	n.s.	n.a.	0.13	0.11	0.06
left-right disagreement	- 0.24	- 0.23	- 0.22	- 0.29	- 0.29	- 0.25	- 0.20	- 0.17
satisfied with government	0.20	0.12	n.s.	n.s.	n.s.	n.s.	0.14	0.08
dissatisfied with government	- 0.26	- 0.21	- 0.08	n.s.	- 0.08	- 0.08	- 0.09	- 0.16
constant	62.2	56.8	56.8	57.8	61.7	67.3	56.0	57.0
explained variance	0.50	0.36	0.23	0.25	0.13	0.13	0.21	0.28

n.s. indicates an effect is not significant; n.a. indicates scores are not available

TABLE 9.9 (continued)
(beta coefficients, constant, and adjusted R² in multiple regression analysis)

	GreenLeft				Socialist Party	
	1986	1994	1998	2002	1998	2002
weak Christian identity	n.s.	- 0.06	n.s.	n.s.	- 0.08	n.s.
strong Christian identity	n.s.	- 0.11	n.s.	n.s.	- 0.12	n.s.
working class identity	- 0.09	n.s.	n.s.	- 0.06	n.s.	n.s.
upper middle class identity	n.s.	n.s.	n.s.	0.07	n.s.	0.11
euthanasia	n.s.	n.s.	0.12	0.10	n.s.	0.07
income inequality	0.15	0.09	0.13	0.19	0.10	0.13
nuclear plants	0.11	0.11	0.10	0.10	n.s.	0.08
European integration	n.a.	n.a.	n.s.	0.09	n.s.	n.s.
crime	n.a.	0.08	n.a.	0.08	n.a.	n.s.
asylum seekers	n.a.	0.20	0.24	0.17	0.20	0.14
left-right disagreement	- 0.27	- 0.29	- 0.25	- 0.26	- 0.26	- 0.25
satisfied with government	- 0.15	n.s.	n.s.	n.s.	- 0.07	n.s.
dissatisfied with government	n.s.	n.s.	- 0.06	- 0.07	n.s.	n.s.
constant	51.4	64.2	60.2	62.0	58.4	52.8
explained variance	0.22	0.30	0.25	0.34	0.21	0.19

	Orthodox Protestant				List Pim Fortuyn
	1986	1994	1998	2002	2002
weak Christian identity	0.06	0.16	0.09	0.13	n.s.
strong Christian identity	0.25	0.29	0.28	0.26	n.s.
working class identity	n.s.	n.s.	n.s.	n.s.	n.s.
upper middle class identity	n.s.	n.s.	- 0.06	n.s.	n.s.
euthanasia	- 0.22	- 0.14	- 0.25	- 0.27	0.06
income inequality	n.s.	n.s.	n.s.	0.07	- 0.06
nuclear plants	n.s.	- 0.08	n.s.	n.s.	n.s.
European integration	n.a.	n.a.	- 0.05	n.s.	n.s.
crime	n.a.	n.s.	n.a.	n.s.	n.s.
asylum seekers	n.a.	n.s.	n.s.	0.08	- 0.32
left-right disagreement	- 0.24	- 0.23	- 0.22	- 0.23	- 0.26
satisfied with government	n.s.	0.06	n.s.	n.s.	- 0.08
dissatisfied with government	- 0.14	n.s.	n.s.	0.07	0.09
constant	43.5	42.5	49.4	49.3	41.9
explained variance	0.34	0.30	0.33	0.33	0.31

Note: With respect to the orthodox Protestant parties the model includes dummy variables for a weak or strong Protestant identity instead of a weak or strong Christian identity.

about how voters evaluated the various parties, irrespective of the factors included in the model. The most noteworthy changes across time were that the evaluations of GreenLeft were considerably more positive than those of their predecessors, and that the rather positive evaluations of D66 in 1994 had ceased to exist four years later. The findings furthermore indicate that the orthodox Protestant parties and List Pim Fortuyn were evaluated relatively negatively. With respect to the former this can be understood if one realises that the reference group to which the constant refers concerns secular voters.[26] This may also explain why the constant regarding the Christian Democrats was usually slightly lower than that of most other parties. For the negative evaluations of List Pim Fortuyn such a straightforward explanation is not available.[27]

The explanatory power of the model that combines the various concepts provides a baseline against which the impact of party leader evaluations can be assessed. In Chapter 8 it was already shown that party evaluations and party leader evaluations strongly correlated. This seems to suggest a large impact of leader evaluations. This impact will be examined by adding party leader evaluations to the multivariate model discussed above.

The DPES asked voters to indicate how much they liked various party leaders.

> I would also like to know how sympathetic you find the following politicians.
> If you don't know a politician, please feel free to say so. First Wim Kok. Which
> score would you give him? And Jaap de Hoop Scheffer? …

Voters made use of the same card they used to indicate their feelings about the political parties, which had a line printed with values ranging from 0 to 100, while both end-points and the mid-point were labelled.

Incorporating party leader evaluations in the model improved the explanatory power substantially (Table 9.10). The extent to which it did, varied between 15 per cent with respect to evaluations of D66 in 1998 and 46 per cent with respect to evaluations of List Pim Fortuyn in 2002. Consequently, the multivariate model that included party leader evaluations resulted in explained variance figures that were considerably higher than those of the multivariate model presented previously. For example, while in 1998 the model that did not take into account party leader evaluations on average explained about 25 per cent of the variance in party evaluations, the model that did include party leader evaluations had an explanatory power of around 50 per cent. Hence, the inclusion of party leader evaluations resulted in as much extra explanation of variance in party evaluations as all the other concepts had accounted for together.

One might be tempted to conclude that party leader evaluations were thus the single most important determinant of voters' feelings towards political parties. However, a warning of caution must be given. The major problem of an analysis of the impact of party leader evaluations on party evaluations, is that the relationship is

TABLE 9.10 Explanatory power of a multivariate model that includes party leader evaluations (explained variance [adjusted R²] in multiple regression analysis)

	additional explained variance				overall explained variance			
	1986	1994	1998	2002	1986	1994	1998	2002
Labour Party	0.21	0.29	0.27	0.20	0.73	0.54	0.48	0.51
Liberal Party	0.19	0.27	0.28	0.16	0.65	0.59	0.60	0.44
Christian Democrats	0.12	0.20	0.26	0.29	0.62	0.56	0.49	0.54
D66	0.32	0.40	0.15	0.30	0.45	0.53	0.36	0.58
GreenLeft	n.a.	0.28	0.27	0.28	n.a.	0.58	0.52	0.62
Socialist Party	-	-	0.38	0.40	-	-	0.59	0.59
Orthodox Protestant	n.a.	0.33	0.31	0.28	n.a.	0.63	0.64	0.61
List Pim Fortuyn	-	-	-	0.46	-	-	-	0.77
mean	0.21	0.30	0.27	0.30	0.61	0.57	0.53	0.58

n.a. indicates party leader evaluation scores are not available

reciprocal. If party evaluations are regarded as the dependent variables and party leader evaluations as the independent variables, effects of party leader evaluations on party evaluations would be found. However, these effects may result from an opposite causal direction, namely from party evaluations to party leader evaluations.[28] This problem may also occur with respect to other factors, but appears to be most severe with respect to party leader evaluations.[29]

One finding in particular suggests that the impact of party leader evaluations might be overestimated. Consider the findings regarding party evaluations in 1994. These suggest that evaluations of the orthodox Protestant parties were, like those of the other parties, affected fairly strongly by voters' feelings towards their leaders. Similar findings are obtained if one focuses on those parties individually. At the same time, however, evaluations of the three orthodox Protestant parties were strongly correlated to each other. In fact, in a model that explains evaluations of one orthodox Protestant party (GPV) on the basis of voters' evaluations of the other two orthodox Protestant parties (RPF and SGP), the explained variance equals 84 per cent. If voters' evaluations of the leader of the GPV (Schutte) are additionally included, the explanatory power increases with only 2 per cent. This suggests that evaluations of the orthodox Protestant parties have similar causes, and that party leader evaluations play a minor role. Analyses like those performed in this chapter, however, result in a different conclusion. This means that such analyses presumably overestimate the impact of party leader evaluations substantially. This is not to say that party leader evaluations play no role, but on the basis of the available data we cannot estimate accurately how large a role they play. As long as the problem of the reciprocal relationship has not been solved, findings as those presented above should therefore be interpreted with much care.

SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION

Previous electoral research has made use of various factors to explain vote choice in the Netherlands. These include social identity, left-right ideology, policy preferences, and government satisfaction. In this chapter their impact on the evaluations of individual parties has been examined. The analyses have shown that virtually all factors contribute to our understanding of why voters evaluate parties as they do. Perhaps the most striking observation is that the explanatory power of the models varied considerably across parties, and within parties across time. Evaluations of the Labour Party could be explained best in 1986 and 1994 on the basis of left-right agreement, while in 1998 and 2002 models including left-right agreement, policy preferences, and government satisfaction performed about equally well. Evaluations of the Liberal Party could also be explained best on the basis of left-right agreement, while the model that included policy preferences clearly outperformed the other two models. The only exception was 1986, when evaluations of the Liberal Party could also be explained well on the basis of government satisfaction. With respect to the evaluations of the Christian Democrats in 1986 government satisfaction and left-right agreement resulted in the best explanations, in 1994 and 2002 left-right agreement and social identity did, while in 1998 the model based on social identity performed best. With respect to the evaluations of D66 the most notable observation is that each model had only limited explanatory power. Evaluations of GreenLeft, on the other hand, could usually be explained rather well on the basis of voters' policy preferences as well as in terms of perceived left-right agreement. With respect to the Socialist Party models including these factors had less explanatory power, but more than the other two. With respect to the orthodox Protestant parties social identity and policy preferences both explained evaluations rather well, and more so than left-right agreement. Finally, evaluations of List Pim Fortuyn could be explained best on the basis of policy preferences, while the model based on left-right agreement outperformed the other two.

These findings illustrate that each model tells a part of the story. This in a sense justifies the application of a model that combines the various concepts. In such a multivariate model perceived left-right agreement played a major role, irrespective of which party was focused on. Apparently, voters perception regarding the extent to which parties' political views correspond with their own opinions in terms of this general ideological dimension always matter. With respect to government parties voters' satisfaction with the incumbent government more often than not played an important role too, in particular if the party of the prime minister was involved. Additionally, voters' Christian identity was highly relevant regarding the Christian Democrats and the orthodox Protestant parties, and to a more limited extent with respect to D66. Social class identity, on the other hand, played only a minor role. Finally, in some instances particular issues had an impact that could not be accounted

for by the notions of left and right, nor by any of the other factors. The most noteworthy case concerns List Pim Fortuyn. Evaluations of this newcomer were affected very strongly by voters' opinions regarding the issue of asylum seekers. The same issue played a role, although less strongly and with effects in the opposite direction, with respect to evaluations of GreenLeft and Socialist Party. Another case where opinions on a particular issue had a large impact, concerns the issue of euthanasia in relation to the orthodox Protestant parties.

Additional analyses indicated that party evaluations could be predicted more accurately if party leader evaluations were also included in the model. The effects of party leaders that were then found, were as large as those of all other factors jointly. This seems to suggest that voters' feelings about the parties' leaders play a major role with respect to their evaluations of those parties. However, a warning of caution was given: the causal direction of the effect may well be in the other direction, which means that voters' feelings about the party leaders are determined by their feelings about the parties they represent.

The findings provide support for the view that electoral research should include party evaluations in its models and analyses, rather than merely focus on vote choice in terms of a single categorical variable, which indicates what party people voted for. Evaluations of different parties appear to be affected by different factors. Only by focusing on evaluations of each party separately, can this be properly analysed. The fundamental implication of these findings is that the assumption of homogeneity in bases of evaluation, which underlies many voting models, should be considered false. Voters do not like or dislike different parties for the same reasons. Voters like or dislike different parties for different reasons.

PART IV

Conclusions

CHAPTER 10

A PSYCHOLOGICAL THEORY

OF VOTING

Similar psychological processes underlie all kinds of behaviour. According to the view adopted in this research, to understand people's behaviour we must understand those psychological processes. This implies that to explain why people vote as they do, psephologists may use insights from psychology. In the preceding chapters some of those insights were used to formulate a number of models with respect to voting. These have been tested in the context of four Dutch parliamentary elections. The following discussion may be seen as an attempt to integrate the ideas presented into a single psychological theory of voting. Furthermore, the main findings will be summarised and some of the implications will be discussed. (Implications for psychology are discussed separately in Appendix G.)

A TWO-STAGE MODEL OF VOTING

The picture that emerges from this research is that of voting behaviour as the result of a two-stage process. The first stage consists of the formation and change of images of parties, candidates, and governments, as well as the formation and change of evaluations of those same objects. The second stage is one of decision-making in relation to a specific upcoming election. According to the view proposed, voters decide on the basis of the evaluations created in the first stage, in particular the evaluations of the parties.

    Voters' images as well as their evaluations of parties, candidates, and governments are based on information that voters receive about them. The two major sources from which voters obtain information are media messages and personal communication. Whenever voters process information about political actors this may have a lasting impact, because it may affect the representation of those objects

in their long-term memory. This may happen in two ways. First, it is possible that voters store the information as such. For example, if they hear that a particular party has proposed to limit the legal possibility of abortion, they may store this fact as such in their memory. Second, it is possible that voters adjust their image of the party involved. For example, the same information may lead voters to believe that the political views of that party correspond closely to principles advocated in the Bible. These two ways in which memory may be affected correspond closely to the distinction commonly made between episodic memory and semantic memory (Tulving 1972). The former concerns personal 'experiences with' and the latter concerns 'facts about'. So voters' long-term memory contains *memories* of their experiences with parties, candidates, and governments, as well as *images* about what they are like.

Information is not only processed cognitively, but also affectively; information is evaluated automatically (cf. Zajonc 1980, 1984). In the example discussed above, this means that voters will automatically evaluate the proposal by the party to change abortion laws. They will like or dislike it to a certain degree. Such 'evaluative responses' will mostly be rather weak. When they are strong, this may lead to specific emotions like disgust, anger, or enthusiasm (cf. Russell 2003).

Evaluative responses and emotions may affect long-term memory. First, voters may become aware of their response and store the knowledge of the response as such in their long-term memory. This means that they remember that they liked or disliked the policy proposal regarding abortion, or whether it made them feel disgusted, angry, enthusiastic, or whatsoever. A second possibility is that the evaluative response or emotion affects another kind of phenomenon, namely that which Frijda (1994) referred to as 'sentiments' and which Russell (2003) referred to by the notion of 'perception of affective quality'. These concern the degree to which particular things are liked or disliked by a person. They may be conceived of as individuals' enduring dispositions with respect to a particular object in terms of a like-dislike continuum. In the example discussed, hearing about the policy proposal may make voters like the corresponding party, depending on whether a positive or negative response was evoked, more or less. If these 'sentiments' concern political parties or candidates, they have been referred to by the notions of party evaluations and candidate evaluations. With respect to governments they have been referred to by the notion of government evaluation or incumbent approval. Such evaluations are activated automatically whenever information about the objects involved is processed (cf. Fazio et al. 1986; Bargh et al. 1992).

Information processed may also be used by voters to form another kind of image, namely one concerning an upcoming election. These images, which can be conceived of as imagined future scenarios, may be referred to by the notion of prospects. Prospects concern what might happen in and after the election. Hence, they tell voters what is at stake. Voters do not only perceive prospects, they evaluate them as well. If voters think about the possibility that a particular person might become

prime minister, for example, they will like or dislike this idea and it may make them anxious or hopeful. Such responses are integrated in a similar way as responses towards parties and candidates into what may be referred to as 'prospect evaluations'. These indicate how much voters like or dislike a foreseen or imagined scenario.

An important point to be added is that information stored in long-term memory may be recalled; it is then processed in a similar way as information from media messages or personal communication (cf. Damasio 2000). This means that if voters recall the proposal by the party with respect to abortion, they may again experience feelings of anger or enthusiasm. Furthermore, these feelings may again affect their evaluation of the party involved. The representation of parties in long-term memory is thus relevant for how voters evaluate them, for if this information is retrieved, it is evaluated and may consequently affect voters' evaluation of the party. So voters who think a lot about the policy proposal concerning abortion – in other words, voters who strongly associate the party with that policy – will presumably have an evaluation of that party that is strongly affected by their feelings about that policy.

The second stage consists of decision-making in relation to a particular upcoming election. According to the model proposed, voters do not use all information stored in memory in relation to the competing parties or candidates, or the incumbent government. Instead, they rely on simple decision rules or short cuts. These are referred to by the notion of heuristics. The model assumes that in these heuristics the evaluations formed in the information-processing stage play a key role. Voters make their decision on the basis of these evaluations.

Six heuristics can be identified. One is the so-called party preference heuristic. It implies that the only information voters need concerns the degree to which they like or dislike the competing parties, which are referred to as party evaluations. These tell voters how to vote, namely for the party they evaluate most positively. This party is referred to as the party preference. Voters may also base their decision on their evaluations of the competing candidates, rather than the parties. According to the corresponding candidate preference heuristic, voters simply vote for the candidate they like best. Another alternative for voters is to base their choice on the evaluation of the incumbent government: if voters like the incumbent government, they vote for them; if they dislike the incumbent government, they vote for the opposition. If the government involves a coalition of two or more parties this heuristic does not automatically result in a choice for one particular party, but voters may solve this problem; for example, if voters feel positively about the incumbent government, they may support the party of the prime minister. Because evaluations of incumbents are often conceived of in terms of approval, the corresponding heuristic may be referred to as the incumbent approval heuristic.

If voters employ one of these three heuristics, they do not take into account what the election is about. Yet voters may do so. In that case, they decide on the basis

of the election outcome preference heuristic. This means that they cast their vote in a way associated with bringing about a desired scenario, and base their choice on so-called 'prospect evaluations'. For example, if voters prefer a Labour candidate to become prime minister and therefore vote Labour, they make use of this heuristic. This heuristic is related to the notion of strategic voting, but has to be distinguished from it. Although strategic voting by definition involves the use of the election outcome preference heuristic, the use of this heuristic need not result in strategic voting. Voters who use this heuristic may well vote for the party they like best.

In the other two heuristics that voters may employ, evaluations are not so central. First, voters may have the habit of voting for a particular party. When they face another election they may decide, without much elaboration, to support the same party again. Voters may also base their choice on the endorsement of a particular party or candidate by other persons. Although choices made on the basis of these heuristics are not directly based on evaluations, these may play a role. For example, it may be hypothesised that voting habits are used by voters only if the various evaluations are not very intense and thus do not point towards a vote for a particular party (cf. Marcus et al. 2000).

Figure 10.1 shows a model that combines these ideas. It is referred to as a two-stage model of voting. In the first stage, which may be referred as the pre-choice stage, voters process information and this leads to the formation and change of images of the government, parties, and candidates; voters also form an image of what upcoming elections are about and who endorse a particular party or candidate. Furthermore, in this stage voters form and change evaluations of the government, parties, candidates, and prospects. In the second stage, which may be referred to as the choice stage, voters make a decision about for whom to vote on the basis of their party evaluations, candidate evaluations, government evaluation, prospect evaluations, perceived endorsements, and voting habit. They do so on the basis of simple decision rules or heuristics.[1]

How do concepts traditionally used to explain vote choice, such as voters' social characteristics, ideological positions, or policy preferences, fit the two-stage model? In the model such concepts are referred to as exogenous variables.[2] These have an impact on voting if they influence the concepts specified in the model, in particular the information-processing. For example, orthodox Christian voters pay attention to other media and have different personal conversations than secular voters, and consequently both groups may process different information. Furthermore, orthodox Christian voters may respond differently towards the same information as secular voters. If both groups hear that a particular party has proposed to limit the legal possibility of abortion, orthodox Christian voters may become enthusiastic, whereas secular voters may become angry. In a similar way voters with different ideological positions or different policy preferences can be expected to attend different media and have different conversations (and hence process different information) and re-

FIGURE 10.1 A two-stage model of voting

spond differently to the same information. Such differences in information processed and evaluative responses or emotions carry over to evaluations of parties, candidates, and governments. Voters with different social characteristics, ideological positions, and policy preferences differ in how they evaluate parties, candidates, and governments. Consequently, voters who differ in terms of such characteristics will also differ in terms of how they vote.

The view presented implies that *explaining vote choice* may also be conceived of as a two-stage process. The primary task of psephologists is to identify the heuristics that voters employ to make their choice and explain why they use a particular heuristic. In this stage researchers have to take voting habits, government evaluations, party evaluations, candidate evaluations, prospect evaluations, and perceived endorsements as a given. After all, voters also take them as a given when they decide for whom to vote. However, as long as we do not also understand why voters evaluate governments, parties, candidates, and prospects in a particular way, our understanding of their voting behaviour will remain limited. It is therefore essential to additionally explain why voters like or dislike governments, parties, candidates, and prospects. This may be considered the second task of electoral researchers.

THE SINCERE VOTE MODEL

In this study the impact of voting habits, endorsements, and evaluations of parties, governments, candidates, and prospects has been focused on in terms of simple decision rules, or heuristics. This approach differs from how the relationship between independent variables and vote choice is often analysed. Many studies of voting predict vote choice on the basis of a model in which various independent variables are combined in a mathematical way – as if voters assign different weights to each variable and reach their vote decision by thus combining all variables.

This study also differs from other studies of voting in another way: it has not considered party choice the sole dependent variable. Instead, voting has been analysed on the basis of the question whether it could be defined as 'sincere'. It has been argued that to understand why people vote as they do the various concepts included in the two-stage model are not equally important. The single most important concept is that of party evaluations. In most democratic countries of the world elections can be seen as primarily a competition between political parties and consequently nothing matters more than how voters feel about those parties. To what degree voters like or dislike parties is presumably the key to their choice. These feelings have been conceptualised in this study in terms of the social-psychological concept of attitudes. With respect to political parties voters' attitudes have been referred to by the notion of party evaluations. If people vote for the party they evaluate most positively, their

vote is classified as sincere; if they vote for another party, their vote is classified as non-sincere.

The influence of party evaluations on voting behaviour has been modelled in terms of the sincere vote model. This model is based on the idea that it is essential to distinguish between four concepts: party evaluations, party preferences, voting intentions, and voting behaviour. According to the model, party evaluations jointly form a party preference. Party preferences indicate which parties voters evaluate most positively. A party preference may consist of one party (single party preference), as well as two or more parties (multiple party preference). According to the model voters form a voting intention in accordance with their party preference, and in the polling booth they transform their voting intention into voting behaviour. This means that three expectations can be formulated: (1) voters intend to vote for the party they evaluate most positively (the party preference); (2) voters vote in line with their voting intentions; and consequently (3) voters vote in line with their party preferences. The latter expectation may be referred to as the sincere vote hypothesis.

The sincere vote model has been tested by applying it to the Dutch parliamentary elections in 1986, 1994, 1998 and 2002 on the basis of data from the respective Dutch Parliamentary Election Studies (DPES). The results of the analysis can be summarised by distinguishing five groups of voters: (1) voters who met the expectations and who had a single party preference, (2) voters who met the expectations and who had a multiple party preference, (3) voters whose voting intention did not match their party preference, (4) voters whose voting behaviour did not match their voting intention, and (5) voters who were undecided (when interviewed before the election) and whose voting behaviour did not match their party preference.[3]

What number of voters belonged to each of the five groups is shown in Table 10.1. The number of voters who met the expectations and whose choices could be predicted accurately on the basis of the model decreased from 67 per cent in 1986 to 45 per cent in 2002. In each election a substantial minority of the voters (between 16 and 26 per cent) met the expectations, but their choice could not be predicted accurately because they had a multiple party preference, that is, they evaluated at least two parties equally positively. Furthermore, in each election all types of discrepancies occurred and caused voters not to meet the expectations. If the figures of the various categories are combined, then it becomes clear that the number of voters who did not meet the expectations increased from 17 per cent in 1986 to 30 per cent in 2002.

Whether the numbers of voters who met the expectations are regarded as high or low, depends on the perspective taken. If we compare the results to the begin situation, one in which we knew nothing about voters, the sincere vote model certainly resulted in a large fit. However, if we think about the fact that most models of voting assume that voters vote for the party they like best, then the figures of fit are remarkably low. From that perspective, we should be surprised about the large number of

TABLE 10.1 Percentage of voters who met the expectations based on the sincere vote model and why others did not

		1986	1994	1998	2002
1.	voters who met the expectations (voters with single party preferences)	67	57	48	45
2.	voters who met the expectations (voters with multiple party preferences)	16	22	26	25
3.	voters with a discrepancy between party preference and voting intention	5	5	9	11
4.	voters with a discrepancy between voting intention and voting behaviour	9	8	10	12
5.	voters with a discrepancy between party preference and voting behaviour (voters who were initially undecided)	5	10	10	11
	total	100	100	100	100
	(N)	(1192)	(1282)	(1596)	(1505)

Note: The figures add up to more than 100 per cent, because some voters fit the third as well as the fourth group (between 1.4 and 2.9 per cent; see Table 7.32 in Chapter 7, categories 10 to 13).

voters who do *not* fulfil the expectations. In the four elections on average no less than about one in every four voters violated the assumption that underlies virtually all models of voting, namely that they vote for the party they like best.

Another important conclusion concerns the concepts distinguished in the sincere vote model. Although strong relationships were found, a substantial minority of voters intended to vote for another party than one they evaluated most positively, and another substantial minority voted for another party than the one they initially intended to vote for. The discrepancies found provide support for the idea that the three corresponding concepts can and should be distinguished. One reason to do so is that the discrepancies between the concepts may be useful for particular additional analyses.

The analysis of the sincere vote model showed that there is more to voting than simply expressing which party one likes best. What more there is, was discussed in terms of the alternative heuristics that voters may employ to reach a vote decision. What is particularly interesting about the heuristics identified, is that they may explain why voters sometimes prefer to vote for another party than one they evaluate most positively. Discrepancies between party preferences and voting intentions may

be attributed to the use of alternative decision rules. To what extent the heuristics could provide an explanation of so-called non-sincere voting was analysed. Three factors had the hypothesised impact. First, voters' preferences regarding the partisan composition of the future government played a role. If voters preferred a coalition that did not include their favourite party, they were relatively likely to vote for another party than one evaluated most positively. Second, although party leader evaluations were far less important than party evaluations, they did play a role. Voters who did not like the leader of their favourite party well, as well as voters who liked the leader of another party well, were relatively likely to support another party than their favourite. Third, the findings provide support for the idea that voting habits play a role. Some voters stuck to the party they already voted for in the previous election, even though they liked another party somewhat better.

The findings indicate that the impact of strategic voting and candidate preferences cannot be ignored. These factors may explain the amount of non-sincere voting found. The findings furthermore indicate that a considerable minority of the voters changed their mind about for whom to vote in the last weeks of the campaign and consequently the possibility of changes in party evaluations in the period shortly before the election cannot be ignored either. This also implies that campaigns matter: not only may they be used by voters who do not know for whom to vote shortly before the election, even voters who already know how to vote weeks in advance may change opinion and vote differently. By distinguishing party preferences, voting intentions, and voting behaviour, the sincere vote model provides a framework to study these phenomena. Hence, the sincere vote model reaches further than merely explaining vote choice on the basis of party evaluations. The model also provides a basis for additional analyses.

EXPLAINING PARTY EVALUATIONS

A strategy that psephologists might adopt if they wish to study the impact of the conceptions used traditionally in electoral research, is to examine how they affect evaluations of parties, candidates, and governments. This approach was adopted in this research in order to explain party evaluations in the context of four Dutch parliamentary elections. Four models were formulated to explain voters' party evaluations. For the sake of convenience, they may be referred to as the social identity model, the policy preferences model, the left-right agreement model, and the incumbent approval model. Furthermore, the additional explanatory power of party leader evaluations was examined. The analyses showed that the various factors indeed affected party evaluations; the extent to which they did varied considerably across parties (see Table 10.2).

TABLE 10.2 Explanatory power of various models to explain party evaluations (I)
(explained variance in multiple regression analysis - mean adjusted R² across four years)

	Labour Party	Liberal Party	Christian Democrats	D66
social identity model	0.05	0.05	0.16	0.07
policy preferences model	0.13	0.17	0.10	0.08
left-right agreement model	0.20	0.25	0.18	0.09
government satisfaction model	0.14	0.08	0.13	0.05
multivariate model	0.32	0.35	0.34	0.19
party leader model (additional power)	0.24	0.23	0.22	0.29

	Green Left	Socialist Party	Orthodox Protestant	List Pim Fortuyn
social identity model	0.04	0.03	0.18	0.00
policy preferences model	0.17	0.11	0.16	0.24
left-right agreement model	0.18	0.13	0.14	0.18
government satisfaction model	0.04	0.00	0.04	0.05
multivariate model	0.28	0.20	0.33	0.31
party leader model (additional power)	0.28	0.39	0.31	0.46

Two social characteristics were examined, namely religious identity and social class identity. The latter had virtually no impact on how voters evaluated the various parties. Voters' religious identity had a considerable effect, but only with respect to some of the parties. Voters with a (strong) Christian identity evaluated the Christian Democrats and orthodox Protestant parties much more positively than secular voters did, while they evaluated Labour much more negatively in 1986, and D66 in 1998 and 2002. The effects were observed even if voters' ideological positions and policy preferences were taken into account. Effects on evaluations of the other parties were either limited or absent. Consequently, whereas evaluations of the Christian parties could be explained relatively well on the basis of the social identity model (explained variance varied between 15 and 20 per cent), evaluations of the other parties mostly could not (explained variance was usually below 5 per cent).

Regarding the impact of policy preferences on party evaluations, variation was also observed across parties. Variation was found not only in terms of the degree to which policy preferences could explain party evaluations, but also in terms of which policy preferences mattered. Evaluations of the Labour Party and Liberal Party were affected most strongly by voters' positions regarding the issue of income inequality. Evaluations of the Christian Democrats were affected most strongly by the issue of euthanasia. Evaluations of the orthodox Protestant parties were affected even more strongly by voters' position regarding euthanasia, while a modest effect in the opposite direction was observed for D66. Voters' feelings about GreenLeft depended most

strongly on their positions regarding the issue of asylum seekers. A similar effect of more limited magnitude was observed in relation to the Socialist Party. The strongest effect of policy preferences in any year also concerned the issue of asylum seekers, but the direction of the effect was reversed. Voters who took a right-wing position on this issue evaluated List Pim Fortuyn much more positively than other voters. Multivariate analyses indicated that the asylum seekers issue mattered more strongly than anything else with respect to how voters felt about this newcomer. These findings indicate that voters' policy preferences affect their evaluations of political parties in varying ways. Whereas some parties are liked or disliked for their positions on one issue, other parties are for their positions on another issue.

There is one exception to the finding that the impact of the factors varied considerably across parties. Perceived agreement in terms of the left-right continuum had a similar effect: if voters perceived a particular party to be further removed from their own position in terms of a left-right continuum, they evaluated that party more negatively. Across parties as well as across time the effects were of a similar magnitude. The left-right agreement model performed relatively well in 1986, in particular with respect to the three major parties (explained variance varied between 30 and 40 per cent). Political conflict could well be understood in these ideological terms, and this was apparently an important basis for voters' evaluations of the major parties.[4]

Another factor that has been examined in relation to party evaluations is voters' satisfaction with the incumbent government. Again, effects varied considerably across parties and time. In some instances, voters' evaluations of government parties depended strongly on their satisfaction with the latest government. This was the case with respect to the Christian Democrats and Liberal Party in 1986, Christian Democrats in 1994, and the Labour Party and D66 in 2002. Evaluations of the Labour Party in 1994 and of the Liberal Party in 1998 and 2002, on the other hand, were virtually unaffected by voters' feelings towards the governments in which these parties participated. How much voters liked or disliked opposition parties usually was affected less strongly by government satisfaction, except for the Labour Party in 1986. Voters who were satisfied with the government liked them worse, and dissatisfied voters liked them better. So the overall pattern is that incumbent approval affects evaluations of government parties, most strongly those of the prime minister's party, whereas evaluations of opposition parties are usually not affected much. Across parties the explanatory power of the government satisfaction model was rather poor, except for the three major parties in 1986 (explained variance varied between 25 and 35 per cent).

The impact of a final factor, party leader evaluations, has been examined on the basis of the so-called 'improved-prediction strategy' (cf. King 2002). First, it was examined how well voters' party evaluations could be explained on the basis of a multivariate model that included all concepts discussed above. Self-evidently, the explanatory power of the multivariate model exceeded that of the other models. Next,

TABLE 10.3 Explanatory power of various models to explain party evaluations (II)
(explained variance in multiple regression analysis - mean adjusted R^2 across parties)

	1986	1994	1998	2002
social identity model	0.11	0.08	0.07	0.07
policy preferences model	0.13	0.11	0.12	0.17
left-right agreement model	0.24	0.17	0.13	0.16
government satisfaction model	0.19	0.04	0.03	0.05
multivariate model	0.36	0.28	0.25	0.29
party leader model (additional power)	0.21	0.30	0.27	0.30

it was shown that adding voters' evaluations of party leaders to the multivariate model improved the explanatory power considerably. The degree to which party evaluations could be explained better if party leader evaluations were included varied across parties, and within parties across time. On average, the additional explanatory power of party leader evaluations was as strong as that of all four other factors combined. This may seem to suggest that party leader evaluations are of paramount importance for how voters evaluate parties, but a warning of caution was given. The strong correlation between party leader evaluations and party evaluations may well be the result of an effect of the latter on the former, rather than the other way round.

If the models are compared in terms of how well they perform across parties, a number of observations can be made (see Table 10.3). First, in 1986 and 1994 the left-right agreement model resulted in larger explained variance figures than any other model. In 1998 and 2002 the policy preferences model and the left-right agreement model had fairly similar explanatory power, which was considerably larger than those of the two other models. The explanatory power of the social identity model on the whole was rather limited, while the government satisfaction model performed well only in 1986. If the various concepts are combined in one multivariate model, the explanatory power exceeds that of the other individual models. Given the previously discussed findings, it will be no surprise that such a model performed somewhat better in 1986 than in later years. Adding party leader evaluations to the model strongly improved the explanatory power.

These findings are not at odds with previous electoral research, which mostly focused on the choice set as a whole rather than evaluations of individual parties. What has become clear, however, is that behind the overall figures a considerable amount of variation across parties may be hidden. Although voters' social identity overall did not matter much, it did in terms of how some parties were evaluated. And although government satisfaction could not explain how voters felt towards all parties, in most instances it did affect rather strongly their evaluations of at least one

party. Furthermore, voters' preferences regarding a particular issue often affected their evaluations of one party, while having no impact on their evaluations of the others. By analysing evaluations for each party separately, it has been shown that some parties are liked or disliked for one reason, and other parties for another.

THE PSEPHOLOGICAL PARADIGM

Most electoral studies share a set of related assumptions with respect to how the minds of voters work. Jointly, they may be referred to as the psephological paradigm. Various studies have shown that those assumptions are in fact false. The mind works differently than electoral researchers have explicitly or implicitly assumed. In order to increase our understanding of voting, in particular the psychological processes involved, we therefore need to abandon those assumptions. It is time to assess to what extent this research has contributed to that task.

In this study the psephological paradigm has not been abandoned fully. Some of the assumptions commonly made also underlie this study. First, voting has been regarded as a two-decision process in which voters first decide whether or not they will vote, and second for whom they will vote. The fact that both decisions need not be made independently of each other, has been neglected. Second, votes have been focused on in terms of the party for which they were cast, even though voters may have considered their votes as being cast for a particular candidate. And third, political parties have been regarded as unitary actors. The possibility that voters distinguish between different aspects of parties, has not been taken into account. The latter fact is reflected in the central position of the notion of party evaluations in this research. The use of this concept implies that voters' likes and dislikes concern parties as a whole. According to an alternative view, voters may like a particular party better at the national level than at the local level, or they may like a party better in terms of its program than in terms of its government performance.

Other assumptions that make up the psephological paradigm, however, have not been taken for granted. Some of the assumptions challenged have not been examined empirically. For example, it has been argued that voting studies have falsely assumed that parties are represented in voters' memory only in terms of so-called semantic memory. However, voters not only have *images* of parties, but also *memories*. Voters may remember, for example, specific things that parties have done in the past. This aspect has traditionally been ignored in many election surveys. The same applies to the impact of emotions, which have not (yet) gained central stage in electoral research. To what extent this has hindered our understanding of why voters like or dislike parties remains to be seen, however. The election surveys upon which this study is based did not contain data necessary for the required analyses.

Some other assumptions have been challenged and this has been supported by empirical evidence. Most importantly, the assumption of a sincere vote, according to which all voters simply vote for the party they like best (irrespective of the electoral context), has been examined rigorously. This has been done by testing the sincere vote model. The findings show that this assumption is false. A considerable amount of voters preferred to vote for another party than one they evaluated most positively. To some extent the discrepancies found between voters' party preferences and voting behaviour might be seen as a methodological artefact, which results from the design of election surveys like the Dutch Parliamentary Election Studies. Because party evaluations were assessed some time before the actual election, changes in those evaluations in the latest phase of the campaign may have accounted for discrepancies observed between party preferences and actual voting behaviour. However, even in the pre-election interviews a considerable minority of voters indicated that they intended to vote for a party that they did not like best at that moment. This means that the assumption of a sincere vote has to be considered false. Moreover, large minorities of voters were found to like at least two parties equally well. For them, too, there is more to voting than simply expressing which party they liked best. If they were to vote for the party they evaluated most positively, they would not be able to reach a decision.

Another assumption that has been challenged is the assumption of causal homogeneity, according to which all voters decide in the same way. It has been argued that voters may decide on the basis of different choice mechanisms. This view has been combined with the idea that voters make use of heuristics. When faced with an election, voters do not weigh all information related to the judgement or contestants. Instead, they rely on decision short cuts. The most important heuristics have been identified on the basis of a combination of existing voting studies, in particular the study by Downs (1957), and attitude-behaviour models. According to the resulting view, voters may decide for whom to vote on the basis of a voting habit, by relying on their evaluations of one of three key political actors – incumbent government, competing parties, or their candidates –, on the basis of their preferences regarding the outcome of the election, or on the basis of endorsements by other people. The analyses show that vote choices cannot all be understood from the perspective of a single heuristic, not even the heuristic that underlies virtually all models of voting (party preference heuristic). However, virtually all vote choices can be understood from the perspective of at least one heuristic.

An assumption that shows similarity with the previous one, is the assumption of homogeneity in bases of evaluation. Most models of voting build on the idea that the degree to which voters like or dislike parties depends on their image of those parties, that the image of each party consists of the same set of elements, and that the evaluations of those elements jointly determine the overall evaluation of a party. Parties are assumed to be liked and disliked for the same reasons. According to the

model of party evaluations presented in this research, however, how voters evaluate parties depends on their evaluations of information they process about each party. The model states that information that voters process in working memory automatically evokes emotional responses, and that these are integrated by forming and updating party evaluations – hence the model is referred to as the emotion-integration model. This implies that evaluations of different parties may be based on different kinds of information. After all, the media reports and personal conversations about one party may involve different subjects than those concerning another party. The analyses support this view: the extent to which voters' social identity, policy preferences, perceived ideological agreement with parties, and satisfaction with the incumbent government affected their party evaluations, clearly differed across those parties. Contrary to what models of voting often assume, the bases of evaluation are not the same across parties.

FUTURE RESEARCH

There are various ways in which future research might build on this study and further improve our insight in why people vote as they do. Some possibilities seem particularly worth mentioning.

One strategy is related to the simplifications that have been made in this study. Self-evidently, the real world is not as simple as the models presented suggest. For example, it may be doubted whether voters' feelings with respect to parties are indeed one-dimensional, as suggested by the central notion of party evaluations, and can be conceived of as a single score in terms of a like-dislike continuum. The possibility that voters' attitudes towards parties may be ambiguous, for example, has not been taken into account. Perhaps conceptualising those feelings in terms of two or more dimensions – for example, one for positive and one for negative feelings (cf. Cacioppo et al. 1997) – and examining their relationships with vote choice, would result in more accurate explanations of voting. Or one might conceptualise voters' feelings towards parties in terms of a number of discrete emotions, like anger, disgust, and enthusiasm (cf. Abelson et al. 1982; Marcus et al. 2000). Similarly, feelings about incumbent governments and feelings about prospects need not be one-dimensional; they may also be conceptualised, for example, in terms of discrete emotions like anger and gratitude (incumbents), or hope and fear (prospects). Furthermore, the implicit assumption of the sincere vote model that voters either have an intention to vote in a particular way or have no intention at all, may be challenged. Perhaps it would be more accurate to conceive of the formation of voting intentions as the result of a process that consists of various stages. Voters who are hesitating between two parties, for example, could be considered as occupying some kind of intermediate position.

With respect to the heuristics that voters may use to decide for whom to vote, one question in particular still needs to be answered. This study has identified the heuristics that voters may use, but it has not clarified in what circumstances voters will adopt which heuristic. There are at least two ways in which this matter might be dealt with. First, the heuristics identified might be ordered in terms of a hierarchy. One could hypothesise, for example, that if the election outcome preference heuristic points to a particular party, voters will use that heuristic. If it does not, they will turn to the incumbent approval heuristic. If this heuristic does not provide a choice either, voters will turn to the party preference heuristic, next to the candidate preference heuristic, otherwise to the voting habit heuristic, and in the last instance to the endorsement heuristic. Self-evidently, another ordering is also conceivable. This matter might also be dealt with in another way. One could conceive of the concepts that underlie the use of the various heuristics as making up a number of parallel forces, that may each point towards (or away from) a particular party. Which of the forces determines for whom people vote, may be hypothesised to depend on their strength. This means that if voters have particularly strong feelings about the competing candidates, for example, they might be hypothesised to use the candidate preference heuristic. Future studies might examine whether such explanations can add to our understanding of voters' use of heuristics.

With respect to the finding that evaluations of different parties may have different origins, there is a similar problem. The question arises why certain characteristics are important with respect to some parties, but not with respect to others. On the basis of this study, it may hypothesised that this has to do with the information that voters process about parties, which in turn depends on the way parties are discussed in the media, which in turn presumably depends – at least partly – on the behaviour of the parties themselves. To what extent this explanation holds, has not been examined in this study. By combining studies of voting behaviour with studies of political communication and media studies of election campaigns this may be analysed. Furthermore, to what extent the emotion-integration model of party evaluations provides a more accurate description of the psychological processes that underlie the formation and change of party evaluations than other models, remains to be seen. On the basis of the kind of data upon which this study is based (traditional election surveys) this cannot be assessed. Hence, future studies might address this matter by employing different methods, such as experimentation.

Another matter that has not been addressed, is the impact of the political system. It has been assumed that the psychological processes that underlie voting do not differ across countries with different political systems. Nevertheless, the system may matter. For example, the extent to which individuals meet the expectations of the sincere vote model may differ across political systems. One might hypothesise that the expectations are met less often in political systems in which candidates play a more central role. The political system may also influence the degree to which

other heuristics are employed by voters. One might hypothesise, for example, that political systems that typically lead to coalition governments inhibit the use of the incumbent approval heuristic and the election outcome preference heuristic. Examining such an impact of political systems may increase our understanding of voting.

A final way to build on this research, would be to apply the sincere vote model more broadly. In this study the model has only been applied to explain voting behaviour at the individual level at a single point in time. Both in terms of the time frame, as well as in terms of the level of analysis, the analysis can be extended. First, one might use the sincere vote model to analyse electoral change at the individual level. The model suggests that if voters change their vote, this can be attributed primarily to changes in evaluations of the competing parties; additionally, changes in the impact of factors that lead to non-sincere voting and changes in the composition of the set of competing parties may play a role. Second, one might use the sincere vote model to analyse electoral change at the aggregate level. The model suggests that such changes can be attributed to changes in evaluations of the competing parties at the individual level (in combination with changes at the individual level in the impact of factors that lead to non-sincere voting and changes in the composition of the electorate). On the basis of the sincere vote model a nexus between the analysis of voting behaviour (individual level) and election outcomes (aggregate level) may be established.

ON PARTISANSHIP

Arguably, one of the most important implications of this research concerns the conceptualisation of partisanship. The Michigan scholars initially saw partisanship as one of the factors that influenced the vote directly (Campbell et al. 1954). In *The American Voter* (1960), however, they argued that partisanship had to be seen as an indirect determinant of vote choice. This was specified in terms of the 'funnel of causality'. Social characteristics determined which party voters identified with, party identification influenced voters' perceptions and evaluations of the competing candidates and the issues central in the election, and these perceptions and evaluations influenced their vote choice. European electoral research has traditionally treated voters' feelings towards the political parties in the same way: in terms of identification.

According to the view presented in this research, partisanship should be considered a direct determinant of vote choice. Most democratic countries of the world have a parliamentary system in which political parties play a key role. Elections can then be conceived of as primarily a choice between parties. Consequently, when voters decide for whom to vote, their feelings towards the competing parties may be

expected to be of paramount importance and influence their vote choice directly. Furthermore, this study proposes to conceptualise partisanship not in terms of identification, but in terms of evaluation. This means that in Europe voters' feelings about parties should be treated in the same way as feelings about candidates have been in the United States: as direct determinants of vote choice that are conceptualised and operationalised in terms of a like-dislike continuum. This implies that partisanship is not regarded a stable disposition, acquired in early life and maintained during adulthood. Instead, the view presented fits better the conception of partisanship as a running tally (cf. Fiorina 1981).[5]

The analyses presented in this research show that if partisanship is treated in the way proposed, various problems associated with the party identification concept may be overcome. Thomassen (1976b) pointed out that party identification, at least in the way the concept was operationalised in Dutch election studies, could not be distinguished meaningfully from vote choice: voters simply identified with the parties they voted for (or intended to vote for) and reverse. The findings in this research show that this problem does not apply if partisanship is conceptualised and operationalised in terms of party evaluations. Although most voters intended to vote for a party they evaluated most positively (their party preference), a substantial number of voters were found to intend to vote for another party. The party preference concept can be distinguished empirically from vote choice. Additional analyses indicated this distinction is meaningful. Discrepancies between which party voters liked best and which party they intended to vote for could (in part) be explained on the basis of party leader evaluations and preferences regarding the partisan composition of the future government.

Another problem with the party identification concept, Van der Eijk and Niemöller (1983, ch. 8) argued, is that in the Netherlands many voters identified with more than one party. This problem of multiple identifications does not apply to the party preference concept, or to its measure. Instead, the possibility of multiple preferences is incorporated. Whether a party preference is single or multiple depends on whether one party is evaluated most positively, or whether more than one party is. Theoretically, there is no reason why voters may not like more than one party equally well. The empirical analysis has shown that many voters indeed do. So the second major problem of the party identification concept also does not apply to party evaluations and party preferences.[6] Furthermore, focusing on voters' feelings with respect to parties in terms of party evaluations fits Richardson's (1991) plea for measurements that tap negative feelings. Whereas negative feelings towards parties cannot be analysed well on the basis of the party identification concept, they can be analysed in terms of party evaluations.

Another matter is whether partisanship needs to be included in a model of voting. The finding that the concept of party identification cannot be applied to the Netherlands, has led several scholars to conclude that we should focus on identifica-

tion in terms of social groups or in terms of ideology. It should be questioned whether this is the best strategy. Political parties are such central objects in the electoral process, that how voters feel about them cannot be ignored if one wants to understand their behaviour. The only question is how the influence of those feelings on voting behaviour has to be analysed. This study has provided an answer to that question.

Appendices

APPENDIX A

THE CONCEPT OF A SINCERE VOTE

The introduction of the concept of a sincere vote is generally credited to Robin Farquharson. In *Theory of Voting* (1969) he sought to fill a gap in social choice literature, namely its neglect of strategies that voters may employ in order to obtain a desired outcome. In order to be able to analyse such strategies, he used the notion of 'sincere voting' as a point of departure.

In the mathematical models Farquharson presented three concepts are central: voters, outcomes, and preferences (pp. 5-6). Voters are defined as individuals (or other units, such as nations), which constitute an electorate (or an assembly or committee) and whose choices have consequences. Outcomes are defined as the possible results of the decision process in which voters participate. Preferences are defined as voters' evaluations of the outcomes in terms of a rank order. Hence, voters are assumed to be able to list all possible outcomes of a voting procedure in order of their preference. Farquharson argued that in his book the results "have been set out only for the case of three voters and three outcomes, but can readily be extended to cover any desired number of either" (pp. xi-xii). Furthermore, he argued that outcomes may involve single candidates as well as combinations of candidates (p. 6). This means that the models can also be applied to parliamentary elections in which political parties compete for a large number of seats.

Following K. J. Arrow (1951), Farquharson noted that "the simplest assumption which can be made about the behaviour of voters is that their votes are directly in accordance with their preference scales" (p. 17). Such behaviour he referred to as 'sincere voting'. In some cases this kind of behaviour is not advantageous to a voter, since voting another way would have resulted in a more preferable outcome (preferable from the perspective of the voter). Voters may then adopt a strategy other than voting sincerely. This is commonly known as 'strategic voting'. Note that in order to be able to vote strategically, voters need to have an idea about the preferences of

other voters. If few other voters share their preferences, it may be advantageous to adopt a strategy and vote 'non-sincerely'.

Farquharson's notion of sincere voting can be applied relatively easily to a context in which three candidates (A, B, and C) compete for a single seat on the basis of plurality rule. In that case, there are three possible outcomes: (1) candidate A wins the seat, (2) candidate B wins the seat, and (3) candidate C wins the seat. Voters are assumed to rank order these three outcomes and sincere voting corresponds with voting for the candidate one prefers to win the seat. For example, for voters with the preference rank order 'ABC' sincere voting corresponds with voting for candidate A.

It becomes slightly more complicated if three candidates compete for two seats, even though in that case there are also only three possible outcomes: (1) candidates A and B win the seats, (2) candidates A and C win the seats, and (3) candidates B and C win the seats. What complicates the situation is that if voters prefer a particular outcome, this does not lead to a unique vote choice. For example, for voters who prefer the outcome in which candidates A and B win the seats, the question remains whether to vote for candidate A or B. This problem can be solved by focusing on the whole rank order: a 'second preference' for candidates A and C to win the seats leads to a sincere vote for candidate A, whereas a 'second preference' for candidates B and C to win the seats leads to a sincere vote for candidate B. This example nicely illustrates the necessity of the assumption that voters rank order all possible outcomes.

Another situation is that in which three *parties* compete for two seats. In that case there are six possible outcomes: (1) party A wins both seats, (2) party B wins both seats, (3) party C wins both seats, (4) party A and B both win one seat, (5) party A and C both win one seat, and (6) party B and C both win one seat. This means that in such an election voters need to rank order six alternative outcomes. If they vote according to these preferences, their vote may be called sincere.

As Farquharson rightly pointed out, the principles he set out can be applied to elections with any number of candidates (or parties) and any number of seats. If one wants to apply the ideas empirically, however, one runs into trouble. The reason lies in the fact that voters need to rank order all possible outcomes. In the context of Dutch parliamentary elections, for example, usually around twenty parties compete for 150 seats. If one would exclude parties that fail to win any seat, this still leaves about ten parties and 150 seats. This means that in Farquharson's terms there are about 140 billion possible outcomes, which voters are presumed to rank order. This may be possible theoretically, but in practice voters cannot be expected to be capable of rank ordering such a large number of possible outcomes, nor can any such rank order be assessed in empirical research.

This study therefore proposes to define a sincere vote not in terms of the outcome of an election (as alternative distributions of the seats), but in terms of those who compete in an election. As in this research political parties are put central, sincere voting is defined in terms of voters' preferences regarding the competing par-

ties. Furthermore, this study proposes to determine these preferences not on the basis of a rank order of parties provided by voters, but on the basis of voters' evaluations of each individual party; evaluations indicate to what extent a voter likes or dislikes a particular party. By comparing at the individual level the evaluations of the competing parties, voters party preferences can be determined. A vote is defined as sincere if it is cast in favour of the party that a voter prefers, that is, evaluates more positively than any other party.[1]

ILLUSTRATIONS OF

THE USE OF HEURISTICS

Support for the view that voters may use different decision rules, or heuristics, can be found in analyses of answers that voters themselves provide to open-ended questions about why they voted for a particular party. Tables below list examples of such answers, taken from the 1998 Dutch Parliamentary Election Study (Aarts et al. 1999).

First, various voters motivated their choice by referring to an election outcome they preferred (Table B.1). For example, some said that the 'purple coalition' had to return, that Labour should become large enough, or that Wim Kok should become prime minister again. Some others mentioned their aversions with respect to possible election outcomes; for example, by stating that they wanted to prevent a second purple coalition, to prevent the Liberals to become the largest party, or to prevent that Bolkestein would become prime minister. Various other voters motivated their choice by referring to retrospective judgements, which mostly involved approval of the incumbent government or its leader (Table B.2). For example, some voters said they were very satisfied about the past four years or that Kok was doing well.

Other voters made statements that point to the use of the party preference heuristic (Table B.3). They said they voted for a particular party simply because it was the most attractive party, because it appealed to them most, or because there was no better alternative. Some other voters motivated their choice by referring to the appeal of a particular politician, mostly the leader of the party they supported (Table B.4). Voting habits were also mentioned by various voters, who sometimes said they voted for a particular party because they had done so all their life, for years, or the last times (Table B.5). The notions of tradition and being brought up that way point to a similar mechanism of automatic choice. Finally, some voters indicated that they based their choice on the endorsement of that party by someone else (Table B.6). They indicated that others said they had to vote that way, that they did so on the advice of a colleague, or because their husband voted for them.

TABLE B.1 Vote choice motivations related to the election outcome preference heuristic

Somewhat leftist government needed; Labour should be large enough	PvdA-voter
I found that Wim Kok should become prime minister again	PvdA-voter
I was afraid that otherwise we would get Bolkestein as prime minister	PvdA-voter
To prevent that the Liberals would become the largest party	PvdA-voter
Because 'purple' had to return	D66-voter
I was afraid that they would become too small to maintain 'purple'	D66-voter
Must remain in 'purple' cabinet	D66-voter
There should be no 'purple-II'	CDA-voter
Hoped that CDA would win; to get representatives of CDA in government	CDA-voter

TABLE B.2 Vote choice motivations related to the incumbent approval heuristic

Very satisfied about past four years	PvdA-voter
'Purple-I' did well	PvdA-voter
Because Kok is doing well	PvdA-voter
Kok was good as prime minister	PvdA-voter
Because of the good economy thanks to this cabinet	PvdA-voter
Ministers did good work last four years	VVD-voter
I found that they were doing well	D66-voter
They had an important role the last four years	D66-voter
Was not so satisfied with the 'purple' cabinet	CDA-voter

TABLE B.3 Vote choice motivations related to the party preference heuristic

Most attractive party	PvdA-voter
A good party	PvdA-voter
In other parties less trust	PvdA-voter
The best party	CDA-voter
Is my party	CDA-voter
Appeals to me most	VVD-voter
There was no better alternative	VVD-voter
Better than D66	GL-voter
Made the best impression on me	SP-voter

TABLE B.4 Vote choice motivations related to the candidate preference heuristic

I like Kok	PvdA-voter
Because of Kok	PvdA-voter
More confidence in Kok than Rosenmöller	PvdA-voter
Pronk is an honest politician	PvdA-voter
Convincing impression of De Hoop Scheffer	CDA-voter
Bolkestein is clear	VVD-voter
Els Borst appealed to me	D66-voter
Borst made a good impression in the debate	D66-voter
Kok is not my man	SP-voter

TABLE B.5 Vote choice motivations related to the voting habit heuristic

That has always been my party	PvdA-voter
Tradition	PvdA-voter
Brought up with	PvdA-voter
Out of habit	CDA-voter
Have voted for them all my life	CDA-voter
Always voted for a confessional party	CDA-voter
Tradition, for years my party	VVD-voter
I did that last times	VVD-voter
Always voted D66	D66-voter

TABLE B.6 Vote choice motivations related to the endorsement heuristic

I always vote the same as my husband	PvdA-voter
Because others said I had to do so	PvdA-voter
People say that it is a good party	PvdA-voter
Because father voted for that party as well	CDA-voter
I think I have to because I am a Catholic	CDA-voter
On the advice of a colleague	VVD-voter
Because my parents vote for them	VVD-voter
Husband voted for me	D66-voter
My girlfriend did it for me	D66-voter

APPENDIX C

THE CONCEPTUALISATION
OF MEMORY

To understand how parties are represented in memory, and how this may affect voters' evaluations of these parties, it may be useful to provide a classification of memory based on three distinctions: long-term versus short-term memory, primary versus secondary memory, and episodic versus semantic memory (see Figure C.1).

In *The Principles of Psychology* (1890) William James distinguished between primary and secondary memory. Information that is perceived through the senses, and which individuals become consciously aware of, concerns primary memory.

> An object of primary memory is not thus brought back; it was never lost; its date was never cut off consciousness from that of the immediately present moment. In fact it comes to us as belonging to the reaward portion of the present space of time, and not to the genuine past. (James 1890a/1950: 646-647)

Secondary memory concerns the recollection of that same information after it has dropped from consciousness.

> Secondary memory […] is the knowledge of a former state of mind after it has already once dropped from consciousness; or rather *it is the knowledge of an event, or fact*, of which meantime we have not been thinking, *with the additional consciousness that we have thought or experienced it before*. (James 1890a/1950: 648)

The fact that information can be recalled implies that it has been stored. This points to the distinction between short-term and long-term memory. Primary and secondary memory both concern what today is commonly referred to as short-term or working memory (Squire 1987, ch. 10). Information that is present in conscious awareness concerns short-term memory. Information that is stored, which can be retrieved and thus become secondary memory, concerns long-term memory.

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                              MEMORY
                   ┌─────────────┴─────────────┐
               short-term                  long-term
              ┌────┴────┐                ┌─────┴─────┐
          primary    secondary       episodic    semantic
```

FIGURE C.1 Taxonomy of memory (based on Squire 1987 and James 1890a)

Larry Squire (1987, ch. 11) proposed to categorise long-term memory in turn on the basis of two divisions, which reflect the fact that different systems in the brain are involved.[2] The first division is that between declarative and procedural memory. The former concerns memory for facts and experiences that can be expressed verbally, whereas the latter includes skills and abilities (which cannot be expressed verbally). Since the latter are not of interest in this context, procedural memory will be ignored here. With respect to declarative memory, Squire further distinguished between episodic and semantic memory (cf. Tulving 1972). The former is associated closely with personal experiences, the latter with knowledge of facts.

> Episodic memory refers to memory for past events in an individual's life. This system represents information concerning temporally dated episodes that can later be recollected. Episodic memory stores the cumulated events of one's life, an individual's autobiography. Semantic memory refers to knowledge of the world. This system represents organized information such as facts, concepts, and vocabulary. The content of semantic memory is explicitly known and available for recall. Unlike episodic memory, however, semantic memory has no necessary temporal landmarks. It does not refer to particular events in a person's past. (Squire 1987: 169-170)

Although the distinction between episodic and semantic memory has proven controversial, in particular regarding the question whether different brain systems are involved, in social psychology the distinction has been considered useful (Carlston and Smith 1996: 185).[3]

Both the orthodox model and the on-line model (see Chapter 6) consider the way that parties and candidates are represented in voters' memory relevant for how they evaluate them. However, they differ in terms of the kind of memory focused on. Traditional theories of voting focus primarily on long-term memory, in particular semantic memory. Research on the on-line model has emphasised the role of short-term memory, in particular primary memory. To understand well why voters evaluate parties or candidates as they do, however, all four aspects have to be focused on.

THE CONCEPTUALISATION
OF EMOTIONS

Various authors have stressed that how individuals evaluate parties or candidates cannot be understood properly if one does not take into account the role of emotions (see Chapter 6). The aim of this appendix is to discuss the conceptual issues related to this literature in some more detail, and thereby provide the basis for a model of party evaluations in which the role of emotions is incorporated. This model itself, which is referred to as the emotion-integration model of party evaluations, is discussed in Chapter 6.

EMOTIONAL RESPONSE AND FEELING THERMOMETERS

According to George Marcus, Russell Neuman and Michael MacKuen (2000) emotions result from two different systems in the brain: the disposition system and the surveillance system (see Chapter 6). If we assume that these systems exist, an important question is whether the emotional output of the systems is unipolar or bipolar. This has implications for how the impact of emotion should be conceptualised, as well as for how they can best be measured. Marcus and his colleagues argued that the emotional outcomes of the two systems can be conceptualised best as two unipolar dimensions. This means that depression is nothing but the absence of enthusiasm, and calmness is nothing but the absence of anxiety. They furthermore argued that this implies that conceptualising emotional response along a bipolar valence dimension is misleading. Consequently, the use of the feeling thermometer scale is inappropriate, they argued. Their arguments link up to those provided by John Cacioppo, Wendi Gardner and Gary Berntson (1997), who argued that attitudes, which are usually conceived of as a single bipolar dimension (see Chapter 3), can be

represented better in terms of two unipolar dimensions (one for positive and one for negative evaluative processes).

Although Marcus and his colleagues may be right that emotion cannot be conceptualised best as one bipolar valence dimension, this does neither imply that the emotional output of the two systems is unipolar, nor that feeling thermometer scales have to be abandoned. For the conceptualisation of emotional response there are a number of alternatives to the two unipolar dimensions. One possibility is to view both dimensions as bipolar. With respect to the emotional output of the disposition system, which scans successes and failures of ongoing activities, Marcus and his colleagues focused primarily on enthusiasm resulting from detected success. They regarded depression as the typical outcome of absence of enthusiasm. Another possibility would be to focus explicitly on the frustration of people's goals as an opposite of success. A prime candidate for the corresponding emotional outcome appears to be anger. Anger may be hypothesised to result from a detected frustration in the disposition system. Clearly, anger does not point to the absence of enthusiasm, but has to be seen as an emotion in its own right. Consequently, anger and enthusiasm could be seen as the opposites of a bipolar dimension.[4] In a similar way one could argue about the possible opposite of anxiety and fear. Aristotle (335 B.C./1991) already argued that two important emotions that are each other's opposites are *phobos* and *tharsos*, which have been translated as fear and confidence. Hence, we may conceive of emotions – if the term emotion is appropriate – as trust and confidence as the opposite of emotions like anxiety and fear.

Another possibility is to regard emotional response as four unipolar dimensions, by separating the aforementioned positive emotions from their negative opposites. Yet another possibility is that some emotions concern a bipolar dimension, whereas others concern a unipolar dimension.[5] Finally, emotions may be conceived of as more varied, in line with the distinctions that have been made between different so-called discrete emotions. This links up to the idea that there are only a limited number of 'basic emotions', such as fear, anger, disgust, joy, and sadness. Other emotions, such as shame or guilt, have been conceived of as specific mixtures of basic emotions, and correspondingly distinctions have been made between 'primary' and 'secondary' emotions (see, for example, Plutchik 1980, ch. 9–11). To analyse their impact, different emotions may thus also be conceptualised and analysed as distinct phenomena, rather then transforming them into scores for positive and negative emotions, or for enthusiasm and anxiety.[6]

What this discussion shows, is that emotional response can be conceptualised in several ways. A lesson to be learned from the work by Marcus and his colleagues is that emotion is not conceptualised best as one bipolar valence dimension. However, their framework seems problematic as well. It may be doubted whether feeling unenthusiastic, safe, or comfortable indeed can be conceived of best as absence of emotional response, and it can be questioned whether the disposition and surveillance

system have only unipolar emotions as their outputs. Furthermore, it remains unclear how emotions that are not included in the framework have to be dealt with. Can these emotions be ignored? If not, how must they be treated?

Another matter is whether feeling thermometer scales are appropriate measurements for emotional response. If one thinks that emotional response can be operationalised by a single bipolar measure, the objections by Marcus and his colleagues appear to be valid. The results of various studies confirm that emotional response cannot be conceived of that way (see Marcus et al. 2000). However, this does not imply that feeling thermometer ratings are not valuable. To come to that conclusion, it would above all be necessary to show that there exists no such thing as liking or disliking candidates (or other objects), the notions that underlie the measurements. This is not what the studies on the impact of emotions showed. Emotional responses in terms of anxiety, fear, enthusiasm, disgust, and anger may well exist next to positive and negative affect as tapped by feeling thermometer scales. If such discrete emotions, or the dimensions they jointly make up, exist independently of each other, this does not imply that liking and disliking as such, or related emotions like love and hate, do not exist. Consequently, it may be useful to study the latter additionally. Furthermore, even if positive and negative affect exist largely independently of one another, they may still be studied in terms of ratings along a single bipolar evaluative dimension (Cacioppo et al. 1997).[7] So although feeling thermometer ratings do not reflect the variety of emotional responses that voters may show, the measure may still be useful for assessing an overall evaluation, like that referred to as an on-line tally (Lodge et al. 1989).

TAXONOMY OF EMOTION

If liking and disliking exist next to emotional responses as anxiety, fear, hope, enthusiasm, pride, disgust, and anger, the question arises how these phenomena relate to each other. In this context an important distinction is that between emotional response as an acute or temporary state and emotional response as a more enduring or permanent state, which is often referred to by the notion of a trait. According to Richard Lazarus (1994: 79), of the many distinctions that have been made between different kinds of emotion phenomena, that between stable and unstable, or between state and trait, is the least controversial. Another distinction that can be used to classify emotions is whether or not the emotion is related to a specific object or event (intentionality). Emotions that lack an object are often distinguished and referred to by the notion of moods. Nico Frijda's (1994) classification of emotional or affective phenomena into four categories is based on these two distinctions. With respect to emotions that involve a specific object or event, Frijda distinguished between emotion episodes (temporary states) and sentiments (enduring states). The notions of love and

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                                  EMOTION
                        _____
                       /                        \
                    state                      trait
                   /     \                    /      \
               moods   emotion episodes   temperament   sentiments
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
FIGURE D.1 Taxonomy of emotion (based on Frijda 1994 and Lazarus 1994)

hate, and likes and dislikes, he regarded as typical examples of this latter category (although these words may be used also to refer to temporary states). Emotional responses that do not involve a particular object may be referred to as moods (temporary states) and personality or temperament (enduring states).

A classification of emotion based on these two distinctions is provided in Figure D.1. Emotional phenomena are divided first on the basis of the temporal dimension into states and traits.[8] Emotion states and traits are both in turn divided on the basis of the question whether they are directed at a particular object. Emotion states that lack an object are referred to as moods, while those directed at a particular object are referred to as emotion episodes. Emotion traits that lack an object are called temperament, while those concerning a particular object are called sentiments.

The taxonomy is illuminating with respect to the study of emotions in relation to candidate evaluations. The measures used by Abelson and his colleagues (1982) and Marcus (1988) concern emotion episodes (has the candidate ever made you feel angry?), while the measures used by Marcus and MacKuen (1993) presumably concern sentiments (do you feel enthusiastic about the candidate?). Hence, in studies that examined the impact of emotion different phenomena were focused on. Some analyses concerned the impact of temporary emotional states, whereas others concerned more permanent emotional traits.

Another thing to note is that it was not emotions as such that the reported studies examined, but *memories of emotions*. The questions of the American National Election Studies indicated whether voters *recalled* having experienced certain emotional responses. It is well known that memories are constructions that are influenced by current thoughts and feelings (Schacter 1996). This also applies to memories of emotions (Robinson and Clore 2002a). In the electoral context Linda Levine (1997) confirmed this. She found that recalled emotional reactions to the withdrawal by Ross Perot in the 1992 U.S. presidential election changed across time. Systematic distortions occurred in relation to later appraisals and subsequent feelings with respect to Perot's withdrawal. For example, voters who remained loyal to Perot after the election underestimated how sad and angry they initially had been (according to their

own earlier reports). This implies that memories of emotions may be distorted compared to the actual, original response. Consequently, self-report may be considered problematic for assessing past emotional experiences. As the initial emotional response is usually not available to researchers, however, they have to rely on voters' memories. Although these may be distorted, Levine's findings are encouraging at the same time. The recalled emotions were biased, but nevertheless considerable stability was observed. This means that the reports may still be reasonably accurate.

FROM EMOTION EPISODES TO SENTIMENTS

A final question is how the emotional phenomena distinguished relate to each other. From the perspective of this research, the relationship between emotion episodes and sentiments is particularly interesting, as voters' feelings towards political parties fit those categories. Moreover, party evaluations may be considered an example of the emotion phenomenon that is referred to as sentiments; both concern a degree of liking or disliking.

The most important way in which emotion episodes and sentiments are related, is that the former may become integrated into the latter (Frijda 1994: 65). In this context, the framework provided by James Russell (2003) may be useful. According to Russell, at the heart of what we call emotion is what he calls *core affect*. This refers to a person's state that is characterised by a particular level of arousal and a particular level of pleasure. It concerns the extent to which a person feels good or bad, energised or enervated. Core affect may be viewed as a position in a two-dimensional space that combines the dimensions of pleasure–displeasure and activation–deactivation (see also Russell 1980; Watson and Tellegen 1985). Russell argued that whenever individuals notice a change in their core affect, they attribute this change to a particular event or object. In the case of a lost friend, for example, individuals will attribute their sadness to that loss. Russell used the notion of *attributed affect* to refer to the linking of a change in core affect to its perceived cause. Furthermore, he argued, on the basis of these processes individuals make inferences about the capacity of particular events or objects to change their core affect. In other words, people know whether certain things can make them feel good or bad. This knowledge he referred to as *perception of affective quality*. People supposedly classify objects in those terms, or at least in terms of the pleasure dimension (p. 157).[9]

Russell's framework links up well to the taxonomy of emotion discussed. His distinction between core affect and attributed affect is related to that between moods and emotion episodes, while his distinction between attributed affect and affective quality is related to that between emotion episodes and sentiments.[10] Russell assumed that emotion episodes are all built on core affect. Each emotion episode is associated with particular levels of arousal and pleasure. Moreover, his framework im-

plies that sentiments can be viewed as perceptions of affective quality that are based primarily on the core affect attributed to the objects involved. This means that past emotional experiences with an object explain people's evaluations of that object. So what matters is to what extent objects make people feel good or bad, energised or enervated. These are integrated into sentiments. This research refers to these by the notion of evaluations.

THE IMPACT OF PARTY SIZE

Various electoral researchers have argued that one of the factors that determine whether voters will vote for a particular party is its size. The idea is that large parties are better able to realise their policy preferences, since they have a better chance of getting into government (Maas et al. 1991: 76; Oppenhuis 1995: 133; Tillie 1995: 123-124). Consequently, if voters are attracted by more than one party, they are more strongly inclined to vote for a large party. Various research findings support the idea that party size plays such a role. A. E. Bronner and R. de Hoog (1978) found that in their judgements about how similar or different parties were, powerfulness (potential government parties versus not potential government parties) was one dimension that voters made use of. They found that powerfulness played a role with respect to voters' preferences for parties (see esp. ch. 8). Obviously, powerfulness is related to size. Another example of the presumed impact of party size is found in reactions to Van der Eijk and Niemöller's (1983, ch. 7) test of the smallest distance hypothesis. They found that a substantial minority of the Dutch voters did not vote for the party that in ideological terms was closest to them. Of the voters who did, many had two or more parties at equal distance. In reaction to these findings it was suggested that the size of parties could play an additional role (Maas et al. 1991; Van Holsteyn 1989). Empirical analyses showed that voters supported the closest party more often if it was a large party than if it was a small party (87 versus 32 per cent) (Maas et al. 1991: 76). And if more than one party was at closest distance, voters more often voted for a large party than for a small party (about 90 versus 10 per cent) (Van Holsteyn 1989: 145). Jean Tillie (1995, ch. 6) found that ideology and party size were the two most important determinants of voters' tendency to vote for parties (with the impact of both seeming to be of about equal size). Erik Oppenhuis (1995, ch. 6-7) found that in other countries of the European Union parties' size also strongly influenced voters' tendency to vote for them.

TABLE E.1 Size of parties (number of seats in the Second Chamber after each election)

		1982	1986	1989	1994	1998	2002
Labour Party	PvdA	47	52	49	37	45	23
Liberal Party	VVD	36	27	22	31	38	24
Christian Democrats	CDA	45	54	54	34	29	43
Democrats 66	D66	6	9	12	24	14	7
Political Party Radicals	PPR	2	2	-	-	-	-
Communist Party	CPN	3	-	-	-	-	-
Evangelist Party	EVP	1	-	-	-	-	-
Pacifist Party	PSP	3	1	-	-	-	-
GreenLeft	GL	-	-	6	5	11	10
Political Reformed Party	SGP	3	3	3	2	3	2
Reformed Political League	GPV	1	1	2	2	2	-
Reformed Political Federation	RPF	2	1	1	3	3	-
ChristianUnion	CU	-	-	-	-	-	4
Centre Party	CP	1	-	-	-	-	-
Centre Democrats	CD	-	-	1	3	-	-
Elderly Alliance	AOV	-	-	-	6	-	-
Union 55+	U55+	-	-	-	1	-	-
Socialist Party	SP	-	-	-	2	5	9
List Pim Fortuyn	LPF	-	-	-	-	-	26
Liveable Netherlands	LN	-	-	-	-	-	2
	total	150	150	150	150	150	150

Note: In 1989 the four small left-wing parties (PPR, CPN, EVP, and PSP) had merged into GreenLeft; in 2002 two orthodox Protestant parties (GPV and RPF) had merged into the ChristianUnion.
Source: www.parlement.com

On the basis of the framework of the sincere vote model it may be tested to what extent party size has the hypothesised impact. If it has, then we expect to see that discrepancies in the relationship between party preferences and voting intentions occur more frequently among voters whose party preference consists of a small party than among voters whose party preference consists of a large party. Additionally, we expect to see that such voters relatively often evaluate a small party best, but intend to vote for a large party.

Before the impact of party size can be analysed, the question how party size should be operationalised has to be settled. The elections that are focused on in this research are Dutch parliamentary elections. The elections determine the distribution of the 150 seats of the Second Chamber of parliament. Therefore, it seems appropriate to operationalise the size of parties as the number of seats they occupy in the Second Chamber (see also Tillie 1995: 101). The only remaining question, then, is which

TABLE E.2 Party preferences and the party preference–voting intention relationship (percentage of voters with a non-sincere voting intention)

party preference:	1986	1994	1998	2002
Labour Party	2	3	10	7
Liberal Party	3	4	3	10
Christian Democrats	6	6	5	6
D66	12	7	11	17
GreenLeft	30	16	20	18
Socialist Party	-	-	16	21
Orthodox Protestant	23	16	20	18
Centre Democrats	29	15	40	-
Elderly Alliance	-	-	30	-
List Pim Fortuyn	-	-	-	15
Liveable Netherlands	-	-	-	20
all voters	7	8	13	14

Note: The GreenLeft figure of 1986 concerns their predecessors.
Reading example: Of all voters whose party preference included the Labour Party, in 1986 2 per cent had a non-sincere voting intention; of all voters in 1986 7 per cent had a non-sincere voting intention.

moment should be focused on. Because the distribution of seats in a specific election is in a sense the phenomenon to be explained, this would not be an appropriate measure to operationalise party size. Therefore, in the analyses below the parties' number of seats in the Second Chamber of the Dutch parliament *after the previous election* is taken as a measure of party size. In the analysis of the 1998 election, for example, the measures of party size correspond with the number of seats parties obtained in the election in 1994. Table E.1 shows the number of seats each party held in the Second Chamber after the various elections.

If voters who prefer small parties have non-sincere voting intentions relatively often, we expect to see a relationship between which party voters preferred and what kind of voting intention they had (sincere or non-sincere). Table E.2 shows the proportion of non-sincere voting intentions in relation to voters' party preferences (single and multiple party preferences are both included).[11] Across the parties some clear differences can be observed. Among voters who evaluated the Labour Party, Liberal Party, or Christian Democrats most positively, few voters intended to vote for another party than their party preference (between 2 and 10 per cent). Among voters whose party preference included D66, the proportion that had a non-sincere voting intention was fairly similar to the figures concerning the electorate as a whole. Voters whose party preference included one of the other, smaller parties relatively often intended to vote for a party they did not like best. For example, for voters who preferred GreenLeft (or their predecessors) this proportion varied between 16 and 30

TABLE E.3 Voting intentions of voters with a non-sincere voting intention (%)

party preference:	1986	1994	1998	2002
Labour Party	35	22	24	19
Liberal Party	22	24	27	15
Christian Democrats	24	16	30	30
D66	10	18	5	3
GreenLeft	2	2	4	4
Socialist Party	-	-	2	5
Orthodox Protestant	5	1	6	7
Centre Democrats	1	16	1	-
Elderly Alliance	-	-	1	-
List Pim Fortuyn	-	-	-	15
Liveable Netherlands	-	-	-	2
total	100	100	100	100
(N)	(82)	(87)	(186)	(204)

Note: The GreenLeft figure of 1986 concerns their predecessors.

per cent, and for voters who preferred the orthodox Protestant parties it varied be-tween 16 and 23 per cent.[12] Overall, these figures provide support for the hypothesis that the size of parties influenced voters' tendency to prefer to vote for them.

Another expectation that follows from the hypothesised impact of party size, is that voters with non-sincere voting intentions turned to large parties relatively often. Table E.3 therefore shows the voting intentions of voters with a non-sincere voting intention. Note that the number of voters is low, so the figures have to be interpreted with care. Nevertheless, the overall pattern is consistent with the hypothesis. Voters with non-sincere voting intentions relatively often intended to vote for a large party.

So far, the impact of party size has been examined by inspecting the tables with in mind the size of the various parties of the party preferences. The impact of party size can be also analysed without any reference to the specific parties that were in-volved. In order to do so logistic regression analyses have been performed. The de-pendent variable in these analyses is a so-called dummy variable that indicates whether or not voters intended to vote in line with their party preference (the vari-able was coded '0' for voters with a sincere voting intention and '1' for voters with a non-sincere voting intention). The independent variable is the size of the preferred party (number of seats in the Second Chamber). In the case of multiple party prefer-ences, the measure is based on the largest party included in the party preference.

The results of the logistic regression analyses are shown in Figure E.1.[13] As ex-pected, in each year the chance of a non-sincere voting intention decreased as the size of the preferred party increased. Consequently, voters who preferred a large

FIGURE E.1 Size of the preferred party and the chance of a non-sincere voting intention

party were relatively unlikely to have a non-sincere voting intention, whereas voters who preferred a small party were considerably more likely to have a non-sincere voting intention. Note, however, that even for the smallest parties the figure predicts a voting intention in line with the party preference, since the chance of a non-sincere voting intention remains below 50 per cent. Although the overall pattern is fairly similar in all four years, some differences can be observed. In 1994 the effect of party size appeared to be not as large as in the other years, whereas 1986 stands out as the year in which party size mattered most. These differences are reflected in the explanatory power of the models (see note 3). In 1986 non-sincere voting intentions could be explained fairly well on the basis of party size (Nagelkerke R^2 equalled 0.24), whereas in the other years the explanatory power of the models was much more limited (Nagelkerke R^2 varied between 0.06 and 0.12).

Although these findings support the idea that discrepancies between party preferences and voting intentions have to do with the size of the parties involved, they do not provide evidence for the hypothesised impact. The figures only show that specific voters more often intended to vote for *other* parties, not that they intended to vote for *larger* parties. Therefore, additional analyses are needed to find out whether the party that voters with non-sincere voting intentions intended to vote for was indeed larger than their party preference. Table E.4 provides the relevant data. As expected, in each year a majority of the voters with non-sincere preferences intended to vote for a party that was larger than that of their party preference (be-

TABLE E.4 Relationship between size of preferred party and size of party intended to vote for (voters with non-sincere voting intentions only) (%)

	1986	1994	1998	2002
voting intention for larger party	70	63	65	60
voting intention for similar-sized party	4	7	8	10
voting intention for smaller party	27	30	28	30
total	100	100	100	100
(N)	(82)	(87)	(186)	(204)

Note: Voters with multiple party preferences who intended to vote for a party that had a size between that of the largest and the smallest party included in the party preference, are included in the second category.
Reading example: In 1986 of all 82 voters with a non-sincere voting intention 70 per cent intended to vote for a party that was larger than their party preference, 4 per cent intended to vote for a party of similar size, and 27 per cent intended to vote for a party that was smaller than their party preference.

tween 60 and 70 per cent). Some voters, however, intended to vote for parties that were actually smaller than their party preference. These were largely outnumbered, however, by voters who turned to larger parties.

The findings provide support for the hypothesis that the size of parties is relevant with respect to the question what party voters prefer to vote for. Voters whose party preferences consisted of smaller parties were more likely to intend to vote for another party than their party preference than voters whose party preference consisted of larger parties. Moreover, a majority of the voters with non-sincere voting intentions turned to a larger party than their party preference.

A final question to be answered is how the logistic regression models based on party size relate to those based on coalition preferences (see Chapter 8). After all, the underlying idea is that party size matters because large parties are more attractive because they are more likely to participate in the government.

The model based on party size explained non-sincere voting intentions worse than similar models based on coalition preferences: in 1994 and 2002 the amount of explained variance of models based on party size was considerably smaller, whereas in 1986 and 1998 the amount of explained variance of both kinds of models was virtually the same.[14] Moreover, models that included measures for coalition preferences as well as party size hardly explained non-sincere voting intentions better than models that based on coalition preferences: the model improvement was very limited.[15] In other words, if the impact of voters' coalition preferences is taken into account, party size contributes to a very limited extent to the explanation of discrepancies between party preferences and voting intentions. Apparently, the impact of party size indeed resulted from the fact that coalition preferences included large parties more often.[16]

PARTY LEADER EVALUATIONS

AND VOTE CHOICE

This appendix shows how voters evaluated party leaders, which party leaders they preferred, and to what extent their voting intentions and voting behaviour were in line with their party leader preferences. The findings support the view that in Dutch parliamentary elections political parties are more central than their candidates, because voting intentions and voting behaviour can be predicted more accurately on the basis of party evaluations (see Chapter 7) than on the basis of party leader evaluations (see this appendix; see also Chapter 8). How voters evaluated the various party leaders is shown in Table F.1 to Table F.4.

By comparing at the individual level the evaluation scores awarded to each party leader, party leader preference measures have been created. A party leader is said to be preferred if a voter evaluates that leader more positively than all other party leaders. Across the years for at least 98 per cent of the voters a party leader preference measure could be created; for up to 2 per cent it could not, because they did not evaluate any of the party leaders. Table F.5 shows what evaluation scores voters awarded to the party leader they preferred, while Table F.6 shows how many party leaders voters preferred. Analogous with the distinction between a single and a multiple party preference, a distinction can be made between a single and a multiple party leader preference. The proportion of voters who evaluated one party leader more positively than any other varied between 59 per cent in 2002 and 78 per cent in 1986. Consequently, between 1986 and 2002 the proportion of voters with a multiple party leader preference increased from 22 per cent to 41 per cent (differences in the number of leaders evaluated account for some, but not all, of the variation observed in the table).

How often voters preferred the various party leaders is shown in Table F.7 to Table F.9. Table F.7 shows the party leader preferences of voters with a single party leader preference, while Table F.8 concerns voters with multiple party leader prefer-

TABLE F.1 Evaluation scores awarded to party leaders in 1986 (% and mean) (N=1630)

	Den Uyl (PvdA)	Nijpels (VVD)	Lubbers (CDA)	Van Mierlo (D66)
100	6	1	11	1
90	8	2	18	3
80	14	7	19	10
70	12	10	11	13
60	12	12	10	18
50	13	16	12	19
40	9	13	3	10
30	6	10	3	6
20	5	9	3	4
10	6	10	4	3
0	6	7	3	3
subtotal	98	97	98	90
don't know	2	3	2	10
total	100	100	100	100
mean	55	43	67	53

ences. The findings are combined in Table F.9, which shows voters' party leader preferences irrespective of whether they involved a single of multiple preference. In 1986 Ruud Lubbers of the Christian Democrats was preferred most often by far. Of all voters 42 per cent liked him better than any other party leader. Other voters with a single party leader preference mostly preferred Joop den Uyl of the Labour Party: 27 per cent liked him best. Few voters preferred Ed Nijpels (Liberal Party) or Hans van Mierlo (D66). In 1994 the party leader who was preferred most often was Wim Kok of the Labour Party. Van Mierlo (D66) was preferred relatively often as well (by 17 per cent), while relatively few voters preferred Elco Brinkman (Christian Democrats), Frits Bolkestein (Liberal Party), or a leader of the smaller parties. Four years later, Kok stood out as the most-often preferred leader even more strongly. Among all voters 35 per cent liked him best, while none of the other leaders was preferred by more than 10 per cent. In 2002, on the other hand, there was little agreement concerning party leader preferences. The two best-liked leaders, Jan Peter Balkenende of the Christian Democrats and Paul Rosenmöller of GreenLeft, were each preferred by only 12 per cent of the voters. Unlike his predecessors Den Uyl and Kok, Ad Melkert was preferred by very few voters (4 per cent).

TABLE F.2 Evaluation scores awarded to party leaders in 1994 (% and mean) (N=1812)

	Kok (PvdA)	Bolkestein (VVD)	Brinkman (CDA)	Van Mierlo (D66)	Brouwer (GL)
100	5	0	1	2	1
90	10	2	3	7	2
80	20	6	8	14	5
70	20	12	13	21	10
60	16	15	13	17	12
50	12	17	16	17	15
40	6	11	13	7	10
30	4	9	10	4	7
20	2	6	7	3	5
10	3	6	7	2	4
0	1	4	7	1	3
subtotal	98	89	98	96	73
don't know	2	11	2	4	27
total	100	100	100	100	100
mean	64	48	46	60	48

TABLE F.2 (continued)

	Rabbae (GL)	Schutte (GPV)	Van Dijke (RPF)	Van der Vlies (SGP)	Janmaat (CD)
100	0	1	0	0	0
90	1	1	0	0	0
80	3	3	0	1	0
70	6	4	1	1	0
60	7	6	1	2	1
50	12	8	2	4	2
40	5	4	1	2	2
30	5	6	1	2	2
20	3	4	1	2	3
10	4	4	1	1	8
0	6	3	1	2	77
subtotal	52	44	11	17	95
don't know	48	56	89	83	5
total	100	100	100	100	100
mean	44	43	38	39	5

TABLE F.3 Evaluation scores awarded to party leaders in 1998 (% and mean) (N=2101)

	Kok (PvdA)	Bolkestein (VVD)	De Hoop Scheffer (CDA)	Borst (D66)	Rosenmöller (GL)
100	7	1	1	1	2
90	16	3	2	3	6
80	26	10	6	9	16
70	22	13	11	16	17
60	11	14	15	18	12
50	9	16	19	18	11
40	3	13	10	10	7
30	2	9	7	8	3
20	1	6	4	4	2
10	1	6	3	2	2
0	1	4	1	2	1
subtotal	98	96	79	91	80
don't know	2	4	21	9	20
total	100	100	100	100	100
mean	72	50	52	54	62

TABLE F.3 (continued)

	Marijnissen (SP)	Schutte (GPV)	Janmaat (CD)
100	1	1	0
90	3	1	0
80	6	4	0
70	9	6	1
60	9	6	0
50	11	10	1
40	6	6	1
30	5	5	2
20	3	4	4
10	2	3	10
0	1	2	72
subtotal	57	48	93
don't know	43	52	7
total	100	100	100
mean	55	47	5

TABLE F.4 Evaluation scores awarded to party leaders in 2002 (% and mean) (N=1908)

	Melkert (PvdA)	Dijkstal (VVD)	Balkenende (CDA)	De Graaf (D66)	Rosenmöller (GL)
100	1	1	2	1	2
90	2	4	7	3	7
80	6	13	17	13	18
70	14	22	19	20	23
60	17	20	16	19	16
50	18	17	14	14	10
40	15	10	8	9	8
30	11	5	5	6	5
20	7	3	3	3	3
10	8	2	3	4	3
0	2	0	0	1	1
subtotal	99	97	96	93	98
don't know	1	3	4	7	2
total	100	100	100	100	100
mean	47	59	61	57	61

TABLE F.4 (continued)

	Marijnissen (SP)	Veling (CU)	Van der Vlies (SGP)	Fortuyn (LPF)	Teeven (LN)
100	1	0	1	2	0
90	7	1	1	5	0
80	14	3	2	9	2
70	17	4	3	11	4
60	17	6	5	8	8
50	12	8	7	10	14
40	7	5	4	8	10
30	6	4	4	8	9
20	3	4	3	7	8
10	4	3	4	15	8
0	1	1	2	16	3
subtotal	89	39	35	98	67
don't know	11	61	65	2	33
total	100	100	100	100	100
mean	59	48	44	40	38

TABLE F.5 Evaluation scores awarded to preferred party leader (% and mean)

	1986	1994	1998	2002
100	17	8	12	10
90	25	19	23	24
80	27	29	33	37
70	14	22	19	20
60	8	10	7	6
50	5	6	3	2
0-40	2	5	2	1
none evaluated	2	1	2	0
	—	—	—	—
total	100	100	100	100
(N)	(1630)	(1812)	(2101)	(1908)
mean score	80	75	79	80

TABLE F.6 Number of leaders preferred (% and mean)

	1986	1994	1998	2002
1	78	67	65	59
2	18	24	24	23
3	4	7	8	11
4 or more	1	2	3	6
	—	—	—	—
total	100	100	100	100
(N)	(1595)	(1797)	(2066)	(1900)
mean score	1.3	1.5	1.5	1.7

TABLE F.7 Distribution of single party leader preferences (%)

	1986	1994	1998	2002
leader Labour Party	27	29	35	4
leader Liberal Party	2	7	7	6
leader Christian Democrats	42	6	4	12
leader D66	7	17	3	5
leader GreenLeft	-	4	8	12
leader Socialist Party	-	-	4	8
leaders Orthodox Protestant	-	2	3	3
leader Centre Democrats	-	1	1	-
leader List Pim Fortuyn	-	-	-	9
leader Liveable Netherlands	-	-	-	0
total	78	67	65	59
(N)	(1595)	(1797)	(2066)	(1900)

TABLE F.8 Distribution of multiple party leader preferences (%)

	1986	1994	1998	2002
leader Labour Party	14	23	27	7
leader Liberal Party	7	10	12	15
leader Christian Democrats	18	11	7	19
leader D66	10	21	11	14
leader GreenLeft	-	9	16	21
leader Socialist Party	-	-	7	15
leaders Orthodox Protestant	-	4	4	4
leader Centre Democrats	-	1	1	-
leader List Pim Fortuyn	-	-	-	11
leader Liveable Netherlands	-	-	-	2
total	22	33	35	41
(N)	(1595)	(1797)	(2066)	(1900)

Note: Because voters with multiple party leader preferences are represented in more than one row, the figures add up to more than the total that had a multiple party leader preference.

TABLE F.9 Distribution of party leader preferences (single or multiple) (%)

	1986	1994	1998	2002
leader Labour Party	41	52	63	11
leader Liberal Party	10	17	19	22
leader Christian Democrats	60	17	11	30
leader D66	17	38	14	19
leader GreenLeft	-	13	25	33
leader Socialist Party	-	-	11	23
leaders Orthodox Protestant	-	7	6	7
leader Centre Democrats	-	2	2	-
leader List Pim Fortuyn	-	-	-	20
leader Liveable Netherlands	-	-	-	2
total	100	100	100	100
(N)	(1595)	(1797)	(2066)	(1900)

Note: Because voters with multiple party leader preferences are represented in more than one row, the figures add up to more than 100 per cent.

TABLE F.10 Relationship between party leader preferences and voting intentions (%)

	1986	1994	1998	2002
voting intention for party of leader preference	76	68	68	71
voting intention for another party	24	32	32	29
total	100	100	100	100
(N)	(1061)	(1062)	(1277)	(1392)

To what extent voters intended to vote for the party of the leader they liked best, is shown in Table F.10. Across the years between 68 and 76 per cent intended to vote for the party of their favourite party leader, while between 24 and 32 per cent intended to vote for another party. These findings indicate that voting intentions were related to party leader preferences fairly strongly, but less strongly than to party preferences – recall from Chapter 7 that the corresponding figures for party preferences showed much stronger relationships.

IMPLICATIONS FOR PSYCHOLOGY

The aim of this research has not been to evaluate attitude-behaviour models or emotion research, or whatever other psychological theory. However, the findings presented do have some implications for those fields.

One of the insights from attitude-behaviour research that has been central in this study, is that a distinction can and should be made between attitudes towards objects (like a particular political party) and attitudes towards behaviour involving those objects (like voting for a particular party in a specific election) (see Ajzen and Fishbein 1980; Eagly and Chaiken 1993). This research suggests that it may be useful to distinguish a third category of attitudes, namely those towards prospects (like the prospect that a particular party will become largest in a specific election). This builds on the insight from neuroscience that decision-making is guided by individuals' evaluations of, or emotional responses to, imagined future scenario's (see Damasio 1994); it also links up to the idea presented in the context of emotion research that three kinds of evaluations should be distinguished: those of objects, events, and actions (Ortony et al. 1988). The three kinds of attitudes are related to each other. If voters strongly like a particular party, they will presumably like the prospect of that party becoming largest, and they will presumably also like the idea of voting for that same party. The attitudes are related not only in terms of empirical correlations, but also in terms of causal relationships: attitudes towards objects underlie attitudes towards prospects, which in turn underlie attitudes towards behaviour; however, attitudes towards objects may also influence attitudes towards behaviour directly (see Figure G.1).[17]

This study furthermore suggests that if individuals decide to behave in a particular way, the underlying psychological process may include the formation of prospective attitudes, but these need not be formed. This means that behavioural decisions may be based on individuals' evaluations of particular prospects associated

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┌─────────────────┐     ┌─────────────────┐     ┌─────────────────┐
│    attitudes    │ ──▶ │    attitudes    │ ──▶ │    attitudes    │
│ towards objects │     │towards prospects│     │towards behaviour│
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
FIGURE G.1 Three categories of attitudes and their relationships

with that behaviour, but individuals may also base their decision on their evalua-
tions of the objects involved without taking into consideration any prospect. For ex-
ample, in the electoral context voters may decide to support a particular party be-
cause they would like that party to become largest or because they would like that
party to participate in the next government. In that case prospective attitudes play a
role. However, voters may also decide to support a particular party simply because
they like that party well. In that case they do not elaborate upon possible future sce-
narios associated with the outcome of the election, but simply rely on their attitudes
towards the objects involved. This view is in line with that presented by Eagly and
Chaiken (1993) about how attitudes as focused on by Fazio (1986) and attitudes as
focused on by Fishbein and Ajzen (1975) may be fit into a single model.

Another matter concerns the question which objects are relevant in relation to
behaviour. In the electoral context there are at least three different kinds of actors
that play an important role: political parties, candidates, and governments. Hence,
voters' attitudes towards each of those actors matter. Attitude-behaviour models
have often merely assumed that in a behavioural context it is clear what the objects
are that should be focused on, namely those which could be considered the target of
the behaviour. However, in elections it is not always clear whether the targets are
parties, candidates, or governments. Moreover, in the same election different voters
may base their decision on their attitudes towards different targets or objects. Pre-
sumably, in other contexts similar problems play a role. One of the key questions,
then, is which objects are of paramount importance, and which factors determine
how relevant various objects are for different individuals.

A final lesson for attitude-behaviour research concerns the role of preferences.
Various attitude-behaviour studies have shown that what matters in a choice situa-
tion are not attitudes towards single choice options as such, but attitudes towards the
various choice options in comparison to one another. In this study this idea has led to
the use of the notion of preferences. A preference concerns that object or prospect of
a particular choice set, towards which an individual's attitude is most positive, that
is, more positive than that toward any of the alternative choice options. In the elec-

toral context this means that attitudes towards political parties can be focused on in terms of party preferences, which indicate towards which party individuals held the most favourable attitude. In other domains a similar procedure may be used.

Regarding another subfield of psychology, that of emotion research, the most important message from this study appears to be that we need further insight in the relationship between what Frijda (1994) referred to as emotion episodes (temporary states) and sentiments (enduring states or dispositions). According to the view presented in this research, emotion episodes are integrated into sentiments. Furthermore, a general response in terms of a like-dislike dimension is regarded as the single most important sentiment. Emotion research has often focused on emotion episodes and neglected sentiments. According to Frijda (2000: 64), however, both concepts are not that different and consequently emotion researchers should perhaps include sentiments in their analyses. The framework provided by Russell (2003) may be considered useful in this context, since it shows how emotion episodes and sentiments may be related.

Notes, Bibliography,
and Author Index

NOTES

CHAPTER 1 – INTRODUCTION

[1] Joseph Schumpeter (1942/1996: 269) defined the democratic method on the basis of precisely this criterion. However, free and fair elections are clearly not the only thing that matters. To speak about a democracy, many other requirements must be fulfilled, such as universal suffrage, the right to run for office, freedom of expression, alternative information, and associational autonomy (see Dahl 1989, who speaks about polyarchy instead of democracy, which he regards an ideal that will never be fully reached). Nevertheless, elections may be considered democracy's key element.

[2] How elections serve as 'instruments of democracy' has been discussed by, among others, Bingham Powell (2000). In his view, two key functions of elections are holding past governments accountable and providing future governments with a mandate. Additionally, he points to their role in selecting representatives, and holding these accountable.

[3] *Psephos* is Greek for a vote and *logos* for a word.

[4] The Michigan scholars (Campbell et al. 1954, 1960) presented a fairly similar view. Sociological variables were thought to influence voting behaviour only through mediation of psychological variables, such as party identification and attitudes. Even the Columbia scholars (Lazarsfeld et al. 1944, Berelson et al. 1954) adopted such a view. This will be discussed in more detail in Chapter 2.

[5] Note that the view presented implies that it is possible to distinguish between psychological and non-psychological concepts. A philosophical discussion about this distinction is not provided here. Suffice it to say that psychological concepts are those that concern an individual's mind. Non-psychological concepts are all concepts that do not in any sense refer to, and exist independently of, the individual's mind. With respect to variables (the concrete measurements of concepts) a similar distinction can be made between psychological and non-psychological variables.

[6] This idea also applies to non-psychological variables: some can be regarded as the causes (or consequences) of others. For example, individuals' income may depend on

their level of education.

   [7] Universal suffrage was introduced for men (aged 25) in 1917, and for women in 1919. The required age was lowered to 23 in 1946, to 21 in 1967, and to 18 in 1972 (Daalder 1991: 57).

CHAPTER 2 – PSYCHOLOGY IN VOTING THEORY

   [1] In this context issues and ideology need not be very different. When issues are used to position voters in a political space, frequently the issues are assumed to represent a more general dimension of political conflict. An issue can then be regarded as an indicator of an ideological dimension (see, for example, Irwin and Van Holsteyn 1989b: 113).

   [2] This can be deduced from the figures presented by Lazarsfeld, Berelson and Gaudet (1944: 26).

   [3] The three principles were referred to, and summarised, as "*differentiation* is a condition for disagreement (...) *transmission* is a condition for persistence [and] *contact* is a condition for consensus" (Berelson et al. 1954/1966: 74).

   [4] Research in which this line of thought is still strongly present is that of 'contextual theories of politics' (see Huckfeldt and Sprague 1993).

   [5] The data had been published before by Lipset in *Political Man* (1960) and were based on a survey conducted in May 1956 by the Netherlands Institute of Public Opinion (Lipset 1960/1969: 245).

   [6] This figure can be computed on the basis of the data presented by Lipset and Rokkan (1967: 17).

   [7] In some studies social class is operationalised on the basis of individuals' occupation (see, for example, Nieuwbeerta 1995; Nieuwbeerta and Ultee 1999). Such measurements do not concern an identity. However, alternative measurements are based on voters' self-classification in terms of social class, which does refer to an identity (see, for example, Van der Kolk 2000).

   [8] Asch (1952) has been selected as an example of this criticism, because in *Voting* his criticism is referred to and replied to explicitly (Berelson et al. 1954/1966: 290 ff.).

   [9] These words were related only to the local level of Elmira, but the point of view can be generalised to any level.

   [10] Many psychological phenomena that have been elaborated upon later by other scholars were already discussed in *Voting*. Examples are effects of framing (p. 200 ff., p. 270), bandwagon effect (p. 289), wishful thinking (discussed as 'projection', p. 289), and perception biases resulting from assimilation and contrast effects (discussed as 'distortion effect', p. 220 ff.).

   [11] Sociological characteristics not only influence psychological characteristics, but the reverse occurs also. Although characteristics such as religion, social class, and urban versus rural place of residence may be 'inherited' to a large extent or 'just happen' to people, they also result from individuals' deliberate choices (Catt 1996: 92-93). The political values people have may influence their choices and determine what their social characteristics are. For example, because individuals regard doing certain voluntary work highly

important, they may have a part-time paid job and consequently have a lower income than they would have had otherwise. In that case income depends on political values, rather than the other way round.

[12] The question wordings are taken from the questionnaire printed in *The Voter Decides* (Campbell et al. 1954/1971: 217-218).

[13] Other ordering dimensions, however, could be used as well, Campbell and his colleagues (1960) argued. They listed three additional possibilities: (1) exogenous factors versus relevant conditions, (2) personal versus external conditions, and (3) political versus non-political conditions.

[14] The fact that Thomassen (1976b: 77) labelled his conclusion as 'tentative' and 'inconclusive', has not prevented many from concluding that the party identification concept is of no use in some countries, or at least in the Netherlands; or that the party identification in those countries "does not exist" (Miller and Shanks 1996: 117).

[15] In the Dutch Parliamentary Election Studies, from which these questions have been taken, distinctions have been made additionally between respondents who considered themselves a convinced adherent, and those who did not. Voters who mentioned more than one party sometimes were asked additional questions. For these details refer to the documentation of those studies (Van der Eijk et al. 1986; Anker and Oppenhuis 1994; Aarts et al. 1999).

[16] The question wordings used by Thomassen (1976b) differ somewhat from the DPES format just discussed.

[17] Later research showed that with respect to the stability in party identification (compared to vote choice) the Dutch case was unique in comparison to the United States, Canada, Britain, and Sweden: only in the Netherlands did fewer voters change their vote than the direction of their party identification (LeDuc 1981; Holmberg 1994a). Other research, however, indicated that also in Germany vote preference was more stable than party identification (Richardson 1991). Berglund (2000) pointed out that the finding that party identification is instable in the Netherlands, may be largely a result of the exclusion of independents from analyses. If those are included, he argued, the original findings by Thomassen (1976b) are not replicated.

[18] According to the model, voters apply two future-orienting modifiers to their judgement. First, a so-called *trend factor* may be taken into account. This implies that less weight is given to performances in the beginning of the election period, and more weight to more recent performances. Second, if both parties have different platforms or policies but provide an equal utility income, vote choices are based on comparisons of *performance ratings*. These are based on the comparison between an actual government and a voter's ideal government, that is, between what a government has done and what a voter thinks they should have done. Hence, performance ratings are the ratio between the received utility income and the highest possible utility income. These ratings enable voters to compare government performances in different situations (different times and different areas) (Downs 1957, ch. 3).

[19] Downs (1957: 47) argued that the model assumes all information voters have is factually correct, although it may be incomplete. Another assumption made is that citizens' political tastes are fixed. Downs (1957: 37-38) furthermore noted that voters may be

unaware of benefits they receive, and that only the benefits voters are conscious of can influence their vote choice.

[20] Downs (1957: 48) argued that for each voter the meaning of 'reasonable' depends on the voter's personal temperament.

[21] These included voters with more than one party 'at a closest distance' for whom no unique prediction could be made on the basis of left-right positions alone.

[22] The framework of the heartland model was used before by Anthony Heath, Roger Jowell and John Curtice (1985, ch. 8) to analyse the role of ideology in voting in Britain. Its application to the Netherlands was discussed first by Irwin and his colleagues (1987).

[23] One of the criticisms of Downs' theory was that political disagreement is not structured by a single dimension (Stokes 1963: 370-371). The research by Van der Eijk and Niemöller (1983) nevertheless defined ideology in Dutch politics on the basis of one dimension only, that of left-right. Others have also concluded that Dutch politics is structured by one dimension (Tillie 1995). According to other researchers, however, (voting in) Dutch politics can be understood best on the basis of two ideological dimensions (Middendorp 1991; Irwin and Van Holsteyn 1989b, 1997; Van Holsteyn and Irwin 2003), or on the basis of three (Van Wijnen 2001).

[24] Note that this conceptualisation is in line with one in which religious values are regarded as the primary dimension of conflict, and left-right values are regarded as a secondary dimension. Note that this framework more or less implies that whereas the Labour Party and the Liberals are evaluated on the basis of two dimensions, the Christian Democrats are on the basis of one.

[25] Irwin and Van Holsteyn's (1989b) heartland model also differs from Van der Eijk and Niemöller's (1983) left-right model in another way. The impact of left-right was studied on the basis of each voter's *own* perception of parties' positions. As a consequence each voter had its own configuration of parties in the space. In the heartland model parties' heartlands are regarded as fixed and consequently they do not vary across voters.

[26] In the 1977-1986 period the proportion of voters who were situated in the heartland of one of the three parties who voted for the corresponding party varied between 51 and 58 per cent. These figures can be computed on the basis of the data provided by Irwin and Van Holsteyn (1989b: 116, Table 1). Figures concerning 1989 and 1994 are not fully comparable with those concerning the earlier elections, because in 1989 question wordings had changed and the abortion issue was replaced by that of euthanasia (Irwin and Van Holsteyn 1997: 105). The 1989 and 1994 data, however, indicate that in 1994 fewer voters fit the heartland model than in 1989. The figures concerning the performance of the three major parties in their own heartland varied between 45 and 59 per cent in 1989, and between 42 and 54 per cent in 1994.

[27] In 1998 the Christian Democrats obtained only about 30 per cent of the vote in their heartland, while in 2002 the figures for the Labour Party and Liberal Party were only about 25 and 30 per cent, respectively.

[28] In some analyses Middendorp (1989; 1991) found structures that consisted of more than two dimensions. These are not elaborated upon here.

[29] The same applies to other spatial models of voting: they may be used to analyse voting behaviour, even if they do not accurately describe how voters perceive electoral

politics.

[30] This view is related to the work of, among others, David Sears (2001; Sears et al. 1980), who emphasised that voters are not rational beings who reason about their self-interest, but react emotionally to 'symbols'.

[31] A neutral position implies no direction and no intensity.

[32] Mathematically, they operationalised the effect of an issue with the following formula: issue effect = (candidate location – neutral point) x (voter location – neutral point). By adding up the effects of different issues an overall issue effect results, which is referred to as 'scalar product'.

They operationalised a candidate's position as the mean perceived position of the candidate by the voters (p. 101). Hence, the model assumes that candidate positions are fixed across individuals.

[33] The saliency theory has implications for voting only in as far as voters also perceive parties in terms of valence issues. Whether they do arguably depends to a considerable extent on how the media report about parties. In the context of the 1994 Dutch parliamentary elections Sander Flight and Juan Felix (1995: 101) found that parties campaigned mainly in terms of valence issues, as Budge and Farlie (1979) argued, but that the media reported the campaign mainly in terms of position issues. Consequently, it may well be that political parties behave according to the theory of issue ownership, but that voters do not.

[34] Catt's (1996) research focused on British election studies, but the arguments are valid more in general. She distinguished two aspects of the orthodoxy: the theoretical and the methodological. The methodological aspects of the orthodoxy concern standardised methods of collecting and analysing data. In this section the methodological aspects are not discussed; only the theoretical aspects are focused on.

[35] U.S. presidential elections illustrate that other objects are possible: in these elections voters select a ticket that comprises two candidates, one for president and one for vice-president.

[36] In relation to parties' positions in an ideological space or an issue space, it has been suggested that consequently ideological positions of parties can be conceived of better as an area than as a position (see, for example, Granberg and Gilljam 1997: 45-46).

[37] This idea is to a large extent at odds with the notion of second-order national elections (Reif and Schmitt 1980; see also Van der Eijk, Franklin, et al. 1996).

[38] One might argue that knowledge of a certain speech need not concern episodic memory; it may also concern semantic memory. It is possible that a certain speech is represented in memory as a fact, rather than as a recollection of having heard the speech. In such cases it would perhaps be more appropriate to speak of 'episodic information' than 'episodic memory'.

CHAPTER 3 – ATTITUDE-BEHAVIOUR MODELS AND VOTING

[1] The early conceptualisations of an attitude as a readiness to respond in a favourable or unfavourable way towards an object, seems to refer most strongly to the behav-

ioural component.

² Another view on attitudes has been employed by Fishbein and Ajzen with respect to attitudes towards behaviour (Fishbein and Ajzen 1975; Ajzen and Fishbein 1980). In this alternative view an attitude is regarded as a resultant of evaluations of a set of beliefs, which implies that attitudes are not 'independent' phenomena, but a resultant of evaluated beliefs.

³ Eagly and Chaiken (1993: 155) additionally stated, "attitudes, tendencies to evaluate an entity with some degree of favor or disfavor, are ordinarily expressed in cognitive, affective and behavioural responses". This view largely reflects the so-called three-component view on attitudes.

⁴ In recent years the idea that attitudes concern a single evaluation of an object has been challenged. It has been argued that the evaluation of an object may consist of more than one dimension, for example dependent on the context in which it is evaluated. Consequently, one could speak about multiple attitudes (Wood 2000: 548-551), which may result in attitudinal ambivalence (Ajzen 2001: 39-40). According to the view adopted in this research, however, attitudes concern a single dimension.

⁵ In some research the position of a party is fixed among respondents, since it is operationalised as the average scale position given to the party by respondents. In other research the party position is allowed to differ across respondents, since individual perceptions of party positions are used. Only the latter method corresponds closely to the notion of beliefs.

⁶ Quality of decision making is defined in relation to the likelihood that one would later arrive at another decision (Fazio et al. 1992: 395).

⁷ Two theories that explain the underlying psychological processes are cognitive dissonance theory (Festinger 1957) and self-perception theory (Bem 1972).

⁸ In some area's, such as health psychology, Icek Ajzen's (1985, 1991) Theory of Planned Behaviour, a modified version of the Theory of Reasoned Action, has frequently been applied (Ajzen 2001).

⁹ For theoretical criticism on the Theory of Reasoned Action see Jonas and Doll 1996; Liska 1984; Sarver 1983; and Swanborn 1996.

¹⁰ The principle of correspondence has also been referred to as the principle of compatibility (Ajzen 1988; Eagly and Chaiken 1993: 162-166, 217).

¹¹ Contrary to Ajzen and Fishbein (1980) and Eagly and Chaiken (1993, ch. 4), in this research a distinction between 'object' and 'target' is not made. When attitudes towards objects are discussed, these correspond with what Eagly and Chaiken referred to as attitudes towards targets. Hence, in this research attitudes towards objects do not include attitudes towards behaviours.

¹² In some instances certain 'steps' in the model may be skipped; for example, sometimes intentions are not formed and attitudes result more directly into behaviour.

¹³ One might argue that attitude-behaviour research overestimates the strength of the relationship between attitudes and voting behaviour, because voting behaviour is usually measured on the basis of self-report and such measures tend to be biased towards current attitudes. However, these problems apply to other behaviour as well, so this cannot explain the *relatively* strong relationship observed in the domain of voting.

[14] The increase in explained variance using regression analysis mostly varied between five and ten per cent. The differences may to a considerable extent be a methodological artefact, because differences in measurement may have occurred.

[15] This may have been a methodological artefact. The authors argued that this finding may have been due to the fact that the intention was operationalised as the likelihood of voting for one specific *candidate*, not party (Singh et al. 1995).

[16] A. Echebarria Echabe, D. Paez Rovira and J. F. Valencia Garate (1988: 187) also concluded that subjective norms had more effect than attitudes, which was replicated in a later study (Echebarria Echabe and Valencia Garate 1994). Their research, however, did not measure attitudes directly, but made use of expectancy-value measures. This may explain their deviating results.

[17] Echebarria Echabe and his colleagues (1988; 1994) made use of expectancy-value measures of attitudes and it remains to be seen whether similar effects would have been obtained if attitudes had been measured directly. Moreover, with respect to the 1994 study their findings may be due to the fact that intentions were operationalised for each party separately at a seven-point scale, rather than as categorical variable.

[18] To judge whether concepts are useful additions or not, two criteria may be used: prediction and explanation (Sutton 1998). In some circumstances merely predicting whether an individual will perform certain behaviour may be useful, but in this research explanation is the aim.

CHAPTER 4 – THE SINCERE VOTE MODEL

[1] Concepts that political scientists refer to as attitudes do not necessarily involve an evaluative (like-dislike) dimension. Political knowledge, for example, is regarded by political scientists as an example of (political) attitudes (see, for example, Robinson et al. 1999). However, political knowledge does not concern a positive or negative evaluation of a particular object. Consequently, from a social psychological perspective political knowledge does not fit the notion of an attitude.

What distinguishes this study from various other studies on attitudes, is that a one-dimensional view of attitudes is adopted. This is drawn attention to by speaking about evaluations instead of attitudes.

The emphasis put in this research on the notion of evaluations may also be linked to the work of Sears (2001; Sears et al. 1980), who speaks about 'symbolic politics'. According to Sears, citizens' emotional responses to a wide variety of 'symbols' are of paramount importance to understand how they behave in politics.

[2] Distinguishing between behavioural preferences and intentions is important if discrepancies between both concepts can be expected, resulting from the additional impact of skills or cooperation (see Eagly and Chaiken 1993). Voting is presumably not one of the domains where this is relevant. If voters like the idea of voting for a particular party, lack of skills or cooperation will presumably not prevent them from forming an intention accordingly. Therefore, in the context of voting distinguishing the two concepts is not necessary.

³ At the aggregate level this means that if a certain party is evaluated more positively than another party, this does not imply that the party also was preferred more often than the other party.

⁴ It may well be that parties and candidates are represented in memory not independent of each other, but in relation to one another, especially in two-party systems (Rahn 1995; Rahn et al. 1990; see also Sniderman et al. 1990; 1991, ch. 9). This could imply that party preferences are more or less as such stored in memory. What is important, however, is that also in this view there is 'a balance' between party evaluations and party preferences. Consequently, party preferences can be determined by merely comparing party evaluations.

⁵ The model implies that voters will choose from the parties they know: a party can only be evaluated, and thus preferred, if voters know the party.

⁶ Although the idea that voting behaviour is determined by a voting intention may seem obvious (or tautological and useless), distinguishing both concepts is important. It involves the distinction, and linkage, between a behavioural concept (voting behaviour) and a mental concept (voting intention). The explanation of voting behaviour by voting intentions therefore fits the psychological approach, according to which behaviour can be explained on the basis of mental or psychological concepts. Moreover, including voting intentions in the analysis enables researchers to study party preferences and voting intentions at the same time. The importance of this will become clear later in this study.

⁷ There are other ways in which the strength component may be defined. One option is to regard the evaluation as a measure of strength. A preference for a party that is evaluated very positively would then be considered stronger than a preference for a party that is evaluated fairly positively. A disadvantage of this procedure is that the comparison between evaluation scores, which according to the sincere vote model is highly important, would be lost. Another possibility is to define the strength of a preference as the degree to which a party is on average liked more, or less, than the other parties. A disadvantage of this procedure is that the strength measure could be positive even though a party is not preferred, which would be awkward from the perspective of the sincere vote model.

⁸ One may be tempted to conclude that the sincere vote model can best be applied to a single moment in time, namely that corresponding with the actual voting behaviour. Although this would presumably result in the strongest relationships between voting behaviour and the other concepts, this is not by definition an approach to be preferred. Our understanding does not depend solely on the strength of statistical relationships. We could well increase our understanding by taking into account a longer time period 'at the cost' of the strength of the relationships.

⁹ An example of a 'true discrepancy' between voting intention and voting behaviour would be voters who accidentally ticked another party and consequently voted for another party than the one they preferred to vote for. This appears to have happened with respect to the butterfly ballot paper used in Palm Beach County in Florida in the 2000 U.S. presidential election between George W. Bush and Al Gore: due to the design of the ballot paper, some voters, while intending to vote Gore (and thinking they did), in fact voted for Pat Buchanan, a candidate not really similar to Gore.

[10] Another possibility is that the impact of other factors (exogenous variables) changed. The sincere vote model may also be used to analyse the size of such change, even though the factors from which they originate cannot be identified. This links up to the third way in which the model may be used.

[11] A matter related to this is the impact of party size on vote choice (see Van der Eijk, Franklin, et al. 1996; Tillie 1995; Oppenhuis 1995). If party size has the hypothesised impact, we expect to see discrepancies between party preferences and voting intentions that are related to the size of the parties involved.

[12] The underlying idea of normal vote analysis is that voters have a long-term preference to vote for a particular party. Party identification, viewed as a stable long-term characteristic, could then be seen as the individual level equivalent of the normal vote. However, Converse (1966) did not explicitly make such a link to the individual level in his analysis. Moreover, he argued that voters may have a long-term preference to vote for another party than the one they identify with.

Although the sincere vote model does not require party preferences or vote preferences to be stable, it shows some similarities with the normal vote analysis outlined by Converse.

[13] Changes in the composition of the electorate are another factor that such an aggregate level analysis would have to take into account.

CHAPTER 5 – VOTE CHOICE HEURISTICS

[1] As a result, if individuals make judgements, these may have biases and not be fully accurate. For example, Daniel Kahneman, Paul Slovic and Amos Tversky (1982) showed that when individuals make judgements the principles of representativeness, availability, and anchoring and adjustment result in certain biases.

[2] Identifying what heuristics voters may use to reach a vote decision may be considered the first task of electoral research in relation to choice mechanisms. A second task is to explain why the use of a certain heuristic results in the choice for a particular party. A final task is to explain in what circumstances voters will make use of each heuristic. In this chapter the emphasis is mainly on the first task: identifying the different heuristics voters may employ.

[3] If voters rely on *retrospective* judgements in order to get the favoured policies in the future, their behaviour may still be considered instrumental.

[4] Damasio (1994) referred to this idea as the 'somatic marker hypothesis' .

[5] D66 were doing badly in the opinion polls. If the actual results would be that bad (or worse), the coalition of the Labour Party, Liberal Party, and D66 would supposedly not continue.

[6] Similar processes may operate in elections that concern other positions, such as those of mayor, governor, or senator. In such elections voters imagine that the various candidates become mayor, governor, or senator, and their evaluations of these prospects are the key to their vote choice.

[7] This terminology links up with Ivor Crewe and Anthony King (1994: 191), who

spoke about the "presidentialization of British elections".

[8] If statements of vote selectors do not concern future policies, their use does not fit the notion of prospective voting. Moreover, even if they do, one may doubt whether all voters that make use of vote selectors view them in terms of *future* policies. If not, classifying its use as an example of prospective voting would be inaccurate.

[9] The party size preference heuristic is described in the figure as "vote for the party you want to increase in size". The point of reference may be an actual situation (for example, the current number of seats in parliament) as well as a hypothetical situation (for example, the vote share in opinion polls).

[10] Note that the term 'incumbent' is used here more broadly than mere incumbency in a district or as President

[11] In this research 'incumbent approval' will mean 'the degree to which voters *approve or disapprove* of the performance of the incumbent (president or government)'. Hence, 'approval' includes 'disapproval'.

[12] Key's (1966: 76) argument that "the only really effective weapon of popular control in a democratic regime is the capacity of the electorate to throw a party from power" points to voting as an instrumental act. However, Key (1966: 61) put more emphasis on the retrospective character of voting, as he argued that the electorate "commands prospectively only insofar as it expresses either approval or disapproval of that which has happened before".

[13] Although an attitude-behaviour model in which only the attitude towards the incumbent is included matches well with the notion of retrospective voting, a difference between such an attitude-behaviour model and the discussed heuristic may be observed. The attitude towards the incumbent need not be (influenced by) a retrospective judgement. For example, the attitude can be based on an appraisal of that candidate's future policy proposals.

[14] In some studies so-called differential measures have been used. These can be regarded as a mixture between an across-subjects design and a within-subjects design (see, for example, Fishbein, Ajzen and Hinkle 1980).

[15] Protest may involve disapproval of government actions, but it may also concern other actors. Moreover, if voters feel they protest against something, the object of the protest may be ill-defined. Only if a protest is clearly directed at government actions, it fits the incumbent approval heuristic.

[16] In relation to the 1998 Dutch parliamentary elections some voters of GreenLeft mentioned this: they said that the party had done a good job as an opposition party (voters no. 12756, 14174, and 19090; 54-year-old woman, 39-year-old woman, and 46-year-old woman).

[17] Drees is usually credited for the introduction of these benefits (AOW), but they were in fact introduced in 1956 by Suurhoff. Earlier initiatives by Drees in the late 1940s, however, in a sense laid the foundation for them (Daalder 2000: 37-39).

[18] Downs (1957) mentioned this heuristic as an alternative possibility for voters in multi-party systems with coalition governments. Because in such a context taking into account possible election outcomes was difficult, voters could simply vote for their favourite party. Although it is usually not identified as a choice mechanism, the party pref-

erence heuristic may be regarded as an assumption that underlies most theories of voting.

[19] Note that consequently the notion of a sincere vote may be considered an analytical construct, just as the notion of a strategic vote.

[20] Voters may also develop other kinds of voting habits. An example that fits few models of voting is that of a Dutch voter who reported that she always voted for the first party on the ballot. Because the first party on the ballot varies across elections (it corresponds with the party that received most votes in the previous election), this voter supported different parties, even though the choice mechanism concerned a habit.

[21] Downs (1957) argued further that habitual voters come in two kinds: those who always vote for the same party (loyalists) and those who always abstain (apathetics). As in this research only those who actually vote are focused on, only the former kind are of interest here.

[22] The concept of a normal vote, however, concerned the aggregate level.

[23] In *The Voter Decides* (1954) Campbell and his colleagues took this position, but in *The American Voter* (1960) they viewed party identification as an indirect determinant. Some later models again included party identification as a direct determinant of vote choice (see, for example, Markus and Converse 1979).

[24] The party preference heuristic might also be described as "vote for (the candidate of) the party that you like best", while the candidate preference heuristic might also be described as "vote for (the party of) the candidate you like best".

[25] Note that the model speaks about 'prospect evaluations', not 'prospective evaluations'. One reason for this is a matter consistency in terminology: what precedes the notion of evaluation in each instance is the object of that evaluation: party, candidate, government, or prospect. An additional reason is that the notion of 'prospective evaluations' has been used in electoral research in a somewhat different way. Miller and Shanks (1996, ch. 14), for example, define prospective evaluations as expectations regarding the future governmental performance of parties or candidates (p. 391). An example would be voters' judgement regarding whether a particular presidential candidate would solve the problem of poverty. Such judgements are not like-dislike ratings of a hypothetical situation, and therefore do not fit the conceptualisation of prospect evaluations adopted in this research.

CHAPTER 6 – THREE MODELS TO EXPLAIN PARTY EVALUATIONS

[1] The notion of a funnel of causality as employed by the Michigan scholars deviates from this idea (Campbell et al. 1960). However, in their analyses vote choice was also presented as the sole dependent variable, while a set of independent variables was used to explain vote choice.

[2] The argument can even be taken one step further. The concepts used traditionally to explain vote choice not only *can* be linked to party evaluations instead of vote choice, arguably they *should* be linked to party evaluations rather than to vote choice.

[3] The main question with respect to the rule of combining various evaluations is probably how important each single characteristic is. In a simple model each single evalu-

ation may be given equal weight. This requires that the evaluations of the characteristics are all measured on the same scale. An alternative would be to assign different weights to different characteristics. This corresponds to the notion of 'saliency': some aspects may be more important or salient than others. The weights may also be determined empirically, for example by the use of a statistical analysis in which the single evaluations are used as independent variables and overall party evaluations as dependent variables. Note that such a procedure assumes that the weight assigned to each characteristic is equal among all voters; for an alternative approach, refer to Rivers (1988).

[4] In relation to the orthodox model three conclusions concerning how we may go beyond the existing theories may be formulated. First, it is important to include all concepts simultaneously, rather than focus on some only. Second, it is important not to define the concepts too narrowly. For example, party characteristics should include not only issues, but also other kinds of characteristics; and in as far as issues are focused on, they should not be limited to the few that the researcher regards important. Third, individual differences, as well as differences across parties, should be allowed for.

[5] The model is also central in later work by Kelley (1983).

[6] Updating is not necessary if the positive or negative valence of the processed information fits the existing evaluation. For example, if a candidate proposes a policy that certain voters disagree with, these voters need not adjust their evaluation if they already strongly dislike the candidate.

[7] The designs of the various experiments varied in terms of the experimental conditions, tasks performed, question order, measurements used, and so on. The outline of the experiments discussed corresponds most closely to the 1989 study by Lodge and his colleagues, whereas their 1995 study deviates most strongly from the discussed design.

[8] A small effect was found of policy positions that were falsely attributed to the candidates. This was explained as projection or rationalisation bias: individuals are more likely to think that candidates they like take policy positions they like (Lodge et al. 1989: 415; McGraw et al. 1990: 49).

Kathleen McGraw and her colleagues (1990) found that issue saliency mattered: issues that individuals had rated as very important had a stronger impact than other issues.

[9] Using a somewhat different experimental design David Redlawsk (2001) found that candidate evaluations could be predicted better on the basis of recalled information than on the basis of processed information. A problem of this study, however, is that the evaluation of recalled information was determined directly by asking subjects for each memory whether it made them feel good, bad, or neutral about the candidate, whereas the evaluation of information processed was determined indirectly by comparing that information to the subjects' ideal points. Because of these differences the comparison is problematic.

[10] The correlations between the positive and negative emotion factors ranged between – 0.04 and – 0.54. The correlations between the two corresponding indices ranged between – 0.05 and – 0.42 (Abelson et al. 1998: 622–623, table 1–2).

The factor loadings typically varied between 0.60 and 0.80 (of the forty-two values none exceeded this range, and eleven were lower). If we assume that the variables that made up a factor measured one and the same concept, these values are fairly low. One

should keep in mind, however, that the variables were dichotomous; this may have influenced the results. Nevertheless, the factor loadings do not permit the conclusion that the various variables that made up a factor measured a single concept. In that case the values had to be higher. So, the conclusion must be that the various variables apparently shared some common element, but may still be independent phenomena.

[11] The values of Cronbach alpha of these indices ranged between 0.62 and 0.80 (Abelson et al. 1998: 627, table 7).

[12] The index of positive emotions contained three different emotions and the index of negative emotions four. Hence, the overall effect of negative emotions could be as large as that of positive emotions.

[13] Victor Ottati, Marco Steenbergen and Ellen Riggle (1992) found that if episodic memories of emotions were operationalised as a four-point ordinal scale (always-never) instead of the dichotomous yes-no, positive and negative emotions were more strongly correlated to each other, and were not more weakly correlated than positive and negative trait measures. Hence, the low correlations between positive and negative emotions found by Abelson and his colleagues (1982) may have been a methodological artefact.

[14] Alternative explanations for the low correlations that have been suggested are methodological in nature (see Abelson et al. 1982; Ottati et al. 1992).

[15] Initially Marcus (1988) referred to both systems as the behavioral activation and behavioral inhibition system; Marcus and MacKuen (1993) referred to them as behavioral inhibition and behavioral approach system. In order to prevent confusion in the following discussion both systems are referred to by the names that were employed more recently: disposition and surveillance system (Marcus et al. 2000).

[16] The notion of interest had been used to operationalise enthusiasm, so the fact that enthusiasm was found to increase interest is not much of a surprise.

[17] The role of emotion in relation to cognition has been discussed in various other studies as well (see, for example, Ragsdale 1991; Goren 1997; Glaser and Salovey 1998; and Lavine et al. 1999).

[18] Emotion episodes may also be integrated into other kinds of sentiments – for example, disgust or enthusiasm about a certain party. These are the type of emotions that Marcus and MacKuen (1993) focused on. Such sentiments are presumably stored in long-term memory just as party evaluations. This study regards the latter of paramount importance and only focuses on those.

[19] The distinction that is made between the emotional response as such and its conscious representation corresponds with that made in emotion research between emotions and feelings (Damasio 1994, 2000; LeDoux 1998). According to the corresponding view, emotions are the total set of changes or responses in the brain and the body, whereas feelings are the conscious representations of those responses.

[20] This means that voters *may* have insight in why they like or dislike a particular party to a certain degree. If voters have accurate beliefs about what emotional responses affected their evaluation of a particular party, voters' accounts of those experiences provide an explanation for their party evaluations. However, voters may also hold inaccurate beliefs about the relationship between their emotional response to particular information about a party and their evaluation of that party.

More specific, voters may be mistaken with respect to the causal direction. A rather negative evaluation of a particular party, for example, might lead voters to also evaluate negatively a particular characteristic of that party. Voters might then – falsely – assume that their negative overall evaluation was driven by their negative evaluation of this characteristic. In that case one could speak about rationalisation. Note that the model presented does not include such processes, because it is directed solely at the causes of party evaluations, not their effects.

[21] The fact that information upon which party evaluations are based, as well as information concerning the resulting emotional responses, are soon forgotten, implies that the processes described by the emotion-integration model of party evaluations cannot be studied well on the basis of self-report. The reason is that self-report appears to result in valid measures of emotional responses only for a limited period of time.

Why this is the case has been illuminated by Michael Robinson and Gerald Clore (2002). According to their theory, individuals can recall emotion episodes only for a short period of time. Next, individuals can only 'estimate' their emotional responses on the basis of related information in episodic memory. After a few weeks this information is also lost and individuals can only estimate their emotional responses on the basis of general beliefs about the emotion-evoking ability of particular situations or beliefs about the typical emotional response of the individuals themselves (both kinds of beliefs are stored in semantic memory).

Because estimates of past emotions based on beliefs stored in semantic memory may well be biased, the formation and change of party evaluations can only be studied for the period immediately preceding that of a self-report. Changes in party evaluations across long periods of time – for example, that between two consecutive parliamentary elections – require many repeated surveys.

CHAPTER 7 – EMPIRICAL TEST OF THE SINCERE VOTE MODEL

[1] Documentation on these studies can be found in Van der Eijk, Irwin and Niemöller (1986); Anker and Oppenhuis (1989); and Aarts, Van der Kolk and Kamp (1999). The documentation on the 2002 survey should become available soon too. The corresponding data files have been (or will be) deposited at the Steinmetz Archive in Amsterdam; they can also be obtained from several other social science data archives.

[2] The fact that party evaluation measures were included in the pre-election interview is highly important, because this safeguards somewhat against the possibility that party evaluations or party preferences are deduced from actual voting behaviour (see the discussion about the causal direction of the relationship between attitudes and behaviour in Chapter 3). It must be noted, however, that in the pre-election interview voters were also asked about their voting intentions. We cannot exclude the possibility that answers to that question influenced answers to subsequent questions later in the interview about party evaluations.

[3] The question wordings are from the 1998 survey. The English translations have been taken from the DPES documentation (Aarts et al. 1999). For details about the ques-

tion wording in the other surveys, question order (including the order in which parties were evaluated), and showcard format, refer to the official DPES documentation (see note 1).

[4] It should be noted that the connotation of the Dutch word "sympathiek" is somewhat different from the English translation "sympathetic". The Dutch word does not involve feelings of sympathy; its meaning comes closer to "likeable" or "nice".

[5] There are three reasons to recode the 101-point measure into an eleven-point format. The first is that research findings suggest that people are unable to distinguish that many intensities and consequently not much can be gained by including many answer categories (Miller 1956; Cox 1980). This implies, one could argue, that minor differences on the 101-point scale do not represent true attitudinal differences.

A second reason is that minor differences in evaluations of parties might result from differences in (intended) voting behaviour, rather than the other way round. People sometimes infer what their attitudes are from their behaviour (cf. Bem 1972; Eagly and Chaiken 1993: 538-552). Although it would not be realistic to assume that party evaluations are merely inferred from (intended) voting behaviour, to some extent such a process may operate. Minor differences on the 101-point scale, in particular at the upper side of the scale, would then be the result. Although the problems of reversed causal direction can never be fully overcome in analyses based on cross-sectional data, we might safeguard somewhat against them by not regarding minor differences on the evaluation scale too seriously (and rounding off the scores).

A final reason to recode the scores is that this makes the party preference measure (to be discussed later) more comparable across the years. This has to do with the fact that the showcard on which the evaluation scale was presented differed across the various DPES studies. For example, in 1986 each single unit between 0 and 100 was marked by a small line, while in 1998 only multiples of ten were marked. Presumably due to such differences, the proportion of evaluations that consisted of other values than multiples of ten varied considerably across the surveys. For example, the proportion of evaluations of the Labour Party that consisted of another value than a multiple of ten was 13.9 per cent in 1986, 5.2 per cent in 1994, 1.6 per cent in 1998, and 23.9 per cent in 2002. If the scores would not be recoded, differences in the number of voters with a multiple party preference could be a methodological artefact resulting from differences in question format (or better: showcard format). This would in turn affect the predictive power of the sincere vote model. This is not to say that by applying the recoding procedure all figures are fully comparable, but the problems are arguably less severe.

[6] In 1986 by accident one of the small left-wing parties (PSP) was not included.

In 1998 the order in which the parties were presented was randomised.

[7] The official DPES data files do not distinguish between voters who did not know the party and voters who did not know what evaluation score to award. Initially such distinctions were made, however. In the interview a separate code was used if voters said they did not know the party. In an unofficial file of the 1998 DPES that was distributed within a small circle of electoral researchers (a file with the name NKO98B.sav) this distinction was still present. Data from that file show that on average (across the eleven parties) 77 per cent of the voters who are classified as 'don't know' indicated they did not

know the party, whereas 23 per cent did not know what evaluation score to award. For the four largest parties (Labour, Liberal Party, Christian Democrats, and D66) both proportions were of about equal size, while for the other parties clearly more voters said they did not know the party than that they did not know what score to award. Therefore, in the analyses and discussion in this research voters in the 'don't know' category will be treated as if they did not know the party.

The few voters for whom no scores were available have been included in the 'don't know' category.

[8] The 1986 figures concern the Centre Party, the figures of later years concern the Centre Democrats. Since the former can be regarded a predecessor of the latter, both parties will sometimes be referred to jointly as Centre Democrats.

[9] The figure for the ChristianUnion was 8 per cent, and that for the SGP 4 per cent. The fact that both figures add up to 12 per cent (instead of 10 per cent, which the table lists), indicates that two per cent of the voters had a multiple party preference that included both the ChristianUnion and the SGP.

[10] Voters who did not evaluate any party have been excluded from subsequent analyses if these involve party preferences.

[11] The proportion of voters with a single party preference can be also determined by combining the figures that indicate that a particular party was strongly, moderately, or weakly preferred.

[12] The recoding of the evaluation scores into an eleven-point format affected these figures. For example, without this recoding in 2002 the proportion of voters with a single party preference would be 74 per cent rather than 64 per cent.

[13] Parties have been classified as left-wing or right-wing on the basis of the mean left-right score respondents awarded them. Labour Party, GreenLeft (and their predecessors), Socialist Party, and D66 have thus been classified as left-wing; the other parties as right-wing.

[14] The few voters who evaluated only one party, are included in the strong party preference category.

[15] The original Dutch questions do not contain an equivalent of the English 'to intend', as the translation of the question suggests. In Dutch the question wording was "Op welke partij gaat u stemmen op 6 mei?". This could have been translated as "Which party are you going to vote for on May 6?" or as "Which party will you vote for on May 6?".

[16] Voters who did not know yet whether they would vote, and voters who did not know for whom to vote, were asked whether there were any parties they considered voting for; and if so, which parties. Voters who intended not to vote were asked what party they would vote for, if they were obligated to vote by law. The operationalisation of voting intentions does not make use of answers to these questions, but is based solely on the preceding question about voting intentions.

[17] Because self-reports of past behaviour tend to be biased towards current preferences, such a bias will presumably only weaken the support found for the sincere vote model. The problem would be more severe if party evaluations would have been measured in the same interview as that in which the behaviour is reported. That, however, is not the case: party evaluations are measured before the election.

[18] The proportion of voters in the DPES who reported having cast a vote is considerably larger than the actual turnout in that election. This may be an effect of a sample bias (non-voters are underrepresented in the DPES) or misreporting (voters who did not vote nevertheless report a vote), but it may also result from a so-called Hawthorne-effect: participation in the research stimulates voters to vote in the election.

[19] In each survey, for about one per cent of the voters who claimed to have voted no party choice was reported. The reasons for this were that the voters refused to answer, had cast a blank vote, did not know for whom they had voted, or data concerning their vote choice were uncodable or missing. These voters will not be included in analyses that concern voting behaviour.

[20] The figures concerning voting intentions and voting behaviour concern the aggregate level and therefore cannot be used to draw inferences about what happened at the individual level.

[21] According to the sincere vote model, voters with multiple party preferences may vote for any of the parties they evaluate most positively. Which of the preferred parties those voters are expected to (intend to) vote for, is not indicated by the model. Consequently, the model can explain voting behaviour fully only for voters with single party preferences.

[22] Due to panel attrition the number of voters included in this table is smaller than in the previous one.

[23] Another reason why voters with a single party preference may be more likely to vote in line with their voting intention has to do with changes in party evaluation scores that may occur over time. For the sake of argument, let us assume that voters indeed prefer to vote for a best-liked party. As a result of changes in party evaluations a non-preferred party may then be evaluated more positively than the party of the initial voting intention. This would result in a change in voting intention and the ultimate vote would differ from the initial preference. As the difference between the evaluations of the party intended to vote for and the best liked other party is larger, the chance that the difference will be overcome due to changes in the party evaluations is smaller. By definition such a difference is larger for voters with a single party preference (this difference is ten points or more) than for voters with a single party preference (this difference is zero). Consequently, the second-best evaluated party is more likely to become the best-liked party due to changes in party evaluations among voters with a multiple party preference than among voters with a single party preference. This means that voters with multiple party preferences are more likely to change their voting intention and consequently vote for another party than their initial voting intention indicated.

[24] Support for the presumed role of voting intentions is also obtained if the party preference–voting behaviour relationship is focused on: this relationship is less strong than that between voting intentions and voting behaviour. Findings from which this can be deduced will be presented later in this chapter (Table 7.32).

[25] The figures were 23 per cent in 1986, 29 per cent in 1994, 24 per cent in 1998, and 22 per cent in 2002.

[26] If voters would choose at random, the chance that voters with a multiple party preference would vote sincerely is larger due to the simple fact that their party preference

included more parties.

[27] The findings about the party preference–voting intention and voting intention–voting behaviour relationships suggest that the voting behaviour of voters who had formulated a voting intention did not match party evaluations fully either, but to validate such a conclusion the relationship between party preferences and voting behaviour itself must be examined. It is possible that both types of discrepancies counterbalance each other. A voter may evaluate *party A* most positively, prefer to vote for *party B* before an election, but ultimately vote for *party A*. In that case there would be a discrepancy between party preference and voting intention, as well as between voting intention and voting behaviour, but there would be no discrepancy between party preference and voting behaviour.

[28] Note that the number of patterns is not sixteen (two times two times two times two), as one might suppose. The main reason for this is that some combinations are logically impossible. For example, a discrepancy in the party preference–voting intention relationship and a match in the voting intention–voting behaviour relationship cannot go together with a match in the party preference–voting behaviour relationship. On the other hand, some additional patterns are distinguished due to the fact that some voters had not yet formed a voting intention when they were interviewed before the election.

[29] The figures are discussed as if a change took place between 1986 and 1994. Another interpretation is that the 1986 election was an odd one out.

[30] An exception with respect to party evaluations is the 2002 DPES, which asked voters to evaluate the various parties before as well as after the election. The three other surveys included party evaluations measures only in the pre-election interview.

CHAPTER 8 – THE NON-SINCERE VOTE

[1] How problematic the exclusion of the endorsement heuristic from the analyses is, depends on the number of voters who employed it. Research by Joop van Holsteyn (1994, 2000) suggests that in relation to Dutch parliamentary elections the problem is not severe. In their answers to open-ended questions about why they voted for a particular party, few voters referred to other people (indicated by Van Holsteyn by the notion of imitation).

[2] In the DPES voters were asked how much difference it makes to them which parties become part of the government (much, a little, or no difference). Because inclusion of the corresponding variable hardly affected the outcomes of the analyses, this question is not made use of.

Two other kinds of election outcome preferences that may play a role are those concerning which party becomes the largest in the new (Second Chamber of) parliament, and who becomes the prime minister of the new government. Since the DPES did not contain questions about voters' preferences regarding which party becomes largest, this aspect is not studied here.

With respect to voters' preferences regarding the future prime minister, voters were asked how much faith they had in various persons as a prime minister. The leaders of the major parties were awarded scores in terms of a seven-point rating scale with end-points

labelled 'no faith at all' and 'very much faith'. What is problematic, however, is that these questions were asked in the *post*-election interview. Therefore, it is not appropriate to use them to explain voting intentions *before* the election. Consequently, the analysis of the impact of election outcome preferences in this chapter is limited to the role of voters' government preferences.

[3] This classification is based on the idea that the Labour Party, GreenLeft, and Socialist Party can be considered left-wing parties, the Liberal Party, List Pim Fortuyn, Centre Democrats, and orthodox Protestant parties can be considered right-wing parties, and other parties can be considered centre parties.

This classification differs from that with respect to multiple party preferences, which did not include the notion of centre parties (see Chapter 7, Table 7.14 and note 13), because few voters included solely left-wing or right-wing parties in their coalition preference.

[4] In part these figures result from missing data, since those voters have been included in this category.

[5] In 1986 and 1994 respondents were asked to choose between the four major parties. Consequently, those who liked one of the smaller parties best could not include these parties in their coalition preferences.

[6] Because there were very few voters who did not express a coalition preference but did express a vote preference, these are not included as a separate category in the table.

[7] Before this question was asked, respondents were asked about their perception of the effects of government policy on the economic situation, on employment, and on their personal financial situation. This may have influenced the subsequent judgement by a process known as priming.

[8] Voters who did not provide an answer are also included in the don't know category.

[9] Because few voters were *very* satisfied or *very* dissatisfied, these categories are not distinguished in the subsequent analyses.

[10] The various proportions do not include voters with a multiple party preference that included both a government and an opposition party.

[11] What matters is not the government satisfaction and party preference as such, but whether or not both matched with each other. By combining the categories this is emphasised.

Moreover, in only one of the eight cases there was a significant difference in the proportion with a non-sincere voting intention between the groups joined (p-value of Chi-square test < 0.05). (In 1998 dissatisfied voters who preferred an opposition party had a non-sincere voting intention more often than satisfied voters who preferred a government party. Chi-square = 17.9; d.f. = 1; p = 0.00)

[12] The party leaders of the Labour Party, Liberal Party, Christian Democrats, D66, Centre Democrats, and List Pim Fortuyn were about equally well-known as their parties (except for Bolkestein in 1994 and De Hoop Scheffer in 1998). The party leaders of GreenLeft, Socialist Party, orthodox Protestant parties, and Liveable Netherlands were less well-known than their parties, except for Rosenmöller and Marijnissen in 2002.

[13] In 1994 GreenLeft had two leaders, Brouwer and Rabbae. The evaluation scores

used in the analyses are based on the leader that a voter liked best.

[14] The relatively large figures in 1986 and 1998 result from the fact that in 1986 only the leaders of the four major parties were included in the survey, while in 1998 no evaluation scores were asked for the leaders of two orthodox Protestant parties and the Elderly Alliance.

[15] Because coefficients of logistic regression analyses are not always easy to interpret, results are presented in terms of figures. The models are shown in Table N.1. In these analyses (and in the next), the dependent variable was coded '0' for voters with a sincere voting intention and '1' for voters with a non-sincere voting intention. The chances in the figure can all be computed on the basis of these data. The formula upon which the models are based is as follows:

$$log \ (prob \ [event]/prob \ [no \ event]) = C + BX.$$

This formula can be written in terms of odds as follows:

$$prob \ (event)/prob \ (no \ event) = e^c * e^{bx}.$$

Hence, in 1986 the odds of the probability of a non-sincere vote versus a sincere vote for voters who awarded the leader of the preferred party an evaluation score of, say, 80, was 0.044 (namely, $e^{-1.84} * e^{-0.016*80}$). This means that for these voters the chance of a non-sincere voting intention was 4 per cent (*0.044/[1+0.044]*).

In addition to the constant and the b-value, standard errors (S.E.) are presented. These indicate whether or not the effects as indicated by the b-values are statistically significant. Finally, Nagelkerke R^2 is a measure that indicates to what extent the variance in the dependent variable can be explained on the basis of the independent variable(s) in the model. Its value can vary between 0 and 1. The larger the value, the better the model explains the dependent variable.

[16] Because the predictions that the models make for voters who awarded low evaluation scores are based on few observations, these should be interpreted with care. Therefore, dashed lines are used for evaluation scores below 50.

[17] The slightly weaker impact in 1986 may be a methodological artefact resulting from the fact that this year only the leaders of the four major parties were evaluated.

[18] Table N.2 presents the results of these logistic regression analyses.

[19] Because differences below – 20 and above 30 occurred seldom, dashed lines are used in those areas.

In order not to exclude respondents from the analyses, for voters who did not evaluate the leader of their party preference as well as for voters who only evaluated the leader of their party preference difference scores of 0 have been used. A score of 0 can be regarded as a neutral position, since it implies that party leaders brought their parties neither an advantage, nor a disadvantage.

The results of the logistic regression analyses are shown in Table N.3. The amount of explained variance of the model based on difference-scores was larger than the sum of explained variance of the two previous models. This means that party leader evaluations can best be focused on in terms of the party leader preferences that they constitute, like argued in Chapter 4 and Chapter 5.

TABLE N.1 Evaluation of the leader of the preferred party and the chance of a non-sincere voting intention (results of logistic regression)

	1986	1994	1998	2002
constant	- 1.84	- 1.08	- 0.77	- 0.78
B-value	- 0.016	- 0.020	- 0.017	- 0.014
(S.E.)	(0.007)	(0.006)	(0.005)	(0.005)
Nagelkerke R^2	0.02	0.03	0.02	0.01
(N)	(1041)	(1062)	(1286)	(1398)

TABLE N.2 Evaluation of the best-liked leader of non-preferred parties and the chance of a non-sincere voting intention (results of logistic regression)

	1986	1994	1998	2002
constant	- 3.53	- 4.31	-3.51	- 4.23
B-value	0.015	0.026	0.022	0.033
(S.E.)	(0.007)	(0.008)	(0.006)	(0.006)
Nagelkerke R^2	0.01	0.03	0.02	0.04
(N)	(1114)	(1086)	(1380)	(1423)

TABLE N.3 Difference between evaluations of the leaders of preferred and non-preferred parties and the chance of a non-sincere voting intention (results of logistic regression)

	1986	1994	1998	2002
constant	- 2.40	- 2.44	- 1.79	- 1.72
B-value	- 0.017	- 0.040	- 0.028	- 0.030
(S.E.)	(0.005)	(0.006)	(0.004)	(0.005)
Nagelkerke R^2	0.03	0.10	0.05	0.06
(N)	(1127)	(1091)	(1396)	(1426)

[20] Party leader evaluations may also influence party evaluations, and thereby influence vote preferences more indirectly. In that way the impact of party leader preferences may still have changed. Chapter 9 will discuss this possibility.

[21] The table includes voters who did not evaluate any of the parties, but who did evaluate one or more party leaders. The reason is that for these voters a voting intention can be predicted, namely on the basis of the party leader evaluations.

[22] Note that the 1986 figure is underestimated as a result of the panel attrition.

[23] If we focus solely on voters who could recall a vote for a specific party in the previous election, the proportion of voters who preferred another party increased from 20 to 33 per cent.

[24] The analyses do not include the very few voters who did not evaluate any of the

parties, but nevertheless had a vote preference.

[25] The two variables are added to control for possible effects of party evaluations and party preference strength. If the control variables were not added, the outcomes might result from differences in those factors. First, voters who like their party preference well may be less likely to have a non-sincere voting intention than voters who do not like their party preference well. In other words, we may expect that as the party evaluation becomes more positive, the chance of a non-sincere voting intention becomes smaller. Second, voters who have a strong party preference, which means that they like all other parties much less than their party preference, may be less likely to have a non-sincere voting intention than voters who like one or more other parties only a little less. In other words, we may expect that as the difference between the evaluations of preferred and non-preferred parties becomes larger, the chance of a non-sincere voting intention becomes smaller. These possible effects have been controlled for by adding two variables: one that indicates the evaluation score awarded to the party preference, and another that indicates the preference strength. Note that the preference strength measure was discussed in Chapter 7, and is comparable to that discussed earlier in this chapter in relation to party leader preferences. It indicates the difference between the evaluation score awarded to the preferred party and the score awarded to the best-liked non-preferred party.

[26] Merely predicting a sincere vote for all voters would already lead to proportions of correct predictions between 86 and 93 per cent. If a distribution is skewed so much, it is hard to improve the proportion of correct predictions.

[27] The R statistic is a measure that indicates the partial contribution of each variable to the model. Its values may vary between -1 and $+1$. The larger the absolute value of R, the stronger this variable contributed to the explanation of the dependent variable. Hence, in these models a positive value means that the chance of a non-sincere voting intention increased. A negative value, on the other hand, means that this chance decreased. (The other coefficients have been discussed earlier in this chapter; see note 15).

[28] This contrasts with the bivariate relationship found above, which emphasises the importance of focusing on the various concepts simultaneously in a single, multivariate analysis.

[29] Party leader preferences are operationalised on the basis of a continuous variable, whereas other heuristics are operationalised on the basis of categorical variables. One may wonder whether this affected the results. Additional analyses indicated this was not the case. Very similar results were obtained on the basis of logistic regression models that included a categorical variable to operationalise party leader preferences (one with three categories: (1) leader of preferred party liked best, (2) leader of a non-preferred party liked best, or (3) leader of preferred and non-preferred parties liked equally well).

[30] The size of the impact of the two control variables was limited, and the direction as expected. If voters evaluated their party preference more positively (as indicated by the evaluation score awarded), they were somewhat less likely to have a non-sincere voting intention. Additionally, if the preference for this party was stronger (as indicated by the difference with the evaluation score awarded to the best-liked non-preferred party), they were somewhat less likely to have a non-sincere voting intention.

[31] The Ns upon which the figures are based can be determined on the basis of Ta-

ble 7.21.

[32] For some voters (between 3 and 10 per cent) the reason was that their coalition preference included none of the parties they evaluated most positively.

CHAPTER 9 – EXPLAINING PARTY EVALUATIONS

[1] Three other parties that have been represented in Dutch parliament – the Centre Democrats, Elderly Alliance, and Liveable Netherlands – are not included. First, these parties received few seats – with only one exception at most three – and might therefore be considered less interesting. Second, in 1994, when the Elderly Alliance received six seats, respondents were not asked to evaluate them.

[2] Another thing to note is that the analyses are based on the assumption that the various concepts influence party evaluations, rather than the other way round. As will be discussed later in this chapter in more detail with respect to party leader evaluations, this assumption is problematic. Voters may, for example, be satisfied about a particular government simply because they like the parties that participate in it. Or voters may base their policy preferences on the degree to which they like the parties who advocate them. Even in the case of social characteristics the causal direction may not be as often assumed (see Catt 1996: 92-93). To overcome these problems longitudinal data, which assess the same concepts at different points in time, are necessary. Because the surveys upon which this research is based are cross-sectional studies, the findings to be presented should be interpreted with care. (The Dutch Parliamentary Election Studies consist of a pre-election and post-election interview, but questions concerning the various concepts are usually asked in only one of these interviews.)

[3] The problem of the causal direction discussed above applies equally to each party evaluation. Hence, the most interesting aspect of the analysis of party evaluations is not affected by this problem.

[4] Like in earlier chapters, question wordings are from the 1998 survey. Differences in question wordings will not be discussed. For details, refer to the official documentation of the DPES.

[5] In 1986 and 1994 the question about attendance of religious services was asked only to church members. In 1998 and 2002 the question was also asked to respondents who did not consider themselves member of a church. In order to make the figures comparable across the years, and because in the following analyses this question will be used to operationalise the strength of a Christian identity, the figures in the table concern respondents who considered themselves a member of a Christian church.

In 1986 four categories of church attendance were used (see Table 9.2), while since 1994 an additional category was included for attending church two or three times a month. In order to make the figures comparable across years, these voters have been classified as 'at least once a month' (and were combined with voters in that category). The differences in question format may be a reason why in 1986 some more voters were classified as attending church weekly than in later years.

[6] In order to exclude effects that are not statistically significant ($p < 0.05$) a backward

procedure has been used.

    Dummy variables were created that were coded '1' if voters belonged to a particular category, and '0' if they did not.

    [7] Because few voters classified themselves as upper class or upper working class, these categories have been combined with upper middle class and ordinary working class, respectively.

    [8] The few voters who had a non-Christian religious identity, as well as voters who did not know which social class they belonged to, are not classified separately. Consequently, these voters are in a sense represented, like secular middle class voters, by the reference category to which the constant in the regression analysis applies.

    [9] Evaluations of the orthodox Protestant parties (in 1986, 1994, and 1998: SGP, GPV, and RPF; in 2002: SGP and Christian Union) are analysed in terms of the highest evaluation score awarded to any of these parties. Similarly, the evaluations of the predecessors of GreenLeft (CPN, PPR, and EVP – recall that respondents were not asked to evaluate the PSP) are analysed in terms of the highest evaluation score awarded to any of them.

    [10] This conclusion is supported by the findings shown in Table 9.4. Formal statistical evidence for this conclusion, however, is to be found in partial R figures (which are not shown).

    [11] The labels are from the 1998 DPES, except those of the issue of crime, which are from the 2002 survey. The labels of the ethnic minorities issue have been adjusted slightly, in order to reflect the original question wording more accurately. Question wordings and labels sometimes differed across years. Refer to the official documentation of the DPES for details.

    [12] Three additional remarks need to be made. First, in 1986 the issues of asylum seekers, integration of ethnic minorities, crime, and European integration were not yet included in the survey, in 1994 the issues of asylum seekers and European integration were not yet included, and in 1998 the issue of crime was not included. Second, in 1986 the questions were all asked in the post-election interview. Since 1994 they have all been asked in the pre-election interview, except that since 1998 the question on nuclear plants has been asked in the post-election interview, and in 2002 so were the questions on integration of ethnic minorities and European integration. Third, with respect to some issues position one at the seven-point scale corresponded with the 'right-wing' position, and position seven with the 'left-wing' position (euthanasia, income inequality, nuclear plants). With respect to other issues this was reversed (ethnic minorities, asylum seekers, crime, European unification).

    [13] Because some of the questions were asked in the post-election survey, in which up to 18 per cent of the respondents did not participate, for some issues the opinions of a substantial minority of voters remain unknown. If this panel attrition is accounted for, the don't know figures in some cases were slightly higher, but none exceeded 10 per cent.

    [14] Testing the impact of policy preferences on the basis of the proximity model or the directional theory would require the inclusion of data concerning voters' perceptions of parties' positions with respect to the various issues. As such data are mostly not available in the DPES, the analyses presented only include voters' own policy preferences.

    [15] Tables N.4 to N.7 show the correlations between voters' positions with respect to

TABLE N.4 Relationship between voters' policy preferences in 1986
(Spearman's correlation coefficient)

	eutha-nasia	income inequality
income inequality	0.17	-
nuclear plants	0.11	0.45

TABLE N.5 Relationship between voters' policy preferences in 1994
(Spearman's correlation coefficient)

	eutha-nasia	income inequality	nuclear plants	ethnic minorities
income inequality	0.11	-		
nuclear plants	0.10	0.33	-	
ethnic minorities	- 0.11	n.s.	n.s.	-
crime	n.s.	0.14	0.10	0.32

TABLE N.6 Relationship between voters' policy preferences in 1998
(Spearman's correlation coefficient)

	eutha-nasia	income inequality	nuclear plants	ethnic minorities	asylum seekers
income inequality	0.18	-			
nuclear plants	n.s.	0.22	-		
ethnic minorities	n.s.	0.08	0.10	-	
asylum seekers	- 0.10	0.10	0.11	0.51	-
European integration	n.s.	- 0.09	n.s.	0.21	0.19

TABLE N.7 Relationship between voters' policy preferences in 2002
(Spearman's correlation coefficient)

	eutha-nasia	income inequality	nuclear plants	ethnic minorities	asylum seekers	crime
income inequality	0.10	-				
nuclear plants	n.s.	0.21	-			
ethnic minorities	n.s.	0.13	0.13	-		
asylum seekers	- 0.06	0.21	0.18	0.48	-	
crime	- 0.10	n.s.	0.09	0.38	0.44	-
European integration	n.s.	n.s.	n.s.	0.25	0.19	0.16

n.s. indicates a correlation is not significant (p > 0.05)

the various issues.

The analyses concerning comparisons between various multiple regression models based on different sets of issues are not shown here.

[16] The fact that with respect to the major parties the model based on policy preferences had more explanatory power in 1986 than in later years, can be understood if one realises that this election year was characterised by a high level of polarisation (see Thomassen et al. 2000).

[17] In 1986 the question was asked only in the post-election interview, not in the pre-election interview.

[18] In the 1994 pre-election survey, as well as the 1986, 1994, and 1998 post-election surveys, the ten-point format was used. In the 1998 and 2002 pre-election surveys, as well as the 2002 post-election survey, the eleven-point format was used.

[19] Because the questions concerning the parties' positions have only been asked in the post-election interview, the following analyses make use of measures from that interview. In order to assess the impact of left-right ideology properly, respondents who participated only in the pre-election interview have therefore been excluded from the analyses.

[20] In order to make findings comparable, the 2002 scale has been transformed into a similar format as those used in previous surveys (a scale with values ranging between 1 and 10).

[21] The procedure followed with respect to left-right ideology differs from that with respect to policy preferences, since those analyses did not include voters' perceptions of party positions (see note 14). There are several reasons to opt for a different design here, even though this arguably decreases the ability to compare the outcomes with those concerning the impact of policy preferences. First, the models that were formulated by Downs (1957) and applied to the Netherlands by Van der Eijk and Niemöller (1983) concern perceived agreement in terms of left right, not merely voters' positions. Hence, applying those explanations of vote choice in order to explain party evaluations requires the inclusion of measures that indicate perceived agreement. Second, the objections made by Stokes (1963) and Rabinowitz and Macdonald (1989) in relation to the proximity model of issue voting, which were discussed in Chapter 2, do not apply to the left-right continuum: left-right scales can be conceived of as a set of ordered alternatives. Third, the meaning of 'left and right' (in particular that of 'right') is somewhat ambiguous. Because voters may attribute a different meaning to such ideological labels, the effect of ideology on party evaluations might be underestimated if all voters would be analysed at once in terms of how they positioned themselves on a left-right continuum. By making use of scores that indicate perceived agreement, such effects may in a sense be controlled for.

[22] It seems plausible that voters who were pleased with a government in which the Christian Democrats were the largest party, liked the other smaller Christian parties better, while voters who were pleased with a government without the Christian Democrats liked the other Christian parties worse.

[23] One alternative strategy, the experimental strategy, is impossible to execute in practice and cannot be employed on the basis of survey data. The other alternative, the counterfactual strategy, is discarded because it links up less well with the kind of analyses

performed in this chapter.

[24] To eliminate variables that were not significant (p>0.05) a backward procedure has been used.

[25] This could have been expected on the basis of the idea that such factors can be ordered in terms of a 'funnel of causality' (see Campbell et al. 1960, ch. 2; Miller and Shanks 1996, ch. 8; Thomassen et al. 2000: 25-26).

[26] In the analysis of evaluations of the orthodox Protestant parties, the voters concerned are not secular voters, but non-Protestant voters. These include not only secular voters, but also Catholics and few others.

[27] A possible explanation for the low evaluation scores awarded to List Pim Fortuyn is that voters did not like Pim Fortuyn as a person. This expectation can be deduced from the fact that voters evaluated Pim Fortuyn himself rather negatively (see Appendix F) and that evaluations of Pim Fortuyn strongly correlated with those of List Pim Fortuyn (see Chapter 8). The following analyses provide a test for this explanation.

[28] Relationships between party evaluations and party leader evaluations can also be spurious, especially from an information-processing perspective. If political parties are in the news, this often involves their leaders. The resulting information-processing may lead voters to update two 'running tallies': one concerning their evaluation of the party and another concerning their evaluation of the party leader. In that case both evaluations are caused by the same information processed.

[29] Another reason why the relative impact of party leader evaluations on party evaluations might be somewhat overestimated is methodological in nature. Party evaluations and party leader evaluations have been measured in a similar way: on the basis of a rating scale with values ranging between 0 and 100. The other independent variables, on the other hand, have been operationalised in different ways.

CHAPTER 10 – A PSYCHOLOGICAL THEORY OF VOTING

[1] The distinction between images, evaluations, and vote choice links up to the distinction commonly made in psychology between cognition, affect, and motivation (or conation).

[2] The exogenous variables may concern characteristics of voters themselves, as well as characteristics of their environment (cf. Lewin 1951). These may also include phenomena not discussed elaborately in this study, such as voters' personality and self-image or their social environment.

[3] The third and fourth group are not mutually exclusive: voters may have a voting intention that does not match their party preference, while their voting behaviour does not match their voting intention. Because this applied to few voters (between 1 and 3 per cent, see Table 7.32 in Chapter 7), voters with a discrepancy in both relationships are not distinguished as a separate group.

[4] Behind a stable impact of perceived agreement in terms of left-right, a shift in terms of what kind of issues matter may be hidden. To some extent this was the case in the Netherlands. More specifically, while between 1986 and 1998 voters position on the

left-right scale were associated most strongly with their positions on the issue of income inequality, in 2002 left-right positions were associated most strongly with positions on the issues of ethnic minorities and asylum seekers. Apparently, the meaning of rather abstract notions like left and right may change. This need not be a surprise: such notions are used to make sense of politics, and since the issues that are central in political debates change, so may the meaning of more abstract notions.

[5] Fiorina (1981) regarded party identification as a summary measure of various retrospective evaluations. The party preference concept as employed in this research lacks that explicit reference to judgements about the past. The fact that experiences in the past have an impact of how voters evaluate parties, does not mean that those evaluations themselves are retrospective in nature.

[6] The fact that the party preference measure does not have the problems of party identification as operationalised in Dutch voting studies, does not mean that the party preference measure is a better operationalisation of party identification. Party preferences and party identification are two different concepts.

APPENDICES

[1] The concept of a sincere vote as defined in this study differs from Farquharson's (1969) conception in a number of ways. Two differences have already been discussed. First, preferences are defined in terms of objects (parties) rather than outcomes (distributions of seats). Second, preferences are assessed on the basis of voters' evaluations of individual parties rather than a rank ordering of these. As a result of this latter fact, in this study ties in a rank ordering are allowed, whereas in Farquharson's work they are not. Furthermore, the procedure proposed enables one to assess the intensity of a preference, which cannot be deduced from a rank order. Despite these differences, the essence of the original definition of sincere voting remains intact. After all, a preference rank order can be deduced from the evaluations and sincere voting remains defined as "voting directly in accordance with one's preference scales".

A final thing to note is that in social choice theory any vote is either sincere or strategic. This follows from the fact that its formal system allows voters to deviate form their sincere vote only on the basis of a strategy that may help establish a particular outcome at the aggregate level. This study takes into account a wider range of ways in which voters may reach a vote choice. Consequently, voters may also vote 'non-sincerely' for other reasons than strategic ones. This is discussed in Chapter 5.

[2] The first division, which corresponds closely to what Daniel Schacter (1996) refers to as implicit and explicit memory, has a firmer base in neuroscientific research than the second division (Squire 1987, ch. 11).

[3] The episodic-semantic distinction may be used to draw attention to the fact that political parties and candidates may be represented in voters' (semantic) memory not only in terms of images of what they are like, but also in terms of what they have said and done. In that case, however, the temporal landmarks do not concern the experiences of the voter, but the actions of the parties or candidates. We may distinguish between both

aspects by referring to them as semantic and episodic information.

⁴ Marcus and his colleagues acknowledged that in some instances the disposition may result in negative emotions, but they conceived of it is terms of aversion.

⁵ For example, one may conceive of enthusiasm and anger as unipolar dimensions (of which depression and calmness indicate the absence), whereas fear and anxiety on the one hand and confidence and trust on the other may concern the opposite sides of a single bipolar dimension.

⁶ Whether the various emotions can be conceived of in terms of one, two, or three dimensions – and if so, which ones – has been a major question of emotion research. The purpose here obviously is only to illustrate that different such conceptualisations exist.

⁷ According to Cacioppo and his colleagues (1997) attitudes build on positive and negative evaluative processes, which exist independently of each other. However, they argued, people's conceptual organisation of affective states may tend towards a single bipolar evaluative dimension (p. 22). Consequently, especially in studies that rely on self-report, conceptualising and operationalising attitudes or emotional responses in terms of a single bipolar dimension may be considered appropriate.

⁸ This distinction parallels that made earlier in this chapter between short-term and long-term memory.

⁹ Note that Russell's (2003) framework differs from the theory of Marcus and his colleagues (2000) in terms of which dimensions underlie emotion (pleasure and arousal or enthusiasm and anxiety) as well in terms of whether the dimensions are bipolar (pleasure and arousal in Russell's framework) or unipolar (enthusiasm and anxiety in Marcus et al.'s theory).

¹⁰ The notion of temperament is less central in Russell's (2003) framework, but the genetically based individual differences with respect to core affect that he mentioned (p. 154) may be linked to it (see also Diener and Lucas 2000). The most important difference between the concepts in the taxonomy of emotion and the concepts central in Russell's framework, is that the latter refer to states of activation and pleasure. Emotion is commonly conceived to be more than that, and is related more closely to the pleasure dimension than to the arousal dimension.

¹¹ The number of observations upon which the figures are based varied as follows: Labour Party between 310 and 520, Liberal Party between 207 and 341, Christian Democrats between 277 and 396, D66 between 109 and 276, GreenLeft between 80 and 294, Socialist Party between 159 and 210, Orthodox Protestant parties between 71 and 157, Centre Democrats between 7 and 20; Elderly Alliance 81, List Pim Fortuyn 198, and Liveable Netherlands 54; figures concerning all voters are based on Ns between 1091 and 1426.

¹² With respect to the orthodox Protestant parties these figures include some voters (7 per cent) who evaluated one orthodox Protestant party most positively, but intended to vote for another orthodox Protestant party.

¹³ The results of the logistic regression analyses are shown in Table N.8.

The range of the number of seats of the party preference in the figure has deliberately been set from 0 to 55. These numbers of seats are about the range of the observations: the size of the parties on which the data are based ranged from 1 to 54 (see Table E.1 in Appendix E). The model also makes predictions for party sizes that are larger, but be-

TABLE N.8 Relationship between the size of the preferred party and the chance of a non-sincere voting intention (results of logistic regression)

	1986	1994	1998	2002
constant	- 0.41	- 1.59	- 0.63	- 0.96
B-value	- 0.066	- 0.031	- 0.053	- 0.038
(S.E.)	(0.006)	(0.006)	(0.006)	(0.005)
Nagelkerke R^2	0.24	0.06	0.12	0.08
(N)	(1127)	(1091)	(1396)	(1426)

cause these predictions are not based on observations in that range those predictions should not be given too much weight.

[14] The differences in terms of Nagelkerke R^2 were 1 per cent in 1986, 6 per cent in 1994, 1 per cent in 1998, and 10 per cent in 2002 – all in favour of models based on coalition preferences.

[15] In the four years the differences in Nagelkerke R^2 were 0.02, 0.00, 0.04, and 0.01.

[16] Whereas in 1986 and 1994 these results could at least in part be a methodological artefact resulting from the fact that coalition preferences could only include the four major parties, this cannot account for the same findings in the other years.

[17] Those familiar with attitude-behaviour research will notice the similarity between prospective attitudes and the evaluations of behavioural beliefs that Fishbein and Ajzen (1975) focused on, which concerned the belief that behaviour will lead to certain consequences. Despite the similarity, there are some differences. A first difference is that Fishbein and Ajzen did not conceive of the evaluations of beliefs as attitudes in the same way as attitudes towards objects and attitudes towards behaviour. Secondly, they did not conceive the consequences of the behaviour in terms of prospects. Arguably, a more important difference is that Fishbein and Ajzen's conception more or less implies that individuals first consider behaviour, and then reason what the consequences of that behaviour would be. The thought of the behaviour then precedes the thought of the prospect. According to the ideas presented in this study the process is reversed. In the electoral context this means that according to Fishbein and Ajzen's view voters think about the possibility of voting for a particular party, realise that this might help that party become largest, feel that they would like that to happen, and therefore like the idea of voting for that party. According to the view presented in this study voters think about the possibility that a particular party becomes largest, feel that they would like this to happen, realise that voting for that party might help it become largest, and therefore like the idea of voting for that party.

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INDEX

DE STANDAARDSTEM

*Een psychologische studie
naar stemgedrag bij verkiezingen*

DEEL I – INLEIDING EN ACHTERGROND

HOOFDSTUK 1: INLEIDING

Waarom stemmen mensen zoals ze dat doen? Dat is de centrale vraag van dit onderzoek. Waarom steunen kiezers een bepaalde kandidaat of partij, en niet een andere? Deze vraag is niet nieuw en er zijn al veel antwoorden gegeven. Toch is ons inzicht in stemgedrag nog beperkt. In zekere zin schijnt het vandaag de dag nog beperkter dan enkele decennia geleden. De verklarende kracht van modellen die gebaseerd zijn op sociaal-demografische factoren, zoals religie en sociale klasse, is sterk afgenomen. Hetzelfde geldt voor modellen die gebaseerd zijn op ideologie en beleidsvoorkeuren. We zullen ons daarom moeten wenden tot andere benaderingen. Eén mogelijkheid is om te kiezen voor een psychologische benadering. De kerngedachte hierin is dat om te begrijpen waarom mensen op een bepaalde manier stemmen, we moeten begrijpen wat er in hun hoofd omgaat.

Stemmen wordt vaak opgevat als een combinatie van twee beslissingen of vragen: wel of niet gaan stemmen, en op wie gaan stemmen? Alhoewel beide beslissingen met elkaar verband kunnen houden, worden ze in verkiezingsonderzoek (een vakgebied dat in het Engels wel *psephology* wordt genoemd) als onafhankelijke beslissingen behandeld. Dit onderzoek hanteert dezelfde benadering en is alleen gericht op de vraag op wie kiezers stemmen. In deze studie is de vraag dus waarom mensen stemmen zoals ze dat doen, *gegeven het feit dat ze stemmen*. Daarbij wordt stemgedrag in dit onderzoek gedefinieerd in termen van partijen, aangezien in de meeste democratieën partijen een centrale rol spelen. Dit betekent dat de onderzoeksvraag in de praktijk overeenkomt met waarom kiezers op (een kandidaat van) een bepaalde partij stemmen.

Omdat alle kiezers gebruikmaken van eenzelfde soort hersenen, zullen de psychologische processen die aan hun stemgedrag ten grondslag liggen niet wezenlijk verschillen tussen kiezers, verkiezingen, landen, of tijdstippen. Toch is vanuit het perspectief van verkiezingsonderzoek Nederland bijzonder interessant. Eén reden daarvoor is dat in termen van psychologische modellen ter verklaring van stemgedrag Nederland een geval apart is gebleken: bestaande modellen konden er niet goed worden toegepast. Bij Nederlandse kiezers kon geen zinvol onderscheid gemaakt worden tussen partij-identificatie (een centraal concept in psychologische modellen) en stemkeus, en daarom werd het belangrijkste psychologische model niet bruikbaar geacht. Nederland is ook interessant omdat recente verkiezingen opvallende veranderingen teweegbrachten. Het meest in het oog springend is het feit dat in 2002 de lijst van Pim Fortuyn, die zelf negen dagen voor de verkiezingen werd vermoord, de Tweede Kamer binnenkwam met 26 zetels. Daarmee werd de LPF ineens de tweede partij van het land. Een laatste reden waarom Nederland geschikt is voor deze studie, is dat de benodigde onderzoeksgegevens beschikbaar zijn. De enquêtes van het Nationaal Kiezersonderzoek (NKO) in 1986, 1994, 1998 en 2002 bevatten vragen op basis waarvan centrale ideeën van dit onderzoek kunnen worden getoetst.

HOOFDSTUK 2: DE PSYCHOLOGIE VAN DE THEORIE TER VERKLARING VAN STEMGEDRAG

Het werk van commerciële onderzoeksbureaus, die in de jaren dertig van de twintigste eeuw voor het eerst op grote schaal gegevens verzamelden over stemgedrag, legde de basis voor belangrijke studies naar stemgedrag in de Verenigde Staten. De eerste was *The People's Choice* (1944) van Paul Lazarsfeld en zijn collega's van Columbia University. Het doel van hun onderzoek was om het psychologische proces van meningsvorming te onderzoeken, maar de auteurs kwamen uiteindelijk tot de conclusie dat stemgedrag goed kon worden verklaard op basis van sociaal-demografische kenmerken, waaronder sociaal-economische status, godsdienst, en woonplaats (stad versus platteland). De mechanismen die sociaal-demografische kenmerken verbinden aan stemgedrag werden meer uitvoerig behandeld in hun tweede studie, *Voting* (Berelson et al. 1954). In Europa zijn de verwante ideeën die Seymour Martin Lipset en Stein Rokkan uiteenzetten in *Party Systems and Voter Alignments* (1967) vooral van belang. Zij toonden onder meer dat in Nederland in de jaren vijftig de invloed op stemgedrag van sociaal-demografische kenmerken, in het bijzonder godsdienst en kerkgang, zeer sterk was. Deze studies sluiten aan bij de sociologische benadering, die wordt gekenmerkt door aandacht voor sociaal-demografische kenmerken en groepslidmaatschap als verklarende factoren. Vanuit psychologisch perspectief is de vraag hoe sociaal-demografische kenmerken worden omgezet in stemkeuzes. In methodologische termen: welke

psychologische variabelen worden beïnvloed door sociaal-demografische kenmerken, die daardoor indirect van invloed zijn op de stemkeus?

In reactie op de studies van de onderzoekers van Columbia University, publiceerden Angus Campbell en zijn collega's van de University of Michigan *The Voter Decides* (1954) en *The American Voter* (1960). De sociologische benadering kan stemgedrag niet goed verklaren, zo stelden de onderzoekers uit Michigan, en de aandacht dient te worden verschoven van sociale naar psychologische kenmerken. De kern van Michigan-theorie, die als belangrijkste representant van de psychologische benadering wordt gezien, is het idee dat kiezers beelden in hun hoofd hebben, en dat deze beelden bepalen op wie ze stemmen. De schakel tussen de beelden en de stemkeus bestaat uit het idee van psychologische krachten, die optreden omdat de beelden worden geëvalueerd. De beelden worden als positief of negatief ervaren. In *The American Voter* was dit vervat in zes "partij-attitudes" (*partisan attitudes* – evaluaties met betrekking tot kandidaten, beleid, en groepsbelangen), die beïnvloed werden door de partij-identificatie van kiezers, die op haar beurt werd bepaald door sociaal-demografische kenmerken. In de analyses werden partij-attitudes geconstrueerd op grond van beleidsvoorkeuren van kiezers en hun opmerkingen over de kandidaten. Partij-identificatie werd gemeten door kiezers te vragen of zij zichzelf doorgaans beschouwen als Republikein, Democraat, of onafhankelijk.

Vanuit psychologisch perspectief is het van belang om op te merken dat partij-attitudes niet beschouwd moeten worden als indicatoren voor hoe de psyche werkt. Het aangebrachte onderscheid werd slechts gemaakt voor analytische doeleinden. De studies uit Michigan zijn dus psychologisch in de zin dat de verklaring voor stemgedrag is gebaseerd op informatie in het hoofd van kiezers. Maar ze zijn niet psychologisch in de zin dat mentale processen die ten grondslag liggen aan stemgedrag beschreven worden, of dat de gehanteerde concepten psychologische entiteiten zijn. Een andere constatering is dat in de sociale psychologie attitudes doorgaans geconceptualiseerd worden als posities op een dimensie die uiteenloopt van zeer positief tot zeer negatief, terwijl partij-attitudes posities zijn op een dimensie die uiteenloopt van sterk pro-Republikeins tot sterk pro-Democratisch. Daarnaast is het waard om te vermelden dat Jacques Thomassen (1976) heeft laten zien dat in Nederland partij-identificatie, dat hier werd gemeten door kiezers te vragen of zij zichzelf beschouwen als aanhanger van een bepaalde politieke partij, niet zinvol kon worden onderscheiden van stemkeus, zoals in de Verenigde Staten. Verder wezen Cees van der Eijk en Kees Niemöller (1983) op een ander probleem: in Nederland identificeerden kiezers zich met meer dan één partij, wat volgens hen niet in overeenstemming is met het concept van partij-identificatie.

Een economische benadering wordt meestal onderscheiden als derde benadering. *An Economic Theory of Democracy* (1957) van Anthony Downs wordt gezien als de belangrijkste vertegenwoordiger. Volgens zijn theorie proberen kiezers

nut, dat zijn ontlenen aan het beleid van de regering, te maximaliseren. Rationele kiezers evalueren elk beleidsvoorstel van een partij, zetten deze afzonderlijke evaluaties om in een totale evaluatie voor elke partij, en vergelijken ten slotte de evaluaties van de deelnemende partijen om hun stemkeus te bepalen. Echter, omdat kiezers nooit volledig geïnformeerd kunnen raken over alle beleidsvoorstellen, kunnen ze ideologie als richtsnoer gebruiken. Downs veronderstelde dat partijen ten aanzien van alle issues standpunten innemen, die kunnen worden gepositioneerd (en dus gemiddeld) op een links-rechts dimensie. Kiezers stemmen dan op de partij die het dichtst bij hen staat. Downs memoreerde ook dat kiezers uit gewoonte steeds op dezelfde partij kunnen stemmen, of kunnen afgaan op het oordeel van iemand anders. Alhoewel Downs stelde dat zijn theorie geen psychologische theorie is, maar slechts verklaart hoe kiezers zich zouden gedragen als zij rationeel zouden handelen, is in termen van drie methoden die zijn onderscheiden om stemgedrag te onderzoeken (externe gebeurtenissen bestuderen, de sociale omgeving bestuderen, en psychologische variabelen bestuderen) zijn theorie toch duidelijk een voorbeeld van de psychologische benadering.

Alhoewel de onderscheiden benaderingen verschillende sferen oproepen, vullen ze elkaar eerder aan dan dat ze tegenstrijdig zijn. Tegelijkertijd delen theorieën ter verklaring van stemgedrag een reeks assumpties of vooronderstellingen over hoe de psyche van kiezers werkt. Samen vormen deze wat het paradigma van verkiezingsonderzoek kan worden genoemd. Eén van deze assumpties is het idee dat alle kiezers hun gedachten op dezelfde manier opmaken en daardoor in één causaal model passen (assumptie van causale homogeniteit). Daarnaast wordt meestal uitgegaan van het idee dat kiezers hun keuze bepalen door de meest positief geëvalueerde partij of kandidaat te steunen (assumptie van een standaardstem). Aanvullend wordt doorgaans verondersteld dat hoezeer men partijen of kandidaten positief of negatief evalueert afhankelijk is van het beeld dan men van hen heeft en van een waardering voor dat beeld. Weer een andere assumptie is dat de reeks kenmerken die evaluaties van partijen of kandidaten bepalen voor alle partijen en kandidaten hetzelfde is (assumptie van homogeniteit in de basis voor evaluatie). De laatste overeenkomst heeft niet betrekking op wat modellen ter verklaring van stemgedrag zeggen, maar wat ze niet zeggen. Wat vooral ontbreekt is een visie op de beslismechanismen die aan het werk zijn.

HOOFDSTUK 3: ATTITUDE-GEDRAGMODELLEN EN STEMGEDRAG

Attitudes worden al lang beschouwd als één van de belangrijkste concepten in de sociale psychologie. De twee belangrijkste redenen daarvoor zijn dat attitudes percepties beïnvloeden en gedrag sturen. Daarom kan bij het bestuderen van stemgedrag vanuit een psychologisch perspectief het attitudeconcept van belang worden geacht.

De vraag hoe een attitude kan worden gedefinieerd is niet eenvoudig te beantwoorden. Ondanks vele decennia van onderzoek naar attitudes – of misschien wel juist daardoor – is er geen overeenstemming over een conceptuele definitie. Toen het concept werd geïntroduceerd, werden attitudes vooral gezien als "ten opzichte van iets", en niet als "een toestand van iemand". Latere definities verschillen van de oorspronkelijke opvatting en attitudes werden beschouwd als de neiging van individuen om op een bepaalde manier te reageren. Milton Rosenberg en Carl Hovland (1960) leverden een invloedrijke bijdrage door in te gaan op het soort reacties dat attitudes oproepen. Zij stelden dat attitudes niet direct kunnen worden waargenomen en gemeten, maar alleen de reacties die ze oproepen. Deze reacties, zo stelden zij, vallen in drie categorieën uiteen: een cognitieve, een affectieve, en een gedragscomponent. Zij concludeerden dat voor de meeste onderzoekers de affectieve component centraal staat. Sindsdien hebben verschillende toonaangevende onderzoekers dezelfde conclusie getrokken, namelijk dat affect centraal is. De term evaluatie wordt daarbij vaak als synoniem gebruikt. De definitie van Alice Eagly en Shelly Chaiken (1993: 1), die tegenwoordig vaak wordt gehanteerd, omschrijft een attitude als "een psychologische neiging die wordt uitgedrukt door een bepaalde entiteit in zekere mate gunstig of ongunstig te evalueren". Evaluaties die gunstig of ongunstig zijn is het centrale element geworden in de definitie van een attitude.

Gedrag kan worden verklaard op grond van attitudes ten aanzien van objecten waar het gedrag betrekking op heeft. De algemene bevinding is dat als een attitude ten aanzien van een object meer positief is, gedrag ten gunste van dat object meer waarschijnlijk is. Veel onderzoek naar de relatie tussen attitudes en gedrag is gedaan binnen het kader van bepaalde attitude-gedragmodellen. De "theorie van beredeneerd gedrag" (*Theory of Reasoned Action*) van Martin Fishbein en Icek Ajzen (1975) wordt in het algemeen beschouwd als het belangrijkste model. In de kern stelt deze theorie dat individuen hun besluit om bepaald gedrag te vertonen baseren op hun inschatting van de gevolgen van het vertonen van het gedrag. In de theorie van beredeneerd gedrag hebben attitudes betrekking op het vertonen van bepaald gedrag (ten aanzien van een object). Russell Fazio (1986) benadrukte in zijn model dat gedrag vaak niet het gevolg is van zulke bewuste afwegingen inzake de gevolgen van gedrag. In plaats daarvan worden veel soorten gedrag min of meer automatisch opgeroepen door positieve attitudes ten aanzien van het object van het gedrag. Alice Eagly en Shelly Chaiken (1993) benadrukten dat deze twee modellen elkaar niet uitsluiten. Hun eigen model suggereert, wanneer toegepast in de electorale context, dat kiezers op een bepaalde partij kunnen stemmen simpelweg omdat ze die partij graag mogen, maar ook omdat ze uit gewoonte op die partij stemmen, omdat ze zich identificeren met stemmen op die partij, omdat ze menen dat dit van ze wordt verwacht (of zich daartoe verplicht voelen), of omdat ze de gevolgen van stemmen op die partij positief evalueren.

Attitude-gedragonderzoek naar stemgedrag leidt tot een aantal conclusies. De belangrijkste is dat men met attitudes ten aanzien van partijen en kandidaten een eind komt als het gaat om het verklaren van stemgedrag. Hoe mensen stemmen blijkt sterk te worden bepaald door de mate waarin men de deelnemende partijen of kandidaten positief of negatief evalueert. Een tweede reeks samenhangende conclusies heeft betrekking op het onderzoeksontwerp en de statistische methode om de invloed van attitudes te analyseren. Als gedrag betrekking heeft op een keuze uit een reeks alternatieven, zoals bij stemmen, dan is het van belang om niet naar de afzonderlijke attitudes te kijken, maar naar hun onderlinge samenhang. De centrale hypothese is dat kiezers stemmen op de partij (of kandidaat) ten aanzien waarvan hun attitude het meest gunstig is. Het betreffende attitude-object kan de voorkeur genoemd worden. Een andere conclusie is dat er een verschil is tussen de vraag of kiezers een voorkeur hebben voor een bepaalde partij en of zij van plan zijn er op te stemmen. Attitudes ten aanzien van partijen en kandidaten kunnen dus betekenisvol worden onderscheiden van stemintenties, die een schakel vormen bij de invloed van attitudes op stemgedrag. Een laatste conclusie is dat stemgedrag, evenals ander gedrag, het gevolg kan zijn van verschillende psychologische processen. Kiezers kunnen afgaan op hun attitudes ten aanzien van de deelnemende partijen en kandidaten en stemmen op de meest gunstig geëvalueerde, maar kiezers kunnen ook afwegen wat de gevolgen zijn van hun gedrag, bijvoorbeeld in termen van de uitkomst van de verkiezingen. Andere manieren waarop kiezers een keuze kunnen maken zijn door terug te vallen op een gewoonte of het advies van anderen te volgen.

DEEL II – EEN SYNTHESE VAN PSYCHOLOGIE EN VERKIEZINGSONDERZOEK

Hoofdstuk 4: Het standaardstem-model

De vraag waarom mensen stemmen zoals ze dat doen wordt in dit hoofdstuk beantwoord door het standaardstem-model (*sincere vote model*) te presenteren. De introductie van het begrip van een "standaardstem" wordt doorgaans toegeschreven aan Robin Farquharson. In *Theory of Voting* (1969) poogde hij om een lacune in de literatuur van de sociale-keuzetheorie op te vullen, namelijk het ontbreken van aandacht voor strategieën die kiezers kunnen hanteren om een door hen gewenste uitkomst te bewerkstelligen. Om zulke strategieën te kunnen analyseren gebruikte hij het idee van "*sincere voting*" als uitgangspunt of standaard. Dit zou men letterlijk kunnen vertalen als "oprecht stemmen", maar wat vrijer vertaald zou men kunnen spreken van het uitbrengen van een "standaardstem". Farquharson merkte op dat "de eenvoudigste assumptie die men kan maken over het gedrag van kiezers is dat

hun stemgedrag in overeenstemming is met hun voorkeursrangorde" (p. 17). Zulk gedrag betitelde hij als "oprecht stemmen". In sommige gevallen is zulk gedrag niet voordelig voor een kiezer, omdat een andere stem zou resulteren in een meer wenselijke uitkomst (meer wenselijk vanuit het perspectief van de kiezer). Kiezers kunnen dan als strategie hanteren om op een andere manier te stemmen dan standaard. Dit staat bekend als strategisch stemmen. Deze studie stelt voor om een standaardstem niet te definiëren in termen van voorkeuren ten aanzien van de uitkomst van een verkiezingsproces (als alternatieve zetelverdelingen, zoals Farquharson deed), maar in termen van voorkeuren ten aanzien van de deelnemende partijen. Een stem wordt gekwalificeerd als standaardstem als deze wordt uitgebracht ten gunste van de partij waar de voorkeur van een kiezer naar uit gaat, dat wil zeggen een partij die positiever wordt geëvalueerd dan welke andere partij dan ook.

Het standaardstem-model is gericht op het verklaren waarom bij een bepaalde verkiezing individuen stemmen op (een kandidaat van) een bepaalde partij. Volgens het model is het belangrijkste concept om stemgedrag te verklaren dat van attitudes ten aanzien van partijen. Op welke partij mensen stemmen hangt af van hoezeer zij de individuele deelnemende partijen wel of niet mogen. In overeenstemming met het idee dat evaluatie een centraal aspect is van attitudes, kunnen we in plaats van "attitudes ten aanzien van partijen" ook spreken van "partijevaluaties". Om aan te geven hoe partijevaluaties stemgedrag bepalen bevat het model aanvullend twee andere concepten: partijvoorkeur en stemintentie. Wat van belang is, is niet hoezeer men een bepaalde partij wel of niet mag, maar of men deze meer mag dan de andere partijen. Partijevaluaties moeten dus worden bekeken in termen van hoe zij in hun onderlinge samenhang partijvoorkeuren vormen. De partijvoorkeur bestaat uit die partij (of partijen) die een kiezer het meest positief evalueert. Als kiezers met een verkiezing worden geconfronteerd, vormen zij een stemintentie in overeenstemming met hun partijvoorkeur. Stemintenties behelzen het plan om te gaan stemmen op (een kandidaat van) een bepaalde partij bij een bepaalde aanstaande verkiezing. Op welk moment kiezers besluiten op wie ze gaan stemmen, en zo dus een stemintentie vormen, kan van persoon tot persoon verschillen. Het model veronderstelt dat als kiezers in het stemhokje staan, het enige wat zij doen is hun bestaande stemintentie omzetten in stemgedrag. Alles tezamen betekent dit dat kiezers zullen stemmen op de partij die zij het meest positief evalueren. Hiernaar kan worden verwezen als "de standaardstem-hypothese" (*sincere vote hypothesis*). Variabelen die niet in het model zijn opgenomen (exogene variabelen) worden verondersteld stemgedrag primair te beïnvloeden door hun invloed op partijevaluaties. Vanzelfsprekend rijst de vraag waarom kiezers partijen in bepaalde mate gunstig of ongunstig evalueren. Deze vraag wordt behandeld in hoofdstuk 6. In het standaardstem-model worden partijevaluaties als gegeven beschouwd.

Enkele aanvullende opmerkingen over de concepten uit het model en hun onderlinge relaties zijn op hun plaats. Om te beginnen kan met betrekking tot partijvoorkeur onderscheid gemaakt worden tussen een enkelvoudige partijvoorkeur en een meervoudige partijvoorkeur. Als kiezers één partij positiever evalueren dan alle andere, dan spreken we van een enkelvoudige partijvoorkeur. Kiezers kunnen ook meer dan één partij het meest positief evalueren; in dat geval spreken we van een meervoudige partijvoorkeur. Ten tweede kan met betrekking tot partijvoorkeur onderscheid gemaakt worden tussen richting en sterkte. Welke partij men de voorkeur geeft kan de richting van de partijvoorkeur worden genoemd. Hoezeer deze partij positiever wordt geëvalueerd dan welke andere partij dan ook kan de sterkte van de partijvoorkeur worden genoemd. Ten derde kunnen partijevaluaties, partijvoorkeuren, en stemintenties veranderen als de tijd vordert. Daardoor is het mogelijk dat wanneer stemintenties enige tijd voor de verkiezingen worden gemeten, er een discrepantie bestaat tussen stemintentie en stemgedrag. Een laatste kwestie betreft het concept van een standaardstem. Een stem wordt een standaardstem genoemd als deze uitgebracht wordt op de partij die een kiezer het meest positief evalueert, ofwel wanneer partijvoorkeur en stemgedrag met elkaar in overeenstemming zijn. Omdat kiezers andere redenen kunnen hebben om op een partij te stemmen die niet hun partijvoorkeur is dan strategische, wordt voor het tegenovergestelde van een standaardstem de term niet-standaardstem gehanteerd.

Hoofdstuk 5: Beslisregels voor het stemmen

Volgens het standaardstem-model kan de stemkeus van kiezers worden verklaard op basis van hun evaluaties van de deelnemende partijen. Maar stemmen behelst meer dan het vergelijken van partijevaluaties. Het doel van dit hoofdstuk is om daar meer licht op te werpen door te kijken naar verschillende beslisregels die kiezers kunnen hanteren. De gepresenteerde visie is gebaseerd op twee assumpties. Ten eerste wordt verondersteld dat kiezers niet alle voor- en nadelen van hun keuze afwegen, maar gebruikmaken van eenvoudige beslisregels (in het Engels *heuristics* genoemd). De tweede veronderstelling is dat er verschillende beslisregels zijn waar kiezers gebruik van kunnen maken (assumptie van causale heterogeniteit).

De essentie van menselijk gedrag is volgens veel auteurs dat het doelgericht is. Van kiezers kan dan verwacht worden dat ze de toekomst overdenken en hun keuze baseren op evaluaties van mogelijke verkiezingsuitkomsten. Zulke uitkomsten kunnen we toekomstscenario's of perspectieven noemen en de evaluaties ervan perspectief-evaluaties. Het overeenkomstige keuzemechanisme kan de beslisregel van de verkiezingsuitkomst-voorkeur worden genoemd. Dit kan betrekking hebben op de partijsamenstelling van de regering (coalitievoorkeur), wie minister-president wordt, de grootte van partijen, of het gevoerde beleid. Ten tweede kunnen kiezers hun stem baseren op hun oordeel over de prestaties van de zittende regering

(regeringsevaluaties). De overeenkomstige beslisregel is eenvoudig: als individuen tevreden zijn met de prestaties van de regering, dan stemmen ze op een regeringspartij; zijn ze ontevreden, dan stemmen ze op de oppositie. Dit keuzemechanisme kan de beslisregel van goedkeuring van de zittende macht worden genoemd. Ten derde kunnen kiezers hun stem bepalen op grond van evaluaties van de deelnemende partijen. Volgens de overeenkomstige beslisregel stemmen kiezers op de partij die ze het meest positief evalueren. Omdat in dit onderzoek die partij wordt aangeduid als de partijvoorkeur, kan dit de beslisregel van de partijvoorkeur worden genoemd. Bij sommige verkiezingen, zoals presidentsverkiezingen, draait het vooral om kandidaten. In dat geval kan verwacht worden dat kiezers afgaan op hun evaluaties van die kandidaten. Volgens de overeenkomstige beslisregel van de kandidaatvoorkeur stemmen kiezers op de kandidaat die ze het meest positief evalueren. Deze beslisregel kan overigens ook worden toegepast bij verkiezingen waarin partijen een centrale rol spelen. In plaats van bij elke verkiezing een afzonderlijke afweging te maken, kunnen kiezers ook de gewoonte ontwikkelen om steeds op (een kandidaat van) dezelfde partij te stemmen. Als zij worden geconfronteerd met een verkiezing, dan zetten deze kiezers hun gewoonte om in opnieuw eenzelfde stem. Dit keuzemechanisme kan de beslisregel van de stemgewoonte worden genoemd. Ten slotte kunnen kiezers hun stem baseren op steunbetuigingen voor een bepaalde partij of kandidaat door iemand anders – bepaalde personen, groepen, of organisaties. Als kiezers hun keuze daarop baseren, dan kunnen we spreken van de beslisregel van de steunbetuiging.

Hoe perspectief-evaluaties, regeringsevaluaties (goedkeuring van de zittende macht), partijvoorkeur, kandidaatvoorkeur, stemgewoonte, en waargenomen steunbetuigingen met elkaar verband houden, en hoe deze in één model kunnen worden samengevoegd, is aangegeven in het beslisregel-model van stemgedrag (*heuristic model of voting*). Het model stelt dat een stemintentie zijn oorsprong kan vinden in elk van de zes onderscheiden concepten. Dit past bij het principe van causale heterogeniteit. Aanvullend stelt het model dat regeringsevaluaties, partijevaluaties, en kandidaatevaluaties stemintenties indirect kunnen beïnvloeden, namelijk via hun invloed op perspectief-evaluaties. Er zijn verscheidene andere factoren die vaak gebruikt worden om stemgedrag te verklaren, zoals sociaal-demografische kenmerken, beleidsvoorkeuren, en ideologische posities. Volgens het model hebben deze factoren geen directe invloed op stemintenties. Daarom zijn ze niet opgenomen in het model en worden ze exogene variabelen genoemd. Dit betekent dat de invloed van zulke factoren op stemintenties verondersteld wordt te verlopen via de concepten uit het model.

Het beslisregel-model van stemgedrag staat op drie manieren in verband met het standaardstem-model. Ten eerste geeft het beslisregel-model aan dat partijevaluaties stemintenties kunnen beïnvloeden op zowel een directe manier (via het gebruik van de beslisregel van de partijvoorkeur) als een indirecte manier (via

hun invloed op perspectief-evaluaties en het gebruik van de beslisregel van de verkiezingsuitkomst-voorkeur). Ten tweede maakt het beslisregel-model duidelijk hoe kiezers met een meervoudige partijvoorkeur kunnen kiezen uit de partijen die zij even positief evalueren. Ten derde geeft het beslisregel-model aan dat het bij stemmen om meer gaat, en wat er meer is, dan het tot uitdrukking brengen van een partijvoorkeur.

HOOFDSTUK 6: DRIE MODELLEN OM PARTIJEVALUATIES TE VERKLAREN

Als stemgedrag sterk beïnvloed wordt door evaluaties van de deelnemende partijen, zoals de modellen uit de voorgaande hoofdstukken veronderstellen, dan is de vraag waarom kiezers partijen positief of negatief evalueren. Dit hoofdstuk bespreekt drie modellen die gebruikt kunnen worden om partijevaluaties te verklaren.

Eén manier om partijevaluaties te verklaren is een model te ontwikkelen op basis van het paradigma van verkiezingsonderzoek, dat werd besproken in hoofdstuk 2. Zo'n model wordt hier het traditionele model (*orthodox model*) genoemd. Het model is gericht op het verklaren van stemgedrag, maar kan ook worden gebruikt om partijevaluaties te verklaren; deze evaluaties zijn namelijk expliciet in het model opgenomen. Het te verklaren feit in dit model is het stemgedrag van een individu. In overeenstemming met de assumptie dat kiezers de partij steunen die zij het meest positief evalueren (assumptie van een standaardstem), wordt stemgedrag bepaald door algemene evaluaties van de partijen. Hiermee verschuift de vraag naar waarom kiezers partijen positief of negatief evalueren. Volgens het model is dit afhankelijk van zowel de gepercipieerde eigenschappen van de betreffende partij als de eigenschappen van de betreffende kiezer. Partij-eigenschappen worden niet alleen waargenomen door kiezers, maar ook geëvalueerd. Hoe kiezers partij-eigenschappen evalueren is afhankelijk van hun persoonlijke eigenschappen.

Milton Lodge en zijn collega's (1989) hebben een alternatieve visie geformuleerd in het indruk-gerichte model (*impression-driven model*) van kandidaat-evaluaties, ook wel bekend als het *on-line model*. Volgens dit model zullen kiezers telkens wanneer zijn informatie met betrekking tot een kandidaat tot zich nemen, een algemene evaluatie van die kandidaat bijstellen, een zogenaamde "*running tally*". De kerngedachte is dat de informatie op basis waarvan evaluaties worden bijgesteld goed kan worden vergeten, terwijl de invloed op de evaluatie blijft voortbestaan. Hierdoor hoeft de informatie met betrekking tot een kandidaat die kiezers in hun geheugen hebben opgeslagen niet in overeenstemming te zijn met de manier waarop de kandidaat wordt geëvalueerd. Ten aanzien van partijen kunnen we een alternatief model ter verklaring van stemgedrag formuleren door het *on-line model* te combineren met het idee dat kiezers stemmen op de partij die ze het meest positief evalueren. Het verschil met het traditionele model betreft wat geëvalueerd

wordt: percepties die in het geheugen liggen opgeslagen, of informatie die ooit verwerkt is maar niet langer opgeslagen hoeft te liggen in het geheugen.

Een derde model komt tegemoet aan verscheidene tekortkomingen van het traditionele model en het *on-line model* en houdt tegelijkertijd rekening met de rol die emoties spelen. Volgens dit model worden partijevaluaties gevormd en bijgesteld op basis van tijdelijke emotionele reacties die het gevolg zijn van het verwerken van informatie in het korte-termijn geheugen. Wanneer individuen informatie verwerken, dan zullen ze deze automatisch evalueren. Voor zover zulke tijdelijke emotionele reacties worden toegeschreven aan politieke partijen, kan dit leiden tot bijstelling van de evaluatie van de betreffende partij en zo een blijvende invloed hebben. Het model geeft aan dat informatie die leidt tot een emotionele reactie waargenomen informatie kan zijn (bijvoorbeeld door het lezen van een krant of praten met vrienden), maar ook informatie die wordt opgeroepen uit het lange-termijn geheugen. De laatste wordt ook automatisch geëvalueerd. Het model wordt het emotie-integratie model van partijevaluaties (*emotion-integration model of party evaluations*) genoemd, omdat partijevaluaties beschouwd worden als een gevolg van emoties die worden ervaren met betrekking tot partijen; deze emoties worden geïntegreerd in algemene evaluaties van de partijen.

DEEL III – EEN ANALYSE VAN VIER TWEEDE-KAMERVERKIEZINGEN

HOOFDSTUK 7: EMPIRISCHE TOETSING VAN HET STANDAARDSTEM-MODEL

In dit hoofdstuk wordt het standaardstem-model empirisch getoetst door het toe te passen op de Tweede-Kamerverkiezingen van 1986, 1994, 1998, en 2002 op grond van gegevens van het betreffende Nationaal Kiezersonderzoek (NKO). De kern van het NKO bestond uit twee interviews met een grote steekproef kiezers. De eerste serie interviews werd gehouden in de weken voorafgaand aan de verkiezingen, terwijl de tweede serie werd gehouden kort na de verkiezingen. Vragen met betrekking tot partijevaluaties en stemintenties werden in het eerste interview gesteld, vragen met betrekking tot stemgedrag in het tweede.

Om partijevaluaties te meten werd respondenten een kaart getoond met daarop een lijn met op gelijke afstand cijfers van 0 tot 100 (alle tientallen). Een score van 0 werd voorzien van het label "zeer onsympathiek", een score van 50 van het label "niet sympathiek, maar ook niet onsympathiek", en een score van 100 van het label "zeer sympathiek". In dit onderzoek zijn alle scores afgerond op tientallen. De metingen voor afzonderlijke partijen kunnen worden gecombineerd om zowel de richting als de sterkte van de partijvoorkeur te bepalen, alsmede om te bepalen of kiezers een enkelvoudige of meervoudige partijvoorkeur hadden. Het interview

bevatte ook vragen naar de stemintenties van respondenten. Om te beginnen werd gevraagd of men zou gaan stemmen bij de aanstaande Tweede-Kamerverkiezingen. Indien men bevestigend antwoordde, werd vervolgens gevraagd op welke partij men zou gaan stemmen. Die laatste vraag wordt in dit onderzoek gehanteerd als maat voor stemintentie. Hoe kiezers daadwerkelijk stemden, het stemgedrag, werd bepaald door kiezers hiernaar te vragen in het interview na de verkiezingen.

Het standaardstem-model doet voorspellingen over twee relaties: van kiezers wordt verwacht dat ze een stemintentie vormen ten gunste van de partij die ze het meest positief evalueren, en dat ze stemmen conform hun stemintentie. Dientengevolge wordt van kiezers ook verwacht dat ze stemmen op de partij die ze het meest positief evalueren. Van de kiezers met een enkelvoudige partijvoorkeur was 85 tot 92 procent van plan te stemmen op de meest positief geëvalueerde partij. Van de kiezers met en meervoudige partijvoorkeur waren de percentages ongeveer hetzelfde (rond 90 procent). Verder bracht bij elke verkiezing ongeveer 85 procent van de kiezers zijn stem uit op de partij waarop men van plan was te stemmen toen men voor de verkiezingen werd ondervraagd, terwijl ongeveer 15 procent uiteindelijk op een andere partij stemde. Van kiezers die nog niet wisten op mie men zou gaan stemmen toen men voor de verkiezingen werd ondervraagd (zwevende kiezers), kan worden verwacht dat zij uiteindelijk stemden in overeenstemming met hun partijvoorkeur. Het aantal zwevende kiezers dat zich gedroeg zoals verwacht was echter tamelijk laag vergelijken met de cijfers ten aanzien van de kiezers die al een beslissing hadden genomen: tot 46 procent van de zwevende kiezers stemde niet-standaard.

Hoe sterk is de steun voor het standaardstem-model als het gaat om het verklaren van stemgedrag, direct op basis van partijvoorkeur, voor het electoraat als geheel? Bij elke verkiezing stemde een ruime meerderheid op de partij die men het meest positief evalueerde. Dit percentage nam echter af van 85 procent tot 72 procent. Bovendien, terwijl in 1986 het stemgedrag van 68 procent van de kiezers correct kon worden voorspeld op basis van de toegekende sympathiescores, nam dit percentage af tot 46 procent in 2002. De overige kiezers brachten ofwel een standaardstem uit maar hadden een meervoudige partijvoorkeur, waardoor hun keuze niet kon worden voorspeld, ofwel ze stemden niet-standaard. Meest opvallend is de toename van het aantal kiezers dat niet-standaard stemde: van 15 procent in 1986 tot 26 procent in 2002. Daarnaast nam het percentage kiezers met een meervoudige partijvoorkeur in deze periode toe van 20 procent tot 36 procent. Kortom, alhoewel de steun voor de standaardstem-hypothese sterk is, is de kracht van die steun door de jaren heen wel afgenomen.

Aanvullende analyses laten zien dat kiezers met een sterke partijvoorkeur minder geneigd waren om niet-standaard stemintenties te vormen dan kiezers met gemiddeld sterke stemvoorkeuren, die daar op hun beurt weer minder toe geneigd waren dan kiezers met een zwakke partijvoorkeur. Kiezers met een meervoudige

partijvoorkeur namen een middenpositie in. Ten aanzien van de relatie tussen stemintentie en stemgedrag laten de analyses zien dat kiezers met een sterke partijvoorkeur het sterkst geneigd waren om aan hun stemintentie vast te houden, gevolgd door kiezers met een gemiddeld sterke, die met een zwakke, en die met een meervoudige stemvoorkeur. De rol van de sterkte van de partijvoorkeur is daarmee zoals verwacht. De toename van het aantal kiezers met een niet-standaard stemintentie blijkt overigens niet slechts het gevolg van veranderingen in de sterkte van partijvoorkeuren (de gemiddelde sterkte van de partijvoorkeur nam gedurende de onderzochte periode aanzienlijk af). In alle vier categorieën kwamen niet-standaard stemintenties door de jaren heen wat vaker voor.

HOOFDSTUK 8: DE NIET-STANDAARDSTEM

De centrale vraag in dit hoofdstuk is waarom kiezers er de voorkeur aan geven om op een andere partij te stemmen dan de partij die ze het meest positief evalueren. In dit verband zijn de beslisregels voor het stemmen die in hoofdstuk 5 zijn besproken bijzonder bruikbaar. Met uitzondering van de beslisregel van de steunbetuiging, kunnen al deze beslisregels worden onderzocht op basis van vragen die waren opgenomen in de enquêtes waarop dit onderzoek is gebaseerd. De resultaten van de analyses laten zien dat als kiezers van plan waren te stemmen op een partij die ze niet het meest positief evalueerden, zij vaak de voorkeur gaven aan een regering met deze partij, tevreden waren over hoe de regering waarin deze partij had deelgenomen het had gedaan, de lijsttrekker van de partij sympathiek vonden, of ook al bij de vorige kamerverkiezingen op de partij hadden gestemd.

Het relatieve belang van elke beslisregel, alsmede de mate waarin zij gezamenlijk niet-standaard stemintenties kunnen verklaren, is onderzocht met behulp van logistische regressie-analyse. Elk jaar was de coalitievoorkeur significant van invloed: als de coalitievoorkeur van kiezers niet de partijvoorkeur bevatte, dan was de kans op een niet-standaard stemintentie aanzienlijk groter. Het effect was het sterkst in 1986 en 2002. Tevredenheid met het regeringsbeleid in de afgelopen jaren was niet significant van invloed: zodra met de andere factoren rekening werd gehouden, konden niet-standaard stemintenties niet beter worden verklaard door tevredenheid met het regeringsbeleid in de modellen op te nemen. Evaluaties van lijsttrekkers waren in drie van de vier jaren van invloed op niet-standaard stemintenties (het uitblijven van een effect in 1986 kan een methodologisch artefact zijn, omdat verschillende lijsttrekkers niet in de enquête waren opgenomen). In het algemeen was de invloed van evaluaties van de lijsttrekkers wat zwakker dan van de coalitievoorkeur. De stemkeus bij de vorige kamerverkiezingen was ook van invloed. Bij elke verkiezing waren kiezers die bij de vorige verkiezingen gestemd hadden op hun huidige partijvoorkeur minder sterk geneigd om een niet-standaard stemintentie te vormen; kiezers die de vorige keer op een andere partij hadden

gestemd, hadden wat vaker een niet-standaard stemintentie. De analyses geven aan dat de vorige stemvoorkeur een grotere bijdrage leverde aan de verklarende kracht van het model dan welke andere factor dan ook. Maar ten aanzien van dit feit is een waarschuwing op zijn plaats: het geheugen van kiezers kan vertekend zijn, waardoor de invloed van vroeger stemgedrag wordt overschat. Een laatste constatering is dat de sterkte van de partijvoorkeur de verwachte rol speelde. Als de partijvoorkeur sterker werd, nam de kans op een niet-standaard stemintentie af.

Een tweede vraag waarop in dit hoofdstuk is ingegaan, betreft hoe kiezers met een meervoudige stemvoorkeur een keuze maken uit de betreffende partijen. Misschien doen ze dat op basis van hun coalitievoorkeur, tevredenheid met het gevoerde regeringsbeleid, voorkeur voor een lijsttrekker, of stemgewoonte. Om te beginnen is onderzocht of het voor kiezers in principe mogelijk was om de knoop door te hakken op basis van de betreffende beslisregel. De coalitievoorkeur bood vaak geen oplossing, omdat kiezers een coalitie wilden waarin twee of meer partijen van hun partijvoorkeur zitting zouden nemen. Tevredenheid met het gevoerde regeringsbeleid bood meestal ook geen soelaas, ofwel omdat kiezers noch tevreden noch ontevreden waren over het regeringsbeleid, ofwel omdat er twee of meer regerings- dan wel oppositiepartijen in hun partijvoorkeur waren opgenomen. De beslisregel van de kandidaatvoorkeur en de beslisregel van de stemgewoonte daarentegen boden beide een meerderheid van de kiezers de mogelijkheid om bij een meervoudige partijvoorkeur de knoop door te hakken. De volgende vraag is of in die situaties waarin een beslisregel gebruikt kon worden, kiezers ook daadwerkelijk een stemintentie vormden zoals op basis van die beslisregel verwacht zou worden. Met betrekking tot twee beslisregels zijn de betreffende percentages maar liefst 80 procent: de beslisregel van de coalitievoorkeur en de beslisregel van de stemgewoonte. Alhoewel de steun voor het idee dat de beslisregel van de goedkeuring van de zittende macht en de beslisregel van de kandidaatvoorkeur minder sterk is, was de stemintentie van de kiezers die deze beslisregels zouden kunnen gebruiken in meerderheid zoals op basis daarvan verwacht zou worden. Dat impliceert dat sommige kiezers deze beslisregels gebruikt kunnen hebben om hun uiteindelijke keuze te maken.

Hoofdstuk 9: Het verklaren van partijevaluaties: een traditionele benadering

Bij elk van de onderzochte verkiezingen was het stemgedrag van de meeste kiezers in overeenstemming met hun partijevaluaties. Als partijevaluaties stemgedrag zo sterk beïnvloeden, dan rijst de vraag waarom kiezers partijen in een bepaalde mate gunstig of ongunstig evalueren. De ideeën die in hoofdstuk 6 uiteengezet zijn kunnen helaas niet worden getoetst op basis van de enquêtes waarop dit onderzoek is gebaseerd. Dat betekent echter niet dat partijevaluaties helemaal niet verklaard

kunnen worden. Het minste wat gedaan kan worden, is pogen partijevaluaties te verklaren op basis van factoren die traditioneel gebruikt zijn om stemgedrag te verklaren en die wel in de interviews aan de orde zijn gesteld: sociaal-demografische kenmerken, beleidsvoorkeuren, ideologische posities, tevredenheid met het regeringsbeleid, en evaluaties van de lijsttrekkers.

De religieuze identiteit van kiezers was sterk van invloed op evaluaties van het CDA en, vooral bij kiezers met een sterke protestantse identiteit, op evaluaties van de kleine christelijke partijen: SGP, GPV, RPF en ChristenUnie. Evaluaties van D66, GroenLinks, en SP werden af en toe ook beïnvloed door de religieuze identiteit van kiezers, terwijl evaluaties van de PvdA, VVD en LPF hierdoor nauwelijks werden beïnvloed. De invloed van identiteit in termen van sociale klasse was bij alle partijen beperkt. Het effect van beleidsvoorkeuren verschilde van partij tot partij. Met betrekking tot de PvdA en VVD waren de vraagstukken van inkomensverschillen vooral van belang, terwijl het effect van het asielzoekersvraagstuk bijna net zo sterk was. Evaluaties van het CDA en D66 werden niet sterk beïnvloed door opvattingen ten aanzien van issues, maar bij verschillende issues trad wel een zwak effect op. Evaluaties van GroenLinks en SP werden tamelijk sterk beïnvloed door verschillende issues, met name die van asielzoekers en inkomensverschillen. Met betrekking tot de kleine christelijke partijen deed het euthanasievraagstuk er sterk toe, en bij de LPF het vraagstuk van asielzoekers. Het effect van standpunten ten aanzien hiervan op evaluaties van de LPF was sterker dan welk ander effect van issues dan ook. De enige factor die ongeveer even sterk van invloed was bij alle partijen, was ideologische afstand in termen van links en rechts. In het algemeen werden partijevaluaties tamelijk sterk beïnvloed door de gepercipieerde ideologische afstand. Het effect van tevredenheid met regeringsbeleid liet een specifiek patroon zien: bij regeringspartijen hadden tevredenheid en ontevredenheid een tamelijk sterke invloed, terwijl evaluaties van oppositiepartijen niet sterk beïnvloed werden (met uitzondering van de PvdA in 1986). Bij elke verkiezing had het sterkste effect betrekking op de partij van de minister-president.

Evenals de sterkte van de effecten van de verschillende factoren, wisselde ook de verklarende kracht van het multivariate model waarin de genoemde factoren worden gecombineerd. Evaluaties van PvdA, VVD en CDA konden in 1986 goed worden verklaard (verklaarde variantie was ongeveer 50 procent), terwijl in daaropvolgende jaren het model minder verklarende kracht had (verklaarde variantie varieerde tussen 20 en 35 procent). De cijfers ten aanzien van de andere partijen wijken daar niet sterk van af, behalve dat evaluaties van D66 slecht konden worden verklaard in de jaren dat de partij in de oppositie zat (verklaarde variantie was 13 procent).

De verklarende kracht van het model waarin de genoemde factoren worden gecombineerd kan als referentiepunt worden gebruikt om het mogelijke belang van lijsttrekkers te analyseren. Als evaluaties van lijsttrekkers aan het model worden

toegevoegd, neemt de verklarende kracht aanzienlijk toe. De mate waarin dit het geval was varieerde van 15 procent met betrekking tot D66 in 1998 tot 46 procent met betrekking tot de LPF in 2002. De verleiding is groot om te concluderen dat evaluaties van lijsttrekkers dus de belangrijkste verklarende factor zijn als het gaat om evaluaties van politieke partijen. Opnieuw moet echter een waarschuwing worden afgegeven: de gevonden effecten kunnen het gevolg zijn van een invloed in omgekeerde richting, namelijk invloed van partijevaluaties op evaluaties van lijsttrekkers. Met name één resultaat doet vermoeden dat de invloed van lijsttrekkers wordt overschat in de gepresenteerde analyses. Volgens de uitkomsten zijn evaluaties van lijsttrekkers ook sterk van invloed op evaluaties van de kleine Christelijke partijen, terwijl evaluaties van die partijen zeer sterk met elkaar samenhangen, wat suggereert dat ze eenzelfde basis moeten hebben. Op grond van de beschikbare gegevens is het niet mogelijk om goed in te schatten hoe belangrijk evaluaties van lijsttrekkers daadwerkelijk zijn.

DEEL IV – CONCLUSIES

HOOFDSTUK 10: EEN PSYCHOLOGISCHE THEORIE TER VERKLARING VAN STEMGEDRAG

Het beeld dat uit dit onderzoek naar voren komt is dat van stemgedrag als het resultaat van een twee-fasen proces. In de eerste fase verwerken kiezers informatie en dit leidt tot de vorming en bijstelling van beelden van de regering, partijen, en kandidaten; kiezers vormen ook een beeld van waar het bij aanstaande verkiezingen om draait en wie steun betuigt aan een bepaalde partij of kandidaat. Daarnaast worden in deze fase evaluaties gevormd en bijgesteld met betrekking tot de regering, partijen, kandidaten, en mogelijke verkiezingsuitkomsten (perspectieven). In de tweede fase besluiten kiezers op wie zij gaan stemmen op grond van hun partijevaluaties, kandidaatevaluaties, regeringsevaluaties, perspectief-evaluaties, waargenomen steunbetuigingen, en stemgewoonte. Ze doen dit op basis van eenvoudige beslisregels. Concepten die traditioneel gebruikt worden om stemgedrag te verklaren, zoals sociaal-demografische kenmerken, ideologische posities, of beleidsvoorkeuren, hebben invloed op de stemkeus als ze invloed hebben op de concepten die in het twee-fasen model zijn opgenomen.

De uitkomsten van de analyses die aan het twee-fasen model ten grondslag liggen staan op gespannen voet met de assumpties die samen het paradigma van verkiezingsonderzoek vormen. Ten eerste is de assumptie van een standaardstem, die stelt dat alle kiezers stemmen op de partij die ze het meest positief evalueren, uitvoerig onderzocht door het standaardstem-model te toetsen. De resultaten laten zien dat deze assumptie onjuist is. Een flink aantal kiezers gaf er de voorkeur aan te

stemmen op een andere partij dan die zij het meest positief evalueerden. Ten tweede is de juistheid van de assumptie van causale homogeniteit, die stelt dat alle kiezers op dezelfde wijze hun keuze bepalen, in twijfel getrokken. De stelling is geponeerd dat kiezers op basis van verschillende eenvoudige beslisregels hun stem kunnen bepalen. De analyses laten zien dat niet alle stemkeuzes kunnen worden begrepen vanuit het perspectief van één beslisregel, niet eens dat van de beslisregel die ten grondslag ligt aan vrijwel alle modellen ter verklaring van stemgedrag (beslisregel van de partijvoorkeur). Echter, vrijwel alle stemkeuzes kunnen worden begrepen vanuit het perspectief van ten minste één beslisregel. Ten derde is de juistheid van de assumptie van homogeniteit in de basis voor evaluatie in twijfel getrokken. Ten aanzien van politieke partijen wordt doorgaans verondersteld dat kiezers verschillende partijen wel of niet mogen om dezelfde redenen. De analyses laten zien dat de mate waarin de sociale identiteit, beleidsvoorkeuren, gepercipieerde ideologische afstand, en tevredenheid met het regeringsbeleid van invloed is op partijevaluaties verschilt per partij. In tegenstelling tot wat modellen ter verklaring van stemgedrag veelal veronderstellen, is voor verschillende partijen de basis voor evaluatie niet dezelfde.

Eén van de belangrijkste implicaties van dit onderzoek betreft misschien wel de conceptualisering van gevoelens van kiezers ten aanzien van politieke partijen. De onderzoekers uit Michigan zagen deze aanvankelijk als één van de factoren die direct van invloed zijn op de stemkeus, maar in *The American Voter* (1960) stelden ze dat gevoelens ten aanzien van partijen als een indirecte verklarende factor moest worden beschouwd. Ze conceptualiseerden deze gevoelens in termen van identificatie. In Europees verkiezingsonderzoek zijn gevoelens van kiezers ten aanzien van partijen traditioneel op dezelfde manier behandeld. Volgens de visie die in dit onderzoek is gepresenteerd, dienen gevoelens ten aanzien van partijen beschouwd te worden als factoren die direct van invloed zijn op de stemkeus. Bovendien wordt in dit onderzoek voorgesteld die gevoelens te conceptualiseren in termen van evaluaties. De gepresenteerde analyses laten zien dat als gevoelens ten aanzien van partijen op de voorgestelde manier wordt geanalyseerd, diverse problemen die verbonden zijn aan het concept van partij-identificatie vermeden kunnen worden. Het probleem dat Thomassen (1976) identificeerde, namelijk dat partij-identificatie en stemkeus niet zinvol onderscheiden kunnen worden, is niet van toepassing op partijevaluaties. Bovendien is het probleem van meervoudige identificatie, waar Van der Eijk and Niemöller (1983) op wezen, niet van toepassing op het concept of de metingen van partijvoorkeur. Een andere vraag is of gevoelens ten aanzien van partijen in een model ter verklaring van stemgedrag opgenomen moeten worden. De bevinding dat het concept van partij-identificatie niet kon worden toegepast in Nederland, heeft verscheidene onderzoekers doen concluderen dat we ons moeten richten op identificatie in termen van sociale groepen of ideologie. Het valt te betwijfelen of dat de beste strategie is. Politieke partijen zijn

zulke centrale objecten in het electorale proces, dat gevoelens van kiezers ten aanzien van die partijen niet kunnen worden genegeerd als men hun stemgedrag wil begrijpen. De enige vraag is hoe de invloed van zulke gevoelens op stemgedrag moet worden geanalyseerd. Deze studie heeft een antwoord gegeven op die vraag.

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CURRICULUM VITAE

Martin Rosema was born on 15 March 1970 in Hengelo, Overijssel, the Netherlands. He attended secondary school from 1982 to 1988 at *Jeanne d'Arc* in Maastricht and *Stad en Lande* in Huizen. From 1988 to 1990 he worked as assistant accountant at KPMG in Amersfoort and next did his military duty in Breda and Assen. In 1996 he received an M.A. degree in Political Science from the University of Leiden. In 1998 he received an M.Phil. degree in Social and Developmental Psychology from the University of Cambridge. From 1996 to 2000 he was affiliated as Ph.D. candidate to the University of Leiden. Since 2001 he has been affiliated as assistant professor of Political Science to the University of Twente. Martin Rosema lives in Amersfoort, together with Marthe Vlaskamp and their son Sam.

Stellingen

behorende bij het proefschrift *The Sincere Vote: A Psychological Study of Voting*
van Martin Rosema

1. De gangbare theorieën ter verklaring van stemgedrag bij verkiezingen
bieden slechts beperkt inzicht in de psychologische processen die aan dat
gedrag ten grondslag liggen.

2. In verkiezingsonderzoek dient conceptueel onderscheid gemaakt te
worden tussen partij-evaluaties, partijvoorkeur, stemvoorkeur/stemintentie,
en stemgedrag.

3. Kiezers kunnen voor het bepalen van hun stem gebruikmaken van
verschillende eenvoudige beslisregels.

4. In tegenstelling tot wat in verkiezingsonderzoek veelal wordt
verondersteld, vinden kiezers verschillende partijen niet in bepaalde mate
sympathiek of onsympathiek om dezelfde redenen.

5. Politieke partijen zouden hun leiders beter kunnen afrekenen op
partij-evaluaties (sympathie van kiezers voor de partij) dan op resultaten van
verkiezingen of traditionele opiniepeilingen.

6. Panelonderzoek (zoals het Nationaal Kiezersonderzoek) krijgt pas
meerwaarde als *dezelfde* vragen op verschillende momenten aan dezelfde
personen worden gesteld.

7. Voor longitudinaal onderzoek naar de mate van politieke interesse, is de
gebruikelijke vraag "bent u zeer, tamelijk, of niet geïnteresseerd in politiek?"
ongeschikt.

8. "Stemwijzers" miskennen een belangrijke functie van verkiezingen,
namelijk het laten afleggen van verantwoording over prestaties in een
afgelopen periode, doordat zij primair zijn gebaseerd op plannen voor een
toekomstige periode.

9. De democratie zou erbij zijn gebaat als actief stemrecht niet langer aan een
leeftijdsgrens wordt gebonden, maar als de uitoefening ervan tot een
bepaalde leeftijd wordt overgelaten aan ouders.

10. Voor politicologen die als zodanig aan een universiteit zijn verbonden,
leidt het vervullen van een functie binnen een politieke partij tot onwenselijke
partijdigheid, of op zijn minst de schijn daarvan.

11. Het toevoegen van stellingen aan een proefschrift wekt ten onrechte
de indruk dat het geven van antwoorden belangrijker is dan het stellen van
vragen.